
VOLUME 93 • NUMBER 4 • OCTOBER 1988

The American Historical Review

AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION



Mitchell Library
MULTNOMAH BIBLE COLLEGE
8435 N.E. Glisan
Portland, Oregon 97220

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

O X F O R D

The Founder
Cecil Rhodes and the Pursuit of Power
ROBERT I. ROTBERG, *Tufts University*. "This is a powerful read, thoroughly based in the archives and the Southern African landscape. A Rhodes Scholar's Rhodes—Rotberg shares with us as complex a view of the enigma as we are ever likely to attain."—Prosser Gifford, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 800 pp., $35.00.

Catherine the Great
Life and Legend
JOHN T. ALEXANDER, *University of Kansas*. Alexander examines Catherine's life in all its aspects: the brilliant strategies by which she won the acceptance of a national elite, her expansive foreign policy, her wide-ranging domestic reforms, and her infamous love life. 352 pp., $24.95.

Threshold of War
Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II
WALDO HEINRICHS, *Temple University*. "Among all of the many studies of American entry into World War II, *Threshold of War* stands out as one of the most thoughtful and meaningful. Heinrichs brilliantly demonstrates the interrelationship of policies toward both German and Japan against the background of world conflict."—Frank Friedel, Harvard University. 304 pp., $21.95.

Cuba
Between Reform and Revolution
LOUIS A. PEREZ, Jr., *University of South Florida*. Drawing on two decades of research, *Cuba* offers a sweeping history of this all-important island, ranging from the Ciboney Indians, who settled in Cuba around 1,000 B.C., to the *Cuba Libre* movement led by José Martí, to the tenure of Fidel Castro's government. 480 pp., $24.95.

Freedom Summer
DOUG McADAM, *University of Arizona*. "Freedom Summer was a sort of high-water mark of the 60's liberalism, but, as McAdam suggests, many of the lessons the volunteers learned fed the more radical elements of the later 60's....Illuminating."—*Kirkus Reviews*. 352 pp., $19.95

Presidential Debates
The Challenge of Creating an Informed Electorate
KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, *University of Texas*, and DAVID G. BIRDSELL, *Baruch College*. "With another season of presidential debates about to engulf us, Jamieson and Birdsell have performed a public service. Their insightful chronicle of past candidate confrontations will enable readers to tell who wins the 1988 round of debates without having to wait for the next morning's poll results."—Robert Shogan, National Political Correspondent, *Los Angeles Times*. 272 pp., $19.95

Secret and Sacred
The Diaries of James Henry Hammond, a Southern Slaveholder
Edited by CAROL BLESER, *Clemson University*. A remarkable set of diaries affording an intimate look at the vanished era of the antebellum Southern aristocracy. "Unique among all the historical works ever published about the Old South."—Louis Rubin, 352 pp., $22.95.

The Spanish Armada
The Experience of War in 1588
FELIPE FERNANDEZ-ARMESTO, *St. Antony's College, Oxford*. In this provocative revisionist account, the author re-examines the famous sea battle and challenges the familiar view of the Spanish "defeat." 300 pp., $24.95.

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue
New York, NY 10016

OXFORD • UNIVERSITY • PRESS

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VOLUME 93 • NUMBER 4 • OCTOBER 1988

The American Historical Review

AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
Founded in 1884. Chartered by Congress in 1889.

Elected Officers

President: AKIRA IRIYE, *University of Chicago*
President-elect: LOUIS R. HARLAN, *University of Maryland*
Vice-Presidents: PATRICIA ALBJERG GRAHAM, *Harvard University, Teaching Division*
RICHARD T. VANN, *Wesleyan University, Research Division*
JOHN J. TEPASKE, *Duke University, Professional Division*

Appointed Officers

Executive Director: SAMUEL R. GAMMON
AHR Editor: DAVID L. RANSEL, *Indiana University*
Controller: RANDY NORELL

Elected Council Members

NATALIE ZEMON DAVIS, *Princeton University*
Immediate past President

JOHN F. BENTON† — *California Institute of Technology*
ROBERT FORSTER — *Johns Hopkins University*
CAROL GLUCK — *Columbia University*
RICHARD H. KOHN — *Office of Air Force History*
LAWRENCE W. LEVINE — *University of California, Berkeley*
PEGGY K. LISS — *Washington, D.C.*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cover illustration: from Hartman Schedel's Latin history of the world (1493), the Last Judgment and resurrection of the dead. Photo courtesy of Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid. See the article in this issue by Sabine MacCormack, "*Pachacuti*: Miracles, Punishments, and Last Judgment: Visionary Past and Prophetic Future in Early Colonial Peru."

The *American Historical Review* appears in February, April, June, October, and December of each year. It is published by the American Historical Association, 400 A Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 (202-544-2422) and is printed and mailed by the William Byrd Press, 2901 Byrdhill Road, Richmond, Virginia 23228. The editorial offices are located at 914 Atwater, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405 (812-335-7609).

The *AHR* is sent to members of the American Historical Association and to institutions holding subscriptions. Membership dues: For incomes of $40,000 and above, $60.00 annually; $30,000–$39,999, $55.00; $20,000–$29,999, $47.00; $15,000–$19,999, $40.00; $10,000–$14,999, $30.00; below $10,000, students, and joint memberships $20.00; associate (nonhistorian) $30.00; life $1,000. The proportion of dues allocated to the *AHR* is $17.00. Subscription rates effective for volume 92: Class I, *American Historical Review* only, United States $43.00, foreign $47.00. Further information on membership, subscriptions, and the ordering of back issues is contained on the two pages—1(a) and 2(a)—immediately preceding the advertisements.

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPTS

Manuscripts should be sent to the Editor, *American Historical Review*, 914 Atwater, Bloomington, Indiana 47405. Texts, including quotations and footnotes, should be double-spaced with generous margins. Submissions sent from the North American continent should include four copies of the complete text (two copies if from abroad). Footnotes should be numbered consecutively throughout and should appear in a separate section at the end of the text. The editors prefer to work with manuscripts that are no more than 35 pages in length, not counting notes, tables, and charts. Especially helpful are submissions that are compatible with our IBM Personal Computer. These include word-processing programs on 5.25 inch diskettes supported by MS-DOS and, in particular, WordStar. To check if your disk is compatible, call our Assistant for Production at (812) 335-7609.

No manuscript will be considered for publication if it is concurrently under consideration by another journal or press or if it has been published or is soon to be published elsewhere. Both restrictions apply to the substance as well as to the exact wording of the manuscript. If the manuscript is accepted, at least one year must elapse between publication in the *Review* and republication of the essay, or any significant part thereof, in another work.

Other guidelines for the preparation of manuscripts for submission to and publication in the *AHR* will be sent upon request. Articles will be edited to conform to *AHR* style in matters of punctuation, capitalization, and the like. The editors may suggest other changes in the interest of clarity and economy of expression; such changes are not made without consultation with authors. The editors are the final arbiters of length, grammar, and usage.

Unsolicited book reviews are not accepted.

Postmaster: Please send notification (Form 3579) regarding undelivered journals to: American Historical Association, 400 A Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003. Publication identification number: *American Historical Review* (ISSN 0002-8762).

The *AHR* disclaims responsibility for statements, either of fact or opinion, made by contributors.

© AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 1988
All rights reserved
Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

VOLUME 93 • NUMBER 4 • OCTOBER 1988

The American Historical Review

AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

Editor: DAVID L. RANSEL

Associate Editor: ANN G. CARMICHAEL

Assistant Editors: PHILIP PAJAKOWSKI
ALLYN ROBERTS

Assistant to the Editors: VIRGINIA D. OLLIS

Assistant for Production: P. JEANNETTE BRUMFIELD

Editorial Assistants: WILLIAM V. BISHEL, JAMES M. BROPHY, STEPHEN COLE, JEANNE A. KERL, NICHOLAS J. MILLER, PHYLLIS SCHROCK

Clerical Assistant: RUTH WEENER

Advertising Manager: KATHY KOZIARA-HERBERT

Board of Editors

JOYCE O. APPLEBY
University of California

JOHN W. BALDWIN
Johns Hopkins University

ALLAN G. BOGUE
University of Wisconsin

JOHN H. COATSWORTH
University of Chicago

L. PERRY CURTIS, JR.
Brown University

THOMAS L. HASKELL
Rice University

LYNN HUNT
University of Pennsylvania

LINDA K. KERBER
University of Iowa

JAMES J. SHEEHAN
Stanford University

MARCIA WRIGHT
Columbia University

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In This Issue

The theme of this issue is economic and intellectual exchange in the Atlantic World, especially the connections between Latin America and Europe. One essay treats Africa's trade with Europe and the Americas.

We begin with a forum on the applicability of the world-system model of Immanuel Wallerstein to colonial Latin America. **Steve J. Stern** reviews the vast literature on "dependency" and modes of production as it developed in Latin America and the United States prior to and after Wallerstein's work. He then tests Wallerstein's model through an analysis of labor policy in two key industries: silver mining in Peru and plantation sugar production in the Caribbean. Stern concludes that the world-system model fails to account for the evolving labor policies in these two cases, and he offers a fresh conceptual approach to these issues that integrates some of the world-system elements with important empirical and theoretical contributions of Latin American intellectuals. In his response, **Immanuel Wallerstein** contends that the empirical data adduced by Stern do more to strengthen than to weaken the world-system interpretation. Stern has not shown, writes Wallerstein, that his conception has greater heuristic value than the view that the capitalist world economy functioned as a singular historical system since the sixteenth century.

Richard L. Garner contributes material for the continuing debate about the colonial development of Latin America by plotting the long-term trends in silver production in its two most important centers, Peru and Mexico. These compilations provide scholars with unusually long and detailed series on which to base assessments not only of the Latin American economy but also of impact of silver on the economies of the Atlantic World and Europe.

David Eltis and **Lawrence C. Jennings** look at another dimension of the same Atlantic World trading system in their analysis of the value, composition, and direction of west African commerce from the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries. They conclude that African trade kept pace with world trade only as long as the slave trade expanded, that the terms of trade ran in Africa's favor until 1870, that the composition of imports into Africa was much like that of other importing regions, and that Africa was largely self-sufficient before the late nineteenth century and so did not rely as heavily on imported goods as did other regions of the Atlantic commercial world.

Sabine MacCormack examines the reworking by the conquered peoples of the Andes of their concept of temporal or world reversal (*pachacuti*) in light of the Christian concept of the Last Judgment. In viewing as a *pachacuti* the execution by the Spaniards of the last Inca ruler and in assessing this and subsequent events in terms of the moral imperatives of the Last Judgment, the Andeans were able to distance themselves from the colonial government's claims to authority and legitimacy. The integration of Andean and Christian concepts also enabled the Andeans to formulate their own political expectations, including the triumphant return of the Inca in a future reversal of time.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Contents

VOLUME 93 • NUMBER 4 • OCTOBER 1988

AHR Forum

Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System
in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean
BY STEVE J. STERN 829

Comments on Stern's Critical Tests
BY IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN 873

Reply: "Ever More Solitary"
BY STEVE J. STERN 886

Articles

Long-Term Silver Mining Trends in Spanish America:
A Comparative Analysis of Peru and Mexico
BY RICHARD L. GARNER 898

Trade between Western Africa
and the Atlantic World in the Pre-Colonial Era
BY DAVID ELTIS and LAWRENCE C. JENNINGS 936

Pachacuti: Miracles, Punishments, and Last Judgment:
Visionary Past and Prophetic Future in Early Colonial Peru
BY SABINE MACCORMACK 960

Reviews of Books

GENERAL

HAYDEN WHITE. *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*. By Dominick Lacapra 1007

JOHN MICHAEL KROIS. *Cassirer: Symbolic Forms and History*. By Stephen Bailey 1008

GIOVANNI BUSINO. *La permanence du passé: Questions d'histoire de la sociologie et d'épistémologie sociologique*. By Mark Poster 1009

PETER STALLYBRASS and ALLON WHITE. *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression*. By Charles Tilly 1009

BERNARD YACK. *The Longing for Total Revolution: Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche*. By John Kirkland 1010

ANDREW LEVINE. *The End of the State*. By Walter L. Adamson 1011

EKKEHART KRIPPENDORFF. *Staat und Krieg: Die historische Logik politischer Unvernunft*. By Joachim Remak 1011

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HARVEY J. GRAFF. *The Legacies of Literacy: Continuities and Contradictions in Western Culture and Society.* By Charles M. Radding 1012

LEWIS FEUER. *Imperialism and the Anti-Imperialist Mind.* By Raymond F. Betts 1013

A. A. FURSENKO. *Neftianye voiny (konets XIX–nachalo XX v.)* [The Oil Wars of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries]. By John P. McKay 1013

CHRISTOPHER HALL. *Britain, America, and Arms Control, 1921–1937.* By Edward W. Bennett 1014

PAUL D. MAYLE. *Eureka Summit: Agreement in Principle and the Big Three in Tehran, 1943.* By James L. Gormly 1015

GEOFFREY TWEEDALE. *Sheffield Steel and America: A Century of Commercial and Technological Interdependence, 1830–1930.* By Charles K. Hyde 1015

IRMGARD STEINISCH. *Arbeitszeitverkürzung und sozialer Wandel: Der Kampf um die Achtstundenschicht in der deutschen und amerikanischen Eisen- und Stahlindustrie 1880–1929.* By Hermann-Josef Rupieper 1016

WILLIAM COLEMAN. *Yellow Fever in the North: The Methods of Early Epidemiology.* By John Duffy 1017

DANIEL M. FOX. *Health Policies, Health Politics: The British and American Experience, 1911–1965.* By John Harley Warner 1017

RICHARD SORABJI, editor. *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science.* By Edward Grant 1018

STEPHEN M. STIGLER. *The History of Statistics: The Measurement of Uncertainty before 1900.* By Harvey W. Becher 1019

MICHAEL J. CROWE. *The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, 1750–1900: The Idea of a Plurality of Worlds from Kant to Lowell.* By Seymour H. Mauskopf 1020

UWE GRANZOW. *Quadrant, Kompass und Chronometer: Technische Implikationen des euro-asiatischen Seehandels von 1500 bis 1800.* By G. L'E. Turner 1021

ALFRED W. CROSBY. *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900.* By Timothy H. Silver 1021

HENRY HOBHOUSE. *Seeds of Change: Five Plants That Transformed Mankind.* By Kenneth F. Kiple 1022

WALTER KENDRICK. *The Secret Museum: Pornography in Modern Culture.* By Vern L. Bullough 1023

MARGARET F. STIEG. *The Origin and Development of Historical Periodicals.* By Donald R. Kelley 1024

ALLEN GUTTMANN. *Sports Spectators.* By John M. Hoberman 1024

CELIA BERTIN. *Marie Bonaparte: A Life.* By Isabel F. Knight 1025

ANCIENT

MALCOLM DAVIES and JEYARANEY KATHIRITHAMBY. *Greek Insects.* By Thomas W. Africa 1026

ALAN WATSON. *Roman Slave Law.* By Bruce W. Frier 1026

EDGAR PACK. *Städte und Steuern in der Politik Julians: Untersuchungen zu den Quellen eines Kaiserbildes.* By C. Robert Phillips III 1027

MICHAEL MCCORMICK. *Eternal Victory: Triumphal Rulership in Late Antiquity, Byzantium, and the Early Medieval West.* By Raymond Van Dam 1028

MEDIEVAL

MICHEL MOLLAT. *The Poor in the Middle Ages: An Essay in Social History.* By Theodore Evergates 1029

WENDY DAVIES and PAUL FOURACRE, editors. *The Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval Europe.* By John B. Freed 1029

EKKEHART ROTTER. *Abendland und Sarazenen: Das okzidentale Araberbild und seine Entstehung im Frühmittelalter.* By James Waltz 1030

ROBERT CHAZAN. *European Jewry and the First Crusade.* By Jeremy Cohen 1031

G. MERLO, editor. *Esperienze religiose e opere assistenziali nei secoli XII e XIII.* By Steven Epstein 1032

ANNE BARSTOW. *Joan of Arc: Heretic, Mystic, Shaman.* By Sharon Farmer 1032

JUDITH M. BENNETT. *Women in the Medieval English Countryside: Gender and Household in Brigstock before the Plague.* By Jo Ann McNamara 1033

CONSTANCE HOFFMAN BERMAN. *Medieval Agriculture, the Southern French Countryside, and the Early Cistercians: A Study of Forty-three Monasteries.* By Richard C. Hoffmann 1034

MICHAEL JONES, editor. *Gentry and Lesser Nobility in Late Medieval Europe.* By David Nicholas 1034

MARIA ASENJO GONZALEZ. *Segovia: La ciudad y su tierra a fines del medievo.* By Teofilo F. Ruiz 1035

ELISABETH VESTERGAARD, editor. *Continuity and Change: Political Institutions and Literary Monuments in the Middle Ages; A Symposium.* By Jenny M. Jochens 1036

MICHAEL BORGOLTE, *et al.*, editors. *Subsidia Sangallensia I: Materialien und Untersuchungen zu den Verbrüderungsbüchern und zu den älteren Urkunden des Stiftsarchivs St. Gallen.* By E. Randolph Daniel 1036

MODERN EUROPE

BRIAN P. LEVACK. *The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe.* By Hans Sebald 1037

ANTONI MĄCZAK. *Rządzący i rządzeni: Władza i społeczeństwo w Europie wczesnonowożytnej* [The Rulers and the Ruled: Power and Society in Early Modern Europe]. By R. J. W. Evans 1038

A. LONDON FELL. *Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and the Legislative State.* Volume 3, *Bodin's Humanistic Legal System and Rejection of "Medieval Political Theology."* By Steven Rowan 1039

DOMINIQUE JULIA *et al.*, editors. *Histoire sociale des populations étudiantes.* Volume 1, *Bohême, Espagne, États italiens, Pay germaniques, Pologne, Provinces-Unies.* By Linda L. Clark 1039

STUART WOOLF. *The Poor in Western Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.* By Mary Gibson 1041

JACOB KATZ, editor. *Toward Modernity: The European Jewish Model.* By Michael Stanislawski 1042

PAUL M. BAUMGARTEN. *Die römische Kurie um 1900: Ausgewählte Aufsätze.* By Jonathan Sperber 1042

HELEN GRAHAM and PAUL PRESTON, editors. *The Popular Front in Europe.* By Irwin Wall 1043

DONATELLA BOLECH CECCHI. *Non bruciare i ponti con Roma: Le relazioni fra l'Italia, la Gran Bretagna e la Francia dall'accordo di Monaco allo scoppio della seconda guerra mondiale.* By Alan Cassels 1044

DAVID LOADES. *The Tudor Court.* By Michael B. Pulman 1045

JEROME FRIEDMAN. *Blasphemy, Immorality, and Anarchy: The Ranters and the English Revolution.* By Richard L. Greaves 1045

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JOSEPH M. LEVINE. *Humanism and History: Origins of Modern English Historiography*. By Barbara Shapiro 1046

J. C. D. CLARK. *Revolution and Rebellion: State and Society in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. By David Underdown 1047

GERALD NEWMAN. *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740–1830*. By Conrad L. Donakowski 1048

JOHN SAINSBURY. *Disaffected Patriots: London Supporters of Revolutionary America, 1769–1782*. By Alan Rogers 1049

JAMES WALVIN. *England, Slaves, and Freedom, 1776–1838*. By Mary Turner 1049

DONALD SULTANA. *The Journey of Sir Walter Scott to Malta*. By Mark A. Weinstein 1050

LEE HOLCOMBE. *Wives and Property: Reform of the Married Women's Property Law in Nineteenth-Century England*. By Sheila Lewenhak 1051

SUSAN KINGSLEY KENT. *Sex and Suffrage in Britain, 1860–1914*. By Deborah Gorham 1051

J. P. PARRY. *Democracy and Religion: Gladstone and the Liberal Party, 1867–1875*. By Walter L. Arnstein 1052

S. P. ROSENBAUM. *Victorian Bloomsbury: The Early Literary History of the Bloomsbury Group*. Volume 1. By David C. Smith 1053

RICHARD DORMENT. *Alfred Gilbert*. By Dianne Sachko Macleod 1054

STANLEY L. JAKI. *Chesterton, A Seer of Science*. By William McGucken 1055

ALEC CAIRNCROSS. *The Price of War: British Policy on German Reparations, 1941–1949*. By Henry R. Winkler 1055

PETER MEAD. *Orde Wingate and the Historians*. By Raymond Callahan 1056

PATRICIA W. ROMERO. *E. Sylvia Pankhurst: Portrait of a Radical*. By Roberta Hamilton 1056

ROBERT RHODES JAMES. *Anthony Eden*. By Stephen R. Ward 1057

JEAN DUNLOP. *The British Fisheries Society, 1786–1893*. By Ian Whyte 1058

I. G. C. HUTCHISON. *A Political History of Scotland, 1832–1924: Parties, Elections, and Issues*. By James D. Young 1059

JAMES HUNTER. *The Making of the Crofting Community*. By T. C. Smout 1060

JEAN BERENGER. *Turenne*. By Douglas Clark Baxter 1061

PRISCILLA PARKHURST CLARK. *Literary France: The Making of a Culture*. By James Smith Allen 1061

JAMES C. RILEY. *The Seven Years War and the Old Regime in France: The Economic and Financial Toll*. By Frank Spooner 1062

FLORIN AFTALION. *L'économie de la Révolution française*. By James C. Riley 1063

MICHAEL P. FITZSIMMONS. *The Parisian Order of Barristers and the French Revolution*. By Bailey Stone 1064

PHILIP MANSEL. *The Eagle in Splendour: Napoleon I and His Court*. By James K. Kieswetter 1064

JONATHAN BEECHER. *Charles Fourier: The Visionary and His World*. By W. Warren Wagar 1065

DAVID HIGGS. *Nobles in Nineteenth-Century France: The Practice of Inegalitarianism*. By Robert Forster 1066

PATRICK FRIDENSON and ANDRÉ STRAUS, editors. *Le capitalisme français XIX^e–XX^e siècle: Blocages et dynamismes d'une croissance*; FRANÇOIS BLOCH-LAINE and JEAN BOUVIER. *La France restaurée 1944–1954: Dialogue sur les choix d'une modernisation*. By Charles P. Kindleberger 1066

FRIEDRICH LENGER. *Zwischen Kleinbürgertum und Proletariat: Studien zur Sozialgeschichte der Düsseldorfer Handwerker 1816–1878*. By James J. Sheehan 1068

GUSTAV SEEBER, editor. *Gestalten der Bismarckzeit*. Volume 2. By Geoff Eley 1069

WILHELM HENNIS. *Max Webers Fragestellung: Studien zur Biographie des Werks*. By Guenther Roth 1069

MARKKU HYRKKÄNEN. *Sozialistische Kolonialpolitik: Eduard Bernsteins Stellung zur Kolonialpolitik und zum Imperialismus 1882–1914; Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Revisionismus*. By Woodruff D. Smith 1070

REINER POMMERIN. *Der Kaiser und Amerika: Die USA in der Politik der Reichsleitung 1890–1917*. By Francis R. Nicosia 1071

TRUDE MAURER. *Ostjuden in Deutschland 1918–1933*. By Werner T. Angress 1072

THOMAS CHILDERS, editor. *The Formation of the Nazi Constituency, 1919–1933*. By Richard F. Hamilton 1072

WILHELM DAMBERG. *Der Kampf um die Schulen in Westfalen 1933–1945*. By Marjorie Lamberti 1074

KLAUS MAMMACH. *Widerstand 1939–1945: Geschichte der deutschen antifaschistischen Widerstandsbewegung im Inland und in der Emigration*. By Radomir V. Luža 1075

MARIE VASSILTCHIKOV. *Berlin Diaries, 1940–1945*. By Peter Hoffmann 1075

CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING. *Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution*; EBERHARD KOLB. *Bergen-Belsen: From "Detention Camp" to Concentration Camp, 1943–1945*. By Alvin H. Rosenfeld 1076

KURT KOSZYK. *Pressepolitik für Deutsche 1945–1949*. By J. Farquharson 1078

ANN G. CARMICHAEL. *Plague and the Poor in Renaissance Florence*. By William M. Bowsky 1078

GERARD DELILLE. *Famille et propriété dans le royaume de Naples (XV^e–XIX^e siècle)*. By John A. Marino 1080

GARY TOMLINSON. *Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance*. By Barbara R. Hanning 1080

JULIAN BUDDEN. *Verdi*. By Paul Robinson 1081

LUISA PASSERINI. *Fascism in Popular Memory: The Cultural Experience of the Turin Working Class*. By Charles F. Delzell 1082

BERNARD MICHEL. *La mémoire de Prague: Conscience nationale et intelligentsia dans l'histoire tchèque et slovaque*. By Owen V. Johnson 1082

F. L. CARSTEN. *The First Austrian Republic, 1918–1938: A Study Based on British and Austrian Documents*. By Klemens von Klemperer 1083

MARIAN MROCZKO. *Polska myśl zachodnia 1918–1939 (Kształtowanie i upowszechnienie)* [Polish West-Oriented Thought, 1918–1939: Formation and Dissemination]. Joan S. Skurnowicz 1084

JOHN COUTOUVIDIS and JAIME REYNOLDS. *Poland, 1939–1947*. By Andrzej Korboński 1084

KARL HEINZ SCHLARP. *Wirtschaft und Besatzung in Serbien 1941–1944: Ein Beitrag zur nationalsozialistischen Wirtschaftspolitik in Südosteuropa*. By John R. Lampe 1085

HANS KNOLL. *Jugoslawien in Strategie und Politik der Alliierten 1940–1943*. By John C. Campbell 1086

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PATRICIA HERLIHY. *Odessa: A History, 1794–1914.* By Alfred J. Rieber 1087

MARTIN A. MILLER. *The Russian Revolutionary Emigres, 1825–1870.* By Norman M. Naimark 1087

CHRISTINE JOHANSON. *Women's Struggle for Higher Education in Russia, 1855–1900.* By Ben Eklof 1088

P. G. RYNDZIUNSKII. *Krest'iane i gorod v kapitalisticheskoi Rossii vtoroi poloviny XIX veka: Vzaimootnoshenie goroda i derevni v sotsial'no-ekonomicheskom stroe Rossii* [Peasants and the City in Capitalist Russia in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Mutual Relationship of the City and the Countryside in the Socioeconomic System of Russia]. By R. E. Johnson 1089

L. S. BESKROVNYI. *Armiia i flot Rossii v nachale XX v.: Ocherki voenno-ekonomicheskogo potentsiala* [The Russian Army and Navy in the Early Twentieth Century: A Survey of Military-Economic Capacity]. By John Bushnell 1090

ROBERT SERVICE. *The Russian Revolution, 1900–1927.* By Theodore H. Von Laue 1090

ROBERT C. WILLIAMS. *The Other Bolsheviks: Lenin and His Critics, 1904–1914.* By Jane Burbank 1091

MICHAL REIMAN. *The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the "Second Revolution."* By Daniel Mulholland 1092

NEAR EAST

AHMAD ANANI and KEN WHITTINGHAM. *The Early History of the Gulf Arabs.* By Elton L. Daniel 1093

GERD WINKELHANE and KLAUS SCHWARTZ. *Der osmanische Statthalter Iskender Pascha (gest. 1571) und seine Stiftungen in Ägypten und am Bosporus.* By Rudi Paul Lindner 1094

ZEYNEP ÇELIK. *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century.* By Roderic H. Davison 1094

HAIM GERBER. *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East.* By Donald Quataert 1095

AFRICA

SHARON STICHTER. *Migrant Laborers.* By B. Jewsiewicki 1096

PAUL PASCON. *Capitalism and Agriculture in the Haouz of Marrakesh.* By Michael Brett 1096

M. W. DALY. *Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898–1934.* By Janice J. Terry 1097

GEOFFREY HODGES. *The Carrier Corps: Military Labor in the East African Campaign, 1914–1918.* By Lewis J. Greenstein 1098

KENNETH P. VICKERY. *Black and White in Southern Zambia: The Tonga Plateau Economy and British Imperialism, 1890–1939.* By Marcia Wright 1099

ASIA AND THE EAST

SUSAN MANN. *Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureaucracy, 1750–1950.* By Yen-p'ing Hao 1099

HAO CHANG. *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning, 1890–1911.* By Mary Backus Rankin 1100

THOMAS R. H. HAVENS. *Fire across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan, 1965–1975.* By Richard H. Minear 1100

SUGATA BOSE. *Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure, and Politics, 1919–1947.* By Paul Greenough 1101

RAVI KALIA. *Chandigarh: In Search of an Identity.* By Howard Spodek 1102

UNITED STATES

MICHAEL H. HUNT. *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy.* By Akira Iriye 1103

CHRISTINE BOLT. *American Indian Policy and American Reform: Case Studies of the Campaign to Assimilate the American Indians.* By William T. Hagan 1103

DAVID TYACK *et al. Law and the Shaping of Public Education, 1785–1954.* By Maris A. Vinovskis 1104

ELIZABETH PLECK. *Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy against Family Violence from Colonial Times to the Present.* By Michael Grossberg 1105

ELLEN K. ROTHMAN. *Hands and Hearts: A History of Courtship in America.* By Joseph F. Kett 1105

PHILIP ABBOTT. *Seeking Many Inventions: The Idea of Community in America.* By Michael Frisch 1106

GARY LAND, editor. *Adventism in America: A History.* By David L. Rowe 1107

PHINIZY SPALDING. *The History of the Medical College of Georgia.* By John Harley Warner 1107

JOHN F. STOVER. *History of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.* By Michael Bezilla 1108

JOHN NIVEN. *The American President Lines and Its Forebears, 1848–1984: From Paddlewheelers to Containerships.* By Edward W. Sloan 1109

ANN KIBBEY. *The Interpretation of Material Shapes in Puritanism: A Study of Rhetoric, Prejudice, and Violence.* By Teresa Toulouse 1109

MILTON J COALTER, JR. *Gilbert Tennent, Son of Thunder: A Case Study of Continental Pietism's Impact on the First Great Awakening in the Middle Colonies.* By George William Pilcher 1110

N. E. H. HULL. *Female Felons: Women and Serious Crime in Colonial Massachusetts.* By Lyle Koehler 1111

MARY ANN JIMENEZ. *Changing Faces of Madness: Early American Attitudes and Treatment of the Insane.* By Leland V. Bell 1111

THOMAS L. PURVIS. *Proprietors, Patronage, and Paper Money: Legislative Politics in New Jersey, 1703–1776.* By Gloria L. Main 1112

MICHAEL C. BATINSKI. *The New Jersey Assembly, 1738–1775: The Making of a Legislative Community.* By Roger J. Champagne 1112

E. MERTON COULTER. *Abraham Baldwin: Patriot, Educator, and Founding Father.* By Christopher Collier 1113

KENT A. BOWMAN. *Voices of Combat: A Century of Liberty and War Songs, 1765–1865.* By Barbara L. Tischler 1114

FREDERICK F. SIEGEL. *The Roots of Southern Distinctiveness: Tobacco and Society in Danville, Virginia, 1780–1865.* By James Oakes 1114

RICHARD G. LOWE and RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL. *Planters and Plain Folk: Agriculture in Antebellum Texas.* By J. William Harris 1115

JOHN ASHWORTH. *"Agrarians" and "Aristocrats": Party Political Ideology in the United States, 1837–1846.* By Major L. Wilson 1115

DAVID RAY PAPKE. *Framing the Criminal: Crime, Cultural Work, and the Loss of Critical Perspective, 1830–1900.* By Maxwell Bloomfield 1116

LOUIS S. GERTEIS. *Morality and Utility in American Antislavery Reform.* By Lewis Perry 1117

ROBERT L. MCCAUL. *The Black Struggle for Public Schooling in Nineteenth-Century Illinois.* By Donald Spivey 1117

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REGINALD HORSMAN. *Josiah Nott of Mobile: Southerner, Physician, and Racial Theorist.* By Hamilton Cravens 1118

JAMES I. ROBERTSON, JR. *General A. P. Hill: The Story of a Confederate Warrior.* By Richard M. McMurry 1119

JOHN HALEY. *Charles N. Hunter and Race Relations in North Carolina.* By Loren Schweninger 1119

PETER WALLENSTEIN. *From Slave South to New South: Public Policy in Nineteenth-Century Georgia.* By Barton C. Shaw 1120

EDWARD LEO LYMAN. *Political Deliverance: The Mormon Quest for Utah Statehood.* By Klaus J. Hansen 1121

ELLEN WEISS. *City in the Woods: The Life and Design of an American Camp Meeting on Martha's Vineyard.* By Dolores Hayden 1121

DORIS WEATHERFORD. *Foreign and Female: Immigrant Women in America, 1840–1930.* By Hasia R. Diner 1122

GLORIA MOLDOW. *Women Doctors in Gilded Age Washington: Race, Gender, and Professionalization.* By Regina Morantz-Sanchez 1123

MARTHA BANTA. *Imaging American Women: Idea and Ideals in Cultural History.* By Eileen Boris 1123

JOYCE S. GOLDBERG. *The* Baltimore *Affair.* By Richard D. Challener 1124

NORMAN POLLACK. *The Just Polity: Populism, Law, and Human Welfare.* By Gene Clanton 1125

PAUL KLEPPNER. *Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics, 1893–1928.* By Ballard C. Campbell 1125

MARY KLACHKO. *Admiral William Shepherd Benson: First Chief of Naval Operations.* By James C. Bradford 1126

MICHAEL M. SOKAL, editor. *Psychological Testing and American Society, 1890–1930.* By Richard Wightman Fox 1127

ERIC HOMBERGER. *American Writers and Radical Politics, 1900–39: Equivocal Commitments.* By Leslie Fishbein 1128

EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ. *Disabled Policy: America's Programs for the Handicapped.* By James Harvey Young 1128

ELIZABETH FEE. *Disease and Discovery: A History of the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health, 1916–1939.* By Stuart Galishoff 1129

SUSAN MCINTOSH LLOYD. *The Putney School: A Progressive Experiment.* By S. Alexander Rippa 1130

ROBERT C. WILLIAMS. *Fordson, Farmall, and Poppin' Johnny: A History of the Farm Tractor and Its Impact on America.* By Wayne G. Broehl, Jr. 1130

JOHN F. BAUMAN. *Public Housing, Race, and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920–1974.* By Dwight W. Hoover 1130

WAYNE F. COOPER. *Claude McKay, Rebel Sojourner in the Harlem Renaissance: A Biography.* By Alfred Moss 1131

SARA ALPERN. *Freda Kirchwey: A Woman of the Nation.* By Winifred Wandersee 1132

MAURINE H. BEASLEY. *Eleanor Roosevelt and the Media: A Public Quest for Self-Fulfillment.* By Rodney Carlisle 1133

HOWARD DICKMAN. *Industrial Democracy in America: Ideological Origins of National Labor Relations Policy.* By James A. Gross 1133

DAVID P. PEELER. *Hope among Us Yet: Social Criticism and Social Solace in Depression America.* By Karal Ann Marling 1134

FORREST C. POGUE. *George C. Marshall: Statesman.* By David S. McLellan 1135

ROGER DANIELS *et al.*, editors. *Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress.* By Arthur A. Hansen 1136

GARY R. HESS. *The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940–1950.* By Michael Schaller 1137

SAMUEL Z. KLAUSNER and VICTOR M. LIDZ, editors. *The Nationalization of the Social Sciences.* By Roger L. Geiger 1138

ELLEN W. SCHRECKER. *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities.* By Thomas C. Reeves 1139

MARK LANDIS. *Joseph McCarthy: The Politics of Chaos.* By Richard Fried 1140

MAURICE ISSERMAN. *If I Had a Hammer . . . : The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left.* By Stephen J. Whitfield 1140

SAMUEL P. HAYS. *Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955–1985.* By Elmo Richardson 1141

CANADA

J. M. BUMSTED. *Land, Settlement, and Politics on Eighteenth-Century Prince Edward Island.* By Gordon T. Stewart 1142

A. B. MCKILLOP. *Contours of Canadian Thought.* By Doug Owram 1143

THOMAS P. SOCKNAT. *Witness against War: Pacifism in Canada, 1900–1945.* By J. L. Granatstein 1143

MELISSA CLARK-JONES. *A Staple State: Canadian Industrial Resources in Cold War.* By Robert D. Cuff 1144

LATIN AMERICA

RICHARD W. SLATTA, editor. *Bandidos: The Varieties of Latin American Banditry.* By Catherine Legrand 1144

MANUEL CABALLERO. *Latin America and the Comintern, 1919–1943.* By Paul W. Drake 1145

CHRISTOPHER ABEL and NISSA TORRENTS, editors. *José Martí: Revolutionary Democrat.* By Sheldon B. Liss 1146

S. L. CLINE. *Colonial Culhuacan, 1580–1600: A Social History of an Aztec Town.* By Ross Hassig 1147

JOHN S. LEIBY. *Colonial Bureaucrats and the Mexican Economy: Growth of a Patrimonial State, 1763–1821.* By Eric Van Young 1147

DAVID J. LANGUM. *Law and Community on the Mexican California Frontier: Anglo-American Expatriates and the Clash of Legal Traditions, 1821–1846.* By James E. Kerr 1148

JEFFERY BRANNON and ERIC N. BAKLANOFF. *Agrarian Reform and Public Enterprise in Mexico: The Political Economy of Yucatán's Henequen Industry.* By Merilee Grindle 1149

CHARLES A. WEEKS. *The Juárez Myth in Mexico.* By Barbara A. Tenenbaum 1149

THOMAS GOMEZ. *L'envers de l'Eldorado: Economie coloniale et travail indigene dans la Colombie du XVI^eme siecle.* By Jeffrey A. Cole 1150

FREDRICK B. PIKE. *The Politics of the Miraculous in Peru: Haya de la Torre and the Spiritualist Tradition.* By Jeffrey Klaiber 1151

FRANK MACDONALD SPINDLER. *Nineteenth-Century Ecuador: A Historical Introduction.* By John Hoyt Williams 1151

ADEMIR GEBARA. *O mercado de trabalho livre no Brasil (1871–1888)* [The Free Labor Market in Brazil, 1871–88]. By Eul-Soo Pang 1152

ALFREDO M. SEIFERHELD. *Nazismo y fascismo en el Paraguay.* Volume 1, *Vísperas de la II Guerra Mundial, 1936–1939*; volume 2, *Los años de la guerra, 1939–1945.* By Jerry W. Cooney 1153

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Collected Essays	1155	Communications	1171
Documents and Bibliographies	1161	Index of Advertisers	54(a)
Other Books Received	1164		

Contributors

David Eltis received his Ph.D. from the University of Rochester in 1979. He teaches economic history at Algonquin College, Ottawa. He is the co-editor of *The Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade* (1981) and author of *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Atlantic Slave Trade*, published in 1987 by Oxford University Press. He is currently expanding into a full-length study an essay on free and coerced transatlantic migration that he contributed to an earlier issue of the *AHR*.

Richard L. Garner, associate professor of history, Penn State University, earned degrees at Drew University, the University of Pittsburgh, and the University of Michigan. At Michigan, he studied under the late Charles Gibson. Professor Garner has just returned from Peru, where he undertook research on Lima's merchant community in the eighteenth century. The article in this issue grew out of a curiosity about how silver production compared in Mexico and Peru when he was working on a book-length study (now completed in association with Dr. Spiro Stefanou) on Mexico's eighteenth-century economy.

Lawrence C. Jennings is a professor of history at the University of Ottawa in Canada. He is the author of *France and Europe in 1848* (1973) and *French Reaction to British Slave Emancipation* (Baton Rouge, 1988). A specialist in nineteenth-century French history, he has also published articles dealing with international relations, the slave trade, and slavery, in reviews such as *French Historical Studies*, the *Journal of Modern History*, the *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, and the *Revue historique*. Currently, he is doing research for a book on the nineteenth-century French emancipationist movement and the abolition of French colonial slavery.

Sabine MacCormack is an associate professor of history and classics at Stanford University. Her doctorate is from Oxford University. She is the author of *Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity* (1981) and of articles on late Roman cultural and religious history. More recently, she has also written about Christian and Spanish perceptions of Andean religion, and about cultural and religious conflict in colonial Peru. She is currently working on a book examining how and why the Inca empire was remembered in sixteenth and seventeenth-century Spain and Peru.

Steve J. Stern is a professor of history at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He did his graduate work in Latin American history at Yale, where he worked with Emilia Viotti da Costa and Karen Spalding. His research interests range in topics from political economy to social history to gender, and in cultural geography from the Andes to Mesoamerica to Afro-America. Previous publications include *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640* (1982) and, as editor, *Resistance, Rebellion and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries* (1987). He is now completing research for a book on power, patriarchy, and class in Mexican history.

Immanuel Wallerstein has since 1976 been director of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations, and a distinguished professor of sociology at the State University of New York at Binghamton. He taught previously at McGill University and Columbia University. He is the editor of *Review* and the author of *The Modern World-System* (1974, 1980, vol. 3, forthcoming, 1988), *Historical Capitalism* (1983), *The Politics of the World-Economy* (1984), and *The Capitalist World-Economy* (1979). He is a past president of the *African Studies Association*. Since 1977, he has served on the Comitato Cientifico of the Istituto Internazionale di Storia Economica "Francesco Datini" in Prato and the International Committee on the Social and Economic History of Turkey, 1071–1920.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean

STEVE J. STERN

FEUDALISM, CAPITALISM, THE WORLD-SYSTEM. About this provocative trilogy Immanuel Wallerstein wrote a provocative book. In Volume 1 of *The Modern World-System*, published in 1974, Wallerstein argued that, around the beginning of the sixteenth century, Europe solved the crisis of feudalism by creating a capitalist world-economy. The new order was premised on three key elements: "an expansion of the geographical size of the world in question, the development of variegated methods of labor control for different products and different zones of the world-economy, and the creation of relatively strong state machineries in what would become the core-states of this capitalist world-economy." Since, Wallerstein argued, the capitalist world-economy crossed the boundaries of various "politico-cultural" structures, the conventional unit of analysis (discrete politico-cultural structures) of historians and social scientists is mistaken. If the "world-system" as a whole exerted decisive influence on the social structures and major changes evident within the politico-cultural units it had incorporated, one could hardly gain deep insight by focusing on such units as discrete entities. For Wallerstein, "the unit of analysis is an economic entity, the one that is measured by the existence of an effective division of labor." And the division of labor created during the "long" sixteenth century (*circa* 1450–1640) studied by Wallerstein was laid out as follows: in the core-states of Western Europe, the rise of free wage labor (and self-employment) in agriculture, pastoral production, and industry; in the peripheries of Latin America and Eastern Europe, the use of forced labor—either slavery or "coerced cash-crop labor"—to produce bullion, sugar, and cereals; in the "semi-periphery" of Southern Europe, a necessary mediating region consisting of "former core areas turning in the direction of peripheral structures," the

This essay is a revised version of a paper originally presented at the American Historical Association Convention in Chicago, December 27–30, 1986. The author wishes to thank various people for helpful and stimulating comments: members of the panel and audience at the original session, especially Immanuel Wallerstein; participants at the History and Society Seminar of the University of Minnesota, where the paper was presented in February 1987; colleagues Roger Bartra, Allen Hunter, Gerda Lerner, Florencia Mallon, and Thomas Skidmore; and three anonymous reviewers of the manuscript for the *AHR*. The author also thanks David Weber for inviting him to write the original paper, John Coatsworth for gracious encouragement, and the University of Wisconsin Graduate Research Committee for assistance that facilitated completion of the essay.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prevalence of an intermediate labor relation, sharecropping.[1]

This complementary and interlocking structure of labor delivered to the states and privileged classes of the core the chief benefits of capital accumulation in the world-system as a whole. In Wallerstein's conception, the explanation of the distribution of particular types of production and labor relations across various regions derives from the needs of the core (or, more precisely, the capitalists and states of the core), and of the world-system as a whole:

> Why different modes of organizing labor . . . at the same point in time within the world-economy? Because each mode of labor control is best suited for particular types of production. And why were these modes concentrated in different zones of the world-economy . . . ? Because the modes of labor control greatly affect the political system (in particular the strength of the state apparatus) and the possibilities for an indigenous bourgeoisie to thrive. The world-economy was based precisely on the assumption that there were in fact these three zones and that they did in fact have different modes of labor control. Were this not so, it would not have been possible to assure the kind of flow of the surplus which enabled the capitalist system to come into existence.[2]

In Volume 2, published in 1980,[3] Wallerstein carried the story forward into the "long" seventeenth century (*circa* 1600–1750). A work fascinating in its discussion of Dutch industries and hegemony, and in its innovative twist on the familiar comparison of capitalist development in Britain and France, Volume 2 adds depth to Wallerstein's thesis and contributes many particular insights concerning cyclical trends and seventeenth-century developments. But it revises little of the grand paradigm sketched in Volume 1, especially in its discussion of the periphery.[4] The greater Caribbean region, stretching from the southern colonies of British North America to the Northeast of Portuguese Brazil, becomes a "new" American periphery added to the "old" periphery of Spanish America. The specific discussion of events in the periphery devotes closer attention to local social conflicts, initiatives, and geography. Occasional exceptions to forced labor, as in the case of apparent wage labor in the Mexican silver mines, are noted and discussed. But the overall picture remains the same. Forced labor prevailed in the periphery (even in the Mexican mines, the mineowners encumbered the laborers with coercive devices, including debt), and the explanation of economic and labor patterns derives either directly from the world-system or its core, or indirectly through the rational response of local American capitalists to the changing

[1] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1974), hereafter, *World-System I*, 38, xi, 91, 103. A streamlined "text edition" (which deleted the notes and bibliographical list but added a special preface and brief bibliographical essay) was published in 1976. All citations given in Arabic numerals are from the 1974 edn.; all citations in Roman numerals are from the 1976 preface.

[2] *World-System I*, 87.

[3] *The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750* (New York, 1980), hereafter, *World-System II*.

[4] See esp. *World-System II*, 7–8, where Wallerstein asserted "the essential *continuity* between the long sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with the one great difference [being cyclical expansion and contraction]."

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

international market.[5]

The promise and limits of Wallerstein's world-system interpretation for Latin American history and historiography constitute the central subject of this essay.[6] I will on occasion, however, refer also to the history of Caribbean slavery to round out the picture. The greater Caribbean region, after all, constituted both an important American periphery and a significant arena of Spanish colonization, and its social and economic experience with colonial slavery bears at least a family resemblance to patterns that emerged in Spanish and Portuguese America proper. Widely praised and widely criticized, Wallerstein's historical interpretation strikes an important chord among students of the so-called Third World, capitalism, and transitions to capitalism. Among scholars of early modern Europe, Wallerstein's work has stimulated discussions of high caliber.[7] Especially from students of the colonial era in Latin America, one might have expected that Wallerstein's reconceptualization of colonialism and mercantilism would have triggered a lengthy and significant debate. From the corner of Latin American history and social sciences, however, Wallerstein's provocation (in the best sense of the term) has seemed less than sharp. His is only one of several versions of the world-systems idea, and about this idea Latin Americans thought long and hard before the

[5] On the periphery in *World-System II*, see 129–75. In general, Vol. 2 is more cognizant of phenomena in the periphery—social conflicts, local geography, a diversity of labor arrangments—that *could* be taken to complicate the thesis sketched in Vol. 1 but avoids following through on their possible implications. The result is that the basic model set forth in Vol. 1 remains unaltered. For Wallerstein's treatment of labor in Mexico in general, and in its silver mines in particular, see *World-System II*, 147–55, esp. n. 130. For recognition of social conflict in the periphery but a method of explanation that subsumes the causes, outcomes, and impacts of such events under the needs of the world-system, or of American elites responding to the world-system, see 130–31, 137, 139–40, 144–45, 154–55 (incl. n. 130), 167–74 (esp. 172–74 and n. 219).

[6] Wallerstein is a prolific scholar who has published numerous other works on the world-system. Particularly helpful for rounding out one's sense of Wallerstein's views on a variety of issues related to the world-system, and for appreciation of his diverse and sometimes penetrating insights, are the essays available in the following books: *The Capitalist World-Economy* (New York and Paris, 1979); *Historical Capitalism* (London, 1983), an especially perceptive work to this reader; *The Politics of the World-Economy: The States, the Movements, and the Civilizations* (New York and Paris, 1984). This article will focus, however, on the paradigm as developed in *World-System I* and applied in *World-System II*, both because these are Wallerstein's most systematic and thoroughly researched historical analyses and because his subsequent essays have not, to my knowledge, changed the essentials of his historical interpretation. With good reason, the *World-System* series is Wallerstein's most influential scholarship.

[7] Important discussions from a mainly European perspective include Robert Brenner, "The Origins of Capitalist Development: A Critique of Neo-Smithian Marxism," *New Left Review*, 104 (July–August 1977): 25–92; Robert S. DuPlessis, "From Demesne to World-System: A Critical Review of the Literature on the Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism," *Radical History Review*, 4 (Winter 1977): 3–41; Peter Kriedte, *Peasants, Landlords, and Merchant Capitalists: Europe and the World-Economy, 1500–1800* (orig. German edn., 1980; Leamington Spa, 1983); Domenico Sella, "The World-System and Its Dangers," *Peasant Studies*, 6 (January 1977): 29–32; Theda Skocpol, "Wallerstein's World Capitalist System: A Theoretical and Historical Critique," *American Journal of Sociology*, 82 (1977): 1075–90. The fuller European literature is ably reviewed in Robert S. DuPlessis, "Wallerstein, World Systems Theory, and Early Modern European Historiography," paper presented at the American Historical Association Convention, Chicago, December 27–30, 1986; DuPlessis, "The Partial Transition to World-Systems Analysis in Early Modern History," *Radical History Review*, 39 (1987): 11–27. See also Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe," *Past and Present*, 70 (February 1976): 30–75, and the debate and commentary in subsequent issues of the same journal. These important essays may also be consulted in T. H. Aston and C. H. E. Philpin, eds., *The Brenner Debate: Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-Industrial Europe* (New York, 1985).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

publication of *The Modern World-System*. In order both to understand the idiosyncrasy of Latin American responses to Wallerstein and to assess honestly the significance of his world-system for the history of Iberian America, and its sister region the Caribbean, we must first move Wallerstein into a Latin American context. We must, in short, put on new spectacles and look at world history with peripheral vision.

THE HISTORY AND MYTHOLOGY OF THE COLONIAL PERIOD has long loomed large in the interpretation of contemporary Latin America. The feudal "diagnosis" of the colonial inheritance reaches back to the nineteenth century, although the nineteenth-century meaning of "feudalism" referred less to economic relationships than to political, social, and jural patterns.[8] In the twentieth century, when analyses of the economic basis of society became more of a perceived priority, scholarly debate about the prevalence of feudalism or capitalism in colonial Latin America, and about the significance of the world economic system for any such assessment, began to assert itself as early as the 1940s. To be sure, the prevailing trend was to use feudalism or a feudal-like legacy to explain the distinctive features, particularly the agrarian question, that set Latin American societies apart from much of the modern West, especially the United States. José Carlos Mariátegui and Lesley B. Simpson in the 1920s; Luís Chávez Orozco, Gilberto Freyre, George McBride, Rodolfo Puiggrós, and Silvio Zavala in the 1930s and 1940s; Woodrow Borah, François Chevalier, and Jacques Lambert in the 1950s and 1960s—this is but a ruthlessly selective list of the prominent and otherwise diverse figures who invoked a feudal-like past to understand enduring features of Latin American life and history.[9] Important works by Richard Morse, Octavio Paz, and Frank Tannenbaum on the Thomist political tradition of Spanish America, and on the contrast between Protestant and Catholic civilizations in the Americas, rarely addressed their questions in terms directly translatable into the interpretation of

[8] See José Carlos Chiaramonte, *Formas de sociedad y economía en hispanoamérica* (Mexico City, 1984), part 1, esp. 21–65.

[9] José Carlos Mariátegui, *7 ensayos de interpretación de la realidad peruana* (Lima, 1928); Lesley B. Simpson, *The Encomienda in New Spain: Forced Native Labor in the Spanish Colonies, 1492–1550* (Berkeley, Calif., 1929), significantly revised in a 1950 edn.; Luís Chávez Orozco, *Historia económica y social de México: Ensayo de interpretación* (Mexico City, 1938); Gilberto Freyre, *Casa-grande e senzala* (1933; 4th "definitive" edn. in 2 vols., Rio de Janeiro, 1943); George McBride, *Chile: Land and Society* (Baltimore, Md., 1936); Rodolfo Puiggrós, *De la colonia a la revolución* (1940; 2d edn., Buenos Aires, 1943); Silvio Zavala, "Orígenes coloniales del peonaje en México," *El Trimestre económico*, 10 (1944): 711–48; Woodrow Borah, *New Spain's Century of Depression* (Berkeley, Calif., 1951); François Chevalier, *Land and Society in Colonial Mexico: The Great Hacienda*, trans. Alvin Eustis (orig. French edn., 1952; Berkeley, Calif., 1963); Jacques Lambert, *Latin America: Social Structure and Political Institutions*, trans. Helen Katel (orig. French edn., 1963; Berkeley, Calif., 1967). It should be noted that the interpretation of Latin American societies as feudal or neo-feudal was not always among the central preoccupations of these works, but all nonetheless contributed to a feudal-like image. Gilberto Freyre, for example, was more concerned with the roots of Brazilian culture and national character than with feudalism, but his interpretation emphasized the bonds of dependence and patriarchalism that suffused the relation of aristocratic masters and their slave-servant populations on great landed estates, and he readily admitted the resemblance to feudalism. Compare the works cited in note 10 below. For the intellectual context of writings by U.S. scholars, see the excellent essay by Benjamin Keen, "Main Currents in United States Writings on Colonial Spanish America, 1884–1984," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 65 (November 1985): 657–82.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a colonial legacy of feudalism. Their rightly influential studies, however, proved by and large compatible with such a thesis and served indirectly to reinforce it by underscoring the persistence in Latin America of cultural traditions rooted in late medieval Europe.[10]

Still, dissent about the place of feudalism, capitalism, and the world economic system in the interpretation of the colonial legacy appeared by the 1940s, and the dissenters were mainly resident Latin Americans. Sergio Bagú, Jan Bazant, Alexander Marchant, José Miranda, and Caio Prado, Jr., all registered significant doubts about the prevailing wisdom. In their versions of colonial history, new elements drew the historian's spotlight and relegated to the shadows the traditional emphasis on aristocratic ethos and feudal involution. Description and explanation focused on the entrepreneurial drive and profit motive of the original colonizers, the evident force of mercantile exploitation as an engine structuring and restructuring economic life and social relations in Latin American hinterlands, the subordination of Iberian America to the role of provider of primary commodities and an economic surplus to the expanding world market of a Europe undergoing the rise of commercial capitalism.[11] In the Caribbean, this recasting of the colonial experience as the exploitative extension of capitalism to the New World had its analogue in the celebrated works of C. L. R. James and Eric Williams.[12]

These revisions of history, still very much a minority view, resonated with the broader political and intellectual environment. They constituted but one example of skeptical stirrings about the beneficence of economic relations and ideas promoted by the advanced capitalist (that is, industrialized) West. For Latin America, the beginnings of the historical critique of the feudal thesis roughly coincided with the beginnings of the social science critique of the comparative advantage theory of international trade, associated especially with the Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL) and its executive secretary, the

[10] Richard M. Morse, "Toward a Theory of Spanish American Government," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 15 (1954): 71–93; Morse, "The Heritage of Latin America," in Louis Hartz, *et al.*, *The Founding of New Societies* (New York, 1964), 123–77; Octavio Paz, *El Laberinto de la soledad* (1950; rev. edn., Mexico City, 1959); Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas* (New York, 1946).

[11] Sergio Bagú, *Economía de la sociedad colonial: Ensayo de historia comparada de América Latina* (Buenos Aires, 1949); Jan Bazant, "Feudalismo y capitalismo en la historia de México," *El Trimestre económico*, 17 (1950): 81–98; Alexander Marchant, "Feudal and Capitalistic Elements in the Portuguese Settlement of Brazil," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 22 (August 1942): 493–512; José Miranda, "La Función económica del encomendero en los orígenes del régimen colonial de Nueva España (1525–1531)," *Anales del Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia*, 2 (1941–46): 421–62; Caio Prado, Jr., *Formação do Brasil contemporâneo: Colônia* (São Paulo, 1942). Miranda was part of the community of exiled Spanish intellectuals who resided in Mexico and helped launch El Colegio de México, a leading center of research and higher learning. (I thank my Mexican colleague Roger Bartra for this information.) Marchant resided in the United States but had been born in Rio de Janeiro, visited fairly regularly, and was a visible and involved figure in Brazil. See A. J. R. Russell-Wood, "United States Scholarly Contributions to the Historiography of Colonial Brazil," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 65 (November 1985): 694–95; and the obituary in *ibid.*, 62 (August 1982): 459.

[12] C. L. R. James, *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution* (1938; rev. edn., New York, 1963); Eric Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1944); compare Fernando Ortíz, *Contrapunteo cubano del tabaco y el azúcar . . .* (Havana, 1940). The connection of this recasting of colonial history and the emerging critique of the West is illuminated in interviews held with James in 1975 and 1982, and rpt. in Mid-Atlantic Radical Historians Organization, *Visions of History* (New York, 1984), 266–77.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

economist Raúl Prebisch.[13] As the 1950s and 1960s unfolded, several experiences—import-substitution industrialization, the cold war, the Cuban revolution, intensified political polarization—contributed to a context in which the initial dissents of the 1940s were taken up and debated extensively. The result was a complicated series of dialectics: between CEPAL-oriented intellectuals and policy makers and the mainstream West; between "moderate" Latin American advocates of development, influenced by the CEPAL idea and the promise of import-substitution, and their more "radical" Latin American critics and associates; among CEPAL-oriented colleagues, as part of a healthy process of self-evaluation; and between the orthodox left, inclined to see the necessity of a "bourgeois revolution" to transform a Latin America still encumbered by feudalism, and an innovative left, increasingly convinced that it was the historic spread of international capitalism, beginning in the Age of Discovery, that explained Latin America's poverty and apparently anachronistic economic structures.[14] These critical debates and dialogues culminated, in the 1960s, in what has come to be known loosely as "dependency theory"—full-scale critiques of neo-classical economics and modernization theory, and the construction of an alternative vision of Latin American history and reality emphasizing the external constraints and impositions of international capitalism.[15] Not surprisingly, revisionist historical and sociological

[13] See the following CEPAL publications: *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems* (orig. Spanish edn., 1949; New York, 1950); *Economic Survey of Latin America 1949* (New York, 1951); *El Pensamiento de la CEPAL* (Santiago de Chile, 1969). See also the sources cited in note 15 below. Prebisch wrote *The Economic Development* and was named CEPAL's executive secretary in 1950. More recent examples of CEPAL thinking, including that of Prebisch, may be followed in *CEPAL Review* (1976–).

[14] This is to some extent a simplification because a number of people crossed the boundaries of these categories, thereby blurring, for example, the distinction between "in-house" and "external" criticism of CEPAL ideas. The various axes of debate sometimes intersected, intellectuals of diverse views knew and influenced one another, and CEPAL was sufficiently dynamic and inclusive to pull diverse figures under its institutional umbrella at one point or another. Andre Gunder Frank, for example, notwithstanding his polemics against moderate developmentalists, originally wrote one of his celebrated essays as a report for CEPAL. See Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: Historical Studies of Chile and Brazil* (1967; rev. edn., New York, 1969), xii. My knowledge of the intellectual history of this period was greatly enhanced by the sources cited in note 15 below. A revealing warning against retrospective simplifications of this intellectual history is made by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "The Consumption of Dependency Theory in the United States," *Latin American Research Review*, 12 (1977): 7–12.

[15] Very helpful retrospectives by leading Latin American intellectuals on the origins and evolving response to the CEPAL and dependency ideas include Cardoso, "Consumption of Dependency Theory," 7–24; Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "The Originality of a Copy: CEPAL and the Idea of Development," *CEPAL Review* (1977): 7–40; Tulio Halperín-Donghi, "'Dependency Theory' and Latin American Historiography," *Latin American Research Review*, 17 (1982): 115–30. Cardoso's essays cited above and several other illuminating articles on the history of CEPAL and dependency ideas are reprinted in his *As idéias e seu lugar: Ensaios sobre as teorias do desenvolvimento* (Petrópolis, 1980). Also useful are Joseph A. Kahl, *Modernization, Exploitation, and Dependency in Latin America: Germani, González Casanova, and Cardoso* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1976), 14–17, 129–94; Albert O. Hirschman, *A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America* (New Haven, Conn., 1971), 85–89, 279–311; Joseph Love, "Raúl Prebisch and the Origins of the Doctrine of Unequal Exchange," *Latin American Research Review*, 15 (1980): 46–60. It is also worth noting that, despite the growing conservatism of the West, especially in the United States, by the start of the 1950s, the intellectual critiques of the West and of advanced capitalism by Latin Americans did not occur in hermetically sealed intellectual isolation. The North Atlantic World also generated important critiques, among the most important of which were Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (1944; rpt. edn., Boston, 1957); Gunnar Myrdal, *Development and Under-Development: A Note on the Mechanism of National and*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

studies appeared in the same period, accompanied by reprint editions of several of the landmark works of the 1940s. Their effect was to cut away at more benign views of society and historical tradition, and at the sense of disconnection between "traditional" patterns of life associated with the colonial-like countryside and more "modern" patterns associated with dynamic cities and capitalist enclaves.[16]

The literature explicating and criticizing various dependency perspectives is enormous and quickly spilled outside Latin America and the Caribbean to embrace Africa and social science theory in general.[17] For our purposes, three points stand

International Inequality (Cairo, 1956), slightly revised in the better known *Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity* (New York, 1957); Paul A. Baran, *The Political Economy of Growth* (New York, 1957).

[16] For a sampling of major works in three diverse countries, see the following: for Brazil, Roger Bastide and Florestan Fernandes, *Brancos e negros em São Paulo* (1955; 2d rev. edn., São Paulo, 1959); Fernando Henrique Cardoso, *Capitalismo e escravidão no Brasil meridional* (São Paulo, 1962); F. H. Cardoso, *Empresário industrial e desenvolvimento econômico no Brasil* (São Paulo, 1964); Florestan Fernandes, *A integração do negro na sociedade de clases*, 2 vols. (São Paulo, 1965); Celso Furtado, *Formaçao econômica do Brasil* (Rio de Janeiro, 1959); Emília Viotti da Costa, *Da senzala à colônia* (1966; 2d rev. edn., São Paulo, 1982); for Mexico, Pablo González Casanova, *La Democracia en México* (Mexico City, 1965); Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Clases, colonialismo y aculturación: Ensayo sobre un sistema de relaciones interétnicas en Mesoamérica," *América Latina* (Rio de Janeiro), 6 (October–December 1963): 63–103; compare Alejandro Marroquín, *La Ciudad mercado (Tlaxiaco)* (Mexico City, 1957); Carlos Fuentes, *La Muerte de Artemio Cruz* (Mexico City, 1962); for Peru, Jorge Bravo Bresani, *Desarrollo y subdesarrollo: De la economía del hambre a la economía del hombre* (Lima, 1967); Carlos Malpica, *Los Dueños del Perú* (1964; 3d rev. edn., Lima, 1968); José Matos Mar, *et al.*, *Perú—Problema* (2d edn., Lima, 1969) and the subsequent volumes in the *Perú—Problema* series organized by the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos; Aníbal Quijano Obregón, "Tendencies in Peruvian Development and in the Class Structure," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds., *Latin America: Reform or Revolution?* (New York, 1968), 289–328; Quijano Obregón, *Nacionalismo, neoimperialismo y militarismo en el Perú* (Buenos Aires, 1971). Among the works of the 1940s cited in note 11 above, the books by Bagú and Prado circulated in new editions in the 1960s, and Miranda's essay was republished in pamphlet form by the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México in 1965.

Naturally, many of these works focused on topics particular to the countries in question: in Brazil, the myth of racial democracy and the legacy of slavery; in Mexico, the political order created by the Mexican Revolution and the continuing subordination of poor people and regions; in Peru, the split of the "nation" between Indian highlands and creole coast, and the dominance of coastal society by oligarchs and foreign capitalists. Nonetheless, the works and authors cited also formed part of a more general conjuncture of criticism in Latin America that blended into the critique of the feudalism thesis begun in the 1940s, and some authors had influence well beyond particular countries. (The fact that a number of critical intellectuals suffered exile in the 1960s facilitated this process.) Other works of more general influence and circulation included Rodolfo Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies about Latin America," in Petras and Zeitlin, *Latin America*, 13–31; Luis Vitale, "Latin America: Feudal or Capitalist?" in *ibid.*, 32–43; Vitale, *Interpretación marxista de la historia de Chile II: La Colonia y la revolución de 1810* (1969; 3d edn., Santiago de Chile, 1972); Theotonio dos Santos, "El Nuevo carácter de la dependencia (gran empresa y capital extranjero)," *Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios Socioeconómicos*, 6 (1967): 9–50. Stavenhagen's "Seven Fallacies" is an expanded version of an article that first appeared in the Mexican newspaper *El Día* in June 1965; Vitale's article first appeared in the Chilean magazine *Estrategia*, 5 (July 1966), according to Vitale, *Interpretación*, 19 n. 11.

[17] For orientations to the literature from a variety of viewpoints and for further bibliographical references, see, in addition to the citations in note 15 above: Carlos Sempat Assadourian, *et al.*, *Modos de producción en América Latina* (1973; 9th edn., Mexico City, 1982); Roger Bartra, *et al.*, *Modos de producción en América Latina* (1975; Lima, 1976); Chiaramonte, *Formas de sociedad y economía*, 89–95; Ronald H. Chilcote and Joel C. Edelstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives of Development and Underdevelopment in Latin America," in Chilcote and Edelstein, eds., *Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond* (New York, 1974), 1–87; Ronald H. Chilcote, "Dependency or Mode of Production? Theoretical Issues," in Chilcote and Dale L. Johnson, eds., *Theories of Development: Mode of Production or Dependency?* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 1983), 9–30; Frederick Cooper, "Africa and the World Economy," *African Studies Review*, 24 (June–September 1981): 1–86; Aidan Foster-Carter, "The Modes of Production Controversy," *New Left Review*, 107 (1978): 47–77; Peter F. Klarén and Thomas J. Bossert, eds., *Promise of Development: Theories of Change in Latin America* (Boulder, Colo., 1986), esp. the essay by Klarén on 3–33, and by Bossert on 303–34; *Latin American Perspectives*, 1:1 and 8:3–4 (1974

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

out. First, two works written in the mid-1960s stood out as the leading theoretical and systematic efforts to construct a dependency perspective for Latin America. The co-authored book of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto on dependency and development (published in 1969 but circulating in mimeographs and oral form since the mid-1960s) and Andre Gunder Frank's study of capitalism and underdevelopment (first published in 1967) are the landmarks to which assessments of dependency perspectives inevitably return.[18] Second, the dependency idea was firmly ensconced in the historical scholarship regarding Latin America by the early 1970s. In 1969 and 1970 respectively, Tulio Halperín-Donghi and co-authors Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein published widely admired works of historical synthesis.[19] These works combined nuanced insight, deep immersion in empirical research on Latin America, and sympathetic engagement of dependency ideas. The stature of these books made it more difficult for serious historians to dismiss the dependency approach altogether as the work of radical social scientists caught up in a superficial projection of presentist theories onto the past. In the United States, whose historical profession is strongly anti-theoretical compared with those of Latin America, new college textbooks published in Latin American history reflected the continuing impact of the dependency idea.[20]

Third, despite the widespread "consumption" (Cardoso's word) of dependency perspectives in toto or in part, the dependency perspective generated very considerable debate, and this debate anticipated some of the issues arising from Wallerstein's later books. Andre Gunder Frank drew the most international and heated attention—perhaps because he published originally in English (he soon secured Spanish, Portuguese, French, and Italian translations), or because his

and 1981); Brooke Larson, "Shifting Views of Colonialism and Resistance," *Radical History Review*, 27 (1983): 3–20; Gabriel Palma, "Dependency: A Formal Theory of Underdevelopment or a Methodology for the Analysis of Concrete Situations of Underdevelopment?" *World Development*, 6 (1978): 881–924; William Roseberry, *Coffee and Capitalism in the Venezuelan Andes* (Austin, Tex., 1983), 59–70; William B. Taylor, "Between Global Process and Local Knowledge: An Inquiry into Early Latin American Social History, 1500–1900," in Olivier Zunz, ed., *Reliving the Past: The Worlds of Social History* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), 115–90.

[18] Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina* (Mexico City, 1969); Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment*. A revised English-language version of Cardoso and Faletto's book was published in 1979: *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, trans. Marjory Mattingly Urquidi (Berkeley).

[19] Tulio Halperín-Donghi, *Historia contemporánea de América Latina* (Madrid, 1969); Stanley J. Stein and Barbara H. Stein, *The Colonial Heritage of Latin America: Essays on Economic Dependence in Perspective* (New York, 1970). It should be noted that, notwithstanding the resonance of *Historia contemporánea* with dependency ideas, Halperín-Donghi has also strongly criticized the reductionism in much of the dependency literature. See his "'Dependency Theory' and Latin American Historiography," 115–30.

[20] See especially the following textbooks: E. Bradford Burns, *Latin America: A Concise Interpretive History* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1972); Benjamin Keen and Mark Wasserman, *A Short History of Latin America* (Boston, 1980); Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, *Modern Latin America* (New York, 1984); compare the popular interdisciplinary text by Eric R. Wolf and Edward C. Hansen, *The Human Condition in Latin America* (New York, 1972). These texts and Stein and Stein, *Colonial Heritage*, each sold well enough to justify reprints or new editions and remained in print as of 1986. (My personal copy of Wolf and Hansen, *Human Condition*, indicates that it was in its third printing by 1973.) One important new textbook that bears little imprint of dependency ideas is James Lockhart and Stuart B. Schwartz, *Early Latin America: A History of Colonial Spanish America and Brazil* (New York, 1983). Another textbook author treats dependency ideas with reserve but considers them too influential to ignore: Lyle N. McAlister, *Spain and Portugal in the New World, 1492–1700* (Minneapolis, Minn., 1984), 387–90.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

analysis was crudely one-dimensional and unchanging compared to that of Cardoso and Faletto, or because he was Anglo rather than Latin American.[21] For Latin Americanists, Frank's thesis now appears as a kind of vulgar preview of Wallerstein's more well researched and sophisticated work on the world-system. Frank stressed a chain of metropolis-satellite links that systematically transferred economic surpluses from the satellites (read: "periphery") to the metropoles (read: "core") and thereby caused the "underdevelopment" of the satellites. The metropolis-satellite polarization characterized relations not only between world areas (say, Western Europe and Iberian America) but also within world areas and regions, converting some metropoles (for example, Spain and Portugal vis-à-vis their colonies) into satellites (read: "semiperiphery") of more powerful metropoles (for example, the Netherlands and England). Frank's historical analysis demonstrated that the exploitative chain of the international commercial system had bound apparently "remote" and feudal-like regions of Latin America to capitalism long ago, in some regions as early as the sixteenth century. This binding had taken the form of export booms that drained Latin American regions of their wealth and left in their wake regional impoverishment and decline easily confused with feudalism. Frank contributed importantly, therefore, to demolishing the notion, prevalent in modernization theory, that Latin America was a region of "dual societies" divided between dynamic zones integrated into modern capitalism and backward zones languishing in feudal isolation. Capitalism, understood as profit-driven production of commodities for large-scale markets on unequal terms that benefited capitalists and metropoles, was the quintessential colonial legacy in precisely the impoverished regions considered "feudal" and "isolated" in the twentieth century.[22]

[21] The flexibility and evolution of Cardoso and Faletto is indicated by the changes introduced in the subsequent editions of their celebrated book and in an important article by Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil* (New Haven, Conn., 1973), 142–78. On the changes in various editions of Cardoso and Faletto's book, Robert A. Packenham, "Plus ça change . . . : The English Edition of Cardoso and Faletto's *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina*," *Latin American Research Review*, 17 (1982): 131–51, is somewhat useful although marred by the author's tendentious hostility to Cardoso and Faletto and by a narrow view of the oral and printed means by which ideas circulated in Santiago and elsewhere in Latin America. Reference to the translations of Frank's *Capitalism and Underdevelopment* may be found in the preface to the revised 1969 edition, xx. An enormously perceptive account of the reception of Frank's work in Latin America and in the United States is Halperín-Donghi, "'Dependency Theory' and Latin American Historiography," 115–30; compare F. H. Cardoso, "Consumption of Dependency Theory," 7–24.

[22] Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment*. As the prior discussion and notes 14 and 17 make clear, Frank's celebrated work was not an isolated breakthrough but part of a wider stream of revisionism undertaken by Latin Americans. In this regard, see esp. Stavenhagen, "Seven Fallacies," 13–31; Stavenhagen, "Clases, colonialismo y aculturación," 63–103; González Casanova, *La Democracia en México*. Frank wrote and continues to write a large number of books and articles, but it is his early work—mainly amplifications or extensions of the key ideas of *Capitalism and Underdevelopment*—that is most important for the purposes of this essay. Other important early books were *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution* (New York, 1969); *Lumpenbourgeoisie: Lumpendevelopment: Dependence, Class, and Politics in Latin America* (New York, 1972). On the modifications introduced in the latter book, see Brenner, "Origins of Capitalist Development," 83–86. A later publication on colonial Mexican agriculture was actually researched and written in 1965–66 and reflects his early views: *Mexican Agriculture, 1521–1630: Transformation of the Mode of Production* (New York and Paris, 1979), vii–xii.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Scholars on the left, broadly defined, were the most disposed to confront seriously the issues and implications of dependency perspectives, and the critical assessment of Frank's work rekindled interest in the important Dobb-Sweezy debate in the 1950s on Europe's transition from feudalism to capitalism.[23] In that debate, Sweezy's critics argued that his stress on the expansion of commerce and profit making in late medieval Europe could not really account for the qualitative transformations of technique ("forces of production") and social relations ("relations of production") that gave the capitalist mode of production its distinctive historical character. Profit making and intense market activity that turned the purpose of production in wide territories toward exchange-value rather than use-value could be found in a variety of historical epochs and societies, including ancient Rome. What explained, at bottom, capitalism's unique and even revolutionary impact on economic life was its new method of organizing production on the basis of the free sale of labor-power to capitalists in exchange for a wage. Free wage labor was the relation of production that liberated entrepreneurship from the comparatively stifling restrictions of pre-capitalist societies. Free wage labor allowed for optimal and changing combinations of machinery and labor, a possibility that made feasible unparalleled technical experimentation and progress in production; it also encouraged the rise of mass markets for subsistence items purchased with wages, a development that expanded the scope of profitable market activity enormously. Marx's creative insight was to analyze the causes, mystifications, inner dynamics, and far-reaching consequences of this transformation of the production process. Sweezy's critics argued that, once one focused on the production rather than the circulation of commodities, the strategic issues requiring explanation shifted from the expansion of the profit motive and international commerce to the replacement of servile labor by proletarianized labor and the associated rise of home markets (that is, mass consumption of commodities). To explain the transition to capitalism therefore required close historical analysis of the social and class conflicts, expropriations of petty producers, and deterioration of subsistence strategies that underwrote the transition from servile to free labor.[24] A good deal of the Europeanists' recent debate on capitalist transition, particularly Robert Brenner's important essays, follows in the tradition of the Dobb-Sweezy debate.[25]

Between Dobb and Brenner, however, came Ernesto Laclau.[26] Like Dobb, and like other critics of Andre Gunder Frank, Laclau invoked the classic Marxist emphasis on capitalism as a mode of production. To demonstrate the rise of

[23] See the collection of articles, most of them orig. pub. in *Science and Society* in the 1950s, rpt. in Rodney Hilton, *et al.*, *The Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism* (London, 1976); Maurice Dobb, *Studies in the Development of Capitalism* (1947; rev. edn., New York, 1963). On the renewed interest in this debate in Latin America, see the citations in Assadourian, *Modos de producción*; Bartra, *Modos de producción*.

[24] The most forceful proponents of this view were Dobb and Takahashi, in Hilton, *Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism*. Compare E. J. Hobsbawm, "The Crisis of the Seventeenth Century" (orig. 1954), in Trevor Aston, ed., *Crisis in Europe, 1560–1660* (New York, 1967), 5–62.

[25] See the sources cited in note 7 above.

[26] Ernesto Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism in Latin America," *New Left Review*, 67 (May–June 1971): 19–38.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

commercial exploitation and a profit motive, as Frank had done for colonial Latin America, was insufficient to demonstrate that the Latin American economy had been "capitalist" since Cortés and Pizarro. It was obvious, observed Laclau, that mercantile exploitation used as its instrument the coercive labor relations and tributary obligations corresponding to the feudal mode of production. This was not a trivial point, since it greatly affected the explanation of Latin America's historic underdevelopment. In Laclau's scheme, underdevelopment derived not only from Europe's channeling of the colonies' economic surpluses from satellite to metropolis but also from its "fixing their relations of production in an archaic mould of extra-economic coercion, which retarded any process of social differentiation and diminished the size of their internal markets."[27] The first implication was that, in the absence of further transformations of production (transformations that could not derive simply from a process of commercialization), the feudal socioeconomic structure imposed by Europe's commercial exploitation of Latin America would have blocked capitalist development, even had Latin America retained a greater share of economic surplus. Further, material progress in twentieth-century Latin America did indeed require the break-up of the feudal socioeconomic structures that dominated many backward regions. Laclau held that Frank had confused the "mode of production" with the "economic system." It was perfectly possible, even likely, that an overarching economic system that was as a whole capitalist—that is, governed by the needs of a dominant capitalist mode of production and by the profit principle—could include several modes of production among its constituent "parts." Frank had demolished the "dual society" thesis of the modernization theorists by demonstrating that Latin America's "backward" regions had been inserted, on exploitative terms, into the world capitalist system, but this contribution hardly demonstrated that such regions were themselves capitalist.

Laclau's distinction between the economic system and its heterogeneous parts effectively undermined Frank's argument, but his assertion of the "feudal" character of the colonial economy has nonetheless remained debatable. The problem is that Latin America has so often seemed "in but not of" the capitalist economy of the North Atlantic world. In the colonial period especially, Latin America has seemed a confusing hybrid of pre-modern "feudal" and modern "capitalist" eras. Neither Frank nor Laclau is a historian, least of all a historian of colonial Latin America. For historians more immersed in colonial economic history and social relations, posing the choice as one between a "feudal" or "capitalist" economy may itself misconstrue the nature of the problem.

On the one hand, Latin America and the Caribbean supplied, through their colonial trades, taxation, and contraband, essential goods and economic surpluses to a European world-economy premised on the expansion of entrepreneurial profit and capital accumulation. Moreover, within Latin America, mercantile interests and the profit-investment principle constituted a powerful force reshaping urban and regional economies, restructuring the kinds and quantities of

[27] Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism," 35.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

commodities produced and the technologies and social relations used to produce them. The rise of profit making and commodity production as a central principle of economic organization; the simultaneous deterioration and destruction of local subsistence economies; the impressive capital expenditures undertaken in the mines, sugar plantations, and other enterprises; and the growth of cities and mining regions, where there developed significant internal markets and relatively free forms of labor, including relations resembling wage labor—all seem to lend strength to the notion that, in the more dynamic colonial regions, the Latin American economy was never "feudal" but followed a "capitalist" logic, albeit one that reflected its special position as colony or periphery of the European world-economy.[28]

On the other hand, a long-term view of the social relations and technologies by which colonial production and social life were organized sees the rebirth on American soil of pre-capitalist or at least non-capitalist modes of production. Rotating labor drafts, slavery, and various forms of serfdom or peonage constituted strategic labor relations in Latin America's mines, plantations, textile workshops, and haciendas. Servile labor relations such as these resembled those of Europe before the transition to capitalism insofar as they rested on extra-economic compulsion rather than the free hiring of proletarianized laborers whose lack of subsistence drove them to sell their labor-power for a wage. In the long run, the mercantile exploitation of Latin America prevented neither the reconstitution of effective, though considerably impoverished, subsistence economies and strategies by Indian communities nor the use of "pre-capitalist" devices (tribute, rents, labor drafts, slavery, peonage) to extract a surplus from direct producers. Even the mining economies of eighteenth-century Mexico and Peru-Bolivia required for their profitability and expansion the reduction of relatively "free" laborers to more "bonded" status.[29] Eventually, colonial internal markets and technology stagnated. The transition to a capitalist mode of production during the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries was to require a struggle against subsistence rights that yielded land and labor arrangements more compatible with the imperatives of capitalist industry and production.[30] The long-term view, then,

[28] On the weight of mining and mercantile exploitation in the structure and organization of economic life, the work of Carlos Sempat Assadourian is fundamental: "Modos de producción, capitalismo y subdesarrollo en América Latina," in Assadourian, *Modos de producción*, 47–81; *El Sistema de la economía colonial: Mercado interno, regiones y espacio económico* (Lima, 1982), which reprints essays written in the 1960s and 1970s; and "La Producción de la mercancía dinero en la formación del mercado interno colonial: El Caso del espacio peruano, siglo XVI," in Enrique Florescano, ed., *Ensayos sobre el desarrollo económico de México y América Latina (1500–1975)* (Mexico City, 1979), 223–92; compare Steve J. Stern, "New Directions in Andean Economic History: A Critical Dialogue with Carlos Sempat Assadourian," *Latin American Perspectives*, 12 (Winter 1985): 133–48. See also Peter J. Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico: Zacatecas, 1546–1700* (Cambridge, 1971); D. A. Brading and Harry E. Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico and Peru," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 52 (November 1972): 545–79; and the still useful classic by Eric R. Wolf, *Sons of the Shaking Earth: The People of Mexico and Guatemala—Their Land, History, and Culture* (Chicago, 1959), 176–87.

[29] See the discussion of silver mining below and the sources cited in notes 65, 71, and 72.

[30] For examples, see Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge, eds., *Land and Labour in Latin America: Essays on the Development of Agrarian Capitalism in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Cambridge, 1977); Cristóbal Kay, *El Sistema señorial europeo y la hacienda latinoamericana* (Mexico City, 1980); Florencia E. Mallon, *The Defense of Community in Peru's Central Highlands: Peasant Struggle and Capitalist Transition*,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

suggests that the colonial Latin American economy, though part of a European economic system in transition to capitalism, followed principles of economic evolution qualitatively distinct from those associated with a capitalist mode of production.

The economic patterns discussed here can lead to conceptual traps and sterile, circular debates. One can emphasize some features to find "capitalism," others to find "feudalism" (or "slavery," understood as a pre-capitalist mode of production). Neither characterization suffices. The dynamics of colonial labor relations, subsistence and markets, and technology were not only distinct from but in some senses antithetical to those of a capitalist mode of production. As conceptualized by Marx, a capitalist mode of production is based on the sale of labor-power for a wage, not primarily under political, social, or cultural coercion but out of economic necessity. Separated from the lands and resources needed to produce their subsistence or items that can be exchanged for subsistence goods, workers freely sell their labor-power to earn a living wage and with their wages constitute an internal market for the sale of commodities produced in capitalist enterprises.[31] This is a phenomenon quite recognizable, despite some ambiguities and complications, by students of Latin America in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries but not in the colonial period. To call colonial Latin America "capitalist" thus obscures the tremendous discontinuity between the contemporary and the colonial economy, as well as the bitter traumas and conflicts associated with the transition to a capitalist mode of production in more recent times.

Yet the intensity of colonial mercantile exploitation and its associated disasters often tended to take on a destructive quality that partly proletarianized small producers and tended, also, to reduce laborers from human beings whose exploitation involved their masters in a many-sided relationship of unequal but mutual obligation to mere human repositories of labor-power used as short-term instruments of mercantile interest and bearing commodity value based on the exchange value of their exploitable labor. Slaves who were worked to death in booming tropical export sectors and drafted peasant laborers whose rotations at the mines pressed them to the limits of good health and physical endurance and virtually destroyed their customary subsistence rights serve as obvious examples. Thus to call colonial Latin America "feudal" or "seigneurial" or to equate Latin American or Caribbean slaveholding with earlier Old World slavery obscures both the intensity of mercantile exploitation inherent in the colonial system and the degree to which this very intensity led to labor relations, subsistence and market patterns, and technological developments with structure and dynamics qualitatively distinct from those of pre-capitalist Europe.[32]

1860–1940 (Princeton, N.J., 1983); John Womack, Jr., *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution* (New York, 1969), esp. 41–54. Compare Arnold J. Bauer, "Rural Workers in Spanish America: Problems of Peonage and Oppression," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 59 (February 1979): 34–63.

[31] For a comparison of Marxist and non-Marxist conceptualizations of capitalism, see Dobb, *Studies*, 1–32; compare Karl Marx, *Capital*, 3 vols. (New York, 1969); Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*, ed. E. J. Hobsbawm (New York, 1964).

[32] It is by now a commonplace to observe that work and health conditions meant that the African slave populations of Brazil and the Caribbean were replaced by fresh imports from Africa rather than

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To accept a simple choice between "feudalism" and "capitalism," then, is to walk into a conceptual trap. Laclau's brief discussion of feudal-like relations of production served, at a particular moment in an evolving debate, to expose Frank's defects. But it did not really solve the deeper conundrum posed by the interpretation of the colonial economy. In this sense, Wallerstein was right when he argued in 1974 that Laclau's was not the last word.[33] What is noteworthy, however, is the speed with which the Latin American literature moved beyond Laclau's initial statement. The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a boom in creative Marxian scholarship in Latin America.[34] Before *The Modern World-System* joined the fray, colonial studies had already yielded a series of sophisticated positions on feudalism, capitalism, and the world-economy.

We may discern four positions, each of which sought to escape the conceptual trap outlined above. One saw the original and paradoxical features of the colonial economy not as an "anomaly" to be explained away but as a basis for extending and enriching our inherited mode-of-production "categories." These scholars sought to develop theories of "colonial" and "colonial slavery" modes of production that would complement the categories inherited from European history.[35] A

through biological replacement in America. Planters commonly made estimates of life expectancy requiring that the short-term exchange-value of commodities produced by slaves be sufficient to ensure profitability despite high mortality and low net fertility rates. (By "net" fertility rates, I mean the rate of live births after subtracting out the rate of death in infancy.) In Bahia, Brazil, in the mid-eighteenth century, it appears that sugar planters recovered the cost of purchase and maintenance of a slave after only three and a half years. Contemporary estimates had it that a slave's life expectancy was in the range of seven to fifteen years, a revealing calculation despite the adjustments that must be made for infant and child mortality. See Stuart B. Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 1550–1835* (New York, 1985), 226, but for context and caution about such calculations, see also 346–78; and Herbert S. Klein, *African Slavery in Latin America and the Caribbean* (New York, 1986), 154–61. On the commodification of forced labor in the mines of Spanish America, see Steve J. Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640* (Madison, Wis., 1982), 84–89, 148–57; Enrique Tandeter, "Forced and Free Labour in Late Colonial Potosí," *Past and Present*, 93 (November 1981): 98–136; Peter J. Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labor in Potosí, 1545–1650* (Albuquerque, N.M., 1984), *passim*; and the discussion of silver mining later in this essay.

[33] Wallerstein, *World-System I*, 126–27.

[34] This is rather obvious to anyone familiar with the scholarship of Latin Americans in the period and is quite evident in Assadourian, *Modos de producción*; and Bartra, *Modos de producción*. By "Marxian," I refer both to scholarship self-defined as "Marxist" and scholarship strongly influenced by or engaged with the Marxist tradition but not necessarily self-identified with that tradition. U.S. readers should note, however, that Latin American intellectuals are often less timid than their U.S. counterparts about identifying their work as "Marxist" and that, given the variety of "Marxist" perspectives and debates that flourished from the 1960s on, such self-identifications implied little about intellectual orthodoxy or creativity. Finally, I should also mention the obvious. The creativity and originality of the period does not deny that it also witnessed a plethora of cruder Marxian publications. Every perspective generates its share of pedestrian work, and the Marxian corner was no exception.

[35] See esp. Ciro F. S. Cardoso, "Sobre los modos de producción coloniales de América," in Assadourian, *Modos de producción*, 135–59; C. F. S. Cardoso, "El Modo de producción esclavista colonial en América," in *ibid.*, 193–242; C. F. S. Cardoso, "Los Modos de producción coloniales: Estado de la cuestión y perspectiva teórica," in Bartra, *Modos de producción*, 90–106. The first two essays were published in 1973 and the third originally presented at a panel on modes of production at the International Congress of Americanists held in Mexico City in September 1974. Compare Jacob Gorender, *O Escravismo colonial* (São Paulo, 1978); Héctor Malavé Mata, "Reflexões sobre o modo de produção colonial latinoamericano" (orig. 1972), rpt. in Théo Santiago, ed., *América colonial* (Rio de Janeiro, 1975), 144–80. For the influence of such concepts in other "Third World" areas in the early 1970s, see Jairus Banaji, "For a Theory of Colonial Modes of Production," *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), 7 (December 23, 1972): 2498–2502. For the subsequent evolution of Ciro F. S. Cardoso's ideas on slavery and colonial production, see Cardoso and Héctor Pérez Brignoli, *Historia económica de*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

second position, compatible with Laclau's theoretical stance, asserted the centrality of American "feudalism" but carefully delineated its particular features by stressing the specific historical context that joined colonial feudalism to international and local mercantile ventures, to capital accumulation, and to other modes of production. One version of this approach explored the colonial economy itself as a complex articulation of various modes of production, a unique "whole" combined of various "parts" in a specific historical context. The most successful example of this approach is Enrique Semo's pioneering interpretation of the colonial Mexican formation as a system that brought feudalism, "embryonic capitalism," and "tributary despotism" (the mode of production of indigenous communities subjected to a tributary relationship with the state) into dynamic and unequal coexistence.[36] A third position stood the inherited theoretical assumptions on their heads. This view held that to search for a dominant mode of production in colonial Latin America is misleading because the cornerstone of the colonial economy was precisely the dominance of commercial capital over production. In this line of analysis, the object of theoretically aware historical scholarship is to explore the ways commercial capital organized and exploited various relations of production, none of which served as the basis for a fully constituted mode of production in Latin America.[37]

América Latina, 2 vols. (Barcelona, 1979), vol. 1; C. F. S. Cardoso, *Agricultura, escravidão e capitalismo* (Petrópolis, 1979); C. F. S. Cardoso, *Economía e sociedade em áreas colonais periféricas: Guiana Francesa e Pará (1750–1817)* (Rio de Janeiro, 1984).

[36] See Pablo Macera, "Feudalismo colonial americano: El Caso de las haciendas peruanas," orig. pub. in *Acta Histórica* (1971), rpt. in Macera, *Trabajos de historia*, 4 vols. (Lima, 1977), 3: 139–227; Enrique Semo, *Historia del capitalismo en México: Los Orígenes, 1521–1763* (Mexico City, 1973); compare Roger Bartra, "Sobre la articulación de modos de producción en América Latina," in Bartra, *Modos de producción*, 5–19; Marcello Carmagnani, *Formación y crisis de un sistema feudal* (Mexico City, 1976). More recent publications along these lines include Claude Morin, *Michoacán en la Nueva España del siglo XVIII: Crecimiento y desigualdad en una economía colonial* (Mexico City, 1979); Ruggiero Romano, "American Feudalism," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 64 (February 1984): 121–34; Margaret Villanueva, "From Calpixqui to Corregidor: Appropriation of Women's Cotton Textile Production in Early Colonial Mexico," *Latin American Perspectives*, 12 (Winter 1985): 17–40. Some of the key ideas on haciendas expounded in this literature—especially on the great estate's resilient capacity to blend servile labor with production for the market—were anticipated in pioneering studies by Eric Wolf and Sidney Mintz, "Haciendas and Plantations in Middle America and the Antilles," *Social and Economic Studies*, 6 (1957): 380–412; Wolf, *Sons of the Shaking Earth*, 202–11; Mario Góngora, *Origen de los inquilinos de Chile central* (Santiago de Chile, 1960); Charles Gibson, *The Aztecs under Spanish Rule: A History of the Indians of the Valley of Mexico, 1519–1810* (Stanford, Calif., 1964), 326–34. The best studies of hacienda profit mechanisms over the course of fluctuating market cycles are Enrique Florescano, *Precios del maíz y crisis agrícolas en México (1708–1810)* (Mexico City, 1969); Brooke Larson, "Rural Rhythms of Class Conflict in Eighteenth-Century Cochabamba," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 60 (August 1980): 407–30. A pioneering and influential contribution to the articulation concept was Pierre-Philippe Rey, *Les Alliances des clases* (Paris, 1973); an overview and rigorous theoretical critique is presented in Harold Wolpe, "Introduction," in Wolpe, ed., *The Articulation of Modes of Production: Essays from Economy and Society* (London, 1980), 1–43.

[37] See Assadourian, "Modos de producción"; Assadourian, *El Sistema*; José Carlos Chiaramonte, "El Problema del tipo histórico de sociedad: Crítica de sus supuestos," in Bartra, *Modos de producción*, 107–25; Juan Carlos Garavaglia, "Introducción," in Assadourian, *Modos de producción*, 7–21; Garavaglia, "Un Modo de producción subsidiario: La Organización económica de las comunidades guaranizadas durante los siglos XVII–XVIII en la formación regional altoperuana-rioplatense," in Assadourian, *Modos de producción*, 161–91. For subsequent work on this issue by these authors, see Assadourian, "La Producción de la mercancía dinero"; Assadourian, *Análisis sobre la formación del sistema colonial* (Mexico City, forthcoming); Chiaramonte, *Formas de sociedad y economía*; Garavaglia, *Mercado interno y economía colonial (Tres siglos de historia de la yerba mate)* (Mexico City, 1983).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Despite the discrepancies between these positions, they shared an important common denominator: each was quite critical of Frank's vision of colonial capitalism, and by 1974 each had advanced a theoretically sophisticated and carefully researched alternative that went well beyond the terms of Laclau's initial critique. Equally telling, perhaps, is that the pioneering works associated with these positions circulated widely in Latin America but not in English translation.[38]

A fourth position, almost certainly a minority view among Latin American intellectuals, asserted the "capitalist" character of the colonial economy. But here, too, the best works went beyond the terms staked out in the initial Frank-Laclau exchange. In 1973, for example, Angel Palerm argued vigorously that Spanish Mexico had constituted a "colonial segment" of the capitalist mode of production. His argument, however, relied not only on demonstrating colonial Mexico's adjustment to, and commercial exploitation by, the world capitalist economy but also on a closely reasoned and well-informed critique of Marxist theory.[39] Peter J. Bakewell's research on the silver mines of Zacatecas convinced him by 1971 of the "capitalist nature" of seventeenth-century New Spain, an economy that generally paralleled "contemporary European design."[40] But he based this conclusion not on Mexico's commercial exploitation by the world-system, whose grip on Mexico had weakened in the seventeenth century, but on careful historical study of silver production in Mexico—its technology, labor relations, and capital investments—and its significance for the colonial Mexican economy as a whole.

It is against the backdrop of this debate that historians must gauge the significance, for Latin American history and historiography, of Wallerstein's historical publications on the modern world-system. Latin Americans had already expended great intellectual energy on their unequal participation in the world-system before the publication of Volume 1 of *The Modern World-System* in 1974. The intensity of the debate, its fast development beyond the foundations laid by Frank and Laclau, the crystallization of relatively sophisticated theoretical positions by

[38] I have in mind here especially Assadourian, "Integración y desintegración regional en el espacio colonial: Un Enfoque histórico," orig. pub. in the Chilean journal *EURE: Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Urbanos Regionales* in 1972 and well known in South America in xerox and mimeograph form before its rpt. in Lima in 1982 in *El Sistema*, 109–34; Assadourian, *Modos de producción*, orig. pub. in Argentina in 1973, and in its ninth printing by Siglo XXI (Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Madrid) as of 1982; Bartra, *Modos de producción*, orig. pub. in Mexico in 1975 and republished in a Peruvian edn. in 1976; and Semo, *Historia del capitalismo*, orig. pub. in 1973 in Mexico, where it had reached its twelfth printing as of 1983, and also pub. in a Cuban edition by Casa de las Américas in 1979. The important essays by Ciro F. S. Cardoso included in Assadourian, *Modos de producción*, were also pub. in Brazil in 1975, in Santiago, *América colonial*, 61–143. It is not an exaggeration to say that only Ernesto Laclau's celebrated article circulated widely in both the United States and Latin America.

[39] Angel Palerm, "¿Un Modelo marxista para la formación colonial de México?" rpt. in Palerm, *Antropología y marxismo* (Mexico City, 1980), 65–88 (see also 89–145); Fernando A. Novais, *Estrutura e dinâmica do antigo sistema colonial (séculos XVI–XVIII)* (São Paulo, 1974), which has much in common with Williams, *Capitalism and Slavery*; Kalki Glausser R., "Orígenes del régimen de producción vigente en Chile," in Glausser R. and Luis Vitale, *Acerca del modo de producción colonial en América Latina* (Medellín, 1974), 5–158. Palerm's thoughtful critique of theory and relative receptivity to discussions of colonial capitalism bear comparison with two important essays by Sidney W. Mintz: "The So-Called World-System: Local Initiative and Local Response," *Dialectical Anthropology*, 2 (November 1977): 253–70; "Was the Plantation Slave a Proletarian?" *Review*, 2 (Summer 1978): 81–98; compare Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York, 1985).

[40] Bakewell, *Silver Mining*, 225.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the early to mid-1970s, the tide of criticism that labeled Frank's thesis simple-minded and theoretically naive, all perhaps contribute to explaining "the surprisingly faint response"[41] to Wallerstein's volumes in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. This is not to say that Wallerstein's important books went unnoticed, especially by U.S. scholars of Latin America and the Caribbean.[42] We may now be witnessing the delayed beginnings of a flurry of responses. But, for Latin Americans especially, the temptation to view Wallerstein as Andre Gunder Frank in more erudite garb must have been great. It was as if Wallerstein had appeared too late, after Latin Americans had staged their exhausting debate on the world-system and modes of production, after they had staked out innovative positions that handled reasonably well the paradoxes of colonial Latin America's idiosyncratic participation in the world capitalist system. And the idea of Latin America's historic dependence and manipulation by an external capitalist force, so much a part of life in Latin America, so current in the intellectual environment of the 1960s and 1970s, no longer constituted a revelation. To put it another way, the novelist Gabriel García Márquez need not have read Wallerstein to execute his brilliant portrayal of dependence in *El Otoño del patriarca* (1975) (*Autumn of the Patriarch*): a Caribbean dictator, hounded by foreign creditors and the U.S. ambassador, finally relents to their pressure to export the Caribbean sea to Arizona, where the desalinated water will irrigate the desert! This magnificent moment of high humor and insight occurs in a work whose very language underscores the long-term continuity of subjection to plundering powers and capitalists. García Márquez interspersed the escapades of the twentieth century with passages lifted verbatim from the diaries of Christopher Columbus.[43]

[41] Halperín-Donghi, "'Dependency Theory' and Latin American Historiography," 129, whose argument on this point is in certain respects similar to mine.

[42] For explicit engagement by students of Latin American or Caribbean history of key ideas formulated by Wallerstein in *World-System I* (as distinct from, say, engagement of Andre Gunder Frank or various branches of the dependency literature), see C. F. S. Cardoso and Pérez, *Historia económica*, 1: 152–58; Jorge Chapa, "Wage Labor in the Periphery: Silver Mining in Colonial Mexico," *Review*, 4 (Winter 1981): 509–34; Garavaglia, *Mercado interno*, 22–24; John R. Hall, "World-System Holism and Colonial Brazilian Agriculture: A Critical Case Analysis," *Latin American Research Review*, 19 (1984): 43–69; Mintz, "So-Called World-System"; Mintz, "Was the Plantation"; Angel Palerm, "La Formación colonial mexicana y el primer sistema económico mundial" (orig. 1976), rpt. in Palerm, *Antropología y marxismo*, 89–124; Roseberry, *Coffee and Capitalism*, 59–66; Stuart B. Schwartz, "Indian Labor and New World Plantations: European Demands and Indian Responses in Northeastern Brazil," *AHR*, 83 (February 1978): 43–79; Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, Calif., 1982), 21–23, 297–98; Maurice Zeitlin, *The Civil Wars in Chile (or the Bourgeois Revolutions That Never Were)* (Princeton, N.J., 1984), 220–37. For engagement of Wallerstein by students of the Spanish Borderlands, see Tomás Almaguer, "Interpreting Chicano History: The World-System Approach to Nineteenth-Century California," *Review*, 4 (Winter 1981): 459–507; and David J. Weber, "Turner, the Boltonians, and the Borderlands," *AHR*, 91 (February 1986): 81 n. 71. This list is not the product of a systematic, exhaustive investigation, but I believe that it reflects well the state of responses to Wallerstein. Three points stand out. First, very few of the respondents are Latin Americans. Second, the response was rather delayed; not until the 1980s does one even begin to identify a clustering of commentary, especially by Latin Americans. Third, and just as important, is a qualitative matter. The comments by Latin Americans on Wallerstein lack the intensity—as measured either by the heat of polemics or by the pursuit of a systematic appraisal—that were common in the response to Andre Gunder Frank in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

[43] Gabriel García Márquez, *The Autumn of the Patriarch*, trans. Gregory Rabassa (New York, 1976), 187–88, 208, 225, 229. The genius of García Márquez's humor, to a Latin American eye, lies in the way it is not all that far-fetched; this episode is no exception. After all, colonizers in Spanish America

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NONETHELESS, IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO AVOID A SERIOUS EVALUATION OF Wallerstein's work from the angle of Latin American history. To say that, in the historiographic and intellectual context of Latin America, the tendency to slight or dismiss Wallerstein *a priori* is understandable is not to say that it is advisable. For several reasons, Wallerstein's work merits a more systematic assessment. First, his impressive command of the historical literature, on Europe especially, makes his work far too rich and deep to be brushed off lightly. Wallerstein's awareness of historical complexity in the early modern "core" and "semiperiphery" surpasses that of most works adopting a dependency or world-system perspective.[44] Second, Wallerstein's is the most systematic and forceful argument that the proper unit of historical analysis since the sixteenth century is neither a state, nor a region, nor a people, but the European world-system as a whole. The challenge of this argument is not met by ignoring it. And the argument, if correct, has enormous implications for the ways historians conceptualize and practice historical research on Latin America.

Third, Wallerstein presented a direct and innovative response to the Frank-Laclau debate. His conceptualization of capitalism does not merely restate Frank's position, and Wallerstein did not dispute the compatibility, up to a point, of feudalism and market activity. To Laclau's assertion that Latin America's servile relations of production corresponded to the feudal mode of production, Wallerstein responded that the total context surrounding particular relations of production exerts a decisive influence on their real dynamics and wider functions ("laws of motion," from the standpoint of Marxist theory). For this very reason, capitalism is best understood not as the replacement of coercive labor relations by free wage labor but rather as the rise of optimal *combinations* of free and coercive labor relations beneficial to the capitalist system as a whole. This is why, in Wallerstein's view, a vast qualitative difference distinguished the position of serfs in medieval Europe from that of sixteenth-century "serfs" subjected to feudal-like relations of production imposed by the capitalist world-economy. The reasoning behind Wallerstein's reply to Laclau is worth quoting at length:

> the difference between the gleb serf of the Middle Ages and the slave or worker on an *encomienda* in sixteenth century Hispanic America, or a "serf" in [sixteenth-century] Poland, was threefold: the difference between assigning "part" of the surplus to a market and assigning "most of the surplus"; the difference between production for a local market and a world market; the difference between the exploiting classes spending the profits, and being motivated to maximize them and partially reinvest them . . . As for involvement in a capitalist world market accentuating feudalism, precisely so, but "feudalism" of this new variety.
>
> The point is that the "relations of production" that define a system are the "relations of production" of the whole system, and the system at this point in time is the European

dug out, processed, and shipped off the insides of great silver mountains to turn the wheels of economic life and obsessions in Europe. I am grateful to my colleague in Spanish American literature, Professor Jill Netchinsky, Tufts University, for drawing my attention to García Márquez's use of the Columbus passages.

[44] See in this regard the instructive comments of Zeitlin, *Civil Wars*, 227–28 n. 15, on *World-System I*; compare my comments on *World-System II* in note 5 above.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

world-economy. Free labor is indeed a defining feature of capitalism, but not free labor throughout the productive enterprises. Free labor is the form of labor control used for skilled work in core countries whereas coerced labor is used for less skilled work in peripheral areas. The combination thereof is the essence of capitalism.[45]

It is for this very reason that Wallerstein considered "feudalism" a misleading concept in the sixteenth-century context and referred to servile labor under capitalism as "coerced cash-crop labor."[46] To equate Wallerstein and Frank sidesteps this argument.

Fourth, the Caribbean experience lends some historical support to Wallerstein's theoretical stance on units of analysis and capitalist combinations of free and coercive labor. The history of Caribbean plantation slavery complicates the distinction between non-capitalist modes of production founded on servile labor and a capitalist mode of production founded on free wage labor. In some extreme instances, the sugar plantation islands have seemed less like societies in their own right, whose material base rested on a non-capitalist mode of production "articulated" to the capitalist mode, than like outposts of Europe. Their absentee rulers lived and invested as an integrated part of the bourgeoisie in the metropolis, and their portfolio of investments included plantation enterprises that handled the slaves as finite repositories of labor-power to be replaced upon death or depletion by fresh African imports.[47] Under these circumstances, even Eugene D. Genovese, a scholar squarely aligned with Dobb and Laclau, equivocated.[48] One could write off the major sugar islands as an "extreme case" proving little. But extreme cases do sometimes expose otherwise hidden tendencies and relationships, and Genovese argues persuasively that the U.S. South is just as "extreme" an instance in the comparative history of American slavery.[49] To consider the Caribbean less

[45] Wallerstein, *World-System I*, 126–27; compare Wallerstein, *Capitalist World-Economy*, 8–17, 147–49.

[46] Wallerstein, *World-System I*, 91.

[47] Several discussions by Sidney W. Mintz are fundamental to considerations of capitalism and non-capitalism in the Caribbean context: "So-Called World-System," 253–70; "Was the Plantation," 81–98; *Sweetness and Power*, 55–61, 65–66, 180–86, *et passim*; Review of Stanley M. Elkins' *Slavery*, *American Anthropologist*, 63 (June 1961): 579–87. On early Jamaica as a "pseudo-society," see Orlando Patterson, "Slavery and Slave Revolts: A Sociohistorical Analysis of the First Maroon War, 1665–1740," in Richard Price, ed., *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas* (2d edn., Baltimore, Md., 1979), 246–92; compare Richard S. Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624–1713* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1972); James, *Black Jacobins*; and the sophisticated discussion of settlement colonies and exploitation colonies in Franklin W. Knight, *The Caribbean: The Genesis of a Fragmented Nationalism* (New York, 1978), 56–66. The danger of the "pseudo-society" concept, of course, is that it might encourage one to slight the ways even the most extreme plantation islands witnessed the eventual development of a social and cultural life that made them more than deformed outposts of Europe (Patterson himself avoided this danger). On the slaves as culture builders from the earliest moments of their enslavement, see the seminal essay by Sidney W. Mintz and Richard Price, *An Anthropological Approach to the Afro-American Past: A Caribbean Perspective* (Philadelphia, 1976).

[48] Eugene D. Genovese, *The World the Slaveholders Made: Two Essays in Interpretation* (New York, 1969), part 1, esp. 16–17, 22–34; compare Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese, *Fruits of Merchant Capital: Slavery and Bourgeois Property in the Rise and Expansion of Capitalism* (New York, 1983), 22–23.

[49] Genovese, *World the Slaveholders Made*, part 1. In Part 2 of the same book, Genovese argued that, precisely because of his extremism as an ideologue, George Fitzhugh is an illuminating example of the sometimes obscure philosophical direction in which the master class of the antebellum South was heading.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

theoretically or historically significant than the equally "extreme" U.S. South would be to make an ethnocentric assumption. Moreover, Brazil has shared more features with the Caribbean than meet the eye. In the sixteenth century, the sugar plantations were much like "islands" of commercial exploitation, narrow coastal strips of effective Portuguese control surrounded by the sea and by frontier territory. In the coffee belt of southern Brazil in the nineteenth century, the dynamic Paulista fraction of the slaveholding class acted much as Caribbean capitalists whose portfolios of real and prospective investments combined free and slave labor.[50]

Notwithstanding the prior debate in Latin America, and its considerable sophistication, Wallerstein's version of the world-system idea demands serious and systematic appraisal from the perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean. For historians, critical evaluation requires that we compare case studies with the general scheme proposed in *The Modern World-System*. Yet to select a case study at random, regardless of significance, would contribute little to this process. Few will listen attentively to an exclamation such as, "After six years of careful study, my conclusion is definite: Wallerstein's model does not apply well to the case of sarsaparilla exports from Santa Rosa de la Frontera de la Oscuridad!" The closer our case studies come to the heart of the thesis, the more telling the critical evaluation. I propose that we focus on the silver mines and sugar plantations of early colonial America. These two case studies have several advantages. Silver from Spanish America and sugar from Portuguese Brazil and the Caribbean constituted the two most important exports provided by America to Europe during the long sixteenth and seventeenth centuries studied by Wallerstein. Not surprisingly, the silver and sugar sectors of Iberian America and the Caribbean also drew the most sustained and intense attention of metropolitan officials. In short, these case studies belong to the very core (if I may appropriate the term) of Wallerstein's vision of the world-system's operation in colonial Latin America and the Caribbean. If these case studies expose major problems in Wallerstein's interpretation, his entire paradigm is at risk. If, on the other hand, Wallerstein's world-system provides us genuine insights about the periphery, and core-periphery relations, these insights should become especially evident in a study of the world-system's highest American priorities.

THE KEY QUESTIONS CONCERN DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION. On a descriptive level, does Wallerstein provide an adequate approximation, in the cases of silver and sugar, of the elements he himself considered essential to his argument? In other words, does the tripartite division of international labor—free labor in the core, sharecropping in the semiperiphery, and forced labor (slavery and "coerced cash-crop labor") in the periphery—succeed in describing the main features of the labor systems associated with silver and sugar production? On an explanatory level,

[50] See the contrasts drawn between the western Paulista planters and those of the Paraíba Valley in Viotti da Costa, *Da senzala à colônia*, *passim*; Viotti da Costa, *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories* (Chicago, 1985), 152–53, 157–59, 168–69, 222–23, 227–28.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

does Wallerstein's method or reasoning account convincingly for the rise of patterns he himself considered strategic? In other words, are the main features of production, labor, and commerce in the silver and sugar sectors best explained by their functional value to the world-system, that is, as the result of optimal solutions imposed either by the world-system or by American capitalists responding to the dictates of the international market?

Let us begin with silver, the legendary American export during the long sixteenth century. The most important source of American silver during this period was Potosí, the great silver mountain on the arid Bolivian *altiplano*.[51] Until recently, the conventional interpretation of labor in Potosí provided an almost classic illustration of Wallerstein's thesis. The earlier account runs along the following lines. Discovered for Spanish colonial purposes in 1545, Potosí first drew an anarchic rush of colonial entrepreneurs who tyrannized the Indians they reduced to slavery. As the initial plunder of rich ore sputtered in the 1560s, the colonial state moved to organize Potosí's more rational exploitation. Under the leadership of Viceroy Francisco de Toledo (1569–1581), the technology and relations of silver production changed dramatically. Enormous sums of capital financed the building of an infrastructure of lakes, dams, aqueducts, and refineries; mercury amalgamation replaced simple smelting techniques and allowed for large-scale refining of lower grade ore; and the infamous *mita* labor system, a rotating draft of Indian laborers, compelled some 13,000 peasants to work in the mines at a stipulated "wage" each year. The *mita* "wage" was so paltry, compared to the purchases and debits imposed on workers, that it represented a kind of legal fiction rather than a means of sustenance. In earlier historiography, this form of "forced paid labor" constituted the strategic labor relation, both because it provided the bulk of the labor force in the mines and because it established the cheap costs of production that underwrote Potosí's prosperity. The *mita* fixed conditions of work, productivity, and payment in a coercive mold that underpaid laborers, drew a subsidy from the peasant economy supporting drafted laborers, and maximized the surplus captured by silver producers and merchants. And the original design of technology and labor relations engineered in the 1570s held up well against the forces of erosion and secular decline. The *mita* was not abolished in Peru-Bolivia until 1812.[52] What better example could one find of a

[51] See Richard L. Garner, "Long-Term Silver Mining Trends in Spanish America: A Comparative Analysis of Peru and Mexico," *AHR*, 93 (October 1988): 898–935, this issue.

[52] For important early contributions to the history of *mita* labor in Potosí, see Jorge Basadre, "El Régimen de la mita," in José Manuel Valega, ed., *El Virreinato del Perú* (Lima, 1939), 187–203; Alberto Crespo Rodas, "La 'Mita' de Potosí," *Revista histórica* (Lima), 22 (1955–56): 169–82; Marie Helmer, "Notas sobre la encomienda peruana en el siglo XVI," *Revista del Instituto de Historia del Derecho*, 10 (1959): 124–43; George Kubler, "The Quechua in the Colonial World," in Julian Steward, ed., *Handbook of South American Indians*, 7 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1946–59), 2: 371–73; John H. Rowe, "The Incas under Spanish Colonial Institutions," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 37 (May 1957): 172–76. Compare Manuel Vicente Villarán, *Apuntes sobre la realidad social de los indígenas ante las leyes de Indias* (Lima, 1964), 101–45; David L. Wiedner, "Forced Labor in Colonial Peru," *Americas*, 16 (April 1960): 357–83. On the prevalence of the "classic" picture as of the early 1970s, see the comments of Brading and Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining," 557–60; compare R. C. Padden, "Editor's Introduction," in Bartolomé Arzáns de Orsúa y Vela, *Tales of Potosí*, ed. Padden, trans. Frances M. López-Morillas (Providence, R.I., 1975), xvii–xxiii; Juan Villamarín and Judith Villamarín, *Indian Labor in Mainland*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

system that exploited "coerced cash-crop labor" in the periphery to serve the needs of the European world-economy?

Yet recent research corroborates only some parts of this earlier picture. The new work does not question the major investments and engineering ventures to revamp the technology of silver production in the 1570s, the inadequacy of the *mita* "wage" to support laborers, or the *mita*'s economic role as a subsidy to silver production. But, on the question of labor, the conventional account breaks down.

A more subtle and well-researched history of Indian mine labor in Potosí is now available, and it recasts the *mita* labor relation into a role more modest and unintended. During Potosí's first century, three overlapping stages emerge in the history of mine labor. In a phase lasting until the early 1570s, what was remarkable was the dependence of European silver producers on conditions of work and technology defined largely by Indians. Indian mine laborers were either *yanaconas*, individual Indians who had cut or loosened ties with native ethnic-kin groups, or *encomienda* Indians, members of ethnic-kin groups "entrusted" by the Crown to particular Spanish colonizers (*encomenderos*). For the most part, the *yanaconas* floated independently from employer to employer and, in effect, leased rights to mine particular veins in exchange for providing a share of the ore to their employers. The *yanaconas* assumed responsibility for organizing, provisioning, and paying their own work parties. The *encomienda* Indians, theoretically a more subject group, in practice turned over the silver needed to pay tributes to their *encomenderos* and kept the rest for themselves. In this early period, the collaboration of the *encomienda* groups with their would-be masters was in any event a fragile matter that limited the Europeans' coercive powers. Moreover, the Indians controlled the smelting of silver. Literally thousands of *guayras*, small wind ovens, dotted the great silver mountain, and it was through the Indian ore market that crude ore was bought, refined, and resold as silver. To acquire pure silver, the Spanish had to sell the ore they received as tribute or as "shares" back to Indians.[53] As Juan de Matienzo, a keen and reliable observer, noted in 1567, the Spanish could only regain a large share of refined silver indirectly, by attempting to

Colonial Spanish America (Newark, Del., 1975), 2, 17, 19–20, 74–79. On the technical aspects and scale of production, see Brading and Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining," 547–56, 568–79; Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 8–32, 137–51; Bakewell, "Registered Silver Production in the Potosí District, 1550–1735," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas*, 12 (1975): 67–103; Bakewell, "Technological Change in Potosí: The Silver Boom of the 1570s," *ibid.*, 14 (1977): 60–77. Older works still useful are Modesto Bargalló, *La Amalgamación de los minerales de plata* (Mexico City, 1969); Bargalló, *La Minería y la metalurgía en la América española durante la época colonial* (Mexico City, 1955), esp. 107–66; Gwendoline Ballantine Cobb, "Potosí and Huancavelica: Economic Bases of Peru, 1545 to 1640" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1947).

[53] For recent research on social relations in Potosí during the early years, see Assadourian, "La Producción de la mercancía dinero," 223–92; Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 14–19, 33–60; Josep M. Barnadas, "Una Polémica colonial: Potosí, 1579–1584," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas*, 10 (1973): 16–70. For the overall context of early colonization in Bolivia, see Josep M. Barnadas, *Charcas: Orígenes históricos de una sociedad colonial* (La Paz, 1973). On the fragility of early native-white relations, and the limits this imposed on European power, see Steve J. Stern, "The Rise and Fall of Indian-White Alliances: A Regional View of 'Conquest' History," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 61 (August 1981): 461–91. A major research effort to revamp our understanding of the history of mining has been undertaken by the Instituto de Estudios Peruanos and is described in Carlos Sempat Assadourian, *et al.*, *Minería y espacio económico en los Andes, siglos XVI–XX* (Lima, 1980).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dominate the provision of coca leaf to Potosí. Annual coca sales absorbed about a million pesos of silver, representing roughly half the value of all market purchases.[54]

The reorganization of technology and labor in the 1570s ushered in a second phase, which dramatically altered production levels and the balance of Spanish-Indian power. In this period, the *mita* draft indeed served as the cornerstone of a profitable labor system. The *mita* rotations sent thousands of laborers to the mines and refineries for a one-year stint of poorly remunerated work assignments. The draft also facilitated the growth of a "reserve army" of voluntary laborers, since the *mitayos* (Indians on *mita* duty) brought relatives with them for their year of service, and since the *mita* itself alternated "work" and "rest" cycles (theoretically, one week working, two weeks resting) under wage and price conditions that forced "resting" *mitayos* to volunteer to sell their services in the labor market. In the 1570s and 1580s, "coerced cash-crop labor" worked wonders indeed. Silver production more than quadrupled, the peasant economy supplied workers and subsidies to the silver economy, and the European sector escaped its earlier dependence on conditions of work and smelting defined in large measure by Andean individuals and ethnic-kin groups. The *guayra* wind ovens of the Indians, inferior to mercury amalgamation except in cases of high-grade ore, slipped into a secondary role in refining.[55]

Yet, as early as the turn of the century, the *mita* assumed an altered role in overall production. The *mita* declined in importance as a *labor relation* providing workers to the silver mines and refineries but grew in importance as a subsidy, or form of "rent," that cheapened the cost of free labor. For, even as Toledo organized a state-sponsored system of forced labor, there arose a more spontaneous system of voluntary hiring. The supply of *minga* Indians, or volunteer laborers, at first drew greatly on the temporary "reserve armies" created by the *mita*, but a close reading of the evidence suggests an increasingly permanent supply of *minga* laborers by the 1600s.[56] The division of labor tended to allot more primitive, dangerous, or repugnant tasks, such as carrying freshly mined ore to the surface, to the *mitayos*, and more "skilled" and highly rewarded tasks, such as ore cutting, to the volunteers. By the early seventeenth century, and perhaps earlier, the *mingas* accounted for better than half the labor supply in the Potosí mines and refineries.[57] Moreover, Indian groups and individuals, and Spanish entrepreneurs, had worked out arrangements whereby *mita* quotas were declared fulfilled if the Indian communities delivered not laborers but sums of money needed to hire substitute

[54] Juan de Matienzo, *Gobierno del Perú* (orig. 1567), in Guillermo Lohmann Villena, ed., *Travaux de l'Institut Français d'Etudes Andines*, 11 (Paris, 1967), 132–33, 162–64; compare Assadourian, "La Producción de la mercancía dinero," 231–32.

[55] See esp. Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 17–18, 65–120; Bakewell, "Registered Silver Production"; compare Jeffrey A. Cole, *The Potosí Mita, 1573–1700: Compulsory Indian Labor in the Andes* (Stanford, Calif., 1985), 1–19. For the interconnected and in certain respects parallel case of the Huancavelica mercury mines, see Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 81–89, 106–09.

[56] Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 132–34.

[57] See Assadourian, "La Producción de la mercancía dinero," 253–56; Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 127–28; compare Tandeter, "Forced and Free Labour," 101.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mingas to replace the *mitayos*. The practice probably accounted for better than half the official *mita* quotas as early as the 1630s. The conversion of *mita* labor into *mita* rent, the decline in official *mita* quotas (due to population decrease and the Indians' own use of the legal system), the stubborn resistance of Indian groups to full physical compliance with the *mita*, and the interest of colonial employers in expanding or stabilizing their labor supply, and in acquiring incomes subsidizing their enterprises—all reduced the significance of the *mita* as a provider of labor but increased its significance as a form of rent, or tributary income, that reduced risks and enhanced profits in the Potosí mines.[58]

Running throughout this evolution of labor was a consistent drive by Indian mine laborers to convert relations of forced labor and of wage labor into a relation resembling sharecropping. In the early years, European social control was fragile, Indian smelters controlled the production of refined silver, and Indian traders dominated the ore market. Under the circumstances, *yanaconas* and *encomienda* Indians did not find it difficult to establish a share system, and their share in the product constituted the primary incentive for collaboration with European mineowners. The quid pro quos inherent in such arrangements began to disintegrate in the 1560s, and, not surprisingly, those years witnessed more serious interest by colonizers in a rationalized forced-labor system.[59] When, in the 1570s, the colonial state consolidated its power, reorganized the mines, and institutionalized forced labor on a massive scale, Indians nonetheless asserted a right by laborers to a share in the ore they produced. The *corpa*, the piece of ore conceded to *minga* Indians as the most attractive part of their "wage," inevitably found its way into the *mita* system. *Mitayos*, like *mingas*, established a customary "right" to the best pieces of ore encountered during the course of work, and the laborers sold their *corpa* pieces in the *qhatu*, the Indian ore market. What the *mitayos* considered a "right" that made their labors more bearable, the mineowners sometimes labeled "robbery." But, in negotiations with Viceroy Toledo on the official wage rate to be paid *mitayos*, the European miners themselves conceded that such "theft" had become a permanent and grudgingly accepted practice and that it constituted the most important part of the *mitayos*' remuneration; they pressed accordingly for its inclusion in the calculation of total "wages" received by *mita* laborers.[60] In the case of the *mingas*, a similar dialectic counterposed "right" and "robbery." What

[58] See Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 123–31, 134–35, 161; Cole, *The Potosí Mita*, 32–44, 56–57, *et passim*; Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz, *Indios y tributos en el Alto Perú* (Lima, 1978), 69–149; Tandeter, "Forced and Free Labour," 102–03. Tandeter, 98–136, performed an economic analysis of *mita* rent for the late eighteenth century and demonstrated convincingly that it was central to profitability in this period. For comparison with the fate of the *mita* and the evolution of labor in Huancavelica, see Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 116–31, 140–57; compare Luis J. Basto Girón, *Las Mitas de Huamanga y Huancavelica* (Lima, 1954), 5–6, 10–13; Guillermo Lohmann Villena, *Las Minas de Huancavelica en los siglos XVI y XVII* (Seville, 1949), 103, 107, 120, 144–45, 160–61, 178, 185–86, 222, 242–43, 251–60, 266, 284–85, 285 n. 31.

[59] See Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 36, 43–59; compare Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 71–79; Guillermo Lohmann Villena, "Juan de Matienzo, autor del 'Gobierno del Perú' (su personalidad y su obra)," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, 22 (1965): 767–886.

[60] Luis Capoche, "Relación general del asiento y Villa Imperial de Potosí . . ." (orig. 1585), published in *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, 122 (Madrid, 1959), 166–67; Assadourian, "La Producción de la mercancía dinero," 268–71; Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 79, 75.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mineowners originally conceded as a right to a daily piece of good ore grew into a more systematic appropriation by laborers of high-grade ores capable of being smelted in the traditional wind ovens. This more aggressive appropriation of ore, considered a "right" by the *mingas* and "theft" by their employers, led to a major controversy about *corpa* rights and the Indian ore market in the early 1580s. Mineowners hoped to roll back the *corpa* system, in part by eliminating the *qhatu*. And no wonder. The Indian ore market accounted for some 25 percent of total production of silver ore. By the late sixteenth century, the *mingas*' customary right to appropriate shares had grown into a key strategy involving the household economy as a whole. The women received high-grade ore from their men when they brought them food at midweek. The women then proceeded to smelt the best ores in their *guayras* (by now the *guayra* sector was run by women) or to trade ore in the *qhatu*.[61]

Compared to *minga* laborers, the *mitayos* worked at tasks and under coercive pressures that restricted their capacity to enlarge their "share" in the product of their labors. They could inject an element of share arrangements into the forced labor relationship, but they could not really transform it. In the case of *minga* Indians, however, the balance of power contrasted sharply: "experience has shown that the metal mined with *mitayos* [*indios de cédula*] is of a higher grade than that worked by *mingas* [*indios mingados*]."[62] This observation by a well-informed contemporary, if it is to be believed, casts doubt on the common assumption that the *mingas* constituted a supply of skilled laborers more attractive to mineowners than rotations of "unskilled" draft laborers. The assumption is too crude because it fails to distinguish between "optimal" solutions in low-grade versus high-grade mines and because it fails to account for the way that lack of labor discipline might in practice undermine the theoretical advantages of "skilled" labor. In Potosí's mines and refineries, the *mingas* developed a reputation as a notoriously independent labor force—difficult to discipline, accustomed to appropriating a share of ore or silver as their "right," assertive about the hours and conditions of their work—that was grudgingly accommodated by employers for lack of a better alternative.[63] The *mingas*, especially those who worked in the underground mines, did succeed in transforming the "wage relation" initially desired by their employers

[61] Capoche, "Relación general," 109, 150–67, 174; Barnadas, "Una Polémica colonial," 16–70; Assadourian, "La Producción de la mercancía dinero," 269–70; Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 123, 140–41. For the continuation of smelting in *guayras* in the seventeenth century, see the famous work by the Potosí priest Alvaro Alonso Barba, *Arte de los metales, en que se enseña el verdadero beneficio de los de oro, y plata . . .* (1637; facs. rpt. of 1770 edn., Mexico City, 1925), 130–31, 139–41 (Book 4, chaps. 1, 6).

[62] Capoche, "Relación general," 150. Capoche's treatise (69–189) is one of the most highly regarded and frequently used documents on early Potosí.

[63] Capoche, "Relación general," 173–74; compare Antonio de Ayans, "Breve Relación de los agravios que reciben los indios que ay desde cerca del Cuzco hasta Potosí . . ." (orig. 1596), published in Ruben Vargas Ugarte, ed., *Pareceres jurídicos en asuntos de Indias* (Lima, 1951), 39–40, 66; Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 121–22; Cole, *The Potosí Mita*, 62–63. On the preference for the *mita* drafts over other forms of labor, from a narrow economic point of view, in another Andean mining region, see Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 192, 260 n. 10.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

into a "share relation."[64] Indeed, sometime during the late seventeenth century, when Potosí's secular decline was well advanced and the mineowners' position weak, the *mingas* expanded their right to appropriate a share of product into a form of partial possession in the mines. They established the practice of *kajcheo*, weekend raids by bands of Indians who mined for themselves the particularly rich ore sections they had encountered during the work week. *Kajcheo* grew into a customary right that plagued the mines throughout the eighteenth century. The *kajcheo* ore was processed not in the larger water-powered refineries (*ingenios*), which handled most of Potosí's ore, but in crude, human-powered mills (*trapiches*) located in the Indian fringes of the city. At the height of this activity, in 1759, some 4,000 weekend raiders accounted for only 3.3 percent of the total ore processed in Potosí, but this tiny fraction of ore in turn yielded 38.1 percent of total refined silver produced in Potosí. The "opportunity cost" of the *kajcheo* to mineowners is obvious and dramatic. For this very reason, argued Enrique Tandeter, it was the brutal intensification of the labor regime imposed on *mitayo* laborers that made the crucial difference in Potosí's profitability and rising silver production during the late eighteenth century.[65]

How far we have traveled from the interpretation provided by Wallerstein's world-system is by now obvious. The paradigm appears badly misleading on both descriptive and explanatory grounds. During most of the long sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Potosí's labor relations fit poorly in the mold of a periphery assigned "coerced cash-crop labor" by the world-system's international division of labor. This was the case even though the colonial state and mineowners had indeed directed enormous effort to making "coerced cash-crop labor" the centerpiece of the labor system. Except for a brief period, however, the labor system is best described as a fluctuating combination of wage relations, share relations, and forced-labor relations in which voluntary share relations predominated—both because such relations were the most numerically frequent and because their influence tended to "distort" or "twist" other labor relations in the direction of "sharecropping."[66] This description does not deny the importance of the *mita* as

[64] Note that, even when employers initially conceded a single piece of good ore per unit of work as part of the "wage," employers held an interest in defining the ore concession as a "wage," a fixed standard of payment according to work performed, rather than a "share," a right of fractional appropriation in the *product* of the work performed. Thus the issue is complex, since the distinction between "wage" and "share" is not, strictly speaking, identical to that between payment in silver coin or unprocessed ore. The *mingas* essentially transformed ore conceded as part of a "wage" into customary rights of appropriation and even possession in the mine and its product.

[65] Enrique Tandeter, "La Producción como actividad popular: 'ladrones de minas' en Potosí," *Nova Americana*, 4 (1981): 43–65 (production figures are on 51); Tandeter, "Forced and Free Labour," 98–136. In 1778, Miguel Feijoó de Sosa's report to Viceroy Guirior calculated that *kajcheo* ores accounted for 53 percent of the refined silver recorded in Potosí's Banco de Rescates (official silver-purchasing bank) during the period 1773–77. Feijoó de Sosa to Guirior, Lima, September 10, 1778, printed in Melchor de Paz, "Diálogo sobre los Sucesos varios acaecidos en este Reyno del Perú" (orig. 1786), rpt. in Luis Antonio Eguiguren, ed., *Guerra separatista*, 2 vols. (Lima, 1952), 2: 350–51.

[66] This statement is more certain for the mines than the refineries, about which information is more sparse. But the refineries hardly corroborate Wallerstein's picture either, since the question, for the case of the refineries, is whether "wage" or "share" relations were more dominant.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a coercive labor relation crucial to the reorganization of Potosí in the 1570s, or its significance as a complementary labor relation and as a form of "rent" subsidizing the mines from the late sixteenth century onward. Indeed, precisely because share relations were so dominant in the organization of labor, and so damaging to the profits of entrepreneurs, institutions of tributary rent and coerced labor sometimes mattered greatly. They could provide the marginal difference between good and poor profits, and entrepreneurs had every reason to squeeze their *mita* privileges as brutally as possible. But if scholars must stay within the descriptive categories of Wallerstein's world-system, on close inspection, labor in Potosí more closely resembles the pattern of the "semiperiphery" than that of the "periphery."

In explanatory terms, the world-system framework also fares poorly. To explain the rise of share arrangments in terms of their utility to the world-system, or to American capitalists adapting to the international market, would miss the point entirely. The twisting of wage and forced labor in the direction of share relations greatly disturbed colonial entrepreneurs and officials, and it bolstered an Indian market of production, consumption, and speculation that developed a life of its own, one not easily molded by the preferences of the colonial state, American elites, or the European world-system.[67] The colonizers' schemes to beat back share arrangements and to control or even eliminate independent Indian marketing yielded at most fleeting victories, partly because the resistance to such attempts was so unyielding and the risks of a concerted drive against customary practices so unsettling.[68]

To set the case of Potosí in context, consider its significance within the silver economy of Spanish America as a whole. I have already pointed out its position as the leading center of silver production in the early colonial period. Two further observations are in order. First, because Potosí's riches drew high priority, it constitutes, among the range of major silver centers, the example most likely to corroborate Wallerstein's analysis. Potosí and Huancavelica (Peru), whose mines provided an American source of mercury for amalgamation, received preferential treatment in the organization of corvée labor. In these centers, the state was least disposed to place trust in the vagaries of voluntary labor. Elsewhere, labor systems in the mines moved more rapidly toward private arrangements unassisted by corvée labor. Oruro (Bolivia), for example, a major silver-producing center early in the seventeenth century, drew some 10,000 laborers by 1617–1618, and this

[67] The most innovative work in Andean economic history has emphasized the rise of internal American markets, especially inter-regional markets, into a force with a logic of its own, sometimes more important in commercial terms than the international flow of trade. See Assadourian, "La Producción de la mercancía dinero," 223–92; Assadourian, *El Sistema*, esp. 109–34, 277–321; Stern, "New Directions," 134–39, 142–43; compare Garavaglia, *Mercado interno y economía colonial*.

[68] The strongest and most politically organized effort to deal with the issue came during 1579–84 and is presented in Barnadas, "Una Polémica colonial," 16–70; Capoche, "Relación general," 150–67; compare Assadourian, "La Producción de la mercancía dinero," 254–55, 268–70. It is obvious from the sources, however, that Indian share arrangements and marketing was a problematic issue that festered before and after this period and that colonizers tried a variety of means to limit the damage—by curtailing the customary rights and independence of voluntary workers or by intensifying forced labor in the mines. For helpful discussions, see Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 46–54, 84; Cole, *The Potosí Mita*, 23–25. 52–53; Tandeter, "Forced and Free Labour," 104–05; compare Matienzo, *Gobierno del Perú*, 16–20, 134–35; Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 74–75.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

competition apparently made labor more scarce in Potosí. Yet it rarely received any *mita* quotas from the state, and such allotments as it received (550 *mitayos*) were insignificant.[69] In Mexico, most of whose best silver mines were situated north of the densely populated Indian heartland, corvée labor played a minor role in silver production. In the northern mines, "coerced cash-crop labor" almost always took the form of Indian or African slavery and accounted for very small shares of the labor force. The overwhelming majority of laborers were hired Indians (*naborías*).[70]

Second, the drive by laborers to establish customary share arrangements appeared not only in Potosí but in virtually every major silver center of Mexico and Peru-Bolivia. The Mexican case is particularly well documented, and scholars agree that, for most of the colonial period, the laborers' shares (known in Mexico as *pepenas* or *partidos*, depending on time, place, and the particular rules of ore division) in the ores they produced constituted a far more important reward than fixed money wages. In Mexico, as in Potosí, the share system developed in the context of a notoriously unruly labor force whose appropriations of ore and general independence lowered the profits of mineowners. In Mexico, as in Potosí, petty refiners diverted particularly rich ores to their crude smelting ovens and probably benefited from the independent ore trade facilitated by the share system. In much of Mexico, apparently unlike Potosí, mineowners and the state eventually rolled back the laborers' customary share rights. Beginning in 1766, a strong, repressive campaign, backed by military force, curtailed and in some mines eliminated the shares of the workers. The labor system moved in the direction of "forced paid labor" (for instance, round-ups of "vagrants" and "idle" laborers) or combinations of forced and wage labor.[71] David Brading's meticulous study of the mining economy argues that the silver boom of the late eighteenth century derived in part from this successful campaign to discipline labor.[72] Before the 1760s,

[69] Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 113–14. The importance of ore shares in the private labor system that developed in Oruro is underscored in a fine study that appeared after this article was drafted: Ann Zulawski, "Wages, Ore Sharing, and Peasant Agriculture: Labor in Oruro's Silver Mines, 1607–1720," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 67 (August 1987): 405–30, esp. 411–20.

[70] See Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 182–83; Bakewell, *Silver Mining*; Enrique Forescano, "La Formación de los trabajadores en la época colonial, 1521–1700," in Pablo González Casanova, ed., *La Clase obrera en la historia de México, Tomo 1: De la colonia al imperio* (Mexico City, 1980), 72–74; Chapa, "Wage Labor," 509–34. For the eighteenth century, see David Brading, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1736–1810* (Cambridge, 1971); Morin, *Michoacán*, 92–101. One of the most original and significant points in Bakewell's study of Potosí is that the conventional contrast between free labor in the Mexican mines and forced labor in the Andean mines is greatly overdrawn. See *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 179–86.

[71] See Bakewell, *Silver Mining*, 121–29, 145–46, 189, 193, 199–201, 209–10; Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 147–49, 157, 197, 233–38, 274–78, 282, 284–91; and Chapa, "Wage Labor," 523–28. Luís Chávez Orozco has published several collections of documents illuminating the important labor conflict at Real de Monte in 1766: *Conflicto de trabajo con los mineros de Real de Monte, Año de 1766* (Mexico City, 1960); *La Situación del minero asalariado en la Nueva España a fines del siglo XVIII* (1935; 2d edn., Mexico City, 1978); *Los Salarios y el trabajo en México durante el siglo XVIII* (1960; 2d edn., Mexico City, 1978); compare Manuel Arellano Z., ed., *Primera huelga minera en Real de Monte, 1766* (Mexico City, 1976); and the comments on Doris Ladd's book in note 72 below.

[72] Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 156–58, 274–78, 284–91. A fine book by Doris Ladd, *The Making of a Strike: Mexican Silver Workers' Struggles in Real del Monte, 1766–1775* (Lincoln, Neb., 1988), appeared after this essay was drafted. In her splendid analysis of labor conflicts over share rights, Ladd argues convincingly that the workers of Real del Monte successfully defended their *partidos* (although new

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

however, in the major mines of Mexico as well as in Potosí, share relations proved stubbornly difficult to resist. Mineowners might control the damage but could rarely muster the political will needed to establish an enduring alternative.

The more closely the case of silver is examined, the more limited is the world-system's power to explain either the history of labor or the division of surplus between laborer and employer. This is not to argue for the irrelevance of the world-system. After all, Europe did establish an enormous silver production sector in America on terms that provided the world-system a colonial surplus, and this accomplishment rightfully constitutes an important chapter in the history of European capitalism. To slight the world-system, or the impact of capitalism on Spanish America, is to ignore the obvious. The point is, however, that the world-system constituted only one of several great "motor forces" that shaped patterns of labor and economy in the periphery; it did not always constitute the decisive causal force even in sectors of high priority; and the various limitations on the world-system's power help to explain the chasm, on a descriptive level, between the world-system model and the reality it purports to illuminate. In the case of silver, any adequate explanation of the shifting labor system, or the division of the economic pie, would have to grant independent causal weight not only to the world-system and its needs but also to the laborers' resistance and assertion of "rights," and to the rise in America of regional and inter-regional markets and elites whose "logic" and interests did not always coincide with those of the world-system.[73] We have, then, three great motors—the world-system, popular

rules of ore mixing reduced the quality of *partido* ores claimed by the workers). Brading's more comprehensive study demonstrates that Ladd erred, however, when she implied (92, 96–97, 120, 124) that customary share rights continued to prevail in Mexico's other silver mines. Especially in Guanajuato, the most important silver-mining zone in the late eighteenth century, attacks against laborers' customary rights were more ruthlessly and successfully enforced than at Real del Monte.

[73] The focus of this article's assessment of Wallerstein's world-system is on labor, and an extended analysis of American markets and elite interests whose own logic sometimes diverged from that of Europe is out of place here. But a rapidly expanding secondary literature exists on this point. For the logic of the American marketplace in Andean South America, see the sources cited in note 67 and the following: Kenneth J. Andrien, *Crisis and Decline: The Viceroyalty of Peru in the Seventeenth Century* (Albuquerque, N.M., 1985), esp. chap. 2; Assadourian, *Análisis sobre la formación*; Larson, "Rural Rhythms of Class Conflict," 407–30; Brooke Larson, *Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia: Cochabamba, 1550–1900* (Princeton, N.J., 1988); Olivia Harris, Brooke Larson, and Enrique Tandeter, eds., *Participación indígena en los mercados surandinos: Estrategias y reproducción social, siglos XVI a XX* (La Paz, 1987); compare Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*. For works that illuminate the internal divisions and the Americanization of bureaucracy that constrained metropolitan power in Habsburg South America during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see John Leddy Phelan, *The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century: Bureaucratic Politics in the Spanish Empire* (Madison, Wis., 1967); Andrien, *Crisis and Decline*; Cole, *The Potosí Mita*; Guillermo Lohmann Villena, *El Corregidor de indios en el Perú bajo los Austrias* (Madrid, 1957); J. H. Parry, *The Sale of Public Office in the Spanish Indies under the Hapsburgs* (Berkeley, Calif., 1953); Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 93–102, 115–32; compare Stuart B. Schwartz, "Magistracy and Society in Colonial Brazil," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 50 (November 1970): 715–30; John Lynch, *The Spanish-American Revolutions, 1808–1826* (New York, 1973), chap. 1; John Leddy Phelan, *The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in Colombia, 1781* (Madison, Wis., 1978). The wider imperial context for much of this literature is the decline of Spain: for stimulating debate on the subject and orientation to its historiography, see Henry Kamen, "The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?" *Past and Present*, 81 (November 1978): 24–50, and the debate in 91 (May 1981): 170–85. For further clarification of context and issues, see J. H. Elliott, *Richelieu and Olivares* (New York, 1984); Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares: The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven, Conn., 1986); Jonathan I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic and the Hispanic World, 1606–1661* (Oxford, 1982); Carla Rahn

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

strategies of resistance and survival within the periphery, and the mercantile and elite interests joined to an American "center of gravity." Observe, in addition, that Western Europe's own internal divisions and competitions affected the political coherence and will of the "world-system," and that, within Spanish America, colonial elites and authorities pursued multiple goals and interests that sometimes divided them against themselves despite their shared general interest in silver production.[74]

Under these circumstances, historical explanation that reduces patterns of labor and economy in the periphery to a reflection of the capitalist world-system is one-dimensional and misleading—even for silver, the early world-system's most valued American treasure.

FOR REASONS OF SPACE AND LOGIC, my examination of the sugar plantation sector will spare the reader the degree of detail presented for silver. The case of silver alone, given its stature in the early modern world-system, is sufficient to establish that the fundamentals of Wallerstein's interpretation are severely flawed when viewed from the American periphery. From the narrow point of view of merely "affirming" or "discrediting" Wallerstein, the analysis of silver makes a detailed review of sugar unnecessary—or, more precisely, redundant. From a larger point of view, however, the case of sugar merits some discussion. It would be illuminating to know whether sugar represents a more felicitous example of the validity of Wallerstein's interpretation or whether it also raises major problems for the world-system paradigm. Sugar, moreover, offers an indisputably "sympathetic" test of the paradigm. As mentioned earlier, the greater Caribbean region includes some examples of a nearly "pure" periphery—islands of slave plantations ruthlessly molded to serve the interests of absentee capitalist rulers, colonial outposts utterly dependent on fresh infusions of African slaves and unable otherwise to function or reproduce themselves as societies in their own right. What better example could one hope to find of a capitalist world-system whose global impact undermines the validity of local units of analysis and whose characteristic pattern combines, in a single, interlocked structure, free labor in the core and forced labor in the periphery?

Let us grant from the outset that the descriptive side of Wallerstein's paradigm applies better to the labor systems that eventually emerged in major sugar regions than to those associated with silver. In the main, African slave labor produced the

Phillips, "Time and Duration: A Model for the Economy of Early Modern Spain," *AHR*, 92 (June 1987): 531–62.

[74] Wallerstein himself did a masterful job of demonstrating internal rivalries within Europe in *World-System I* and *World-System II* and saw hegemony within the core of the capitalist world-economy as relatively rare (*World-System II*, 38 *et passim*; compare Wallerstein, *Politics of the World-Economy*, 37–46). What this may imply for the validity of his conceptual framework is not thoroughly scrutinized, in my judgment. On Spain and Portugal's dependence on rival European powers, see the classic essay by Stein and Stein, *Colonial Heritage*; compare the emphasis on Malthusian limits in Phillips, "Time and Duration." For a specific example of the way multiple narrow goals and interests could serve, within Spanish America, to divide elites against themselves in ways that thwarted realization of the general interest uniting them, see Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, chap. 5. Compare the sources on bureaucracy cited in note 73 above.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sugar that sweetened diets and profits in Europe. There still remains, however, the question of explanation. *Why* did African slave labor come to play this role in sugar production? Does a line of explanation derived from the world-system provide a sufficient answer to this question? The issue becomes all the more complex when we note that colonizers actually tried out several labor strategies in the sugar zones and that African slave labor was not at the outset a foregone conclusion.[75] Wallerstein's scheme may apply better to the outcomes that characterized labor in the sugar zones than to the processes leading to and explaining such outcomes.

Recognition of the early diversity in sugar labor requires the suspension, at least temporarily, of two entrenched notions: that African slavery was from the start the preferred, optimal, or only labor relation adaptable to large-scale sugar production; and that patterns in the Atlantic sugar islands colonized by Portugal and Spain in the fifteenth century predetermined the labor model (African slavery) the Iberians would later apply to sugar production in America. Recent scholarship on the Atlantic sugar islands is producing a somewhat more differentiated picture of labor. If it is true that slave labor predominated on Portuguese Madeira, it is also true that on the Spanish Canaries, European sharecroppers, especially Portuguese, appear to have constituted the bulk of the labor force in sugar.[76] In the Spanish Caribbean as well as Portuguese Brazil, colonizers and Crown attempted to establish thriving sugar-producing zones, and, in both cases, African slave labor at first constituted only one of several significant labor strategies.

The ascent of sugar in the sixteenth-century Spanish Caribbean is a story less well known (perhaps because the boom aborted precipitously in the 1580s) than that of Brazil, but, by the 1560s, the island of Española supported several dozen sugar plantations, the larger ones staffed by several hundred slave laborers each.[77] By then, African slavery constituted the nearly exclusive source of non-managerial labor. But earlier, mixed labor relations and strategies were important. In the early 1500s, Indians as well as blacks worked in the primitive sugar mills (*trapiches*), and

[75] The most careful and nuanced discussion of the variety of labor relations linked to sugar production in the Caribbean is made by Sidney W. Mintz, to whom I am considerably indebted in the following discussion. See his "So-Called World-System," 256–57, 260–61; "Was the Plantation," 85–90; *Sweetness and Power*, 52–54.

[76] Felipe Fernández-Armesto, *The Canary Islands after the Conquest: The Making of a Colonial Society in the Early Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1982), 84–86, 202. Compare the sugar-related contracts in Manuela Marrero Rodríguez, ed., *Extractos del Protocolo de Juan Ruiz de Berlanga, 1507–1508* (La Laguna de Tenerife, 1974), esp. Contracts 13, 14, 61, 107, 114, 127, 185, 186, 237, 255. If read carefully, the intensively researched study of slavery on the Canaries by Manuel Lobo Cabrera, *La Esclavitud en las canarias orientales en el siglo XVI (negros, moros y moriscos)* (Tenerife, 1982), confirms the impression that African slavery was of modest consequence in production on the islands before the 1520s and perhaps after. It also underscores the importance of the early Canaries mainly as a way station, or import-export market, for slaves destined for Europe and America. See 141–65, 205–13, 232–37. The evidence in Lobo Cabrera's work also suggests the possibility, however, that labor on sugar plantations in this period may have often relied on a mix of European sharecropper labor with small numbers of slaves borrowed, loaned, rented, or owned by the sharecroppers.

[77] See Lic. Juan de Echagoian, "Relación de la isla Española . . ." (orig. 1568), pub. in *Boletín del Archivo General de la Nación* (Trujillo, Dominican Republic), 4 (December 1941): 441–61, esp. 446; Mintz, *Sweetness and Power*, 32–35, esp. 34; Carlos Esteban Deive, *La Esclavitud del negro en Santo Domingo (1492–1844)*, 2 vols. (Santo Domingo, 1980), 1: 51–102; Mervyn Ratekin, "The Early Sugar Industry in Española," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 34 (February 1954): 1–19. For a good overview of the early Spanish Caribbean, see Carl O. Sauer, *The Early Spanish Main* (Berkeley, Calif., 1966).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in 1512, the collapse of the Indian population led one official of the Council of the Indies to propose that the sharecropping system of the Canaries be transferred to Española.[78] The recommendation meshed well with the critique of Spanish-Amerindian relations by Bartolomé de Las Casas, among others, and the Crown did experiment somewhat with European-based labor in America. But this strategy proved unrealistic, and the Indian population continued its downward plunge.[79] Even so, the importation of African slave labor occurred slowly and fitfully, hampered by vagaries of price, supply, and royal policy. As late as 1520, when the new governor, Rodrigo de Figueroa, supervised a major expansion of the sugar sector, his reports to the Crown underscored the continuing significance of Indian labor. At a time when African slaves were in short supply, Figueroa used Indian labor grants as well as generous credit to commit colonizers to constructing forty new, substantial sugar mills (*ingenios*). One of Figueroa's most intriguing comments referred to Indians who had "come from outside of this island" and worked as *naborías*, an ambiguous category (in the context of the early Caribbean) of native individuals who were separated from their original communities and who presumably received a wage.[80] The role of imported Indian labor (whether free *naborías*, slaves, or theoretically free *naborías* subjected to slavery in practice) is a topic on which useful research and statistics are unavailable. But it is suggestive to recall that slave raiding was common in the greater Caribbean region, that Amerindian slave exports occasionally reached as far as the Canaries, and that a massive Indian slave trade took hold in Nicaragua and Honduras in the 1520s and 1530s.[81]

Historians still know far too little about early labor in the Spanish Caribbean. But we know enough to suggest that the inability to subject European colonizers to sharecropping or other peasant-based labor systems and the comparative advantages and disadvantages of imported Indian labor must loom large in the explanation of nearly complete reliance on African slavery—a form of labor replete with its own disadvantages, including heavy initial outlays, continuing losses due to flight, and the fear of revolt by an African majority population.[82] And

[78] See José Antonio Saco, *Historia de la esclavitud de la raza africana en el Nuevo Mundo . . .* , 4 vols. (Havana, 1938), 1: 204; Fernández-Armesto, *Canary Islands*, 85 n. 81.

[79] For the political and ideological context of experiments with European colonizers as agriculturalists, see Lewis Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Boston, 1949), esp. 54–71; Sauer, *Early Spanish Main*, 203–06. On the related issue of European images of Indians, see Anthony Pagden, *The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology* (New York, 1982).

[80] Figueroa to Carlos I, November 14, 1520, in Irene Wright, ed., "The Commencement of the Cane Sugar Industry in America, 1519–1538 (1563)," *AHR*, 21 (July 1916): 773, 772 (quotation). Compare Deive, *La Esclavitud*, 1: 71; Sauer, *Early Spanish Main*, 201–02, 212; Hugo Tolentino Dipp, *Raza e historia en Santo Domingo: Los Orígenes del prejuicio racial en América* (Santo Domingo, 1974), 160–61; Frank Moya Pons, *Historia colonial de Santo Domingo* (2d edn., Santiago, Dominican Republic, 1976), 72.

[81] Sauer, *Early Spanish Main*, *passim*; Fernández-Armesto, *Canary Islands*, 173–74; Lobo Cabrera, *La Esclavitud*, 141; David R. Radell, "The Indian Slave Trade and Population of Nicaragua during the Sixteenth Century," in William M. Denevan, ed., *The Native Population of the Americas in 1492* (Madison, Wis., 1976), 67–76; compare Murdo J. MacLeod, *Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History, 1520–1720* (Berkeley, Calif., 1973), 50–52; William L. Sherman, *Forced Native Labor in Sixteenth-Century Central America* (Lincoln, Neb., 1979), 20–82.

[82] On the fear of revolt, see Deive, *La Esclavitud*, 2: 437–41, 602–04. The first important slave revolt on the island occurred in 1522.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to explain the relative disadvantages and eventual failure of European and Indian labor invariably returns the discussion to local conditions—among them, geography, disease, power, and conflict—that molded the options, constraints, and opportunities faced by the "world-system."[83]

It is for the case of Portuguese Brazil that we enjoy the best analysis of these issues. In a fascinating and meticulous study, Stuart B. Schwartz charted the shifting pattern of labor in the early sugar colony.[84] Three findings are especially pertinent. First, for better than a half-century after their turn to sugar in the 1530s, the Portuguese experimented seriously with five labor strategies. Four focused on Indian labor: barter relations to acquire native labor; outright enslavement of Indians; "peasantization," whereby Indians who were settled in villages run by Jesuits could provide labor outside the villages; and wage labor. Not until the 1580s did the labor strategy of the Portuguese sugar planters shift decisively toward African slavery. Second, Schwartz pointed out that, even after the 1580s, Indian labor played a far more important continuing role than once suspected. On the Engenho Sergipe, for example, Indian slaves outnumbered Africans by two to one in 1591, and the baptismal record listed 50 percent more Indian mothers than Afro-Brazilian mothers during 1595–1608.[85] For Bahia as a whole, Schwartz estimated that Indian slaves outnumbered Africans by three to one on the sugar plantations in the 1590s. Village Indians, some of them presumably available to supplement the work force on the plantations, outnumbered slave Indians by two to one. In Pernambuco, the other main sugar region, Indian slaves outnumbered their African counterparts by two to one in the mid-1580s. The overwhelmingly Afro-Brazilian labor force usually associated with the sugar plantations of Brazil's Northeast did not appear until around the 1630s.[86] Third, the strong preference for African slave labor took shape in response to a crisis of Indian labor in the 1560s and 1570s. Epidemic disease struck hard in 1562–1563, and a general Indian rebellion rocked Bahia in 1567. These local conditions, in turn, aggravated political disputes about Indian slavery within the Portuguese world (a conflict that sometimes aligned Jesuits and Crown against planters). The Indians' decline in numbers, and their emphatic and even violent resistance, raised questions about the political and economic viability of Indian labor and, in any event, widened the gap between the expected benefits of Indian and African labor. The wider the gap, the more justified the comparatively heavy investments required to purchase

[83] For an especially careful and perceptive discussion along these lines from which, as usual, I have benefited substantially, see Mintz, "So-Called World-System," 253–70, esp. 255–57, 267–68 n. 11.

[84] The argument is presented succinctly in Schwartz, "Indian Labor and New World Plantations," 43–79, and in revised and fuller form in Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations*, 15–72. The pioneering work on Indian labor and the transition to African slave labor is Alexander Marchant, *From Barter to Slavery: The Economic Relations of Portuguese and Indians in the Settlement of Brazil, 1500–1580* (Baltimore, Md., 1942). For Portuguese-Indian relations as a whole, see John Hemming, *Red Gold: The Conquest of the Brazilian Indians, 1500–1760* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978).

[85] Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations*, 67 (Table 3–5), 61 (Table 3–3). My calculation of mothers deletes the category of "Negro/crioulo" given in Table 3–3, because Schwartz indicated this term was applied to Indians as well as Africans on the chapel register (*ibid.*, 516 n. 31).

[86] Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations*, 70–71; Stuart B. Schwartz, "Colonial Brazil, c. 1580–c. 1750: Plantations and Peripheries," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol. 2 (New York, 1984), 437.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Africans. To be sure, the world-system and its markets also played an important role in such calculations, since high prices for sugar on the international market in the early 1600s increased still further the disparity between the expected returns on African versus Indian labor. But it was the earlier conjuncture of disease, violent resistance, and political conflict that threw into doubt the continuing practicality of Indian labor on a large scale and transformed African slavery into *the* optimal strategy for those looking into the future. As Schwartz remarked, "The system of labor and the nature of the labor force were determined not only in the court at Lisbon or in the countinghouses of Amsterdam and London but also in the forests and canefields of America."[87]

The conclusion is inescapable. Hindsight—the knowledge that Brazil's great sugar plantations ended up depending mainly on African slave labor—has led us to assume a more rapid and complete transition to African slavery than is justified by the historical record. Not until the 1620s or 1630s, nearly a hundred years after the Portuguese set out to establish sugar as the mainstay of Brazil, can researchers justifiably expect to find that sugar plantation slaves were overwhelmingly African or Afro-Brazilian. Most important, the world-system's needs and theoretically optimal labor pattern, while important, do not suffice to explain the outcome of the labor system in the sugar plantation periphery. At the heart of the labor question were conditions that made local Indian and European populations insufficiently exploitable, compared to African slave populations, for the purpose of sugar plantation production. In the interplay between these local conditions of production and the interests and opportunities derived from the international market lies a more powerful explanation of the rise of socioeconomic structures overwhelmingly dependent on African slavery.

This argument is consistent with what historians know about the early history of slave plantation societies in British America. From sugar in Jamaica and Barbados, to rice in South Carolina, to tobacco in Virginia, colonizers at first relied on indentured servant labor to produce commodities for the international market or on a mixed labor strategy that sometimes blurred the distinction between white servant and black slave. On the mainland, Indian labor was in some instances also significant. But, eventually, the European and Indian populations proved insufficiently exploitable, compared to African slaves imported from afar, to serve as the foundation for plantation production. The reasons for this turn the analysis once more to local conditions that shaped the productivity of labor and the limits of social control. Such conditions included not only patterns of health and mortality but also the real and feared effects of popular resistance and the refuge given to such resistance by poorly controlled frontier zones. Given these local conditions, and attractive commodity prices on the international market, elites came to center their strategies on African slave labor. But this outcome occurred

[87] Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations*, 72. Equally critical, albeit from a different theoretical perspective, of the explanatory value of the world-system for the colonial Brazilian case is Hall, "World-System Holism and Colonial Brazilian Agriculture," 43–69.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

only over time, through the trials and tribulations created by life in America, and at first seemed neither obvious nor especially optimal or desirable.[88]

One might object that roughly similar outcomes in the plantation tropics of Spanish, Portuguese, and British America demonstrate the overriding force of macro-level causes, in this case the world-system. But such an argument violates historical accuracy and commits a logical fallacy. The argument is inaccurate because outcomes were only "roughly" similar, and obsessions with eventual outcomes may obscure vast differences along the way. The labor relations and techniques of control in Brazil in 1580—where Indian slaves and recently constituted peasants supplied the bulk of the labor force, and where a good deal of production relied on share arrangements between large planters and small cane growers (*lavradores de cana*) who owned a few slaves—differed enormously from the organization of sugar production and labor by its main American competitor, Española. Española had moved more quickly to the classic Afro-American slave plantation model. The argument is also logically flawed, since one may just as easily explain roughly similar outcomes in terms of roughly similar local variables (patterns of indigenous culture, population and health trends, indigenous and European resistance to plantation labor, the proximity of frontiers) as by determination on an international level. My point here is one of method and logic. It is not to argue for the irrelevance of the international market or of the needs of a European world-system either capitalist or in transition to capitalism. The prices for specific commodities on the international market, and the efforts by European imperial states and merchants to organize and benefit from international trade in prized commodities, including Africans, had an important hand in defining local incentives and the expected returns on African slave labor. An explanation that ignores the world-system is as limited and reductionist as one derived from the world-system.

For the case of sugar, as for silver, the more closely we scrutinize the problem of explanation, the more unavoidable is the conclusion that the logic and necessities of the capitalist world-system, while important, fail to account for the evolution of labor. In both cases, the emerging world-system remains important as a concept explaining America's subjugation to mercantile exploitation. But its power to reduce the periphery to a functionally optimal role serving the core of

[88] The literature on early British America and the servant-slave mix is voluminous, but the best work on early labor strategies and the local conditions, including social conflict, that led to increased reliance on African slaves is Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York, 1975). For Barbados, Jamaica, and South Carolina (the most "Caribbean" of the colonies on the British American mainland), I have found the following especially useful: Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves*, esp. 59–74, 212–23; Michael Craton and James Walvin, *A Jamaican Plantation: The History of Worthy Park, 1670–1970* (Toronto, 1970), esp. 20–21, 32, 51–52; Peter H. Wood, *Black Majority: Negroes in Colonial South Carolina from 1670 through the Stono Rebellion* (New York, 1974). For a recent overview, see Hilary McD. Beckles, "Plantation Production and White Proto-Slavery: White Indentured Servants and the Colonisation of the English West Indies, 1624–1645," *Americas*, 41 (January 1985): 21–45; compare the pioneering and controversial early statement by Oscar Handlin and Mary F. Handlin, "Origins of the Southern Labor System," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d ser., 7 (1950): 199–222. On the sometimes underestimated significance of Indian slavery in British America, and for general context, see Gary B. Nash, *Red, White, and Black: The Peoples of Early America* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1974), 111–14, 145–53.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

international capitalism proves more contingent—more constrained, buffeted, and driven by the force of independent causal "motors" and by internal contradictions—than is suggested by Wallerstein's theoretical framework. Ironically, in his specific historical analysis of sugar and labor in Volume 2, Wallerstein demonstrated his awareness of and agreement with much that has been said. But he avoided serious analysis of the *implications* of such findings for the overarching framework proposed in Volume 1.[89]

Even on the level of description, for which the case of sugar fits Wallerstein's scheme better than silver, appearances from afar may be somewhat deceiving. The term "slavery" has limited descriptive value, since it has been used to describe a wide variety of social and economic relations. It arouses debate even as an abstract and theoretical category.[90] To evaluate the descriptive validity of the world-system framework for the case of sugar therefore requires a closer look at the specific social relations and customs that defined the meaning of African "slavery" on American sugar plantations. For, as Sidney Mintz has argued so eloquently and persistently, the slaves often carved out, even under extreme and dehumanizing conditions, a sphere of activities and customary rights that in certain respects made them "proto-peasants." Often, slaves in the Caribbean not only grew their own food (a concession that served the interests of planters so long as it was narrowly constrained) but also sold food to the free population, invaded the sphere of petty marketing by the thousands, and controlled as much as 20 percent of the coin in regional circulation. Similar patterns were known, although perhaps less frequent or pronounced, in the sugar regions of Brazil. In both areas, the slaves asserted rights of possession in plantation lands and in the fruits of their labors in ways that bore some resemblance to peasant adaptations and that implicitly challenged their formal condition as chattel property. It is this "proto-peasant" dimension that enabled plantation slaves to metamorphose quickly into a "reconstituted peasantry" (to use Mintz's apt term) after emancipation.[91] The descriptive and theoretical

[89] See Wallerstein, *World-System II*, 171–75. For more detailed references, see note 5 above; compare Cooper, "Africa and the World Economy," 10, 59–60 n. 36.

[90] Recent episodes in the scholarly debate about the fundamental meaning of "slavery" include Igor Kopytoff and Suzanne Miers, "African 'Slavery' as an Institution of Marginality," in Miers and Kopytoff, eds., *Slavery in Africa: Historical and Anthropological Perspectives* (Madison, Wis., 1977), 3–81; Orlando Patterson, *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study* (Cambridge, Mass., 1982); compare Frederick Cooper, "The Problem of Slavery in African Studies," *Journal of African History*, 20 (1979): 103–25; Gerda Lerner, *The Creation of Patriarchy* (New York, 1986), 76–100. David Brion Davis has illuminated the changing meanings, symbolism, and implications of the slavery concept, especially in the context of Western civilization, in several important books: *The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1966); *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1975); *Slavery and Human Progress* (New York, 1984). A sense for the variety of slave experiences in Latin America and the Caribbean may be gained from the recent overview by Klein, *African Slavery and the Caribbean*, and its excellent bibliographical essay.

[91] These themes run throughout Mintz's work on the Caribbean. See "Slavery and the Rise of Peasantries," in Michael Craton, ed., *Roots and Branches: Current Directions in Slave Studies* (Toronto, 1979), 213–42; "From Plantation to Peasantries in the Caribbean," in Mintz and Sally Price, eds., *Caribbean Contours* (Baltimore, Md., 1985), 127–53; *Caribbean Transformations* (Chicago, 1974), part 2; "Was the Plantation," 91–96. The estimate that 20 percent of the coin in circulation was controlled by slaves is from Jamaica in the late eighteenth century (cited in *ibid.*, 95). Compare David Barry Gaspar, *Bondmen and Rebels: A Study of Master-Slave Relations in Antigua, with Implications for Colonial British America*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

issues merge in the following question: how wide a "breach" in their condition as slaves need Afro-Americans have opened, how much like peasants and petty commodity producers need they have become, before it becomes misleading to describe plantation slavery as a capitalist labor design by, for, and of the world-system?[92]

The descriptive gap between Wallerstein's international division of labor on the one hand and the history of labor and surplus extraction on the other is less easily discerned in the case of sugar than in that of silver. This is especially true as one moves past the early years in the formation of labor strategies. But the gap is nonetheless significant, a symptom of the limits of the world-system as an explanatory concept or organizing principle. The explanatory prism of the world-system (like all such prisms) may blind the eye to the significance of certain kinds of descriptive data. In the cases of sugar and silver, unfortunately, the consequences of such blind spots are serious. Even for labor, a topic central to the whole framework, the world-system paradigm takes as its point of departure a description that is at best somewhat misleading, at worst thoroughly inaccurate.

THE FOREGOING ANALYSES OF SILVER AND SUGAR IMPLY THAT we must return to the academic drawing board. The state of affairs is even more dismal than may be apparent thus far. The failure of Wallerstein's Europe-centered paradigm does not necessarily mean that established lines of criticism and alternative models fare better upon application to America. As we shall see, the standard line of criticism from within a Europe-centered framework runs into curiously similar descriptive and theoretical difficulties in Latin America and the Caribbean. Just as serious, and not unrelated, the standard critiques fail to rescue and reinterpret some of Wallerstein's genuine insights about the limits of our inherited categories, among them "feudalism" and "capitalism," in colonized America. My purpose in this and the concluding section is twofold: to explain more fully why historians must go back to the drawing board and question our most basic organizing precepts, and to sketch the outlines of a new model. Along the way, I will have occasion to single out significant insights in Wallerstein's work but to situate them in a new context.

Let us begin by reviewing and drawing out briefly three main deficiencies of Wallerstein's model for Latin America and the Caribbean. First, the paradigm failed to describe and to explain reasonably well its two most important historical "test cases," those of silver and sugar, even though critical analysis in this essay has tested the model on its own terms by focusing on labor patterns, a topic rightfully central in Wallerstein's own presentation. Second, these two test cases hint at major theoretical problems. The analyses of silver and sugar provided above establish that local conditions of production, broadly conceived, had central importance in defining the choices and constraints faced by entrepreneurs. The specific

(Baltimore, Md., 1985), 145–49; Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations*, 157, 159, 252–53, 458 (but for a contrasting view of Brazil's sugar zones, see Gorender, *O Escravismo colonial*, 241–67).

[92] For a provocative statement on the "breach" and its limits, see C. F. S. Cardoso, *Agricultura, escravidão e capitalismo*, 133–54.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

technologies, social relations, and subsistence possibilities that shaped the production process, and the shifting capacity of laboring populations to resist greater subjugation, set contours of power and struggle that limited social control and recast what was desirable or even possible from the point of view of capital accumulation. In this perspective, assigning theoretical priority to the rise of a capitalist world market that spawned varied but functionally desirable versions of capitalism in the periphery is fundamentally misleading. This criticism meshes well with the Marxist emphasis on the theoretical importance of the mode of production—the dynamic combination of technologies and social relationships that distinguish one kind of productive system from another—rather than profit-oriented exchange relations as a distinguishing feature of capitalism. A further theoretical problem arises when we look more closely at the character of the "world market." In Spanish America especially, the mining booms and the urban centers gave rise to America-centered market interests and incentives whose weight rivaled or even dwarfed those linked to the international market. The problem of reconciling these diverse and sometimes competing centers of gravity in the world marketplace with the picture of a single world-economy directed from the European core raises thorny theoretical issues as yet unresolved in Wallerstein's paradigm.

Third, the interpretation of early colonial America as a mere variant of world capitalism becomes historically misleading if one adopts a perspective that looks ahead to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Two anomalies or paradoxes from the later period would require explanation. One of these I have already mentioned. The classic picture of transitions to capitalism, wherein earlier subsistence strategies and coercive labor strategies are replaced by wage labor and growing internal markets for basic subsistence goods, is recognizable in various regions of Latin America in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Conceptualizing colonial Latin America as "capitalist" masks the rupture and strife provoked by this great transformation.[93] A second paradox derives from the apparent "involution" or "regression" of some agrarian regions earlier in the nineteenth century into feudalism.[94] Regions commercially dynamic in colonial

[93] It is significant that the bitter conflict over mine labor in Mexico in the eighteenth century stemmed from attempts of entrepreneurs to convert share relations into straightforward wage labor. Given the laborers' capacity and determination to resist the new scheme but their inability to defeat labor reforms altogether, the outcome increased the role of forced paid labor in the mines. On this specific case, see the sources in note 71 above; for a more theoretical discussion of the limits of free wage labor in a colonial context, and the structural contradictions that forced entrepreneurs to pursue free and coercive labor strategies simultaneously, see Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 138–57, esp. 155–57.

[94] The phenomenon is quite well known to students of southern Andean regions. For Cuzco, see Luis Miguel Glave and María Isabel Remy, *Estructura agraria y vida rural andina: Ollantaytambo entre los siglos XVI y XIX* (Cuzco, 1983), 291, 341–87 (esp. 369, 371), 402–03, 455–97 (esp. 488–89), 515–22. For Ayacucho, see Lorenzo Huertas Vallejos, "Historia de las luchas sociales de Ayacucho, 1700–1940" (unpublished manuscript, 1974); Huertas Vallejos, "Prólogo," *Revista del Archivo Departamental de Ayacucho*, 1 (1977): 52–53; Antonio Díaz Martínez, *Ayacucho: Hambre y esperanza* (Ayacucho, 1969); compare Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*. For Cochabamba, see Larson, *Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation*. Compare the more general comments in Assadourian, *Minería y espacio económico*, 15–16; Halperín-Donghi, *Historia contemporánea*, 134–59, esp. 142–43; Heraclio Bonilla, "The Indian Peasantry and 'Peru' during the War with Chile," in Steve J. Stern, ed., *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries* (Madison, Wis., 1987), 220–21. Wolf and

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

times—characterized by considerable commodity production on haciendas and *obrajes* (primitive textile factories), by investment and reinvestment of liquid wealth in agrarian enterprise, and by faltering subsistence economies allowing for infusions of temporary wage labor into a diversified ensemble of labor relations—turned toward greater insulation from market forces, deterioration and decapitalization of haciendas, fuller dependence on rent and forced labor by resident hacienda peons. However we conceptualize the colonial economy, and whatever respects we pay to its dynamic profit-oriented aspects and its capacity to reduce human beings to mere repositories of exploited labor-power, a theoretically valid conceptualization must incorporate the historical potential of dynamic regional economies to "regress" into a pattern more closely resembling feudalism.[95] Neither Wallerstein nor his critics conceptualize capitalism as a kind of economic system or organization that responds to crisis by lapsing into feudalism. Layoffs, strikes, bankruptcies and reorganization, technological innovation, political turmoil, welfare measures, attempts at self-employment, and underground economies—all these we associate with cyclical or secular crises in a capitalist economy. Reversions to feudalism we do not. To do so would make capitalism a concept so elastic as to border on meaninglessness.

If Wallerstein's world-system runs aground on issues of substance and theory, however, so do the standard alternatives. The most prominent critical alternatives dispute the notion that integration of diverse territories into an international and profit-driven commercial system constitutes a sufficient basis for conceptualizing the economy of such territories as "capitalist."[96] The criticism is valid, but the alternative theses proposed or implied in such critiques are not—at least not necessarily. The problem arises because we remain too dependent on theoretical concepts derived from the experience of Western Europe. In this experience, feudalism preceded capitalism. The natural alternative to the thesis of capitalism becomes the thesis of feudalism (or alternatively, slavery, the other key mode of production that preceded capitalism in the European experience). The attractive theoretical critique of emphasis on "commercial capitalism" draws on Marx to argue first that transformations in the sphere of production account far more successfully than commercial changes for the historically distinctive features of capitalism, and also that merchant capital is inherently conservative insofar as the mode of production is concerned. Merchant capital, in this argument, exploits

Mintz's classic "Haciendas and Plantations," 380–412, pointed precisely to the distinctive characteristics of haciendas (as compared to capitalist plantations) that enabled them to survive through involution during depressed times and to open outward in more dynamic ways during prosperous times.

[95] Note that I refer here to economic patterns corresponding more to "feudalism" by Wallerstein's own definition of the contrast between the "serfdom" associated with feudalism and the "coerced cash-crop labor" associated with capitalism. Wallerstein, *World-System I*, 91, 126–27.

[96] The alternative approach can be traced back at least as far as the Dobb-Sweezy debate and the classic essay by Hobsbawm cited in notes 23–24 above. Within the more recent cycle of such discussion, particularly outstanding works include (in chronological order) Genovese, *World the Slaveholders Made*; Laclau, "Feudalism and Capitalism," 19–38; Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure," 30–75; Brenner, "Origins of Capitalist Development," 25–92; and Fox-Genovese and Genovese, *Fruits of Merchant Capital*. An extremely significant work that uses the mode of production concept seriously, yet steps creatively outside standard Europe-centered categories, is Wolf, *Europe and the People without History*.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

already existing modes of production by manipulating terms of trade and harnessing them to the world-economy, but it has no interest in the dynamic transformation and modernization of archaic productive systems.[97] The key intellectual innovation that accounts for the paradox that archaic technologies and social relations of production were harnessed to European capitalism argues that capitalism, as a system, articulated archaic modes of production (mainly feudalism or slavery) in America with a capitalist mode of production in Europe. In this argument, the integration of heterogeneous "parts" (modes of production) into a systemic "whole" dominated by capitalism does not imply that the internal structure and laws of each and every "part" were themselves capitalist.

The Europe-centered alternative to Wallerstein, then, leads almost "naturally" to the following four alternative theses: first, the colonized American periphery was feudal, pre-capitalist, or archaic rather than capitalist; second, social relations of production matter more than markets or the profit principle for establishing the capitalist or non-capitalist laws, or internal dynamics, of the economy; third, merchant capital was both profoundly conservative and parasitic because it characteristically limited itself to siphoning off a surplus from relatively backward and static modes of production; and fourth, the most perceptive theoretical way to interpret the colonial economy in its international context is through the concept of articulation between archaic and capitalist modes of production.

In my view, only the second of these four theses holds up under scrutiny, and problems with the other three point to particular insights that may be rescued from Wallerstein despite the failure of his paradigm as a whole. At bottom, Europe-centered theory critical of Wallerstein's conceptualization of capitalism does not resolve any better the paradoxical features of the colonial economy discussed earlier (see pages 839–42). That earlier discussion pointed to several patterns central to colonial economic life yet difficult to reconcile with the feudal thesis: the pervasive power of mercantile interests and the profit-investment principle to transform regional economies, that is, to restructure the technologies, social relations, and outputs that defined production; the destructive, partly proletarianizing impact of mercantile exploitation on small producers and their subsistence economies; the tendency of dynamic economic sectors to reduce human beings to short-term, exchangeable repositories of labor-power; and the rise of urban and mining camp regions characterized by significant internal markets and somewhat freer forms of labor, including relations resembling wage labor.

[97] As should be clear from my earlier analysis, I agree with the first part of the twofold argument drawn from Marx. The second part is in my view more problematic and reductionist both as a historical tool of analysis and as an interpretation of Marx. Marx's discussion of commercial capital in *Capital*, like the entire discussion of capitalism, slides back and forth between two levels of analysis: a theoretical level designed to show that the inner "secret" of capital accumulation rests not on commercial exchange and gouging as such but on the distinctive social relations and forces of production that enable entrepreneurs to accumulate profits even if they pay a "fair" market price for labor-power; and a historical level of analysis that looks at capitalism as it actually emerged and existed and that acknowledges more readily the historical importance of markets, merchant capital, and colonialism in the creation and expansion of capitalism. Those who draw on Marx to stress the inherent conservatism of merchant capital seem to me to have conflated these two levels of analysis and to have sidestepped Marx's own unresolved ambiguities.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

To these general points may now be added a further "anomaly." The technologies and work patterns associated with silver and sugar production often gave these leading sectors a precociously "industrial" character. Independently of one another, the most distinguished students of silver and sugar all seem struck by the emphatically "industrial" aspects of production: the massive scale of investments in machinery and engineering works, the complexity of the division of labor and the alienation of laborers from the production process, the intensely regimented and time-conscious work rhythms normally associated with nineteenth-century factories.[98] The "industrial" aspects of the silver and sugar sectors would matter little if these constituted secondary appendages to the colonial economy at large or if they constituted "enclaves" sharply demarcated from the rest of the economy. Alas, history is not so cooperative. Silver and sugar were central to the organization of regional and supra-regional economic spaces, and silver, especially, exerted profound secondary consequences even in distant agrarian hinterlands.[99]

In short, critical alternatives wedded to the rise of feudalism or other archaic modes of production in colonial America are grossly misleading, and they gloss over "anomalies" central to colonial economic life as a whole. The notion of articulation of heterogenous modes of production in a wider economic system remains theoretically promising but is weakened if the dominant "mode" in America is assumed to be "feudalism."[100]

In the end, Wallerstein homed in on two specific insights worth underscoring despite the problems with the general interpretation. First, under colonial conditions, which allied merchant capital with imperial political power in the fluid environment of a frontier or "outpost," merchant capital could exert an aggressive, organizing, and transformative impact on technologies and social relations of production. This historical possibility in the colonized periphery is at odds with "classic" Marxian views of the conservatism of merchant capital. It cautions us not to assume too rigidly, under colonial conditions, that local social relations of production constitute *the* point of departure for analyzing the trajectory of merchant capital or its impact on methods of production. Second, the colonial problem exposes the limited historical applicability of our Europe-centered categories, especially "feudalism" and "capitalism." Wallerstein was right to reject "feudalism" as a meaningful category for understanding peripheries drawn into

[98] See Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 13, 137–40, 152–54; Brading and Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining," 549–51; Mintz, *Sweetness and Power*, 46–52; Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations*, 142–45, 152–55.

[99] See Assadourian, *El Sistema*, 109–221, 277–321; Stern, "New Directions," 134–40; Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 47–50, 74–75, 80–113, 138–61, 185–86; compare Schwartz, *Sugar Plantations*, 239–41; and the comment in note 100 below.

[100] It is quite instructive that scholars who stress the predominance of feudalism in colonial Spanish America but are simultaneously aware of the complicating "capitalist" features evident in the silver mines handle the contradiction by seeing the mines as a kind of economic appendage or enclave whose secondary effects were minor in an overwhelmingly agrarian society. For a prominent early example from Mexico, see Chávez Orozco, *Historia económica y social*. Modernized into a theoretical statement on the articulation of modes of production, the same approach leads to the conclusion that capitalism was "embryonic," joined to and stifled by a dominant feudal model of production. A prominent and sophisticated example is Semo, *Historia del capitalismo*.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the radically transformed world of the sixteenth century. He was less illuminating when he responded to our limited conceptual choices by revising "capitalism" into a concept so elastic and omnipotent that the results simply add to the theoretical confusion and fail to describe or explain successfully the history of labor in the periphery. But at least he understood the nature of the conceptual dilemma.

A third insight, though one not intended by Wallerstein, may be derived from his insistence that the underlying logic of an economy may be rooted precisely in its tendency to combine diverse relations of production into an optimal package. In Wallerstein's vision, this is a defining feature of the capitalist world-economy as a whole and explains why forced labor in the periphery, intermediate arrangements in the semiperiphery, and free labor in the core are unified in the single logic of capitalism. We have already seen that the scheme breaks down in the American periphery. The irony, however, is that the principle ascribed by Wallerstein to the world-economy as a whole comes closer to defining economic patterns *within* the American periphery. Repeatedly in colonial Latin America and the Caribbean, one encounters a shifting combination of heterogenous relations of production in a pragmatic package. This heterogeneity of labor relations occurred within single units of production and applied to the bulk of low-status physical laborers (not merely to the more obvious and commonplace distinctions between supervisory employees and skilled experts on the one hand and "unskilled" physical laborers on the other). Again and again, scholars of the mines, haciendas, plantations, and *obrajes* of colonial America find that entrepreneurs fused a diverse array of labor relations, including approximations of wage labor, complicated tenancy, share and debt-credit arrangements, and forced labor drafts and slavery, into a single productive process.[101] One might go so far as to assert that what is distinctive about the economic logic of colonial and neo-colonial situations is precisely the entrepreneurial tendency to combine variegated labor strategies—considered somewhat more antithetical, mutually exclusive, and se-

[101] This characteristic is so familiar empirically that almost any colonial scholar who has researched the documents of particular enterprises will recognize it. Especially valuable on this point is Macera, "Feudalismo colonial," 171–204. For a fuller sampling of research on Mexico and Peru demonstrating varied labor relations even on agrarian enterprises whose labor regimes might seem less internally heterogeneous from afar, see the following: D. A. Brading, *Haciendas and Ranchos in the Mexican Bajío: León, 1700–1860* (New York, 1978), 31–38, 75–76, 95–114; Nicolas P. Cushner, *Lords of the Land: Sugar, Wine, and Jesuit Estates of Coastal Peru, 1600–1767* (Albany, N.Y., 1980), 81–86, 89–91; Enrique Florescano, ed., *Haciendas, latifundios y plantaciones en América Latina* (Mexico City, 1975), *passim*; Glave and Remy, *Estructura agraria y vida rural*, 133–38, 341–69; Herman W. Konrad, *A Jesuit Hacienda in Colonial Mexico: Santa Lucía, 1576–1767* (Stanford, Calif., 1980), 222–36, 246–54, 318–23, 326–30; Cheryl English Martin, *Rural Society in Colonial Morelos* (Albuquerque, N.M., 1985), 121–53; Morin, *Michoacán*, 257–83; Jorge Polo y la Borda G., *La Hacienda Pachachaca: Autobastecimiento y comercialización (segunda mitad del siglo XVIII)* (Lima, 1976), 50–69; Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 141–46, 155–57, 191; John Tutino, "Hacienda Social Relations in Mexico: The Chalco Region in the Era of Independence," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 55 (August 1975): 496–528; Eric Van Young, *Hacienda and Market in Eighteenth-Century Mexico: The Rural Economy of the Guadalajara Region, 1675–1820* (Berkeley, Calif., 1981), 236–64; compare Van Young, "Mexican Rural History since Chevalier: The Historiography of the Colonial Hacienda," *Latin American Research Review*, 18 (1983): 23–24. The literature on labor has also established that Charles Gibson's criticisms of the classic image of debt peonage were correct. See *Aztecs under Spanish Rule*, 252–56; Bauer, "Rural Workers in Spanish America," 34–63.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

quential in a Europe-centered context—into a unified package.[102] The material motivations inspiring such a strategy were threefold: to maximize profits, to insure against setbacks in the supply or benefits of labor derived from any particular labor strategy, and perhaps also to facilitate social control through a structure of "divide and rule" within the labor force. This "law of diversity" may speak not only to the material uncertainties, opportunities, and contradictions particular to colonial life but also to distinctions in morality, ethos, and political culture that differentiated colony from metropolis. In any event, it adds yet another "anomaly" to those that make questionable the standard Europe-centered alternatives to Wallerstein.

THE GREAT CHALLENGE HISTORIANS FACE is to construct a new model, or at the least a new perspective, sufficiently penetrating to render meaningful and explicable the apparent paradoxes and anomalies of colonial economic life. This new approach needs to incorporate the genuine insights of currently contending models and interpretations, but it must also succeed in incorporating the idiosyncracies neglected or trivialized by a Europe-centered straitjacket yet central to the socioeconomic history of colonized America. This daunting task is beyond the scope of this essay and the current competence of its author. At this juncture, I can only propose some starting points. On the level of specific historical analysis, we will need to take seriously all three "motors" identified earlier—the European world-system, popular strategies of resistance and survival within the periphery, and the mercantile and elite interests joined to American "centers of gravity." It is in the contradictory interplay between these three grand motors, and in the divisions and contradictions internal to each of them, that we will find keys to a deeper understanding of the structures, changes, and driving forces of colonial economic life.[103] On the level of theory and basic categories, we would do well to

[102] See Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples*, 155–57; compare Cuauhtémoc Velasco Avila, "Labour Relations in Mining: Real de Monte and Pachuca, 1824–74," in Thomas Greaves and William Culver, eds., *Miners and Mining in the Americas* (Manchester, 1985), 47–67. One important exception is the tendency of sugar plantations to rely mainly on African slavery during boom periods. But such cases were rarer than often assumed, and the contrast may be one of degree. See Mintz, "So-Called World-System," 260–61. It is also possible, of course, that the conventional reading of labor in European history is misleading and that, during a "long" early modern period, variegated labor patterns of the kind discussed here were far more prevalent in Western Europe than usually assumed. The literature on "proto-industrialization" in Europe perhaps points in this direction and resonates interestingly with the colonial Latin American experience, but a theoretically informed and systematic comparison of the findings of the proto-industrialization literature with research on labor and economy in colonial Latin America lies beyond the scope of this essay. I hope to take up the matter in a future essay. On "proto-industrialization," see Franklin Mendels, "Proto-Industrialization: The First Phase of the Industrialization Process," *Journal of Economic History*, 32 (1972): 241–61; Hans Medick, "The Proto-Industrial Family Economy: The Structural Function of Household and Family during the Transition from Peasant Society to Industrial Capitalism," *Social History*, 3 (October 1976): 291–315; Peter Kriedte, Hans Medick, and Jürgen Schlumbohm, *Industrialization before Industrialization: Rural Industry in the Genesis of Capitalism* (New York and Paris, 1981); Kriedte, *Peasants, Landlords and Merchant Capitalists*; and DuPlessis, "Partial Transition to World-Systems Analysis," 23–26.

[103] Beyond a certain point, such a method calls on the historian to merge social history and political economy perspectives. To arrive at a deep understanding, for example, of "popular strategies of resistance and survival" in a colonial context may require a well-rounded consideration of social relations and cultural ideals, raising topics such as ethnicity, gender, or religion more commonly assigned to "social history." Consider, for instance, the pertinent unanswered questions about the role

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

examine carefully the earlier innovations, largely neglected in the United States, of our Latin American colleagues. Particularly significant are two of their proposals: first, that we consider seriously a theory of colonial modes of production and, second, that we consider seriously the possibility that the foundation of the colonial economy was the dominance of commercial capital over production and the corresponding absence of a consolidated mode of production in the usual sense.[104] In the encounter between history and theory, our Latin American colleagues have in this instance led the way. We should engage their work and, to put it another way, move the intellectuals of the periphery into the core of our discussion.

of gender relations and household strategies in the structure and evolution of the Potosí silver economy suggested by the earlier observation (p. 853 above) that women labored as the smelters and vendors of ores appropriated by male *minga* laborers in share arrangements. For more contemporary examples illustrating this methodological point for the case of the Bolivian tin mines, which replaced silver in preeminence in twentieth-century Bolivia, see June Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us: Dependency and Exploitation in Bolivian Tin Mines* (New York, 1979); Domitila Barrios de Chungara, with Moemma Viezzer, *Let Me Speak! Testimony of Domitila, A Woman of the Bolivian Mines*, trans. Victoria Ortíz (New York, 1978); Guillermo Delgado P., "Industrial Stagnation and Women's Strategies for Survival at the Siglo XX and Uncía Mines," in Greaves and Culver, *Miners and Mining*, 162–70.

[104] A third innovation, the proposal that we conceptualize the colonial economy as a complex and historically specific articulation of various modes of production into a unique "whole," is more well known. But it too has largely escaped the rigorous critical engagement needed to test, refine, and draw out its promise or limitations.

I am well aware that, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, a certain disillusionment with the mode of production concept set in among some intellectuals on the left, including Latin Americans, who had once used the concept more readily. Indeed, I would argue that, in part *because* the concept passed out of scholarly fashion, theoretical innovations on colonial Latin America proposed in the early 1970s generally escaped the sustained critical and empirical appraisal they deserved. The shift of the intellectual winds was linked to a broader disquiet about general theory and about Marxism derived from dissatisfaction both with classical orthodoxy and with the theoretical schemes and categories that proliferated in the 1960s and 1970s. The old universal theories were replaced not by conceptual breakthroughs commanding broad assent but by a plethora of theoretical schemes and political agendas whose rapid multiplication and varied quality reinforced a sense of intellectual fragmentation and limited comprehension. In my view, the perceived "crisis of theory" was a kind of mirror image of the perceived "explosion of theory," and it affected non-Marxist as well as Marxist scholarship. Among intellectuals on the left, Ernesto Laclau himself has contributed importantly to this sobering rethinking of theory. See Laclau, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory* (London, 1977); Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London, 1985).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AHR Forum
Comments on Stern's Critical Tests

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

STEVE STERN ASSERTS, QUITE CORRECTLY, that the debate about how to characterize Latin America and the Caribbean, especially during the colonial period, in terms of the concepts of feudalism and capitalism is one that has been going on within Latin America for a long time. Indeed, for reasons not difficult to understand, this kind of theoretical debate has been pursued perhaps with greatest intensity in this particular region of the world, whose intellectual history Stern briefly recounts.

While Stern's article is a criticism of some of my formulations in *The Modern World-System*, and argues that I overestimate the explanatory power of the "world-system" in accounting for historical developments in Latin America, Stern is anxious to situate himself midway between my views (as he sees them) and those scholars who reject entirely the relevance of the (or a) world-system. His "intermediary" theoretical position is a variant, as he notes himself, of the concept of the "articulation of modes of production." Thus Stern is making a case for an interpretive model that, he asserts, has more cogency than alternative models (including mine).

As part of his case, he seeks to demonstrate that my interpretation does not accord with the most recent empirical evidence in two concrete situations that he believes are arenas in which one might expect my arguments to hold most easily. He is thus using a sort of "critical test" method to demonstrate the limited usefulness of my model and thereupon to indicate that his own model fits the data better. It follows that there are three questions one might raise about Stern's case. How accurate is his description of my views—the model and the empirical data? How different are Stern's views from mine, descriptively and analytically? Is Stern's alternate model more helpful to us, that is, does it provide a more satisfactory historical interpretation, one more closely fitting the evidence?

I would like to begin with the two "critical tests" he offers us—silver mining and sugar production. Stern starts with the case of Indian mine-labor in Potosí and the importance of the *mita*. For Stern, the "*mita* labor relation [played] a role more modest and unintended" than I or other scholars had previously argued. He offers a picture of three stages of labor relations on the Potosí mines. Stage 1 lasted until the 1570s. During this period, labor relations were based on "conditions of work

N.B. Footnotes marked with an * were originally published in *The Modern World-System* (Academic Press) and are given here in *AHR* style—The Editor.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and technology defined largely by Indians." Stage 2 involved a reorganization of labor relations, in which "the *mita* draft indeed served as the cornerstone of a profitable labor system."[1] Stern offers no direct explanation of this shift, but presumably it was because the *mita* system was more profitable for the mineowners, either because the workers received less of the surplus or because production was more extensive, or both. In any case, Stern agrees that the new system "worked wonders indeed," quadrupling production. But then, Stern argues, we move after perhaps only thirty years into Stage 3. In this stage, the *mita* declined in importance as a mechanism to secure a supply of labor but "grew in importance as a subsidy . . . that cheapened the cost of free labor." In this period, a "division of labor" developed in which the *mitayos* did "more primitive, dangerous, or repugnant tasks," while the more skilled and highly rewarded tasks were performed by *mingas* who were "volunteer laborers."[2] Also, some Indian communities were able to satisfy their legal obligations to supply *mitayos* by substituting cash payments (a point to be found in my own work).[3] The major explanation Stern offers of this second shift (from Stage 2 to Stage 3) is the stubborn resistance of the Indians and their "consistent drive" to convert both forced labor and wage labor into something resembling "sharecropping." The wage laborers were, however, more successful at this than the *mitayos*, since the latter "worked at tasks and under coercive pressures that restricted their capacity" to make this shift. The wage laborers achieved this success primarily "sometime during the late seventeenth century, when Potosí's secular decline was well advanced." This development of "sharecropping" so threatened the mineowners' profit that during the late eighteenth century they apparently reacted. In this last period, it was only "the brutal intensification of the labor regime imposed on *mitayo* laborers that made the crucial difference in Potosí's profitability and rising silver production."[4]

At this point, Stern states: "How far we have traveled from the interpretation provided by Wallerstein's world-system is by now obvious."[5] Well, not at all! Every detail provided by Stern is precisely what one might have *deduced* from a world-systems perspective, and most of them are indeed presented in my work. The additional evidence Stern provides reinforces the theorizing magnificently. Let us see why.

Stern calls Stage 1 a system based on "conditions of work and technology defined largely by Indians." He is referring to the *encomienda*, and I believe it is somewhat of an exaggeration to describe it this way. Let us look at Silvio Zavala's classic description of the *encomienda* system. "The aim . . . was to establish a system of voluntary wage labor with moderate tasks; but in anticipation that the Indians might not offer their services voluntarily, the order further directed the royal authorities in the colony to deliver laborers to colonists who needed them. From

[1] Steve J. Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean," *AHR*, 93 (October 1988): 850, 851.
[2] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 851.
[3] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System II, Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World-Economy, 1600–1750* (New York, 1980), 149.
[4] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 852, 853, 854.
[5] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 854.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

one point of view this order was designed to prevent abuses arising from a direct relationship between the Spanish master and the Indian encomenderos to compel the Indians to work. From another point of view, however, its significance lies in the fact that if the effort to establish a voluntary system should fail through the Indian's refusal to accept work, the state was ready to act as a mediator and to protect public interest by compelling the laborer to work."[6]

It is true that, under the *encomienda* system, the Indians had some room for maneuver, and of course they used it. Thus they managed in general to avoid work more frequently or to keep more real surplus than mineowners thought desirable. When this element of managerial discontent was compounded by a drop in the basic labor supply caused by declining population (chiefly from epidemics), an increase in coercion seemed to the mineowners a necessary counterweight. In addition, the Spanish Crown was worried about the centrifugal tendencies of the *encomenderos* and thought that a more centralized system of labor allocation, the *mita*, would serve its interests better as well.

Naturally, the Indians were not enthusiastic about the new, harsher system, and this was especially true of those who had to engage in the coerced wage labor of the *mita*. Naturally, they resisted. Permanent worker resistance to exploitation is a basic reality of the capitalist world-economy. There is not a single word in any of my writings on the world-system to suggest anything else. Quite the contrary. It follows, however, that there was nothing special in the fact that Indians in Peru resisted. The question is why, and to what degree, their resistance succeeded in ameliorating their situation. By Stern's own telling, the success was limited.

Stern maintains that after Stage 2 of pure *mita* came Stage 3, a mixed system involving both forced and volunteer labor. According to Stern, both varieties of laborer sought to convert *part* of their remuneration into a sort of "sharecropping" income, and, by the late seventeenth century, this effort was reasonably successful, far more, however, in the case of the volunteer laborers than in the case of the *mitayos*. But notice the other facts he points out en route. The initial distinction, *circa* 1600, between forced and volunteer laborers correlates with a distinction between unskilled and skilled laborers. Of course. One of the basic arguments of *The Modern World-System* holds that the more the work requires skilled labor, the less the system is able to coerce labor directly, since the costs of supervision become too high. Higher real wages serve as compensation for allowing the employer to reduce the costs of supervision. One question, however, might be: who had done this "skilled" work during the period 1570–1600, when, as Stern observes, only the *mita* was in use? Could it have been done in part by the *mitayos* (and was perhaps therefore sabotaged, thus reducing productivity) and in part by Spaniards (at a much higher labor cost than that of hiring Indian volunteer labor)? If so, the creation of a category of Indian volunteer laborers for such tasks was a sensible, cost-reducing reorganization.

As time went on, the volunteer laborers sought and obtained an increase in the "sharecropping" portion of their income, a mode of increasing net remuneration

[6] Silvio Zavala, *New Viewpoints on the Spanish Colonization of America* (Philadelphia, 1943), 94.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for the workers. Why was this permitted by the mineowners? One of the arguments in *The Modern World-System* is that sharecropping is "a mode of risk-minimization" for the accumulators of capital.[7] When did risks go up for the Potosí mineowners? They went up when the price of silver in the world market declined or, to use Stern's language, "sometime during the late seventeenth century, when Potosí's secular decline was well advanced." This is the moment, Stern himself tells us, that the *minga* or volunteer laborers succeeded in establishing their weekend "raids" on the mines as a "customary right." This "right" would "plague the mines throughout the eighteenth century."[8] What then did the mineowners do? Stern tells us himself. They brutally intensified the work of *mitayo* laborers, and this effort made the "crucial difference in profitability and *rising silver production*" (my emphasis). When? "During the late eighteenth century." Why then? Why not 1650 to 1750, when this problem was already getting bigger and bigger, as Stern tells us? Because, from 1650–1750, the world-economy was in a phase of global stagnation, and beginning in 1730/1750 it expanded again.[9] With an expanding world market, it became worthwhile for the mineowners to put in the political and economic effort to increase production. The easiest and most profitable way to do this in Potosí *in the late eighteenth century* was the "brutal intensification" of the *mitayo* system. I fail to see how any part of this picture contradicts in any way the one I have drawn in *The Modern World-System* in the two volumes that Stern has read and in the third about to appear.

Ah, says Stern, but it does. For the descriptive picture is closer to what Wallerstein has called the "semiperiphery" than to what he called the "periphery." And Potosí was supposed to be a locus of peripheral production. But I never suggested that there was *only* coerced cash-crop labor in the sixteenth-century periphery of the world-system, or *only* wage labor in the core, or *only* sharecropping in the semiperiphery. Of course, each geographic region had a mixture. The world is extraordinarily complex. If we are to find explanatory patterns, we cannot waste energy looking for nonexistent ideal types. On the other hand, we can do very well looking for emphases, for the appearance of more rather than less, of some rather than none. Coerced cash-crop labor existed in Potosí (and the Caribbean and Poland). It did not exist, or barely existed, in Tuscany or East Anglia at this time. Yeoman farmers played an important role in northwestern Europe but not in Tuscany or Peru at this time. And the *mezzadria* (*métayage*) was central to the agricultural system of Tuscany (and southern France) at this time and a minor phenomenon in East Anglia or Potosí. After all, even Stern does not claim that most of the workers derived most of their income from sharecropping in Potosí. But they did in Tuscany. Hence I observe three patterns in three parts of the world, none of them "pure," to be sure, but overall presenting quite different "mixes,"

[7] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System I, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1974), 105.

[8] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World System," 854.

[9] For the first period, see my *Modern World-System II*; for the second, see my *The Modern World-System III, The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy, 1730–1840s* (forthcoming, New York, 1988).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nonetheless. I give them names for convenience of reference. And I suggest that these three patterns are not accidental, that they are systematically correlated with a number of factors and make sense primarily if we realize that they serve to maximize capital accumulation in the world-system as a whole.

STERN'S DISCUSSION OF SUGAR AND SLAVERY IN THE CARIBBEAN is even more astonishing than his discussion of Potosí, since here he does not even adduce new empirical findings not in my book. He starts by asking the reader to suspend two entrenched notions: that slavery was the "preferred, optimal, or only" labor relation and that the patterns derived from those of the Atlantic sugar islands.[10] I agree we should set these aside. Here Stern is arguing with others than me. Stern then proceeds to show that, originally in the Western Hemisphere, sugar (rice, tobacco) planters tried to use Indian labor and only later turned to African slave labor.

How does he explain this shift? He mentions a crisis of Indian labor in the 1560s and 1570s that stemmed from epidemic disease. He cites the violent resistance of the Indians and hence raises questions about "the political and economic viability of Indian labor." He states that "European and Indian populations proved insufficiently exploitable, compared to African slaves imported from afar."[11]

As Stern himself acknowledges, I give all these arguments myself, and many more.[12] Stern finds it a matter of "irony" that I do this, while avoiding (he asserts) "serious analysis of the *implications* of such findings for the overarching framework."[13] Let us look therefore at the additional arguments I gave for the shift to slavery, the implications Stern draws from these empirical findings, and the ones that I draw.

I point out that it is no accident that the Indians "died out," particularly those in the Caribbean. It is not merely that they had not been historically immunized against European diseases but also that they were primarily hunters and gatherers. (Not, of course, the Aztecs and the Incas, but notice also that African slavery never took hold to any significant degree in Aztec or Inca areas.) Hunters and gatherers are "inadapted" to disciplined agricultural labor, and one sociopsychological response is to "die out." In the last 400 years, this process of "dying out" has occurred wherever the capitalist world-economy has expanded into a zone inhabited by hunters and gatherers and tried to use them for disciplined agricultural work, not only in the Caribbean. It is a world-systemic pattern.

Of course, such an analysis has no relevance to the European indentured laborers, who get short shrift from Stern in his essay. Here, my analysis is different. It has to do with an elementary concern of capitalists: the cost of labor. Permit me to cite my text at some length.[14]

> It is easy to see why early Caribbean entrepreneurs would have preferred indentured labor to slaves. The first and probably determining reason was the much lower initial capital

[10] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 859.
[11] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 861, 862.
[12] *Modern World-System II*, 171–75.
[13] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 864.
[14] *Modern World-System II*, 172–73.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

outlay. At the time, an indentured servant had to be advanced from about 5 to 10 pounds for passage, whereas an African slave cost 20 to 25.[15] Even if the subsequent expenditure for food and clothing were less for a slave, and even if the outlay for the indentured laborer were amortized over a period of only three or four years, there was still the issue of initial capital liquidity.

Of course, there had to be a supply available. Who in fact came to the Western Hemisphere as indentured laborers (*engagés*)? Generally speaking, these persons were quite young, most often adolescents, children of wage laborers or poorer middle strata. To the extent that they were not pressed into service, what attracted them to the rigors of uncertain climes and certain hard work was the possibility of upward social mobility via a grant of land following their service. It is sometimes suggested that they were more skilled than African slaves; but this is doubtful, considering their age and experience. Indeed, one could make a case for the opposite position. It would take several years to train a worker to be efficient, and just when indentured laborers had "acquired some skill,"[16] they would leave their employers. African slaves, on the other hand, would remain once they were trained. Is this not what is at issue when we say that the decision of Barbados to utilize slave labor is explained by the search for "a more settled, more dependable work force?"[17]

What was it that shifted the balance of factors from favoring the use of indentured labor? In the first place, "good unappropriated land," on which the arrangement was based, gave out[18] because of the combination of land turnover, due to soil exhaustion, and increasing land concentration. Slavery thus came to sugar plantations earlier than to tobacco plantations and came to the West Indies rather than to southern mainland North America.[19] If an indentured laborer could not look forward to his reward, why would he suffer the brutal service on the plantation? When the decline in labor supply was matched by a simultaneous rise in demand, slavery was sure to be adopted. Even when it wasn't "necessarily the cheapest or most efficient mode of operating sugar plantations, . . . it was *the only one available* when white servants could no longer be attracted."[20] It is no accident then that the *substitution* of slaves is regularly associated with *boom* periods.[21]

[15] *See Richard Pares, *Merchants and Planters* (Cambridge, 1960), 19. See also John L. Phelan, "Negro slaves involved a large capital investment"; "Free versus Compulsory Labor: Mexico and the Philippines, 1540–1648," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1 (1959): 191.

[16] *Pares, *Merchants and Planters*, 19.

[17] *Richard S. Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1972), 72. Gabriel Debien cited the fact that the *engagés* were "a floating population" to explain the shift in the French Antilles. *Le Peuplement des Antilles françaises au XVII^e siècle: Les Engagés partis de La Rochelle (1683–1715): Notes d'histoire coloniale* (Cairo, 1942), 2: 74.

[18] *Ralph Davis, *The Rise of the Atlantic Economies* (London, 1973), 131. The fact that land did not give out is exactly the reason that indentured labor survived in French Canada and not in the French Antilles. See Louis Dermigny, "Saint-Domingue aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles," *Revue historique*, 204 (October–December 1950): 236.

[19] *Pares suggested at one point that tobacco was "a free man's crop," because it required "nicety of judgment" and therefore "could not so easily be entrusted to slaves working by routine"; but then he admitted that "the experience of Virginia shows that tobacco could be grown on slave plantations too" (*Merchants and Planters*, 21).

[20] *Davis, *Rise of the Atlantic Economies*, 133, italics added. Theodore Allen noted that there were ten popular and servant revolts or revolt plots in Virginia between the 1667 Servant Plots and the tobacco riots of 1682, the decisive one being Bacon's Rebellion in April 1676. He argued that the planters saw a need to divide the working class by giving the white workers a different status. Hence, "the shift to African labor was precipitate after 1685." "'. . . They Would Have Destroyed Me': Slavery and the Origins of Racism," *Radical America*, 9 (May–June 1975): 49. Russell R. Menard pointed out that "prices for indentured labor began to rise in the late 1670s"; "Secular Trends in the Chesapeake Tobacco Industry," *Working Papers from the Regional Economic History Research Center*, I, 3, (1978): 24. The increased demand for slaves led to higher prices *circa* 1700, and to reduce prices, there followed "an increase in the proportion of younger slaves and females in total shipments"; David Galenson, "The Slave Trade to the English West Indies, 1673–1724," *Economic History Review*, 2d ser., 32 (May 1979): 247.

[21] *See Dunn, *Sugar and Slaves*, 59, on the effect of the sugar boom between 1640 and 1660, and D. A. Farnie on the effect of the tobacco boom between 1680 and 1700; "The Commercial Empire of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Let us look at the implications Stern draws from the "late" adoption of African slavery as the prime labor relation for sugar (rice, tobacco) production in the extended Caribbean. He maintains that this shows that "local conditions" as much as "the world-system and its markets" accounted for this shift. But what are Stern's "local conditions"? Here is one list: "patterns of health and mortality . . . , the real and feared effects of popular resistance . . . , the refuge given to such resistance by poorly controlled frontier zones."[22]

In what sense are any of these conditions "local"? The health and mortality patterns are a direct consequence of the incorporation of the extended Caribbean into a capitalist world-economy and the installation of cash-crop plantations in this zone. Indians were not "dying out" in 1350. And it is no accident that it was West Africans (settled agricultural peoples in a distant external arena of the world-economy) that were sought as a slave population. "Frontier zones"? But a "frontier" is by definition a phenomenon of a "world-system." Without the world-system, these "frontiers" would not have existed. "Feared effects of popular resistance"? Does Stern believe that Indians resisted but that West Africans were docile? Both groups resisted. But, given the structure of the world-system, it was possible for the Indians to succeed more in their resistance: by escape, by the menace of political disorder, and by "dying out" (a bitter form of "success"). African slaves had been transported far from home and were hence unable to "escape" to an area where it would be inherently easy for them to live and hard to be traced. It might be done, and was done. But it was hard. The same applies to political disorder. How can we possibly call these "local" conditions? Did the slaves get to the Caribbean by osmosis?

What Stern seems to mean by arguing the relevance of "local" conditions is the lesser relevance of the "world market." But this calls for two comments. Did anyone ever define the "world-system" as synonymous with the "world market"? Surely, not I. The "world market" is merely one mechanism among many that describe the operation of the modern world-system. Indeed, one of the major intents of all my writings has been to argue that both Adam Smith and Karl Marx, not to speak of their disciples and distorters, have generally speaking overemphasized the importance of the world market. It is a key institution but one far more constrained by factors not usually thought to be part of its definition than we generally acknowledge.

the Atlantic 1607–1783," *Economic History Review*, 2d ser., 15 (December 1962): 208. Philip Curtin suggested a third factor in addition to the decline in the supply of European labor and the rise in demand for labor: differences in the rates of susceptibility to disease. Africans had "the enormous advantage of coming from a disease environment where both tropical diseases and a wide range of common Afro-Eurasian diseases were present"; "The Atlantic Slave Trade, 1600–1800," in J. F. A. Ajayi and M. Crowder, eds., *History of West Africa* (London, 1971), 1: 253. He suggested that the death rate ratio of European to African laborers in the Caribbean was three to one. In an earlier article, he had stated it was four to one, calculating that if we assumed "the cost of maintaining [slaves and indentured servants] was about the same, the slave was preferable at anything up to three times the price of the European"; "Epidemiology and the Slave Trade," *Political Science Quarterly*, 83 (June 1968): 207.

[22] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 862.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even so, let me come to the defense of the world market in this specific instance. What do we mean by a world market for sugar in the seventeenth century? There is some effective demand (at that time located primarily in northwestern Europe) and some effective supply (at that time located primarily in the extended Caribbean). The "prices" depend on some relationship between the world demand and the world supply, a relationship that varies over time for many reasons. Capital accumulation results from maximizing profit, which can also be accomplished in many ways.

One can, for example, expand the demand. Sidney W. Mintz has shown how the effective demand was deliberately and systematically increased at just this moment in time.[23] But profit is also a function of the cost of labor. If Indians "died out" or "escaped," the cost of labor increased. This was, quite directly, a "market" consideration. If sugar planters thereupon came to calculate that African slaves were "cost-effective" vis-à-vis Indians or indentured laborers, they were responding to a "world market" pressure. If, in the 1970s, German manufacturers found German trade unions too strong and moved some factories to Malaysia, we can, if we want, say that the explanation was in "local" conditions. But it was no accident that in the 1970s trade unions were stronger in Germany (France, the United States, and Japan) than in Malaysia, Mexico, or Bulgaria. Hence it was no accident that factories were "moved" from the first set of countries to the second at this time. And it was no accident that this occurred far more in the 1970s than in the 1950s. "Local conditions" will not go very far in explaining such patterns. Rather, they will lead one astray.

In turn, I find it "ironic" that Stern attempts to use Mintz's discussions of slavery against me. In Mintz's most relevant essay, "Was the Plantation Slave a Proletarian?"—an essay, incidentally, I requested him to give, first as a lecture at the Fernand Braudel Center, then as an article in our journal, *Review*—Mintz ended his very careful analysis with a clarification:

> I do not mean to suggest . . . that I believe the fundamental economic difference between Caribbean plantation slaves and European factory proletarians can be abandoned by simple recourse to the theme of the global world-economy. I do believe, however, that Wallerstein's insistence is justifiable, that local forms of labor can be made analytically more comprehensible by prior reference to the world-economy: "The point is that the 'relations of production' that define a system are the 'relations of production' of the whole system, and the system at this point in time [the sixteenth century] is the European world-economy. Free labor is indeed a defining feature of capitalism, but not free labor throughout the productive enterprises. Free labor is the form of labor control used for skilled work in core countries whereas coerced labor is used for less skilled work in peripheral areas. The combination thereof is the essence of capitalism" (Wallerstein, *Modern World-System I*, 27). Put otherwise, it is not analytically most useful to define either "proletarian" or "slave" in isolation, since these two vast categories of toilers were actually linked intimately by the world economy that had, as it were, given birth to them both, in their modern form.[24]

[23] Sidney W. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History* (New York, 1985).
[24] Sidney W. Mintz, "Was the Plantation Slave a Proletarian?" *Review*, 2 (Winter 1979): 97.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In short, I do not believe that my work fails the "critical tests" to which Stern puts it. Nor do I feel that the significant differences between Stern and me lie at the level of historical description. I have tried to show that Stern's descriptions are either the same as mine or involve adding additional data that are not incompatible at all with the theorizing in which I engaged.

This is not, however, to say that differences do not exist. They do. They have to do with the kind of "mythistory" we think productive, to use William H. McNeill's felicitous phrase. Before I elucidate the differences, let us remember McNeill's adjunction: "Pattern recognition of the sort historians engage in is the chef d'oeuvre of human intelligence. It is achieved by paying selective attention to the total input of stimuli that perpetually swarm in upon our consciousness. Only by leaving things out, i.e., relegating them to the status of background noise deserving only to be disregarded, can what matters most in a given situation become recognizable. Suitable action follows. Here is the great secret of human power over nature and over ourselves as well. Pattern recognition is what natural scientists are up to; it is what historians have always done, whether they knew it or not. Only some facts matter for any given pattern. Otherwise useless clutter will obscure what we are after: perceptible relations among important facts."[25]

Stern remarks at one point, "To call colonial Latin American 'capitalist' . . . obscures the tremendous discontinuity between the contemporary and the colonial economy."[26] But not to call colonial Latin America an integral part of the capitalist world-economy is to obscure the tremendous continuities. Here is where our mythistories come in, in selecting out what we see as continuing (a fundamental concern of historical social scientists) and what we see as changing (the second fundamental concern). We can always pinpoint differences. It is the easiest of all scholarly tasks, since everything is always different in some ways from everything else across time and space. What is harder and takes priority is to discover similarities. Only when we have exhausted our statements of the similarities is it prudent to analyze the residual differences. And this is all the more true if one's moral concern is with social transformation. One wants to be sure that a difference matters, that it truly suggests transformation.

Stern's attempt at presenting his views as those of a *via media* between the advocates of the world-systems perspective and the advocates of "local" considerations only, between the whole and the parts, is a self-deception. In order to do this, in order to claim (as he does) that the evolution of labor patterns in Potosí or in the Caribbean are explained in part by "local conditions" and in part by the actions of the "world-system," he has to use a definition of the world-system that is reified, restrictive, and in any case not one that any person espousing a world-systems perspective would use.

The world-system is neither an "actor" nor a "factor." It is the whole historical framework within which the actors act and the factors exist. Certainly, in the particular world-system under discussion, the capitalist world-economy, there

[25] William H. McNeill, *Mythistory and Other Essays* (Chicago, 1986), 5–6.
[26] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 841.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

exists an axial division of labor, and one part of that division of labor is structured in ways that we can abstractly describe as mediated by a "world market." But this "world market" functions under very specific conditions. It is underpinned by an interstate system composed of so-called sovereign states that relate to each other within a system that is ranked. The ability of persons or groups to accumulate capital is circumscribed by various feedback mechanisms, some of which are codified and some of which are not. The struggle of various actors to participate in the benefits of the system is a constant; what varies is the *rapport de force*. There are multiple cyclical patterns but nonetheless also secular trends. As with any kind of system, it is relatively difficult to assess how things will develop in detail and much easier to analyze how the details came to be what they are. But if we are to make any sense of it at all, we have to keep our eye on the fast-moving ball, and the first requirement is to know the field within which the ball game is being played. If we watch too narrow or too wide a field, we miss the game.

One issue Stern discusses at length, but about which he is unclear, is the definition of capitalism. Most of the time, he seems to share the classic imagery of the liberal-Marxist nineteenth-century consensus: capitalism is a system of production based on wage labor, the free market, and the private appropriation of profit. It is located in states that have developed "national economies" and a legal system that guarantees individual property rights. According to Stern, "assigning theoretical priority to the rise of a capitalist world market that spawned varied but functionally desirable versions of capitalism in the periphery is fundamentally misleading."[27] In the context, the criticism seems leveled at me. But I agree with the statement entirely. I do not believe the world market "spawns" versions of capitalism. I do not believe there exist multiple "versions of capitalism." I believe that there is only one kind of capitalism, the single kind that has historically existed. It is this unique and most eminently empirical entity that I am interested in describing and analyzing.[28]

If the definition of capitalism poses a problem—but not one worth avoiding by a sort of helpless antinomian shrug—the definition of feudalism poses even greater problems. In actual historiographic practice, the word has been used even more elastically than capitalism. According to Stern, a "paradox" of my arguments is that I cannot account for the "regression" of some regions "into a pattern more closely resembling feudalism."[29] Here again, I must confess astonishment. I spent the whole of Chapter 4 of Volume 2 of *The Modern World-System* seeking to account for this. Perhaps Stern does not like my explanation, but it is scarcely a question I avoided. In the case of Latin America, I specifically argued that the rise of the

[27] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 866.
[28] A short but comprehensive statement of my views is to be found in *Historical Capitalism* (London, 1983).
[29] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 867.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hacienda can in no sense be considered a "reversion to feudalism." I can only make this clear by repeating the argument:[30]

While some of the Creoles were smarting from the effects of the economic difficulties and seeking salvation in public office,[31] thus multiplying the parasitism of the state bureaucracy, others were in fact adapting quite well to the vicissitudes of the world market. The production of bullion, up to then the major export crop, went down: and the production of grains went up. It is at this point that the confusion arises. Since American grain (unlike east European grain) did not serve as a peripheral export to core regions, it is often assumed that such production was noncapitalist. [Jan] Bazant says that it was quite the contrary: "The production [of wheat] on a large scale was without doubt production for the market and using capital." He reminds us that although wheat was not consumed by peons who ate tortillas, "there was nonetheless an appreciable market: the white population of the cities."[32] Furthermore, this production required much capital in the form of mills, animals, and food for the work force . . .

This is not to suggest that these haciendas were unaffected economically; bad times of the mining areas led to "difficult years, sometimes recession"[33] that was often exacerbated by the creation of new competitive haciendas. However, it is to suggest that the market had a regional limit and that it was not profitable to go beyond that limit in the world economic contraction.[34] This is no doubt the conjunctural origin of the classical description of the structural difference between haciendas, which supplied small-scale markets, and sugar plantations, which supplied large-scale ones.[35] Within the regional limits, hacienda production was quite profitable. One may call this self-sufficiency if one wishes, but to me it seems more plausible that it was, as Bakewell says, "the result of fashioning in the New World a diversified and, in contemporary terms, capitalist economy of the European type; and of using this economy to exploit the rich assets of Middle America for Middle America's advantage."[36] The resulting advantages could not affect an abstract entity called Middle America but they did affect a concrete social group who were the landowners of Middle America . . .

[30] *Modern World-System II*, 151–52, 156.

[31] *See Murdo J. MacLeod on public office as the "only practical answer" to prevent the "falling in status" of many Creoles and Spaniards; *Spanish Central America: A Socioeconomic History, 1520–1720* (Berkeley, Calif., 1973), 311.

[32] *Jan Bazant, "Feudalismo y capitalismo en la historia económica de México," *Trimestre económico*, 17 (January–March 1960): 90. He maintained that "a part of the total production was for export."

[33] *Enrique Florescano, *Precios del maíz y crisis agrícolas en México (1708–1810)* (Mexico City, 1969), 183.

[34] *"[All the evidence] indicates that in a relatively short lapse of time the large hacienda succeeded in supplying regional consumption needs. Once this level was reached however, before the hacienda developed its maximum productive capacity, the regional structure of the markets, the enormous distances, the bad roads, the high freight costs, the commercial policies of the Crown, made it impossible to export its surpluses beyond the regional limit. The hacienda then was obliged, if not to reduce production, at least to maintain it at a stable level"; Florescano, *Precios del maíz*, 184.

[35] *See Sidney W. Mintz and Eric R. Wolf, "Haciendas and Plantations in Middle America and the Antilles," *Social and Economic Studies*, 6 (September 1957): 380.

[36] *P. J. Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Zacatecas, 1546–1700* (Cambridge, 1971), 235. See also Magnus Mörner, "The Spanish American Hacienda: A Survey of Recent Research and Debate," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 53 (May 1973): 191. John Lynch went even further and called this "the first emancipation of Spanish America." "It is tempting to attribute the great depression of the American trade to the collapse of the colonial economies. But it was the consequence of shift rather than collapse. If the colonies no longer fed the trade as of old, it was largely because they were employing their capital at home, in public and private investment"; *Spain under the Habsburgs*, II: *Spain and America, 1598–1700* (Oxford, 1969), 139. Jean Piel inverted this argument further, seeking to refute writers (such as Ruggiero Romano) who speak of a low circulation of bullion based on reduced figures of transatlantic shipment: "If the trans-oceanic monetary flow slowed down, is this the sign of retraction of mining production, or rather that a growing proportion of the bullion is kept locally?"; *Capitalisme agraire au Pérou* (Paris, 1975), 151.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The large, so-called self-sufficient hacienda was precisely a mechanism that enabled subtle adjustment to market forces. It could contract and expand production in function of shifting profitability and speed up or slow down resource utilization, thus maintaining the link between agricultural production and the world-economy over time. Furthermore, the hacienda was the locus of new textile production. Its emergence is analogous to what in later centuries would be known as import substitution, the notorious consequence of worldwide contractions. Bakewell argues that "trade probably declined, in large part, because New Spain no longer needed imports from Europe."[37] He draws the conclusion that "the economy of New Spain, far from suffering any decline in the early seventeenth century, became more healthy";[38] but this is to misconceive the situation. There is no such thing as an economy of New Spain that can be compared to an economy of Spain. Some entrepreneurs in Hispanic America transferred investment, inter alia, to textile production because of the shifting state of the market (the increase of the Spanish and mestizo populations, the decline of silver export, and the economies of labor scale of the hacienda system) and thereby hurt the export potential of Spanish textile producers.

Worldwide contraction did not imply a decline of capitalist economic activity. Indeed, it probably signaled the increased strength of locally-based bourgeois enterprise.[39] Furthermore, as with Europe, the point is not that there was any decline in overall textile production but that this production was moving to the rural areas, the haciendas and Indian villages, and that "fine clothes were being produced for the most part in *obrajes*."[40]

Stern wishes to analyze the rise of the hacienda in terms of its many local complexities and insists that "social relations of production matter more than markets or the profit principle for establishing the capitalist or non-capitalist laws, or internal dynamics, of the economy."[41] He must in this case answer one question. Why was it that, in the very same period (*circa* 1600–1750), the "social relations of production" evolved in parallel ways in two such disparate parts of the world, Latin America and Eastern Europe, or, if we wish to narrow the comparison, Mexico and Poland. I at least have an answer: the parallel impact on peripheral zones of an "era of slow growth." This is the claim to strength of the world-systems perspective,

[37] *Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 234.

[38] *Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 230. John L. Phelan made essentially the same point: "The Borah thesis about the Indian labor shortage is beyond dispute, but this very shortage may have contributed more to economic growth in the seventeenth century than it did to economic stagnation. The word, 'depression,' I suggest, is a misleading term to apply to the whole period"; Review of Lynch, *Spain under the Habsburgs*, II: *Spain and America, 1598–1700* in *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 2 (November 1970): 213.

[39] *"If the emergence of large landed property in Peru coincided chronologically with a decline of the monetary economy and of non-agricultural enterprises—mining, manufacturing, commercial—how would we explain the rise of the Peruvian *obrajes* in the seventeenth century whose volume of production would exceed . . . that of Spain in that epoch, and even more how would we explain the prodigious rise of a Spanish-Peruvian merchant bourgeoisie capable, as of 1613, of forcing Madrid to share the colonial monopoly on commerce between Peru and Spain by the creation of the Tribunal of the Lima Consulate?"; Piel, *Capitalisme agraire au Pérou*, 150. On the "increasing latitude" of the New Spain economic elite vis-à-vis that of Seville, see Richard Boyer, "Mexico in the Seventeenth Century: Transition of Colonial Society," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 57 (August 1977): 457 *et passim*. For the increasing strength of the local *aviadores*, or outfitters, in Mexico vis-à-vis the Crown, who could force debtors to repay them before they paid taxes, see P. J. Bakewell, "Zacatecas: An Economic and Social Outline of a Silver Mining District, 1547–1700," in I. Altman and J. Lockhart, eds., *Provinces of Early Mexico* (Los Angeles, Calif., 1976), 219.

[40] *Hans Pohl, "Das Textilgewerbe in Hispanoamerika während der Kolonialzeit," *Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 56 (December 1969): 448. Davis however emphasized that "the goods that Mexico produced in quantity were the cheaper, low-quality ones, while the high-grade woollens, linens and metalwares continued to come from Europe"; *Rise of the Atlantic Economies*, 161–62.

[41] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 868.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that it can make sense out of a seeming coincidence that links far corners of the world and do so in a way that is defensible in terms of the empirical evidence. Furthermore, it can do so by means of a small set of concepts that are used with some consistency and some tightness.

Stern, at the end of his essay, writes of a "contradictory interplay between . . . three grand motors" of the socioeconomic history of colonized America: "the European world-system, popular strategies of resistance and survival within the periphery, and the mercantile and elite interests joined to American 'centers of gravity.'"[42] But surely this is adding apples and kangaroos, or at least apples and fruit. The three "motors" are at very different levels of analysis or abstraction. If the world-economy is "European" (defined narrowly), there is no sense in calling the Americas a "periphery." But if the word "Europe" is merely a metaphor, and he includes Latin America therein, we are placing at the same level the whole and two of its parts. Moreover, these two "parts" scarcely exhaust the subject. Yes, there were popular strata with strategies of resistance. Yes, there were mercantile groups and elites in Latin America with interests they were pursuing. But were there not also monarchs with their state machineries in the picture, and do we not need to take them into account also as a "motor"? The monarchs with their state machineries were stronger actors in the sixteenth and (late) eighteenth centuries in colonial Latin America than they were in the period from 1600 to 1750, but they were never absent from the scene. And, in passing, is it completely accidental that the periods of Crown strength and weakness correlate with cyclical moments in the history of the world-economy?

Stern considers that my paradigm is "Europe-centered."[43] In 1982, Patrick O'Brien in his critique taxed me with the opposite fault: too much concern with the "economic development of the periphery" and not enough with the "economic history of Western Europe."[44] I say to Stern, as I said to O'Brien, that "my primary concern is to understand the historical development of a singular historical system which has been organized as a capitalist world-economy."[45]

[42] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 871.
[43] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 865.
[44] "European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery," *Economic History Review*, 2d ser., 35 (February 1982): 2.
[45] "European Economic Development: A Comment on O'Brien," *Economic History Review*, 2d ser., 36 (November 1983): 583.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reply: "Ever More Solitary"

DIRECT DEBATE BETWEEN SCHOLARS CAN SERVE TO ENHANCE understanding when the contending parties resist the temptation to talk past one another rather than engage the alternative viewpoint. For this reason, I welcome debate of my assessment of Immanuel Wallerstein's world-system intepretation and my proposed alternative from the angle of Latin American and Caribbean history. Wallerstein's commentary is so riddled with errors and misrepresentations, however, that it does not facilitate the kind of constructive debate that advances knowledge. A point-by-point rebuttal of each such item would serve little purpose for attentive readers and would exceed the space allotted to this brief rejoinder. I will therefore limit myself to illustrating the profusion of errors and misrepresentations in the case of Wallerstein's comments on silver. I will then turn to his comments on sugar as an example of the reductionist method that makes his analysis one-dimensional and mars its explanatory value. Finally, I will take up the broader issues at stake in the debate.

WALLERSTEIN'S DISCUSSION OF SILVER GROSSLY DISTORTS my statements and presentations of data the better to fit his thesis. Let us observe, for example, what he does to the chronology of share arrangements at Potosí. In his rendition of my presentation, the second phase of labor relations (from the 1570s to around 1600) was "pure *mita*,"[1] and the ore shares of the *mitayo* draft laborers were insignificant.[2] Only in the third phase of labor relations (the 1600s) did there develop in Potosí a mixed system of forced and voluntary labor. By Wallerstein's version of my own account, however, not until the late seventeenth century were the *minga* volunteer laborers "reasonably successful"[3] in their efforts to assert customary share rights. Under the stimulus of "an expanding world market"[4] beginning in the mid-eighteenth century, the mineowners reacted effectively by intensifying the work regime imposed on *mitayos* in the late eighteenth century.

[1] Immanuel Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," *AHR*, 93 (October 1988): 875.

[2] Wallerstein bases his dismissal of the share practices of forced laborers on my comparison of the *relative* power of forced and voluntary laborers to assert share rights. See Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 874, 875; Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean," *AHR*, 93 (October 1988): 852–53.

[3] Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 875, compare 874.

[4] Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 876.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This rendition of the chronology presented in my essay is mistaken on every crucial point. The second stage of labor relations, I observed, was not "pure *mita*" but also witnessed the rise of "a more spontaneous system of voluntary hiring." I even went so far as to suggest that the *minga* volunteers, certainly a majority of the work force in Potosí's mines and refineries by the 1600s, "perhaps" reached majority proportions earlier.[5] The mixed labor system and the share customs accompanying it had therefore already developed by the late 1500s. Moreover, Wallerstein ignores the evidence that even the *mitayos* established customary share rights that mineowners could not eliminate and that the shares constituted their most important remuneration.[6] This effort to slight the impact of share arrangements equally distorts Wallerstein's summary of the third phase. In Wallerstein's rendition, the *mingas*' efforts were not "reasonably successful" until the late seventeenth century. Actually, I pointed out that the *corpa* ore shares claimed by Indians loomed large in the picture as early as the 1580s. At that time, they accounted for about a fourth of total ore production, enabled Indian women and men to organize their household economies around the production, smelting, and trade of *corpa* ores, and triggered an abortive effort by the mineowners to eliminate the Indian ore market.[7] What happened sometime during the late seventeenth century, when the *mingas* added weekend mine raiding to their established practices, was a further expansion of a share system that had already operated with reasonable success (from the *mingas*' perspective) for about a century.[8] Finally, while it is true that mineowners responded to this extreme situation, after a delay of at least half (perhaps three-quarters of) a century, by brutally intensifying the labors imposed on *mitayos*, and that this response provided the crucial marginal difference in Potosí's profitability in the late eighteenth century, it is also true that customary share rights nonetheless continued to deprive mineowners of well over a third of the refined silver they might otherwise have claimed.[9] The latter point drops out of Wallerstein's chronology.

The net effect of Wallerstein's distortions of the chronology I presented is to compress severely the duration in time of share arrangements that had a great impact on labor relations and silver production at Potosí. This is why, in addition to misrepresenting my depiction of the second and third stages of labor at Potosí, Wallerstein is also eager to claim that I overstate the impact of share relations in the first phase (1545 to the 1570s).[10] This compressed chronology of share

[5] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 851.

[6] See Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 852.

[7] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 853.

[8] "Expansion" may be slightly misleading insofar as the declining quality of ore may have reduced the benefit of "traditional" share customs in the late seventeenth century and therefore driven the *mingas* to compensate for this erosion by pressing hard for "new" customary rights that granted them even more systematic opportunities to find and appropriate good pieces of ore.

[9] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 854, and note 65.

[10] To cite in response to my argument, however, Don Silvio Zavala's classic essays, published in 1943, when the historiography focused more on legal rules, juridical philosophy, and policy intent than on the on-the-ground social relations that have preoccupied historians since the 1960s, is a rather weak way to question the analysis of labor relations at Potosí before the 1570s. Nor does it help Wallerstein's case when my discussion of *yanacona* and *encomienda* laborers in the early years is reduced, in his

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relations, which decrees them insignificant during the first 125 years or so (1545 to, say, 1670) of Potosí's colonial history, neatly correlates, in Wallerstein's view, with the arguments of *The Modern World-System*. The mineowners "permitted" sharecropping in the late seventeenth century to minimize risks as the world market price for silver declined, then, under the incentive of world market expansion, intensified forced labor to reverse the damage.[11] Small wonder that Wallerstein cannot see how the data on share relations contradict his interpretation "in any way."[12]

The problem of chronology hardly exhausts the list of distortions, errors, and key omissions that pervade Wallerstein's comments on silver. A short sample will suffice to illustrate the depth of the problem. In Wallerstein's account, relative statements are transformed into hard-and-fast absolutes. Thus "overlapping" phases of mine labor become more starkly delineated,[13] and a division of labor that "tended" to concentrate *mitayos* in more primitive or repugnant tasks and *mingas* in more "skilled" and rewarded work is hardened into a purer, more rigid formulation.[14] In Wallerstein's account, a somewhat more refined and modulated version of his tripartite division of international labor appears,[15] and having agreed that each region of the world-system presents a complex mix of labor relations, he asks us to look "for emphases, for the appearance of more rather than less." In contrasting the mixes in different zones of the world-economy, he observes triumphantly that "even Stern does not claim that most of the workers derived most of their income from sharecropping in Potosí."[16] The only problem is that I *do* make this very claim.[17]

response, to a discussion of *encomienda* Indians only. See Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 874–75.

[11] Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 876.

[12] Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 876.

[13] Compare Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 850, and Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 873–74, 875.

[14] Compare Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 851, and Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 874, 875. For Wallerstein, the correlation of "skilled" work with waged or free labor forms, and "unskilled" work with coerced labor, squares well with his own thesis. (His comments on the point downplay, however, the geographical thrust of this distinction in the *Modern World-System* volumes. See especially *The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century* [New York, 1974], 87.) Wallerstein takes the distinction between skilled free labor and unskilled coerced labor so rigidly that he hypothesizes that Spaniards may have performed, in the late 1500s, much of the "skilled" labor later performed by *minga* volunteers. This was not the case. In the silver tunnels of Potosí mountain, distinctions between "skilled" and "unskilled" work referred mainly to distinctions between ore-cutting and ore-hauling work, the labor force was overwhelmingly Indian, and the division of labor between *mitayos* and *mingas* was blurred by the overlap between them.

[15] This version is presented by Wallerstein not as a refinement of his views in light of subsequent thinking or research but as a restatement of them.

[16] Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 876.

[17] See Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 852–55 *passim*. Along the way to this conclusion, Wallerstein states that yeoman farmers and sharecropping were insignificant in the colonial agriculture of Peru and Bolivia. The evidence is more mixed than this, depending on the time period, in some critical agricultural regions. In the valleys of Peru's central coast, small-scale farms and truck gardens (*chácaras*) were at first important in the provision of foods to Lima but were then eclipsed by the growth of large haciendas in the 1590s and early 1600s. See Robert G. Keith, *Conquest and Agrarian Change: The Emergence of the Hacienda System on the Peruvian Coast* (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), esp. 64–72, 81–97; compare Eduardo Arroyo, *La Hacienda costeña en el Perú: Mala-Cañete, 1532–1968* (Lima, 1981).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Wallerstein's omissions betray a similar evasion of the argument. Let us recall that, among the range of major silver centers of colonial Spanish America, Potosí constituted the example most likely to support Wallerstein's thesis. Elsewhere, coerced labor gave way more rapidly to private arrangements in which the share system predominated.[18] This aspect of the argument Wallerstein ignores altogether. The multiple (mis)representations of texts may delight deconstructionists but not readers interested in meaningful debate.[19] Wallerstein simply seems unprepared to engage the crux of the argument. If, in the mix of labor relations at Potosí, share arrangements were dominant, if Potosí is nonetheless the most favorable "test" of the Wallerstein thesis among colonial silver centers, if silver was the highest American priority of the capitalist world-system during the "long" sixteenth century—if all this holds true, what does it imply about the tripartite international division of labor at the foundation of Wallerstein's *Modern World-System*, and about the explanatory power of his world-system paradigm?[20] Surely, not that the capitalist world-system was irrelevant. But, just as surely, that it constituted only one of several great "motor forces" driving the history of labor and economy in colonial America.

LET US TURN FROM A NARROW AND TECHNICAL DISCUSSION of "mistakes" to the larger question of method. Wallerstein's commentary on sugar serves well as an example of his penchant for reducing all significant phenomena bearing on the colonial economy to consequences derived from the world-system. The case of sugar is particularly interesting since Wallerstein and I are in agreement on much of the descriptive data to be explained, and his specific analysis of this data is more sensitive to the significance of social conflicts and conditions of production in America for an emerging labor system.

Wallerstein agrees that for colonial sugar planters in the greater Caribbean region (including Portuguese Brazil), the Amerindian populations proved insufficiently exploitable, eventually, compared to African slaves. He agrees that epidemic disease as well as the Indians' violent resistance (in the case of Brazil) are

In Cochabamba, on the other hand, the strategic "granary" of Potosí, the early might of commercial haciendas was gradually worn down in the eighteenth century by peasant smallholders whose land rentals, sharecropping tenancies, and direct ownership of land enabled them to compete actively in the food market. See Brooke Larson, *Explotación agraria y resistencia campesina: Cinco ensayos históricos sobre Cochabamba (siglos XVI–XIX)* (Cochabamba, 1982); Larson, *Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia: Cochabamba, 1550–1900* (Princeton, N.J., 1988).

[18] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 855–57.

[19] Unfortunately, errors and misrepresentations pervade Wallerstein's entire commentary, not just the discussion of silver (which I am using as an example). I take this opportunity to add, in fairness to Wallerstein, that it would be extremely regrettable to conclude from the errors marring his "Comments" that the *Modern World-System* books are unworthy of serious attention and reflection. As argued in my original essay, Wallerstein's work raises provocative and weighty issues and contributes specific historical and theoretical insights whose value should not be overlooked even if one concludes that the general paradigm is fundamentally flawed. Were his work not important and provocative, I would hardly have relied on a critical evaluation of it as a basis for reappraising colonial political economy in its wider world context.

[20] The three patterns within the tripartite system "make sense primarily if we realize that they serve to maximize capital accumulation in the world-system as a whole"; Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 877.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

relevant to understanding the transition from Indian to African labor strategies. But his characterization of the issue of Amerindian vulnerability to epidemic disease caused by the spread of Old World microbes is revealing. To Wallerstein, "dying out" was a sociopsychological response by which hunter-gatherer cultures rejected the "disciplined agricultural labor" imposed by the world-system, and to which they were especially "inadapted." African slavery was unimportant, he points out, in the former Aztec and Inca territories (with their dense peasant populations and highly developed agriculture), and the background of imported West Africans as "settled agricultural peoples" was a significant factor in their suitability as slaves. "In the last 400 years," Wallerstein observes, "this process of 'dying out' has occurred wherever the capitalist world-economy has expanded into a zone inhabited by hunters and gatherers and tried to use them for disciplined agricultural work . . . It is a world-systemic pattern."[21]

One detects here a rather strenuous effort to subsume the explanatory value of biological and epidemiological history under the rubric of the effects of a single higher force, capital accumulation by the world-system. While it is true that abortions, infanticide, suicide, and a loss of will to live figured in the sociopsychological response of some Amerindians (as well as African slaves!) to plantation labor, and that this response is significant to understanding population history, Wallerstein's way of posing the problem relegates the history of microbes, disease environments, and the biological contact and isolation of human populations to a minor and derivative explanatory role, something less than a force in its own right. The explanatory motor that subsumes biological and epidemiological factors is the world-system's labor demands, to which unsuitable hunter-gatherer cultures responded by "dying out." This approach presses historical causation and explanation into a single dimension: vulnerability to epidemic disease becomes "resistance"[22] to plantation labor by inadaptable natives.

The formulation, however, does not work. The Arawak and Tupinambá peoples of Española and coastal Brazil were not primarily hunters and gatherers; they practiced agriculture, albeit an agriculture whose slash-and-burn techniques perhaps facilitated physical mobility in a tropical environment.[23] Moreover, the great sixteenth-century epidemics almost always unleashed greater devastation on the indigenous population of the coastal lowlands of Latin America and the Caribbean compared to those of the high mountains and plateaus, even when Europeans did not impose disciplined plantation regimes in the lowland areas.[24]

[21] Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 877, 879.

[22] Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 879.

[23] See Mary W. Helms, "The Indians of the Caribbean and Circum-Caribbean at the End of the Fifteenth Century," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, volume 1 (New York, 1984), 49–52; Carl Ortwin Sauer, *The Early Spanish Main* (Berkeley, Calif., 1969), 51–58; Stuart B. Schwartz, "Indian Labor and New World Plantations: European Demands and Indian Responses in Northeastern Brazil," *AHR*, 83 (February 1978): 44–46. Whether one may refer even to a "semi-nomadic" lifestyle is uncertain. Sauer, *Early Spanish Main*, 52, argued that in the Greater Antilles shifting cultivation was unlikely.

[24] The best introduction to the highland-coast distinction and sixteenth-century population history is Sherburne F. Cook and Woodrow Borah, *Essays in Population History: Mexico and the Caribbean*, 2 vols. (Berkeley, Calif., 1971, 1974), esp. 1: 73–118, 411–29. The broad biological picture is admirably

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This helps to explain why, for example, the Afro-American population of Lima and nearby coastal valleys constituted by the late sixteenth century a third or more of the region's total population, despite the absence of a plantation regime and despite an indigenous background of peasant agriculture on Peru's central coast.[25] In short, the vulnerability of indigenous peoples to epidemic disease was a powerful force in its own right in the coastal lowlands, independent of the spread of sugar plantations or the cultural aversion of hunters and gatherers to disciplined agricultural labor.[26] The point here is to illustrate Wallerstein's reductionist method and its limitations, not to argue that vulnerability to epidemic disease was the only important local variable. Local geography, conditions of health and work on the plantations and placer mines, and the Indians' cultural background and responses, including resistance, are extremely relevant to a full analysis of indigenous population decline and movement in the greater Caribbean and to their impact on plantation labor.[27] Nor do I wish to imply the unimportance of the world-system. The "interplay," I argued, "between . . . local conditions of production and the interests and opportunities derived from the international market" accounts more powerfully than the world-system paradigm alone for the emergence of African slavery as an overwhelmingly dominant labor strategy on the plantations of the greater Caribbean.[28]

sketched in Alfred W. Crosby, Jr., *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492* (Westport, Conn., 1972); compare his *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900* (New York, 1986).

[25] I base this (conservative) estimate on Frederick P. Bowser, *The African Slave in Colonial Peru, 1524–1650* (Stanford, Calif., 1974), 337–41, 76–78, 91; Noble David Cook, *Demographic Collapse: Indian Peru, 1520–1620* (New York, 1981), 150–51, 156–57. To exclude coastal river valleys with numerous sugar and wine haciendas relying heavily on African slaves, I am using a restricted definition of "central coast" (the districts of Lima, Cañete, and Chancay only) that omits the northern and southern reaches of more expansive definitions.

[26] Let us note, in addition, that the distinction between the "dying out" of indigenous "hunters and gatherers" and the adaptability of West African agriculturalists is tempered for another reason as well. In the Antilles and Brazil, local conditions of health and diet, work, and domestic and sexual life were such that the Afro-American slave populations had great difficulty reproducing their numbers through natural increase. It was fresh imports that enabled the Afro-American slave populations to remain stable or grow.

[27] As Wallerstein observes, my essay devotes little attention to the colonial British experience with white indentured labor. I preferred (in the limited space of a single, albeit lengthy, article) to focus the detailed analysis on Spanish and Portuguese America because I am writing as a scholar of Latin America, and because the Iberian experience with sugar in America preceded the British experience. My comments on British America were therefore limited to showing the consistency of the British experience with the argument developed for Spanish and Portuguese America. See Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 862–63. There is much truth in the cost-benefit and supply-demand analyses quoted in Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 877–78, but for a splendid work that demonstrates the relevance, too, of local social and political conflicts not easily reducible to calculations of the comparative cost of labor, see Edmund S. Morgan, *American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia* (New York, 1975).

[28] Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 862. The mirror image of Wallerstein's reductionist tendency is his belief that he must "come to the defense of the world market" in the explanation of the transition to African slave labor in sugar production; Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 880. The defense is unnecessary, since my own analysis is careful to point out the importance of the world market and the dangers of a reverse reductionism. (See Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 860, 861–63.) But the defense is understandable if one wants to grant the world-system a primacy and inclusiveness that subject other variables to a secondary and derivative status.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For Wallerstein, this "interplay" is an illusion because the forces I call "local" are creations, or consequences, of the world-system itself. Conditions of health and mortality derived from the integration of the greater Caribbean into the capitalist world-economy that imposed plantations in the area. The proximity of poorly controlled frontier zones providing refuge to popular resistance is a function of world-system geography: "a 'frontier' is by definition a phenomenon of a 'world-system.'" The real and feared effects of popular resistance may have mattered, but it is "the structure of the world-system" that explains why Indian resistance was more successful than that of African slaves. "In what sense," Wallerstein asks, "are any of these conditions 'local'?"[29]

The question is a fair one, but I believe that Wallerstein's answer to it rests on two mistaken judgments. First, Wallerstein seems unable to accept the possibility that even if, from the point of view of "origins," inclusion in the world-system dramatically altered the disease environments, social relations, and power conflicts of colonized American regions, these (changed) conditions of life and labor could quickly take on a dynamic or life of their own. The conditions of health, mortality, and physical abuse that framed life and options in the greater Caribbean may have had as much to do with epidemic disease crises beyond world-system control, and with conflicts and behaviors rooted in the antagonistic dialectic of social control and conflict on the plantations,[30] as with social designs decreed or spread from the core of the world-system. The human geography of frontiers, and the uneven spread of social control, are not reducible to a mere phenomenon of the world-system. Human beings coping with life in America had an important hand in creating and defending "frontiers," in rendering physical environments "more" or "less" accessible to the forces of social control.[31] The limits and complications imposed by Indians and by European indentured laborers on the early labor options of aspiring planters derived not simply from the structure of the world-system but also from the turbulence and uncertainties of the lives they made in America. The real and latent threats of Indian and European laborers heightened the relative attraction of slaves imported from across the sea (although the latter, too, stirred

[29] All quotes are from Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 879.

[30] For example, given the realities of poor health and overwork on plantations of northeastern Brazil in, say, 1560, an Indian (or African) laborer might have an interest in feigning or exaggerating illness. But a plantation owner or manager, eager to resist signaling weakness of will by accommodating such "illnesses" too easily, and conscious that the insecurities of disease and mortality made long-term perspectives on health risky anyway, might have an interest in slighting all but the most serious health problems or even punishing those suspected of feigning sickness. This sort of dialectic could hardly be expected to improve the laborers' health, even if the long-term interest of elites at the level of systemic needs or benefits lay in such improvement.

[31] The south of Chile, with its gold mines, offers a particularly fascinating and dramatic case of human struggles to define, control, and conquer frontiers. For splendid analyses, see Robert Charles Padden, "Cultural Change and Military Resistance in Araucanian Chile, 1550–1730," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 13 (Spring 1957): 103–21; Alvaro Jara, *Guerra y sociedad en Chile: La Transformación de la guerra de Arauco y la esclavitud de los indios* (Santiago de Chile, 1971); Andrew Daitsman, "The Dynamic of Conquest: Spanish Motivations in the New World" (M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1987). On the arduous efforts of runaway Afro-American slaves to make frontier hideaways more "remote" from social control, see Richard Price, "Introduction: Maroons and Their Communities," in Price, ed., *Maroon Societies: Rebel Slave Communities in the Americas* (2d ed., Baltimore, Md., 1979), 5–8.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fears and brought complications). America-centered dynamics such as these bore on the productivity of labor and the limits of social control, thereby exerting a powerful reciprocal impact on the options, constraints, and opportunities of the world-system and its agents in America.

Wallerstein might object that the world-system's impact on American life and dynamics did not stop at the point of "origins." If the world-system continuously framed the American conditions I call "local," would not "interplay" again turn into an illusion? Such an objection would rest on a second mistaken judgment, distinct but related to the first. Wallerstein seems to me to confuse the geographical reach of a relevant framework with its power of historical determination and explanation. This leads him to reject the possibility of a dynamic "interplay" between local conditions that provided a context, or framework, within which world-system actors operated, and a world-system which simultaneously set a context, or framework, for local actors. For Wallerstein, one framework subsumes the other.[32] The spatial reach of *a* relevant framework, however, does not prove its all-embracing power as *the* relevant framework for understanding human history. Such an equation would be a bit like saying that, because the structure of the solar system sets the environmental and ecological framework of human life on earth, it follows that "local" human actions on earth have no independent impact on the environmental and ecological framework of human life on the planet.

LET US CONCLUDE WITH THREE BROAD QUESTIONS of "mythistory," a topic Wallerstein rightly and perceptively introduces. I want first to ask whether the charge of "reductionism" is inherently unfair, since we all of necessity engage in it. I will then consider the problem of continuity and change raised by Wallerstein. Finally, I will introduce what is perhaps the most important "mythistorical" issue at stake in the debate: the historical agency and "solitude" of Latin Americans.

Wallerstein (citing William H. McNeill) points out that we humans recognize historical, social, and natural patterns by selecting among the endless streams of data or stimuli rushing toward our consciousness. The point is valid, and in this larger sense we are all "reductionists." Selectivity and simplification are essential to survival and intelligence. If, in Mexico City street traffic, I give undue attention to air traffic and sidewalk vendors, my vehicle and I will not last long. Historians and social scientists, like urban street drivers, must select what merits more, less, or no attention to discern the relevant patterns and relationships. "Reductionism" in this broadest and most general of senses is essential to the historian's task and therefore an unfair measuring stick for sizing up a historical interpretation. We must turn to a narrower, more refined sense of the term. The urban street driver necessarily engages in "reductionism" to survive. But if, in Mexico City street traffic during the rainy season, I pay scant attention to cross-street traffic when the traffic light on my street is green, I am headed for trouble. I am unaware of, ignoring,

[32] "The world-system is neither an 'actor' nor a 'factor.' It is the whole historical framework within which the actors act and the factors exist"; Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 881.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

or bending into a wishful dimension the relevant knowledge that the street lights are not reliable during the rains and that the city's drivers do not always defer to the lights, especially when the lights are unreliable. When "reductionism" ignores or twists *relevant* data or patterns into a misleading analysis of the topic at hand, it may become a strategy for disaster, not survival.

This narrower, more precise and restricted meaning of "reductionism" is the context for my critical evaluation of Wallerstein's method and intepretation. Reductionism in this narrower sense occurs when a historian or social scientist is unaware of or ignores data, or twists its analysis into a single "mold" or dimension, in ways that fundamentally distort or impoverish our ability to understand or explain the problem under study. Critical evaluation is fairer and more telling if one examines the key building blocks of the argument in its own terms. For this very reason, my analysis focused on silver and sugar rather than minor exports, and the study of silver focused more on Potosí (the "most favorable case" among the major silver centers) than on, say, Oruro or Zacatecas. For this reason, too, my analysis of the American periphery focused on the tripartite international division of labor that is at the foundation of Wallerstein's edifice rather than, for example, on the details of European politics and administration in America. The "reductionism" of a historical interpretation matters little unless one demonstrates how new data or a distinctive line of analysis affects the essential substance or reasoning concerning topics vitally important to the original interpretation. Readers will decide for themselves, of course, whether my evaluation of the silver and sugar sectors is convincing and whether Wallerstein's "reductionism" is in that context a valid characterization.[33]

The relative priority one places on the study of historical continuity or change is closely related, in Wallerstein's view, to questions of "mythistory." Both concerns are "fundamental," but continuity—the discovery of similarity across time—"is harder and takes priority."[34] It seems to me rash to place continuity and change, *a priori*, in rank order of intellectual priority and complexity. The relative importance of each, and the periodizations historians find most useful, depends on the issue or question under examination.[35] For Latin America, at least, the

[33] Because, in my view, the perception of "truths" may require a certain reductionism, and even the most flawed and one-dimensional models may expose or illuminate one or several "truths" among many, I also thought it important to consider whether Wallerstein's interpretation contributes valuable specific insights despite my rejection of the general paradigm. Readers will decide for themselves, too, the merits of the specific insights I highlighted from Wallerstein's work as especially illuminating for understanding the feudalism/capitalism/world-system trilogy in an American context.

[34] Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 881.

[35] In a classic article, Joan Kelly-Gadol demonstrated, for example, how shifting the focus of analysis to women recasts our sense of historical periodization and change: "Did Women Have a Renaissance?" reprinted in Renate Bridenthal and Claudia Koonz, eds., *Becoming Visible: Women in European History* (Boston, 1977), 137–63. In a recent study, I argued that to interpret peasant rebellions scholars need to incorporate multiple time scales simultaneously into the analysis, since both long-term ("structural") and short-term ("conjunctural" and "episodic") perspectives on continuity and change are essential to understanding why and when peasant rebellions happen and what such volatile moments mean to the rebels. From this perspective, a ranked choice between "continuity" and "change" seems too confining. See Steve J. Stern, "New Approaches to the Study of Peasant Rebellion and Consciousness: Implications of the Andean Experience," in Stern, ed., *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries* (Madison, Wis., 1987), 11–13.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

illusion of false or superficial continuities has been as alluring as the illusion of false or superficial changes. One can see the grip of a sense of continuity on many levels—from the early twentieth-century intellectuals who saw the landed estates (haciendas) of their day as direct institutional descendants of the sixteenth-century *encomiendas*;[36] to Alejo Carpentier's brilliant novel depicting a journey into the Venezuelan provinces and jungle as a journey backward in time;[37] to contemporary social historians who observe that the Wars of Independence, violent and destructive as they were, left fundamental social structures intact;[38] to tourist brochures extolling the folklore of exotic Indians living much as their pre-Columbian or colonial ancestors did centuries earlier.[39] This sense of continuity is not, of course, a mere product of imagination, and it exposes something important about Latin America. To sort out, ponder, and analyze the meaningful continuities as well as changes in Latin American and Caribbean history is important and difficult, but I see no reason to reach a sweeping judgment, independent of the specific issues under study, of their relative importance.

Continuity, change—the perspective of each brings its own drawbacks and traps. Too firm and overriding a commitment to continuities may lead to questionable projections in time and casual juxtapositions of distinct historical eras. Note, for example, Wallerstein's response to my comment that a long-term view poses a theoretical paradox to the capitalist world-system intepretation of early colonial America because, in the early *nineteenth* century, some agrarian regions that had been dynamic in colonial times experienced an apparent "regression" into feudalism. Wallerstein's response is to quote at length his analysis of colonial haciendas and economic patterns in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.[40] The analysis he quotes is perceptive (and I share his rejection of the feudalism thesis for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), but it is irrelevant. More precisely, the pertinence of this sort of juxtaposition is at best an open question unless one assumes, *a priori*, that underlying structural continuities are so great that the analysis of one era is applicable to the other. Similarly, Wallerstein refers to the power of the world-system in the late twentieth century to buttress his view of its power in the early modern period. "It was no accident," he tells us, that labor unions in the 1970s were more formidable in countries such as Germany than in

[36] This is why it became an important historiographical accomplishment to demonstrate that the *encomienda* did not confer legal land title upon *encomenderos*, and that the waves of hacienda expansion and consolidation in Latin America occurred after the age of the powerful *encomienda* had passed. For a thoughtful discussion of the *encomienda*-hacienda tangle, see James Lockhart, "Encomienda and Hacienda: The Evolution of the Great Estate in the Spanish Indies," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 49 (August 1969): 411–29.

[37] *Los Pasos perdidos* (Mexico City, 1953).

[38] See, for sophisticated examples, John Lynch, *The Spanish American Revolutions, 1808–1826* (New York, 1973); George Reid Andrews, "Spanish American Independence: A Structural Analysis," *Latin American Perspectives*, 44 (Winter 1985): 105–32.

[39] Anthropologists will recognize more scholarly and sophisticated examples of this sense of overwhelming continuity in indigenous life in the community studies removed from a sense of broader space-time contexts, and in the "ethnographic present" approaches to the indigenous past, that were once quite common. A masterful critique of this tradition by an anthropologist is Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley, Calif., 1982); see also Padden, "Cultural Change," 103–21.

[40] See Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System," 866–67; Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 882–84.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

countries such as Malaysia and that German manufacturers would therefore move factories to Malaysia.[41] Suppose, for the sake of argument, that one accepted this example and decided that the structure of the capitalist world-system was in the 1970s so decisive and powerful that it subsumes or overrides explanation based on "local" analysis of capital-labor relations in countries such as Germany and Malaysia. How would one know that the explanatory strength of the contemporary capitalist world-system may be projected with confidence across time as far back as the early modern era? The pitfalls of continuity are as great as those of change.

Perhaps the most serious difference in our contending "mythistories" lies not in our approaches to "reductionism," or to continuity versus change, but in my rejection of the consequences of Wallerstein's world-system paradigm for the historical agency and "solitude" of Latin Americans. If one may discern a "subtext" in my essay, it is that the peoples of Latin America and the greater Caribbean, even poor laboring peoples of color or humble background, have had major importance as historical agents and causes of their own experience. This agency should not be idealized or overstated, but it has not been limited to futile resistance against the onslaught of the capitalist world-system. A full analysis of such agency—its history, explanation, accomplishments, failures, and limitations—requires serious study of America-centered social dynamics and structures as well as world-system dynamics and structure. It requires, too, acceptance of the possibility that the peoples and economies of the American periphery sometimes fit into the larger world-system in unexpected, less than optimal, or even "dysfunctional" ways. A parallel subtext has been that Latin American intellectuals have often gone further than their North Atlantic counterparts (myself included) in developing the theoretical tools we need to understand the idiosyncratic history and realities of Latin American life.

This double agency, historical and intellectual, is swallowed and rendered invisible by the all-powerful world-system machine. In Wallerstein's big picture, the imprint of the laboring poor of Latin America and the Caribbean, in the early modern era, shrinks to futile resistance to the external force, on terms that do not change in any meaningful way the course of the world-system's impact on economic life and social relations in the American corner of the world. The contours of popular struggles, successes, and failures are so determined by the world-system framework that historical "agency" shrivels up. This disappearance of agency is all the more regrettable since the data and analysis now available make it possible to see a sharply different and more realistic picture. Lost in the world-system paradigm, too, is a good deal of intellectual agency. The idiosyncrasies that make the dynamics of Latin American economic life distinctive, and about which Latin Americans have debated sharply and for which they developed sophisticated theoretical tools, are devoured by a capitalist world-system that mandates variants of capitalist labor relations within the peripheries of capitalism. The peculiarities and paradoxes, the theoretical tools, the debates fade into the background of a familiar picture.

[41] Wallerstein, "Comments on Stern's Critical Tests," 880.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The disappearance of agency, historical and intellectual, is in my view closely related to the notion, made famous by Gabriel García Márquez, that Latin Americans have been condemned to "one hundred years of solitude."[42] In his 1982 acceptance of the Nobel Prize for literature, the great writer pressed his case before the Swedish Academy of Letters. For García Márquez, Latin America is not solitary because it is disconnected from or unsubordinated to the wider Western world or the capitalist world-system. The solitude is rooted elsewhere: in the "outsized reality" responsible for "a lack of conventional means to render our lives believable," in the rejection of Latin America's originality "as if it were impossible to find another destiny than to live at the mercy of the two great masters of the world," in Europe's insistence "on measuring us with the yardstick that they use for themselves." For Latin America, one danger of a nearly omnipotent world-system paradigm is that, despite so much evidence to the contrary, it shrinks agency and reinforces solitude. "The interpretation of our reality through patterns not our own serves only to make us ever more unknown, ever less free, ever more solitary."[43]

Steve J. Stern

[42] I refer here, of course, to the novel that thrust Gabriel García Márquez into international prominence: *Cien años de soledad* (Buenos Aires, 1967).

[43] All quotations are from García Márquez's 1982 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, translated by Marina Castañeda, and reprinted in *The New York Times* (February 6, 1983).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Long-Term Silver Mining Trends in Spanish America: A Comparative Analysis of Peru and Mexico

RICHARD L. GARNER

WHEN SPAIN CONQUERED THE AZTEC AND INCA EMPIRES, it acquired territories so rich in silver that Spanish America became the world's leading supplier. From the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the colonial era, it produced between 3 and 3.5 billion ounces, or a hundred thousand tons, of silver. Scholarly opinion has long held that silver mining had a profound impact on the development of the colonial economies and, because so much silver was exported, on the development of the economies of Spain and Europe. But scholars have been handicapped in testing hypotheses about economic development from American treasure because they have lacked long series of data on silver production in Peru and Mexico. In the last two decades, that void has been filled.[1] It is possible now to determine when

I wish to acknowledge the criticism and assistance of Professors John J. TePaske, Peter J. Bakewell, Charles Cannon, Spiro Stefanou, and Milton Hallberg. Penn State's Liberal Arts College has generously provided computer funds. I am grateful to the American Philosophical Society, the American Council of Learned Societies, and Penn State's Institute for the Arts and Humanistic Studies for support of archival research.

[1] See Earl J. Hamilton, *American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain 1506–1650* (Cambridge, Mass., 1934); Michel Morineau, *Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux métaux: Les Retours des trésor américains d'après les gazettes hollandaises (XVI^e–XVIII^e siècles)* (Cambridge, 1985); Peter J. Bakewell, "Mining in Colonial Spanish America," in Leslie Bethell, ed., *The Cambridge History of Latin America, The Colonial Period*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1984), 2: 105–51; Walter Howe, *The Mining Guild of New Spain and Its Tribunal General* (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), 453–59; John J. TePaske, *et al.*, *La Real Hacienda de Nueva España: La Real caja de México (1576–1816)* (Mexico City, 1976); TePaske and Herbert Klein, "The Seventeenth-Century Crisis in New Spain," *Past and Present*, 90 (1981): 124–27; Peter J. Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society in Colonial Mexico, Zacatecas 1546–1700* (Cambridge, 1971); Alexander von Humboldt, *Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain*, John Black, trans., 4 vols. (New York, 1966), 3: 291–92; Richard L. Garner, "Silver Production and Entrepreneurial Structure in 18th-Century Mexico," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte . . . Lateinamerikas*, 17 (1980): 157–60; John J. TePaske, "Economic Cycles in New Spain in the Eighteenth Century: The View from the Public Sector," in Richard L. Garner and William B. Taylor, eds., *Iberian Colonies, New World Societies: Essays in Memory of Charles Gibson* (University Park, Pa., 1985), 119–42 [the last is a revision of an earlier publication in *Bibliotheca Americana*, 1 (1983): 169–203]; John J. TePaske, "General Tendencies and Secular Trends in the Economies of Mexico and Peru, 1750–1810: The View from the Cajas of Mexico and Lima," in Nils Jacobsen and Hans-Jurgen Puhle, eds., *The Economies of Mexico and Peru during the Late Colonial Period, 1760–1810* (Berlin, 1986), 316–39; John J. TePaske and Herbert Klein, *The Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America*, 3 vols. (Durham, N.C., 1982); Peter J. Bakewell, "Registered Silver Production in the Potosí District, 1550–1735," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte . . . Lateinamerikas*, 11 (1975): 68–103; Lamberto de Sierra, "Reales quintos pagados a S.M. desde 1 de enero de 1556 hasta 31 diciembre de 1783," *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, 42 vols. (Madrid, 1844), 5: 173–84; Jaciro Campante Patrício, "As instituicoes monetaria e bancaria de Potosí no decurso do seculo XVIII," *Revista de Historia*, 56 (1977): 51–72; John Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners in Colonial Peru, 1776–1824* (Liverpool, 1977); and John Fisher, "Mining and the Peruvian Economy in the Late Colonial Period," in Jacobsen and Puhle,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

silver production increased or decreased, by how much, and for what length of time in Spanish America, in each viceroyalty (Peru and Mexico), and in several of the larger mining camps or districts. These calculations show that during the first half of the colonial period (*circa* 1560–1685) Spanish American mines provided between 25,000 and 30,000 tons of silver to the Atlantic World and beyond; during the second half (1686–1810), that amount more than doubled. Although the Spanish American silver curve does not rise steadily or gradually upward, the "upward trend always predominates."[2] Since the Spanish colonial silver industry helped to drive both the American and European economies, more knowledge of the secular trends in mining and the factors that influenced those trends would shed further light on how the Atlantic economy performed. Although Peru had at Potosí the richest silver mining camp, Mexico boasted two important advantages for long-term growth—higher ore grades and lower operational costs—that Peru lacked.[3] Because of these advantages, merchants, who controlled much of the capital market in the New World, had more incentive to invest in expensive rehabilitations of mines in Mexico than in Peru. But, despite a severe depression in Potosí during the seventeenth century and a more costly and less profitable industry throughout Peru, mining did not die out in Potosí or across the viceroyalty. There were bursts of activity, from opening new camps to rehabilitating old ones, throughout the colonial period, and in the eighteenth century an impressive recovery was engineered at Potosí and several other camps. Although Potosí did not regain its former preeminence, it remained one of the largest producing camps in Spanish America as late as two centuries after its founding. Faced with a low return per unit of processed ore, Peruvian mining came to have a marginal character, in contrast to Mexican mining. The survival of the often condemned draft-labor system (*mita*) in Peru may be explained in part because owners could pay *mita* workers less than voluntary laborers and thereby reduce their operating costs. Mexican miners had to be cost-conscious, too, but with higher profit margins they could attract the long-term financing that was crucial to keep the industry healthy.

Economies of Mexico and Peru, 46–60. I have converted all the silver series to *pesos* on the basis of 8 *pesos* per mark (8 ounces) of silver.

[2] Pierre Chaunu and Huguette Chaunu's massive study, *Seville et l'Atlantique (1501–1650)*, 8 vols. (Paris, 1955–59), concerns a conjuncture between Europe and the New World in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A recent important study, based on sources from Holland, is Morineau, *Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux métaux,* 42–119, 220–350. The debate over the value of the study of the *longue durée* is treated in Peter Burke, ed., *Economy and Society in Early Modern Europe* (London, 1972), especially in Burke's "Introduction," 1–9. Essays by Carlos Cipolla (43–46) and Alexandre R. E. Chabert (47–54) offer divergent interpretations on the impact of the flow of silver to Europe, primarily with reference to Italy. In setting out his differences with Cipolla over how to describe the price movement after 1550 in Italy, Chabert acknowledged cyclical dips but asserted that "the upward trend always predominates" (50). The same language, I would argue, could describe the silver-production trend in the Spanish New World.

[3] For a wide-ranging discussion of the mining industry in Peru and Mexico, see David Brading and Harry Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining: Mexico and Peru," *Hispanic American Historical Review,* 52 (1972): 545–79.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 1: Total Colonial Silver Production 1559–1810.

1559–1810: rc = 0.00227141; r = 0.5%; t = 5.02; r^2 = 0.90; *corr.*
1559–1627: rc = 0.00955363; r = 2.3%; t = 4.16; r^2 = 0.92; *corr.*
1628–1697: rc = - .00163477; r = -0.3%; t = 3.92; r^2 = 0.17
1698–1810: rc = 0.00455136; r = 1.1%; t = 10.20; r^2 = 0.91; *corr.*

rc	regression coefficient (log)
r	rate per year
t	Student t statistic
r^2	coefficient of determination
corr.	corrected for autocorrelation if necessary

THE TOTAL OUTPUT OF THE SPANISH COLONIAL MINES between the middle of the sixteenth century and the end of the colonial period reached between 2.9 and 3.1 billion *pesos* (each *peso* of 272 *maravedís*). That total represents an annual average production of between 11.5 and 13.5 million *pesos*.[4] The trend line, as shown on

[4] John TePaske has come up with a total of just over 3 billion from the 1580–1810 period, whereas my total of just under 3 billion is for a longer period, 1559–1810. Such differences will occur because of the several steps required to convert the tax receipts into silver-production series. TePaske's data will be published in a forthcoming book on Peru's and Mexico's economies. To save space, I have not included tables of annual silver production for the colonies or the camps in this essay. I will make these available, with relevant sources and statistics, on computer printouts to anyone interested. The dates for the various series differ slightly in that Potosí's series begins in 1549 and the others in 1559.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Figure 1, yields an annual growth of 0.6 percent. At that rate, more than a century would have passed before output doubled. The fact is that output did not rise automatically in steps of one-half of 1 percent per year but instead moved rather erratically up and down. According to the annual production figures, output had risen 300 percent by 1600, dropped a third by 1700, and climbed another 300 percent by 1810. Despite numerous and frequent shifts in direction, which included some sustained declines, the long-term trend in production was unmistakably upward.[5] Such growth signifies a capacity to overcome recurring problems related to undercapitalization, heavy taxes, and ineptitude.

I have divided the long colonial curve into three periods: 1559–1627, 1628–1697, and 1698–1810. In the first phase, 1559–1627, the rise in the curve represents a yearly growth of about 2.3 percent. In the seventeenth century from 1628 to 1697, the curve follows a downward course at an annual rate of 0.3 percent. In the final century of the colonial period, the trend reverses itself, and output grew by 1.1 percent annually. The high growth rate in the first period can be attributed mostly to easy accessibility to the ores and the mid-sixteenth-century invention of the mercury process that made refining medium and low-grade ores, especially Potosí's tailings, profitable. The downturn in production of silver at Potosí was the chief cause of the declining curve in the seventeenth century. Also contributing to the downturn was a readjustment and consolidation that inevitably took place in the industry as miners had to find the resources to dig deeper shafts and longer tunnels to reach the ore. Still, halfway through the colonial period, Potosí's share of the total output in Spanish America was so large that it could almost dictate the shape of the New World silver curve. The third period can be described as one of both revival and expansion throughout Spanish America: not only were old camps in both Peru and Mexico being rehabilitated but new ones were also being established.

In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a substantial part of the silver mined in America was exported to Europe. This fact has led some historians to contend that the shipment of treasure from America caused an inflation in Europe during the second half of the sixteenth century and the early seventeenth century.

I have used 1810 as the terminal date, although mining continued throughout the insurgency. The impact of the insurgency on mining is a topic for another inquiry.

[5] To calculate the regression coefficients, I have used Econpak, developed by Dr. Milton Hallberg of Penn State. Unless followed by a figure in a parentheses, all growth rates have *t*-values of a 99 percent confidence level. I have corrected for autocorrelation wherever the Durbin Watson statistic does not fall within an acceptable range. In plotting trend lines and calculating growth rates, I do not wish to imply that time, as the independent variable, is the only factor that explains production, the dependent variable. How much to produce depends on many different factors that cannot always be related to time. I have tried in all cases to find the best fitting line to describe each curve. In analyzing segments of trends, I have used essentially a "dummy-variable" approach. This has the effect of treating each segment as unconnected with all other segments with no assurance that the points where they meet are actually joined. My colleague, Dr. Spiro Stefanou, has been analyzing the silver series in terms of linear splines, that is, a technique that eliminates the discontinuities at the points where the segments join. This allows for the plotting of a continuous line rather than a broken one; it may also generate slightly to moderately different growth rates. We will examine these techniques and the findings that they yield in a forthcoming manuscript on Mexico's eighteenth-century economy. Growth rates are calculated according to the standard equation: $P_t = P_0 (1 + r)^t$, with the logarithm of the equation being $\log P_t = \log P_0 + t \log (1 + r)$.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Other historians disagree, contending that there was not much inflationary impact at all. Scholars have compiled and searched numerous price and production series from the Mediterranean to the Baltic for conclusive evidence of the impact of the inflation but without reaching any agreement. When the series for total colonial Spanish American silver output is compared with the European series, they follow similar paths: they rise sharply until the early seventeenth century after which they level off and turn downward. But the lack of precise information about how much silver was produced in America and was exported to Europe has been a handicap to resolving how much inflation there was. It can now be shown that, up to 1600 or 1610, between 375 million and 400 million *pesos* worth of silver were produced in the New World. Nearly all the production of silver occurred in the second half of the sixteenth century, so the annual average output from 1550 to 1600 or 1610 was from 6.5 to 7.5 million *pesos* per year. The rate of growth in production of silver during that half-century meant that output doubled about every thirty years, and that rate of growth may also hold for exports, which constituted half or more of what was produced.[6]

The debate over the economic impact of silver from America on Europe also concerns the proposition that a slump in production of silver pushed America and Europe into a depression. A contraction in the Spanish American silver industry did occur, with the average production falling by as much as a quarter compared to the average for the whole colonial period. A loss of that magnitude would certainly affect the economies of Europe and America, although with respect to America Peru suffered much more than Mexico. What is important to understand, however, is that the downturn in total colonial production was confined primarily to the second quarter of the seventeenth century and that it had bottomed out by the third quarter.[7] The link between New World silver production and Old World economic activity had grown more tenuous in part because the colonial economies were less dependent on Europe. Exporting less silver to Europe during the seventeenth century may have set the conditions for a shorter, milder depression in America than in Europe.[8] Record production levels, established in the 1610s,

[6] F. P. Braudel and F. Spooner, "Prices in Europe from 1450 to 1750," in E. E. Rich and C. H. Wilson, eds., *The Economy of Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, vol. 4, *Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, 6 vols. (Cambridge, 1967), have the most comprehensive set of charts and graphs, particularly Figures 22 (4: 476), 23 (477), 33 (484), 34 (485); for a more critical view, see Morineau *Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux métaux*, 82–93; also see Burke, *Economy and Society*, *passim*; and Adam Szászdi, "Preliminary Estimates of Gold and Silver Production in America," in Hermann Kellenbenz, ed., *Precious Metals in the Age of Expansion: Papers of the XIVth International Congress of the Historical Sciences* (Philadelphia, 1981), 151–224.

[7] For a survey of the statistical profiles of the European economies from 1500 to 1800, see Charles Wilson and Geoffrey Parker, eds., *An Introduction to the Sources of European Economic History 1500–1800* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977).

[8] I have not tried here to resolve the "century of depression" controversy. Clearly, one result of this research is that in terms of mining Peru had a serious depression and Mexico had almost none in the seventeenth century. See Woodrow Borah, *New Spain's Century of Depression* (Berkeley, Calif., 1951), 18–29; Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 226–28; Jonathan Israel, "Mexico and the 'General Crisis' of the Seventeenth Century," *Past and Present*, 63 (1974): 38–39, *et passim*; TePaske and Klein, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis," 116–35, with rebuttals by Henry Kamen and Israel and rejoinders by TePaske and Klein in *Past and Present*, 97 (1982): 144–61; Richard Boyer, "Mexico in the Seventeenth

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

were broken in the 1720s and quickly surpassed again in the 1740s. There were lapses in the steady climb of the production curve during the eighteenth century (early 1720s and early 1740s) but no serious or prolonged interruptions. These observations about a seventeenth century less depressed and an eighteenth century more expansive than earlier thought point to the conclusion that silver was far more abundant in the Atlantic World than has heretofore been appreciated.[9]

Peru's curve closely resembles the curve for total colonial production but with some important distinctions (see Figure 2). For the whole colonial period, the trend line is almost flat, with an annual growth rate of only 0.1 percent (98 percent confidence level). The shifts within the secular movement are fairly dramatic. The early successes at Peru were spectacular. Climbing at an annual rate of 3.6 percent, output doubled about every twenty years. By 1610 (half a century later), the rise had peaked, and a contraction had begun. Production fell at a rate of 1.7 percent per year until 1715. So great was the fall that output in the early eighteenth century was not much higher than it had been in the middle of the sixteenth century. But, severe as the contraction was, it did not extinguish mining activity. In almost every decade between 1630 and 1690, production shot up for a year or two only to lapse once again. Until the eighteenth century, none of these spurts was powerful enough to bring about a permanent recovery. After the long descent of the seventeenth century, Peruvian mining made an impressive recovery, growing at an annual rate of 1.2 percent during the eighteenth century. Despite this strong performance, the record output of the early seventeenth century was not surpassed until the 1780s. In the following two decades, at least until 1810, production turned downward again.

Mexico's silver curve differs significantly from Peru's. From the second half of the sixteenth century to 1810, Mexican output followed a much stronger upward course at 1 percent per year, ten times the rate for Peru (see Figure 3). To be sure, the Mexican curve turned down during the second quarter of seventeenth century and again during the second quarter of the eighteenth century. These were

Century: Transition of a Colonial Society," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 57 (1977): 455–78; C. Sempat Assadourian, Heraclio Bonilla, Antonio Mitre, and Tristen Platt, *Minería y especio económica en los Andes, siglos XVI–XX* (Lima, 1980), 24–25; C. Sempat Assadourian, "La Producción de la mercancía dinero en la formación del mercado interno colonial," in Enrique Florescano, ed., *Ensayos sobre el desarrollo económico de México y America Latina (1500–1975)* (Mexico City, 1979), 231–34; John J. TePaske, "The Fiscal Structure of Upper Peru and the Financing of Empire," in Karen Spalding, ed., *Essays in the Political, Economic and Social History of Colonial Latin America* (Newark, Del., 1982), 75–76, 79–80; and Kenneth Andrien, *Crisis and Decline, The Viceroyalty of Peru in the Seventeenth Century* (Albuquerque, N. Mex., 1985), 11–41.

[9] Two factors—contraband trade in silver bullion and missing ledgers—can affect the shape of the curve in any century but bear most directly on the seventeenth century. Illicit commerce certainly flourished in seventeenth-century Peru, but neither the extent of such commerce nor whether the silver involved was registered or unregistered is yet well understood. Unregistered silver would not appear in the treasury ledgers and, therefore, would not be counted. Moreover, not all the known treasury ledgers have been consulted. If some of the gaps in the seventeenth-century treasury series should ever be filled, the seventeenth-century contraction may become less pronounced. There is the possibility that future research will alter the appearance of the curve in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, too. Morineau, *Incroyables gazettes et fabuleux métaux*, treated fraud on the European side, 238–49, as well as the impact of American treasure on seventeenth and eighteenth-century Europe, 218–549.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 2: Total Andean Silver Production 1559–1810.

1559–1810: rc = 0.00052117; r = 0.1%; t = 2.52; r^2 = 0.02
1559–1610: rc = 0.01532715; r = 3.6%; t = 2.68; r^2 = 0.92; *corr.*
1611–1714: rc = - .00738278; r = -1.7%; t = 5.93; r^2 = 0.81; *corr.*
1715–1810: rc = 0.00494668; r = 1.2%; t = 7.65; r^2 = 0.76; *corr.*

short-term lapses; but, on each occasion, within a few years or at most a decade, the downturn was halted and growth resumed. The Mexican curve also falls into three periods of varying lengths: 1559–1627, 1628–1724, and 1725–1809. In the first phase, which coincided with its earliest discoveries, Mexico posted a growth of 2.5 percent per year. Although the first phase peaked in the 1620s, it may have begun to level off at the turn of the seventeenth century, as was also true in Peru. Downward pressure on the production curve is evident in the 1630s and 1640s, but it does not signal a prolonged depression. During the century-long second phase, while suffering some periodic reverses, the Mexican silver industry still posted a yearly growth of 1.2 percent.[10] During the last decade of the seventeenth century, a new record high was achieved, the first since the 1620s. In the final phase, production grew at a rate no less than 1.2 percent each year and perhaps

[10] Because of so many missing ledgers, this is at best a very tentative rate.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 3: Total Mexican Silver Production 1559–1810.

1559–1810: rc = 0.00426993; r = 1.0%; t = 26.20; r^2 = 0.73
1559–1627: rc = 0.01092604; r = 2.5%; t = 7.02; r^2 = 0.42
1628–1724: rc = 0.00525339; r = 1.2%; t = 5.71; r^2 = 0.52; *corr.*
1725–1810: rc = 0.00518659; r = 1.2%; t = 8.07; r^2 = 0.87; *corr.*

as high as 1.4 percent.[11] At the end of the eighteenth century, the expansion may have begun to slow as it had done off and on during the century, although to what extent remains unclear.

How can we account for the different curves in Peru and Mexico? Peter J. Bakewell, who has studied camps in both Peru and Mexico, argued that Peru's seventeenth-century depression was largely the result of "ore depletion (and the consequent extra costs of new exploration and more difficult extraction)."[12] The decline in the quantity and the quality of ore affected production in both colonies but probably more so in Peru than in Mexico. In either place, ore depletion

[11] The discrepancy arises because total production based on silver-tax receipts (from TePaske) is lower and the growth rate slower than output based on mint registrations (from Humboldt). When miners were granted tax exemptions, the taxes at the treasury would be affected (reduced) whereas the registrations at the mint would not. Other problems such as currency devaluations and bookkeeping errors may affect both total silver taxes and total mint registrations.

[12] Peter J. Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labor in Potosí, 1545–1650* (Albuquerque, N. Mex., 1984), 32. A similar statement appears in his "Mining in Colonial Spanish America," 2: 144.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

translated into greater risks and higher costs for miners and investors. By the eighteenth century, a unit of Peruvian ore may have cost on average from 10 to 20 percent more to extract and process than a similar unit in Mexico.[13] If a Mexican mineowner could expect a 10 percent profit on 1,000 ounces, a Peruvian mineowner could at best expect revenues just to cover expenses.

A second difference can be attributed to generally higher operational costs in Peru than in Mexico, in part because the Crown had long taxed more heavily in Peru. Mineowners paid a variety of royalties, fees, and taxes; in addition, they had to buy mercury, powder, salt, and other items from the government at fixed prices. In 1504, the Crown decreed that all mineowners should pay at least one-fifth of their silver (*quinto real*) for the privilege of mining it. In 1548, Mexico won a concession from the Crown by which the fifth was dropped to a tenth (*diezmo*), and by the seventeenth century the tenth had become the standard. In Peru, however, the fifth remained in effect (with a few exceptions) until 1736, when the tenth was authorized.[14] Thus, for more than half of the colonial period, Andean mineowners paid twice the royalty that Mexicans did. Mercury also represented another major government-imposed expense. On average, mineowners (or refiners) expected a *quintal* (100 pounds) of mercury to produce 100 marks (800 ounces) of refined silver. The higher the yield per *quintal*, the lower the cost of refining to the producer. Peruvians paid a higher price than Mexicans for their mercury and obtained less silver per *quintal* because both their silver and mercury were of lower grades. While in Mexico all the government-related costs (from the pit to the mint) may have added up to about 20 percent of the value of the silver, in Peru they may have reached as high as 35 percent. Since these amounted to fixed costs over which the individual producer had little control, they could only be compensated for through better quality ores or greater operational efficiencies, which were harder to come by in Peru than in Mexico, at least after 1600.

A third explanation for why the Peruvian and Mexican curves differ has to do with how the mining industry developed in each viceroyalty. In Peru, the mountain of silver at Potosí was so rich that it dominated Andean mining until the first decade of the nineteenth century. Although other camps opened up in the seventeenth century, they were not as rich as Potosí, and they had trouble competing with Potosí for the limited capital and labor resources of the Andean economy. At least until the early eighteenth century and perhaps as late as the viceregal reorganization in 1778, the viceregal production curve largely reflected what was happening at Potosí. When production at Potosí fell off sharply during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, other camps had not developed sufficiently to compensate.[15] For example, Oruro, founded in 1606 about 150 miles northwest of Potosí, enjoyed a promising start in the first quarter of the seventeenth century and a brief revival in the eighteenth century, but for the colonial period as a whole its

[13] This is no more than a rough estimate, based on the comparative yield of silver in the amalgamation (or mercury) refining process.

[14] Bakewell, "Mining in Colonial Spanish America," 2: 134.

[15] Bakewell, "Mining in Colonial Spanish America," map on 106; and Orlando Capriles Villazón, *Historia de la minería boliviana* (La Paz, 1977), 58–59.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

curve was downward. Mining opportunities did improve in the eighteenth century because the general Andean economy was on the upswing (even Potosí was expanding), and the Crown had reduced its share of the producers' costs. Pasco, a camp founded in 1630 more than 800 miles north of Potosí (in what was known as Lower Peru), produced little silver until the second half of the eighteenth century, when it eventually matched Potosí. To be sure, Mexico lacked a Potosí, but from the late sixteenth through the seventeenth century it could boast the existence of a half-dozen major camps. All these camps experienced the normal cycles of boom and bust, yet they often engineered recoveries that transformed contractions into expansions. The data that exist for individual districts and for the colony as a whole point to long-term growth rather than decline. In the eighteenth century, output from six of Mexico's major mining districts (that is, groups of mining camps served by a single branch of the royal treasury) grew in the range of 0.3 to 2.8 percent yearly: San Luis Potosí, 2.8 percent; Sombrerete, 2.4 percent; Guanajuato, 1.8 percent; Durango, 0.7 percent; Guadalajara, 0.5 percent; and Zacatecas, 0.3 percent. Since the cycles varied from camp to camp, a contraction in one or two large camps was offset (beyond the near term) by continuing or expanding production at other camps. Over the long run, then, as recovery followed recovery from camp to camp, the Mexican silver curve could maintain its upward movement.

POTOSÍ CONTINUED AS THE PREMIER CAMP IN SOUTH AMERICA almost until the end of the colonial period, but Zacatecas lost its ranking as Mexico's preeminent camp to Guanajuato in the early eighteenth century. Both were founded about 1550, but during the next two and a half centuries Potosí registered nearly two and a half times more silver than Zacatecas: 950 million *pesos* worth of silver compared to 425 million *pesos*. Potosí may have accounted for 80 percent of Peru's colonial output, but Zacatecas probably contributed under a quarter of Mexico's output. As late as 1776, when Potosí was only a shadow of its former self, Peru's viceroy, Manuel de Amat y Junient, reported the district of Potosí still registered 41 percent of Peru's total, followed by Oruro with 14 percent and Pasco with 13 percent.[16] By the middle of the eighteenth century, Zacatecas's share of Mexico's output had fallen to a tenth, although in the beginning of the nineteenth century it rose to between 12 and 15 percent. Having ranked first from the late sixteenth through the early eighteenth centuries, Zacatecas dropped to second or third during the eighteenth century.[17] Zacatecas's fall was offset by Guanajuato's rise to preeminence during the middle of the eighteenth century and the periodic successes at other camps such as Bolaños, Charcas, and Pachuca. Peru's mineowners and officials were aware of the need to broaden the search for ore beyond Potosí. Potosí's greatest mineowner, Antonio López de Quiroga, urged Peru's viceroy, Conde de Lemos, to encourage other owners to explore the mid-seventeenth-century opportunities

[16] Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 6–7.
[17] TePaske and Klein, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis in New Spain," 124–28; and Garner, "Silver Production and Entrepreneurial Structure," 163.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 4: Total Potosí Silver Production 1549–1810

1549–1810: rc = -.00117812; r = -0.3%; t = 6.90; r^2 = 0.15
1549–1605: rc = 0.01134798; r = 2.7%; t = 2.29; r^2 = 0.90; *corr.*
1606–1723: rc = -.00626570; r = -1.4%; t =10.67; r^2 = 0.95; *corr.*
1724–1783: rc = 0.00762832; r = 1.8%; t =14.90; r^2 = 0.94; *corr.*
1784–1810: rc = -.00562445; r = -1.3% t = 3.84; r^2 = 0.35

in camps like Puno, yet for López de Quiroga in particular and other mineowners in general Potosí remained the center of their interests and activities.[18]

Potosí's production curve does not harmonize with its legend of wealth and fame, for the trend over the whole colonial period is unmistakably downward (Figure 4). Its curve rose sharply until the first quarter of the seventeenth century, after which it began a slide that did not end until the middle of the eighteenth century. A late colonial upswing was sustained through the second and third quarters of the eighteenth century, after which it began to weaken. By the end of colonial rule, output had sunk to levels comparable to those recorded during the nadir of its depression. For the whole colonial period, growth was negative at an annual rate of between 0.3 and 0.4 percent.

Potosí's production curve reveals a pattern of growth (1549–1605), decline (1606–1723), revival (1724–1783), and finally decline (1784–1810). The first

[18] Guillermo Lohmann Villena, *El Conde de Lemos, virrey del Peru* (Madrid, 1946), 271–72.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

period was Potosí's most spectacular, when production grew at just under 3 percent annually. This growth rate should not disguise the fact that Potosí's initial years were less than auspicious. Between 1549 and 1572, Potosí's output climbed to 3.2 million *pesos* and then dropped to 1 million *pesos* per year. The decline resulted from the rapid depletion of rich, surface ores that were mined mostly by Indians under contract to the Spanish. To exploit underground ores required technical expertise that Indians lacked.[19] Mining did not long remain in a moribund state or, for that matter, in the hands of the Indians. Two events around 1572 paved the way for Potosí's emergence as the premier camp. First, the government established the *mita* system that was designed to assure Potosí an adequate supply of cheap labor, and, second, the local industry introduced the amalgamation process that was developed in Mexico to refine low-grade ores economically. To refine the ore by amalgamating it with mercury and other ingredients required a substantial investment in plants and equipment. Only the Spanish could afford these investments, and consequently they came to assume a dominant role in both extracting and refining ores. Much of the initial capital invested in the refining operations came from processing the tailings piled around mine entrances. Those piles contained ores too poor to be smelted but rich enough to be amalgamated, and since the extraction costs of these discarded ores had already been paid for, according to Bakewell, the huge profits that they brought in could be used to pay off the loans needed to build the plants as well as to repair and expand the mines.[20] In response to these changes, output rose from less than 1 million *pesos* in 1572 to 7.5 million *pesos* in 1592, an all-time record. Between 1593 and the end of the first decade of the seventeenth century, when the boom came to an end, production was still very high but no longer rising.

During the second period, which encompasses most of the seventeenth century and the first quarter of the eighteenth century, Potosí's output shrank at an annual rate of between 1 and 2 percent. From 1610 (when the boom began to fade) through 1735, the decline was 1.4 percent per year, and from 1650 (when the decline became unmistakable) through 1735, it was 1.6 percent per year. Despite efforts toward and predictions of a recovery in seventeenth-century Potosí, that recovery never materialized. The mountain that rose above the camp and city contained four main veins that ran "more or less south to north vertically on the eastern flank."[21] The early miners dug away the top of the mountain, but, as later miners worked their way down, they had to find a way to extract the ore from the interior. During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, as many as nine horizontal tunnels—six feet high and eight feet wide—were cut into the mountain to reach the ore and to drain the water. The government placed a limit on the size of each mine along a vein, with the result that an unusually rich vein could have several dozen mines (one allegedly had seventy-eight different mines). In 1640, at

[19] Peter J. Bakewell, "Technological Change in Potosí: The Silver Boom of the 1570s," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte . . . Lateinamerikas*, 14 (1977): 9. Bakewell presented essentially the same material on trends and cycles in *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 24–32.

[20] Bakewell, "Technological Change in Potosí," 75–77.

[21] W. F. C. Purser, *Metal-Mining in Peru, Past and Present* (New York, 1971), 29–31.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

least one tunnel reached 400 yards into the interior, and by 1810 another one had reached 2,200 yards at a cost of 560,000 *pesos*. The owners of the mines and the tunnels were often different persons, and conflicts inevitably arose over who should pay and how much should be paid to maintain the tunnels. In short, as miners worked their way through and down the mountain, the cost of cutting tunnels and draining mines increased sharply.[22] The long seventeenth-century downward trend at Potosí is symptomatic of the effect of mounting costs and declining grades, a combination that few mineowners were prepared or qualified to deal with. What kept Potosí's silver registrations from tumbling further and faster in the seventeenth century was the founding of new camps such as Sicasica (1600), Tatasi (1612), and Padua (1652) within the Potosí district but beyond the city itself. In the last half of the seventeenth century, these other camps may have provided as much as one-quarter of the silver registered at Potosí. Even so, that left Potosian mines with an annual average output worth about 1.9 million *pesos*.[23] The dilemma for the industry and the government was real. Potosí still produced far more silver than any other camp but at a cost that was growing and eroding profits. In the early seventeenth century, profits from mining at Potosí helped to finance a general economic expansion; in the late seventeenth century, as profits dwindled, Potosí may have become more of a burden than a benefit for the general economy. To sustain or to curtail mining at Potosí entailed difficult choices for industry and government, but to let economics dictate Potosí's future was probably never a practical alternative, at least, not for the Crown. Recovery, not abandonment, remained the goal for Potosí.

Potosí experienced a modest rise in output in the late third and early fourth quarters of the seventeenth century, after which it entered a half-century of plummeting silver production. For 1690–1699, Potosí's output (for the whole district) dropped by 26.1 percent, for 1700–1710 by 30 percent, and for 1710–1719 by 23.2 percent. In the 1720s, when Potosí's production reached its nadir, annual output averaged only 1.3 million *pesos*, the lowest since the mid-sixteenth century. When a recovery at Potosí finally took hold in the late 1720s or early 1730s, the upward climb proceeded at a snail's pace compared to the leap forward in the second half of the sixteenth century. If dated from 1724, when the depression bottomed out, through 1783, the recovery had an annual growth rate of 1.8 percent. The strongest decades were the 1750s and the 1770s, when output shot up by one-third and one-fifth, respectively. The recovery lost momentum in the two or three decades before 1810, as production peaked in the 1780s and then turned down in the 1790s. Output was as high in the last quarter of the eighteenth century as at any time since the middle of the seventeenth century, but it was still only half of what it had been at the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century. The surge in output came largely in response to long-overdue reforms that lowered operating costs through cuts in silver taxes and

[22] Purser, *Metal-Mining in Peru*, 29–31; Brading and Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining," 550–51; and Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 26, 30.
[23] Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 65.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mercury prices. Additional savings accrued to the owners because with the continuation of the *mita* they could pay draft laborers less than voluntary workers.[24] As the prospect for making a profit improved at Potosí, the expansion there had a wider impact by stimulating business activity, capital investment, and local growth across the Andean region.[25] Without Potosí's eighteenth-century revival, both the mining economy and the general economy might have remained stalled down to the end of the colonial period or, at the very least, until the reorganization of the viceroyalty in 1778. Even in its twilight, Potosí's role, although diminished, was crucial.

Zacatecas followed a different path. Although it suffered numerous setbacks for many of the same reasons that Potosí did, the mine industry there managed to avoid a long-term slump and instead put together a series of recoveries that resulted in an overall upward slanting production curve (Figure 5). To be sure, compared to Potosí, Zacatecas was only a minor player on the silver stage. In the 1580s, when Potosí was at its zenith, it registered seven times as much silver as Zacatecas, and in the first decade of the nineteenth century, when Zacatecas's production broke all previous records, it was still not producing much more than Potosí, whose output by then was about a million *pesos* below its colonial average.

In the sixteenth century, despite major discoveries at Zacatecas, Durango, and Parral in the northern provinces of Mexico, the mining boom was more directly linked to discoveries in Taxco and Pachuca, camps not far from the capital, where their silver was registered and taxed.[26] In the 1580s and 1590s, more than half of all silver-tax receipts were collected in Mexico City, an indication that the central region was more productive than the northern provinces during the late sixteenth century. By the early seventeenth century, the shift from the center to the north was irreversibly underway.[27] During the eighteenth century, the core of the Mexican silver industry was found in the area that extended from Guanajuato north to Zacatecas and from Guadalajara east to San Luis Potosí.

Zacatecas's production curve is both different from Potosí's and more complicated to describe. From 1559 to 1810, Zacatecas's rate of growth was 0.3 percent per year.[28] Along with this rising curve, however, Zacatecan mining had a highly

[24] Enrique Tandeter, "Forced and Free Labour in Late Colonial Potosí," *Past and Present*, 93 (1981): 99–100; and, for a brief discussion of the economic impact, see Tandeter and Nathan Wachtel, "Conjonctures inverses: Le Mouvement des prix à Potosí pendant le XVIII^{e} siècle," *Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations*, 38 (1983): 571–72.

[25] Fisher, "Mining and the Peruvian Economy in the Late Colonial Period," 46 and 56–58, citing the works of Assadourian, *et al.*, Tandeter, and Rose Marie Buechler as well as his own studies.

[26] There was no standard or uniform size for mining districts and their *reales cajas*. Some districts encompassed hundreds of square miles, and others were small and compact. It was even possible to register silver in a *real caja* outside the district in which the silver was mined. Still, the differences in their registrations cannot be explained in terms of the differences in their jurisdictions.

[27] Peter J. Bakewell, "Notes on the Mexican Silver Mining Industry in the 1590s," *Humanitas*, 19 (1978): 384, 400; and TePaske and Klein, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis in New Spain," 124–25.

[28] When silver taxes instead of silver marks are used, the rates are a few tenths of a percent lower per year. Data on silver taxes begin in 1580, but data on silver marks start in 1559. For the discussion of Zacatecas's production curve, I have used growth rates calculated from silver marks, although I have converted marks to *pesos*. For silver taxes, consult TePaske and Klein, "Seventeenth-Century Crisis in New Spain," 124–28; and John J. TePaske, "Economic Cycles," *Bibliotheca Americana*, 1 (1983): 198–203. For silver marks, 1560–1700, see Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 241–45; silver marks, 1700–1821,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 5: Total Zacatecas Silver Production 1559–1810

1559–1810: rc = 0.00111609; r = 0.3%; t = 3.09; r^2 = 0.68; *corr.*

cyclical character. Figure 5 illustrates the difficulty that one faces in trying to analyze the production trend.[29] Generally, output tended to rise for fifty to sixty years, after which it declined for twenty to forty years. The dates for the cycles are 1559–1664 with the boom ending around 1622, 1665–1763 with the boom beginning to fade about 1716, and 1764 to 1810 or 1821.[30] The long cycles are of interest because, at the end of the first century of mining in Zacatecas and again

were compiled from the Clements Library, University of Michigan, Zacatecas Collection: *Quinto y diezmo*, 1700–14, 1716–29, 1734, 1738–49, 1763–67; *Cargo y data*, 1730–34, 1736–37, 1750–62, 1769, 1771–72, 1774, 1776–78, 1780–82, 1784–87, 1790–93, 1799, 1801–21; and Treasury Records and Correspondence, 1715. For years not in the Clements Library, consult Archivo General de Indias (hereafter, AGI), *Guadalajara, leg.* 477, 478, 480, and 482.

[29] If growth rates are calculated for the obvious rises and declines, the results are: 1559–75, 2.7 percent; 1576–98, -1.0 percent; 1599–1622, 3.5 percent; 1623–61, -2.1 percent; 1662–80, 7.3 percent; 1681–98, -2.4 percent (94 percent confidence level); 1699–1724, 3.4 percent; 1725–63, -2.1 percent; 1764–1810, 2.4 percent.

[30] Under this scheme, the peak that can be identified during the 1670s must be treated as a temporary aberration. A major strike was made in the camp of Sombrerete about that time. Until a branch of the treasury was set up there in 1681, Sombrerete's silver was presented for taxation at Zacatecas. For a few years, this arrangement inflated Zacatecas's silver registrations. Such reorganizations took place throughout the colonial period and could not help but affect the silver curves of individual camps.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

at the end of the second century, output had dropped to or below the level for the initial year, 1559. Not only did Zacatecas recover from each downturn but it also raised production during the next long cycle. In the first century, output averaged about 1.2 million *pesos* per year, and during the second that average rose to about 1.5 million *pesos* per year, a change of 23.2 percent. The third cycle, of course, must remain incomplete because of the independence movement, but the cycle's growth phase up to 1810 or even up to 1821 is indisputable. In the boom phase of the third cycle, output reached an average annual level of about 2.2 million *pesos*, but if a contraction had followed the boom, the figure would surely be lower.

The pattern of development in early Zacatecas was similar to the pattern in early Potosí. Zacatecas fell into a slump after the easily accessible ores had been extracted and processed. The introduction of refining with mercury effectively ended the slump and began a boom that peaked in the early 1620s, a decade or so after Potosí had peaked and turned downward.[31] The contraction that encompasses the second quarter of the seventeenth century and half of the third quarter is significant, although it did not turn into a prolonged depression. When Francisco de Rojas y Oñate, a senior officer of Mexico City's high court of justice, the Audiencia, visited Zacatecas in 1644, he discovered how bleak the prospects were for a quick revival of the local industry. He found the local mining economy in disarray: abandoned mines, scarcities of labor and mercury, and owners so deeply in debt that few could maintain or expand their operations.[32] With many of Zacatecas's mines now fifty to one hundred years old, they had reached the stage at which, without expensive repairs, they had become unprofitable.

Despite all these problems, Zacatecas did eventually recover. Rising costs and sagging profits did not discourage a new group of owners and investors from undertaking the repairs. Growth resumed, although it was highly volatile and erratic. Output as measured in Figure 5 appears to skyrocket in the 1670s and the early 1680s and then to plummet in the late 1680s and the 1690s before rising again after 1700, in large part, because high-grade silver was discovered in Sombrerete (one hundred miles north) but registered in Zacatecas until a separate *real caja* was opened in Sombrerete in 1681. Hence this sharp rise followed by an equally sharp decline has more to do with administrative changes than mining operations. If Sombrerete's silver could be factored out, Zacatecas's curve would be less extreme. It would probably show a rise in output at Zacatecas during the 1660s and the 1670s followed by a downward movement through the 1690s before recovery at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Of the nearly 20 million *pesos* registered in Zacatecas during the 1670s, under 10 million *pesos* came from Sombrerete. That would make Zacatecas's share more than 10 million *pesos*, an amount that was higher than the output of the camp during the 1660s. Indeed, Zacatecas's recovery was strong enough to prompt from the leader of the Audiencia of Nueva Galicia in 1681 a statement that both camps were prospering.[33] In the first quarter of the

[31] Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 188; and "Notes on Mexican Silver Mining," 393.
[32] Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 197–99. The government had made matters worse by trying to collect on past-due accounts for purchases of mercury.
[33] Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 193–94.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

eighteenth century, as a result of these periodic recapitalization efforts, Zacatecas was riding the crest of another successful recovery that finally peaked in the mid-1720s, sixty years after the last major contraction. During the next forty years (into the early 1760s), however, output shrank until all the gains of the previous boom had been lost. Many heavily capitalized mines could not be operated profitably and were abandoned in the 1740s and 1750s. The decline in output was so great that by 1760 the number of refineries needed to process the ore had dropped from about thirty to six.[34]

The third cycle began in the 1760s when a new generation of miners with their merchant backers started to claim and to rehabilitate many of the camp's abandoned mines. Especially impressive was a fifteen-year period (1764–1779) when their efforts, supported by the Bourbon mining reforms, resulted in a virtual quadrupling of output (at an annual rate just over 9 percent). Over the final thirty years before Hidalgo's Rebellion, although output fluctuated, it eventually broke all previous records. The new highs in the early 1800s were preceded, however, by a mercury shortage (1798–1801) that caused the curve to dip to near-record lows.[35]

By the eighteenth century, ore yields in Spanish American mining were no higher on average than one to two ounces of silver per hundredweight of ore.[36] This meant that Andean miners had to process several times more ore to achieve the same yields as Mexican miners. Zacatecas's yields of two to three ounces of silver per hundredweight of ore, enough to make but not to guarantee a profit, were close to the Mexican average; Potosí's yields of one ounce or less were also probably close to the Andean average.[37] Some camps did better than Zacatecas and some worse than Potosí. Understanding how silver mining in Spanish America accommodated itself to these conditions requires a closer examination of the industry's structure.

SILVER MINING WAS A SPECIAL COLONIAL BUSINESS IN THAT ALL THE PRODUCT, bullion, was turned into currency, except for the small amount that jewelers and artisans needed for their work. The government determined how many coins could be cut from a bar of silver, and the coins entered the general economy as the owner of the silver used them to cover taxes, wages, supplies, or loans. Not all the currency entered the economy, of course, for a substantial part (perhaps more than half) paid for imports and various governmental transfers. As in any other business venture, to stay in business, silver producers had to receive enough currency from their bullion to cover costs and provide a return on capital that justified further investment in the operation. Costs were dependent on what

[34] Clements Library, Zacatecas Collection, Treasury Records and Correspondence, 1760–69, Box A.

[35] Garner, "Silver Production and Entrepreneurial Structure," 179–85.

[36] Enrique Tandeter, *Trabajo forzado y trabajo libre en el Potosí colonial tardío* (Buenos Aires, 1984), 5 and n. 4.

[37] Tandeter, "Forced and Free Labour in Late Colonial Potosí," 100, n. 4. Calculations for Zacatecas are derived from yields quoted in several documents. AGI, *Guadalajara, leg.* 192; and Archivo General de la Nación (hereafter, AGN), *Minería, leg.* 4.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

producers had to pay for labor and material, on the efficiency of the operation, and the quality of the ore. Silver producers had no direct control over the quality of the ore in the ground, but they could try to compensate for less than average grades by being more efficient, at least in theory. Although the break-even point in terms of ore quality varied from camp to camp and from period to period, it ranged from 40 to 60 ounces of silver per ton of ore refined with mercury.

The quality of ore declined during the colonial era, yet rich lodes remained to be discovered and exploited even in established camps. Predicting yields of silver from ore in flooded and abandoned works was a favorite pastime of owners and investors, and many of these predictions were duly reported in mining surveys conducted by royal officials. In Zacatecas, for example, during the contraction of the 1740s, a survey reported that a group of flooded and largely abandoned mines, if recovered, would yield from 80 to 160 ounces of silver per ton of ore, estimates that were considerably higher than the average.[38] When one of those mines, Quebradilla, was finally recovered by José de la Borda late in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, the yields, although high by colonial standards, were less than half those predicted a half-century earlier.[39] On average, a ton of Andean ore yielded less silver than a comparable ton of ore in Mexico, and Peru's miners had to do more to cut costs or to introduce efficiencies in order to offset the lower quality. But the two major imports, mercury and labor, usually cost more in Peru than Mexico, and Andean miners were no more efficient and may well have been less efficient than Mexican miners. While one part of the history of Spanish colonial mining is the long-term success in Mexico, another part is the long-term effort to support a more marginal Peruvian industry.

Without the invention of the amalgamation process and the mercury that the process required, few Spanish-American camps could have stayed in business very long. Once mercury's importance was established in the second half of the sixteenth century, the Crown moved to create a monopoly to control the production, sale, and distribution of mercury in the viceroyalties. How well the monopoly functioned remains a matter of debate, although most historians agree that the high prices and undependable supplies hardly served the interests of the producers. The mineowners believed that lower prices and larger stockpiles of mercury would possibly increase the production of silver enough to make up for the loss of income from the mercury, and such growth would benefit equally the Crown and the industry.[40] For the Crown, however, the monopoly functioned not only to protect a valuable commodity but also to generate revenue for the government. Although from time to time the government acceded to requests for lower mercury prices or other changes in the administration of the monopoly, it always had to weigh these actions against the conflicting needs of the industry for lower costs and the state for greater revenues. Disbanding the monopoly as some,

[38] AGI, *Guadalajara, leg.* 190.
[39] AGN, *Minería, leg.* 115, *exp.* 4.
[40] Sterling Library, Yale University, *Latin American Collection*, 5–E.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

like Alexander von Humboldt, a staunch free trader, had urged was probably too risky financially for the Crown to consider seriously.[41]

Year-to-year shortages of mercury in individual camps or for entire colonies were frequent and probably unavoidable, given the great distances of mercury mines from the silver camps and a primitive transportation system. While a sudden drop in the mercury supply could curtail production almost immediately, a rise in supplies did not necessarily mean an increase in output of silver, at least in the short term. Other factors, such as the quality of ore, the cost of draining and opening new tunnels, and the availability of labor and capital, had to be taken into account before operations could be expanded to match the supply of mercury. We do not yet know how much mercury was mined in or shipped to Spanish America. A mercury camp, opened at Huancavelica in Peru during the sixteenth century, was to serve Potosí, while mines in Spain and Europe were to supply Mexico and any additional amount that was needed in Peru. The operation and administration of the government-owned mines were often inefficient and inept. Despite these problems, the volume of mercury available for distribution in Peru and Mexico doubled from the seventeenth to the eighteenth century. With the quality of ore on the decline, such an increase was required to support the expansion of mining during the eighteenth century.[42]

The production of mercury at Huancavelica can be reconstructed for two periods, 1571–1724 and 1759–1812 (Figure 6).[43] During these two periods, Huancavelica's production was at least 950,000 *quintales*, and, if the figures for the second quarter of the eighteenth century were known and included, it would probably reach 1.1 million *quintales*. A rule-of-thumb measure for silver to mercury was 100 marks of silver per one hundred pounds of mercury. The ratio of Potosí silver to Huancavelica mercury (assuming that all of Huancavelica's mercury was shipped to Potosí) is about 97 marks for each one hundred pounds. Huancavelica's curve has a slight downward tilt during the colonial period.[44] Huancavelica's mercury production declined more slowly than Potosí's silver production, and this suggests that the supply of mercury was not a crucial factor in causing or sustaining the long depression at Potosí. For shorter intervals, to be sure, a decline in the supply of mercury could have an adverse impact on the silver curve. On the viceregal level, however, Potosí's monopoly over Huancavelica's mercury may well

[41] Humboldt, *Political Essay on the Kingdom of New Spain*, 3: 284–87.

[42] See the graph of mercury from the three principal sources, Huancavelica in Peru, Almadén in Spain, and Idrija in Slovenia, then under the Austrian Habsburgs, in Bakewell, "Mining in Spanish Colonial America," 2: 121.

[43] For 1571–1724, several sets of figures exist, and I have used a set taken from an early eighteenth-century viceregal report. Marqués de Casa Concha, *Relación del estado que ha tenido y tiene la Real Mina de Huancavelica . . .* [1726 copy], Clements Library, Miscellaneous Latin American Collection. These figures agree closely with Set 1, published by Guillermo Lohmann Villena, in *Las Minas de Huancavelica en los siglos XVI y XVII* (Seville, 1949), 452–55. Lohmann Villena's set ends in 1700, but Casa Concha's runs until 1724, although the annual figures become less precise in the eighteenth century. See Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 76, for 1759–1812.

[44] For 1571–1724, the rate is negative at 0.2 percent per year with a confidence level of 70 percent, and for 1759–1812, it is negative at 1.8 percent per year with a 100 percent confidence level.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 6: Mercury from Huancavelica, Peru, 1571–1724, 1759–1812

1571–1812: rc = -.00063937; r = -0.2%; t = 2.98; r^2 = 0.37
1759–1812: rc = -.00778669; r = -1.8%; t = 3.45; r^2 = 0.56; *corr.*

have retarded the growth and development of other Andean camps. At Potosí, the long-term supply of mercury was not the most serious problem.

The Mexican mercury series (Figure 7) is somewhat more complete than the Peruvian series. It includes all shipments to Mexico from 1559 to 1805 with a sixth of the years missing.[45] The Mexican series has a distinct advantage over the Peruvian series in that it encompasses the whole colony and not just a single camp. The crucial linkage between mercury and silver is evident when the growth rates for mercury supply and silver production are compared: mercury grew at an annual rate of 0.8 percent from 1559 to 1805, silver at 1 percent. Mexico's yearly

[45] Yearly mercury data for 1559–1700 are drawn from Chaunu and Chaunu, *Seville et l'Atlantique*, 8.2.2: 1958–60; Bakewell provides quinquennial data in *Silver Mining and Society*, 253–57, for 1565–1700, and although the Chaunus' and Bakewell's totals are not always in agreement, I have used the Chaunus' data for the basic series and filled in the gaps with Bakewell's figures, which, it must be understood, are averages rather than precise annual figures. Yearly data from 1709 through 1805 are drawn from Antonia Heredia Herrera, *La Renta del azogue en Nueva España: 1709–1751* (Seville, 1978), 227–33; and John TePaske's current research. I am indebted to Professor TePaske for these data to complete the series.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 7: Mercury Supply, Mexico, 1559–1805

1559–1805: *rc* = 0.00345664; *r* = 0.8%; *t* = 7.87; r^2 = 0.55; *corr.*

totals of silver production include smelted silver, which by the late eighteenth century amounted to less than 20 percent and perhaps no more than 10 percent of total silver registrations. Until the eighteenth century, silver registrations grew nearly twice as fast as mercury imports, a sign of a rough parity between smelted silver, which did not require mercury, and refined silver. In the eighteenth century, however, silver and mercury grew at about the same rates, because more ore was being refined and less smelted. Mexico may have received as many as 1.7 million *quintales* of mercury between the middle of the sixteenth century and 1810. At 100 marks per *quintal*, Mexico produced about 1.4 billion *pesos* worth of refined silver in a total of 1.8 billion *pesos* of refined and smelted silver. More important than the ratio between refined and smelted silver is the fact that the yield of silver to mercury stabilized at a level that could yield a profit. In several major camps, the yield may have improved to 110 or 125 marks per *quintal* during the second half of the eighteenth century.[46] Mexico's mercury curve, like Huancavelica's

[46] Fabián Fonseca and Carlos de Urrutia, *Historia general de Real Hacienda*, 2 vols. (Mexico City, 1845), 1: 383.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

curve, rose sharply in the last half of the sixteenth century in response to the introduction of the mercury process that made refining low-grade ore economical. The volume of mercury shipped to Mexico fell modestly in the seventeenth century and then rose markedly in the eighteenth century. The decline in mercury shipments coincided with the rise (also modest) in silver registrations. These contradictory trends could coexist in the seventeenth century but not in the eighteenth century, when smelting became less profitable. Miners also had other ways to deal with mercury shortages: they could try to save mercury by using less or recapturing more of what they did use, and they could try to supplement their supply by buying mercury from merchants and dealers outside the royal monopoly.[47] In retrospect, one could argue that increasing the supply of mercury during the seventeenth century (especially at the prevailing prices) would not have permanently reversed the downward trend in Peru, and adding to the supply of mercury would probably have strengthened the upward trend in Mexico.

What the Crown did in the seventeenth century, however, was the reverse: it increased the supply in Peru by shipping less to Mexico. Beginning in the 1620s and continuing into the 1650s, large quantities of mercury from Almadén and Idria were shipped to Peru instead of Mexico with the result that Mexico's supply shrank. This decision may well have been a miscalculation that contributed to a slump in Mexican mining during the second quarter of the seventeenth century. Tables 1 and 2 show that the amount of mercury available in Spanish America (from all sources—Almadén, Idria, and Huancavelica) fell in the period 1630–1670 from more than 100,000 *quintales* to just slightly more than 60,000 *quintales*. During the second and third quarters, Peru had two and a half times more mercury than Mexico. With less total mercury available, Mexican miners and refiners had to make choices about curtailing operations, firing up the smelters, or stretching supplies. Mexican miners were largely successful in making the necessary adjustments because, although the supply of mercury in Mexico did not grow and may have fallen during the second half of the seventeenth century, the output of silver began to rise again. On the Peruvian side, the need for mercury may have been legitimate. The decline in Peru's total registrations (starting about 1610) eased in the second quarter, after which came a brief recovery before the final descent. That the recovery was only temporary was not so apparent to the government, which still regarded Peru's mines and particularly Potosí's as the colonies' most valuable mining properties. By the 1660s, however, the government, recognizing the need to accommodate the demand for mercury in Mexico, reversed its priorities. At a time when Almadén failed to boost its output, the government authorized the shipment of mercury from Huacavelica in Peru to Mexico to supplement the supply of mercury in Mexico, although only a few thousand *quintales* of Peruvian mercury were actually delivered.[48]

[47] Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 189–95.

[48] M. F. Lang, "New Spain's Mining Depression," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 48 (1968): 632–41. While Lang did not demonstrate that Mexican mining was depressed in the seventeenth century, he offered a general picture of the controversy over shipping mercury from Mexico to Peru and vice versa.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1
Mercury Supply in Spanish America, 1571–1700
(By Decades and in Hundredweights)

Date	*Chaunu Totals*	*Percent Change*	*Date*	*Bakewell Totals*	*Percent Change*
1561–1570	8,715				
1571–1580	56,463	547.9	1571–1579	49,912	
1581–1590	94,471	67.3	1580–1589	96,764	93.9
1591–1600	94,887	0.4	1590–1599	96,303	−0.5
1601–1610	70.711	−25.5	1600–1609	68,056	−29.3
1611–1620	106,676	50.9	1610–1619	103,873	52.6
1621–1630	108,389	1.6	1620–1629	106,332	2.4
1631–1640	95,818	−11.6	1630–1639	104,529	−1.7
	[110,194]	[1.7]			
1641–1650	68,174	−28.9	1640–1649	96,850	−7.3
	[94,767]	[−14.0]			
1651–1660	93,281	36.8	1650–1659	94,297	−2.6
		[−1.6]			
1661–1670	68,952	−26.1	1660–1669	63,528	−32.6
1671–1680	81,701	18.5	1670–1679	78,271	23.2
1681–1690	44,848	−45.4	1680–1689	61,941	−21.5
1691–1700	70,990	58.3	1690–1691	74,476	20.2
TOTALS	1,064,075			1,095,132	
	[1,105,044]				
DECADE AVERAGE	76,005			78,224	
	[78,932]				

NOTE: For the decades 1631–1640 and 1641–1650, the Chaunus' totals are incomplete. The figures in brackets show totals based on aggregating Chaunus' Peruvian totals with Bakewell's Mexican totals. Sources: P. Chaunu and H. Chaunu, *Seville et l'Atlantique*, 8.2.2: 1974–75; Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 254, 256.

During the course of the eighteenth century, Almadén (and Idria) became the chief source of mercury for both Mexico and Peru. During the second half of the eighteenth century, Huancavelica probably supplied less than half of what the Andean miners required on average each year to maintain or expand their operations. In that period, Huancavelica's mercury production was falling at about the same rate that Peru's silver output was rising, so the gap between what was needed and what was locally available was widening.[49] The difference was made up through imports. During the last half of the eighteenth century and the first

[49] Fisher provided data on Huancavelica's output from 1759 to 1812 in *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 76.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2
Mercury Exported to Mexico and Distributed to Zacatecas, 1600–1700
(By Decades and in Hundredweights)

Date	*Mexico*	*Percent Change*	*Zacatecas*	*Percent Change*	*Total Percent*
1600–1610	30,402		1,353		4.5
1610–1619	40,697	33.9	15,037	1,011.4	37.0
1620–1629	40,754	0.2	16,248	8.1	39.9
1630–1639	22,909	−43.8	9,197	−43.4	40.2
1640–1649	27,593	20.5	10,993	19.5	39.8
1650–1659	23,170	−16.0	5,600	−49.1	24.2
1660–1669	16,433	−29.1	3,685	−34.2	22.4
1670–1679	23,428	42.6	7,692	108.7	32.8
1680–1689	18,327	−21.8	8,340	8.4	45.5
1690–1699	16,942	−7.6	5,040	−39.6	29.8
TOTALS	260,655		83,185	31.9	

NOTE: Data for Zacatecas, 1600–1610 is incomplete. Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 251–57.

decade of the nineteenth century, a total of 200,000 *quintales* or more of mercury arrived from Europe. To supply Peru with several thousand *quintales* a year and Mexico with 10,000 to 20,000 *quintales* meant that Almadén (and Idria) had to produce annually from 15,000 to 25,000 *quintales*. With such heavy dependence on imports, and given the perils and delays of the Almadén operations and the Atlantic crossings, shortages were bound to occur. But there were no long-term shortages in either Peru or Mexico, and, at times, such as the 1790s, the supply of mercury was ample. In the Viceroyalty of Peru (formerly Lower Peru), the treasury had 11,000 *quintales* on hand in 1790 and received 40,000 *quintales* through 1797 from Huancavelica and Almadén. Even after this abundance of mercury sparked an explosion in output that totaled more than 30 million *pesos*, or 4.5 million *pesos* per year, the treasury still had in 1797 a balance of about 16,000 *quintales*, enough mercury for approximately two years.[50] Similarly, in Mexico during the 1790s, when its silver refineries were consuming 20,000 to 25,000 *quintales* per year, Mexican imports were not only keeping pace but were also providing year-end balances of 15,000 to 25,000 *quintales*, enough for at least a year's operation.[51] Still, the mercury supply system was vulnerable. When the British blockade of the Spanish peninsula was in effect from 1798 through 1801, the flow of mercury from Spain to the New World slowed to a trickle, with the

[50] Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 74–85.

[51] The figures in the mercury-distribution accounts were difficult to reconcile and were constantly being reworked. These are estimates based on three different reports from the Marqués de Branciforte, Viceroy of Mexico, to Diego de Gardoqui, with various dates from 1794 and 1795. AGI, *México, leg.* 1566.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

consequence that silver output in Spanish America dropped by more than a third.[52] Although surpluses existed in both Peru and Mexico, they were quickly drawn down during the shortage and not rebuilt after imports resumed in 1802. Supply was only part of the mercury equation, however. Peruvians paid more for mercury than Mexicans, and, since they normally had lower yields, they had a harder time, no matter the level of supply, making a profit. Without a downward adjustment in mercury prices and other financial incentives, expanding mercury supplies would have contributed little to the long-term growth and development of the Peruvian silver industry.

The price of mercury actually moved downward during colonial times, but it did so slowly and to the advantage of the Crown.[53] As a general rule, mercury prices were lower in Mexico than in Peru even though the Mexican price started at a higher level than Peru's. In Mexico, prices dropped from 180 *pesos* per *quintal* to 82.5 *pesos* in the early seventeenth century and then to 41 *pesos* in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. In Peru, the price of mercury from Huancavelica was set at 104 *pesos* per *quintal* in the late sixteenth century, and for the last half of the colonial period prices fluctuated between the high 90s and the low 70s per *quintal*, although miners lacking capital might pay the equivalent of 100 *pesos* per *quintal* to their creditors (*aviadores*). In 1809, Peru's price dropped to 50 *pesos* per *quintal*, the lowest official price ever. Almadén mercury, which Peru came to depend on more and more in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was normally set at a price that reflected the cost of operating the mine at Huancavelica. As a result, Andean miners paid about twice the price that Mexican miners paid for Almadén mercury (in part, to cover higher transportation expenses), despite repeated requests by the Peruvians to be granted the same price that Mexicans paid.[54] Higher mercury prices translated into higher mining costs at a time when the ore yielded on average no more than the customary ratio of 100 marks of silver per *quintal* of mercury and may have fallen below that level.[55] Mercury was the single most expensive item in the refining operation. In Mexico, after the final price reduction in 1778, Almadén mercury accounted for one-fifth of the total refining costs, and Idria mercury, used when none other was available, accounted for one-quarter of those costs.[56] In Peru, one-third or more of the total refining costs went for mercury. Peruvian producers had to find a way of raising yields or streamlining operations to make up for higher mercury costs. Neither was easy,

[52] Regulations required that during shortages mercury be reserved for the largest refineries with the most ore ready to be amalgamated. Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 81; and AGN, *México, Historia, leg.* 92, *exp.* 40.

[53] Bakewell, "Mining in Colonial Spanish America," 2: 122.

[54] Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 81–82, 83–84. In 1800, the price of Peruvian mercury was raised from 73 to 85 *pesos* per *quintal* in order to stimulate production at Huancavelica and reduce demand for Almadén mercury during the British blockade (81–82). The purchaser usually paid the cost of transporting the mercury from a central warehouse to the mining camp. But the cost of transporting the mercury overseas was included in the price fixed by the monopoly.

[55] Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 74.

[56] David Brading, *Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico, 1763–1810* (Cambridge, 1971), 152–56; and Garner, "Silver Production and Entrepreneurial Structure," 177, n. 58. In that footnote, gross profits should read 4–20 percent instead of 20–40 percent.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and, because of the thin profit margins, the producers often had to buy mercury with cash borrowed from *aviadores* or on credit from the local treasury. *Aviadores* added a steep charge for advancing cash, while the treasury, with a growing portfolio of unpaid mercury debts, could refuse credit or confiscate silver or other property until all indebtedness was removed.[57] Price, more than supply, worked against a profitable industry over the long term.

AMONG THE MOST COSTLY ITEMS FOR PERUVIAN AND MEXICAN MINEOWNERS were wages and salaries. They constituted a larger part of the total cost in the extracting than in the refining of the ore. How much a silver producer had to pay in wages and salaries (either in cash or kind) had a major impact on the profitability of the operation. In the first decades after the major silver discoveries, draft labor had to be used in both Peru and Mexico. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, voluntary labor began to supplement draft labor but did not completely replace it. Peru's draft-labor system (*mita*) remained in effect at both Potosí and Huancavelica until the end of the colonial period, although the majority of Peru's workers were hired rather than drafted.[58] Some historians have argued that the continued reliance on the *mita* system, even for a minority of the laborers, became an obstacle to the development of mining in Peru because it disguised what would have been the real labor costs if the draftees had been hired at prevailing rates.[59] But others have argued that it was precisely the high cost of mining in Potosí (and in Huancavelica) that led both the mineowners and the public officials to defend continuation of the *mita*. Without it, many mines would not have shown any profit, even after the Crown cut silver taxes and mercury prices in the eighteenth century, and the treasury would have lost revenue.[60] No Spanish institution provoked as much condemnation as the draft-labor system—*mita* in Peru and *repartimiento* in Mexico—because of its cruel and exploitative character. But differing economic conditions may explain why Peru's system not only survived but evolved while Mexico's virtually disappeared.

Finding enough workers for the widely scattered and remotely located camps was diffcult at any time, and labor shortages, especially under the pressure of Indian depopulation in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, were unavoidable. By 1600, the colonial mining industry needed between 20,000 and 25,000 workers, a number that was greater than could be supplied through

[57] Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 82–83.

[58] Bakewell offered an overview of labor systems in "Mining in Colonial Spanish America," 2: 123–30; for extended treatments of the *mita* in Potosí and its place in Peruvian colonial labor history, consult Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*; and Jeffrey A. Cole, *The Potosí Mita, 1573–1700: Compulsory Indian Labor in the Andes* (Stanford, Calif., 1985).

[59] Brading and Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining," 579.

[60] Tandeter, "Forced and Free Labour in Late Colonial Potosí," 100–04, 110–17. Certainly, Brading and Cross raised the same issue when they wrote that, "without this source of cheap labor the *cerro rico*, with all its rich ores long since exhausted, could not have continued to work minerals which on average yielded no more than 3/4 ounces of silver per hundredweight," in "Colonial Silver Mining," 560. See also Cole's concluding chapter that incorporates Tandeter's study in *The Potosí Mita*, 123–36.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

voluntary labor.[61] In 1600, Peru and Mexico had about the same proportion (half and half) of draft and voluntary laborers.[62] After 1650, labor shortages moderated as the colonial population began to grow, but they remained a factor in Peru because its population was smaller and grew more slowly.[63]

The institutionalization of the *mita* in Peru extends beyond the simple demographic issues. The *mita* was organized in the 1570s to provide a pool of about 13,500 workers at Potosí, of which only one-third were supposed to be working in any given week. By 1600, the camp needed 11,000 to 12,000 workers, and the difference between what the *mita* provided and what the camp needed was made up by *mingas*, workers hired from among the "off-duty" *mitayos* and other Indians in search of work. Thus, within a quarter of a century of the founding of the *mita*, *mingas*, many of whom may have come to Potosí under the *mita*, outnumbered *mitayos* three to one. Both government and industry expressed a preference for hiring workers rather than drafting them, but their overall concern was not just having enough workers but having enough at a reasonable wage. Since *mitayos* were paid less than *mingas*, the continuation of labor drafts had a strong financial incentive. The insistence on preservation or expansion of the *mita* at the same time that the number of *mingas* was growing was derived in part from an effort to control labor costs.[64] Without the *mita*, Potosí would have had trouble attracting workers under the wages and conditions that *mitayos* had to accept, and many mineowners would have had trouble staying in business. The *mita* did supply a scarce commodity at a bargain price on a temporary basis, but, equally important, it served as a source for the hiring of permanent workers at higher wages than *mitayos* earned though not as high perhaps as a free market would have dictated.

With mine labor frequently in short supply, Potosian miners learned quickly how to buy, sell, lease, and swap labor despite the state's persistent efforts to regulate and allocate the supply. Potosí's labor market became a hybrid. It was shaped but not dominated by either the coercive or the voluntary system. The market showed itself to be remarkably inventive and constantly changing even as Potosí moved from expansion to contraction. In one arrangement, some miners sold or leased the services of their assigned *mitayos* to other producers rather than use them in their own operations; in another, which became popular, some communities, unable to meet their quotas, negotiated with owners to substitute cash payments for drafted workers, the cash to be used, presumably, to hire

[61] Bakewell, "Mining in Colonial Spanish America," 2: 127–28.

[62] Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 111–13, 185–86. In *The Potosí Mita*, 56, Cole estimated that the ratio of one drafted worker to one voluntary laborer was maintained during the seventeenth century at many small operations, and he also discussed (48–50) how competition for draft labor intensified because the number willing or able to work as *mitayos* was dwindling. Although draft labor was used in camps besides Potosí, such as Oruro, and in farming and manufacturing, it did not become such an integral part of these local and regional economic developments as it did in Potosí. For further comments on the labor force within the general demographic history, see Noble David Cook, *Demographic Collapse: Indian Peru, 1520–1620* (Cambridge, 1981); and Nicolás Sánchez-Albornoz's *Indios y tributos en el Alto Perú* (Lima, 1980).

[63] As late as the eighteenth century, epidemics and famines could induce temporary labor shortages with attendant declines in silver registrations in Mexico (1737, 1760, 1779, and 1784), but they were generally manageable. Garner, "Silver Production and Entrepreneurial Structure."

[64] Cole, *The Potosí Mita*, 51–52.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

replacements.[65] Trading in *mitayos* apparently grew as mining costs rose and profits plummeted during the first half of the seventeenth century. Holders of *mitayos* paid them 2.5 to 3.5 *reales* per day, but they could earn several times that amount by selling or leasing their services. The buyer probably paid no more than the prevailing rate in the open market, and the *mitayo*, regardless of his employer, received no more than the *mita*-prescribed wage. For the seller, trading in *mitayos* could bring more profit than operating the mine or refinery to which the *mitayos* were assigned. The government estimated that a single *mitayo* could fetch 235 *pesos* a year. If the services of a third or a half of the several thousand *mitayos* on duty in Potosí were sold or leased for the period of one year, those transactions would generate between a quarter and a half-million *pesos* for the original holders of the labor obligations.[66] The cash-substitution plan followed two basic forms. Indian communities could hire and pay substitute workers (usually *mingas*) or transfer the money for them directly to the mineowners. Either way, the miners could shift a percentage of their operational costs to the Indian communities without having to share any of the savings or profits with them. In an unexpected (and illegal) twist, the miners, who received cash in lieu of workers, could opt to pocket the money rather than use it to hire replacements, hence the phrase *indios de faltriquera*, or Indians in the pocket. From time to time, royal officials reported that only one-third or one-half of the *mitayos* actually showed up to work in Potosí, the rest having been paid for in cash. As much as a million *pesos* could flow from the Indian communities to the Potosí miners each year, although such an amount must be treated as the exception rather than the rule.[67] In 1659, one royal inquiry turned up the fact that the delivery of silver in place of workers amounted to 580,000 *pesos*, a figure said to be much higher than what the treasury collected in silver taxes.[68] Some cash was used to hire *mingas*, and some was certainly pocketed, but the exact division was seldom documented. Despite much criticism on economic, administrative, and moral grounds, the *mita* survived because it evolved from a short-term labor-supply system into a financial service that helped to subsidize Potosí's miners as mining itself grew more costly and less profitable.

[65] Bakewell and Cole provided ample details on the labor markets. Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 124–30, 157–65; and Cole, *The Potosí Mita*, 79–90.

[66] Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 156–60. The selling or leasing of *mitayo* services was more complex and subtle than the above description suggests. In one case, Bakewell explained that refinery owners piled up mercury debts with the treasury in order to win approval to lease their plants and the *mitayos* assigned to them because they could make more money from the leases than from the refineries. Both the treasury and the camp could be losers, though, when the former was saddled with large debts and the latter with inefficient operators.

[67] The figure was arrived at by assuming that there were approximately 3,000 *mitayos* on duty in Potosí each year in the seventeenth century and by multiplying the annual wages of the local *mingas* (7 to 9 *pesos* per week, or 400 to 425 *pesos* per year) times one-half to two-thirds of the *mitayo* population. Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 161–62.

[68] Cole, *The Potosí Mita*, 92. Cole's source, a report by Francisco de la Cruz, the bishop-elect of Santa Marta, stated that the royal fifth at Potosí was only 300,000 *pesos* in 1659. Bakewell and Lamberto de Sierra showed silver registrations that should have yielded taxes in the range of 600,000 to 700,000 *pesos*, but TePaske and Klein showed silver revenues at Potosí of about 500,000 *pesos*. This discrepancy raises the possibility that, if de la Cruz's figure for the royal fifth is inaccurate, his estimate of the *mita* deliveries could also be suspect. It is often difficult to reconcile several sets of figures, such as silver marks versus silver revenues, in any given year.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In the eighteenth century, economic forces combined to resuscitate the *mita* at Potosí and to lead some to call for it to be extended beyond Potosí. The forces at work were a revival in mining, spurred in part by cuts in silver taxes and mercury prices, and a scarcity of labor. The underlying cause of the labor shortage in the Andean camps was the slow rate of the population growth, although some regions posted greater gains than others.[69] The Spanish also believed that Indians would not work in the mines unless "forced" to do so, which in a sense was true; many Indians refused to work because they had other job choices.[70] The imbalance between the supply of and demand for labor boosted wages and costs. In Potosí, a high-cost and low-profit camp to begin with, *mita* labor was one way to cut expenses in order to raise profits, since *mitayos* were paid less than free laborers. During the seventeenth century, the number of all workers needed annually in Potosí had fallen from 10,000 to 4,000. The number of *mitayos* had declined as well and may have dropped even further in the first quarter of the eighteenth century.[71] After the revival began in 1720s and 1730s, the demand for labor surely rose. For the end of the eighteenth century, when Potosí's mining was on the wane again, Enrique Tandeter reported that the camp had about 5,000 laborers of whom just under half (2,376) were *mitayos*. As in the past, *mitayos* held the least desirable jobs, such as hauling and grinding ore, jobs that could not be easily or cheaply filled by wage labor. Potosian mineowners had long tried to exact more work from the *mitayos* than the regulations permitted (another way of getting more output for the daily wage). In the eighteenth century, some of the regulations were rewritten so that the *mitayo*'s daily quotas (thirty bags of ore instead of fifteen, for example) increased, while his wages did not. *Mitayos* had to work longer hours and enlist family members to fulfill their obligations, all of this at no higher cost to the owner. The difference between what *mitayos* were paid and what *mingas* had to be paid ended up as miners' profits. The continuation of *mita* labor and the revision of its work rules may have contributed substantially to Potosí's recovery in the second half of the eighteenth century, although this remains to be spelled out in detail. In short, mining became profitable once again at the expense of the Indian communities that had long subsidized the *mita* system.[72]

By the late eighteenth century, Upper Peru and Potosí had been attached to the Viceroyalty of Río de la Plata, but *mita* quotas earlier defined for Potosí remained in force for certain provinces in the newly reorganized Viceroyalty of Peru (Lower Peru). Apart from the financial gain through the continued use of the *mita*, the need for labor may have been as real in Upper Peru as it was becoming in Lower Peru, especially at Pasco, the viceroyalty's premier camp. Moreover, Indians in Lower Peru were disinclined to seek or to accept work in the mining camps, and miners, expressing their exasperation, often demanded labor drafts to relieve

[69] Marcel Haitin, "Prices, the Lima Market, and the Agricultural Crisis of the Late Eighteenth Century in Peru," *Jahrbuch für Geschichte . . . Lateinamerikas*, 22 (1985): 187–88.

[70] Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 90.

[71] Cole, *The Potosí Mita*, 120.

[72] Tandeter, "Forced and Free Labour in Late Colonial Potosí," 100–04, 110–17; Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 153–55; and Cole, *The Potosí Mita*, 28–32, 123–36.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shortages and moderate wages. Some "voluntary" drafts were permitted but were seldom successful. At Pasco, the shortages were so severe and constant that workers could earn as much as 3 *pesos* a day, a wage that was several times higher than what miners thought that they should pay or could afford. Competition for workers even led to poaching, which the government tried to ban.[73]

In the long and controversial history of the *mita*, certain developments make some economic sense. Bakewell argued, correctly I believe, that, despite the protestations of royal officials and later historians, the selling and "pocketing" of *mita* services could be economically useful because they introduced a degree of flexibility into a system whose quotas were normally revised each decade.[74] But, as Potosí slid more deeply into a mining depression, that economic rationale became less valid because sustaining the industry rather than shifting the labor of that industry was the chief concern. The delivery of *mitayos* whether in person or in silver became a way to help to keep Potosí's financially beleaguered miners in business, a goal, it should be stressed, that the Crown often shared.[75] If wages had been allowed to rise to reflect the imbalance in supply and demand, many Potosian mines would have gone bankrupt, with losses not only to the industry but to the Crown as well. Subsidies were preferable to abandonments, even though the miners had to mount active campaigns to persuade increasingly skeptical viceroys that the *mita* in various forms had to be preserved. The miners lost a few battles—periodically, the Crown approved reforms—but won the war because, as Potosí's production turned upward in the 1730s, the *mita* both provided scarce labor and subsidized costly operations. Its survival was assured until the end of the colonial period.

Although the *mita* endured in Andean mining until independence, its Mexican counterpart, *repartimiento*, did not survive the seventeenth century.[76] The question that needs to be raised, even though we may not be able to answer it yet, is whether the emergence of free labor in Mexico contributed positively to the development of the mining industry in contrast to the dual system of free and forced labor in Peru. That Mexico's population was larger, may have recovered more quickly in the seventeenth century, and was located closer to the major mining centers than Peru's were distinct advantages. It may be equally significant that, as the silver industry took root and the employment regimen took shape, no single Mexican camp had a demand for labor comparable to Potosí's. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, when the pressure of Indian mortality was the heaviest, draft and slave labor were used primarily to alleviate local shortages. David Brading and Harry Cross cited the example of Pachuca, which drafted 1,108 Indians from surrounding villages during 1576–1579 but only 57 by 1661.[77] According to a survey of the industry in the 1590s, the number of mine workers

[73] Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 90–97.
[74] Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 162–63.
[75] Cole reported that Potosí's miners would "literally kill" to protect the practice of *indios de faltriquera*. *The Potosí Mita*, 124.
[76] Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 92–94; and Bakewell, "Mining in Colonial Spanish America," 2: 128.
[77] Brading and Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining," 557.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had reached over 9,000 for the whole colony (compared to more than 10,000 in the single camp of Potosí in Peru); of the 9,000, 68.5 percent were *naborías*, or free Indian workers, 17.7 percent were *repartimiento* Indians, and 13.8 were slaves. *Naborías* tended to be concentrated in the north, where the natives were less populous and *repartimiento* labor in the central areas, where the natives were more numerous. Because northern miners lacked access to the Indian communities in the central areas, the probable location of the colony's major boom in the late sixteenth century, they had to find other ways (slavery, wages, or peonage) to bring workers to their camps. Had northern Mexico, where the population was small and scattered, sprouted a Potosí, the colony would probably have created a draft-labor system. By the time the mining industry had shifted from the center to the north, a wage-labor system was already in place. Although never widespread in the northern camps, *repartimiento* did on occasion account for a third of the workers in Zacatecas, which had become the colony's premier camp.[78]

During the Indian depopulation from the middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth century, competition for labor in Mexico could be intense. Three strikes—two in the 1630s and one in the 1650s—at Parral may have severely depleted the pool of workers in Zacatecas and other nearby camps. Many mestizos and mulattos, who were often the skilled workers, migrated to Parral because their skills commanded a higher wage there than in Zacatecas.[79] An intermediate form of labor between the compulsory and voluntary systems was peonage, which Indians accepted to earn money for tribute and other obligations. In Zacatecas, Bakewell found instances in which money may have been advanced, although he could not always ascertain whether this was done to attract or retain the workers. It was widespread enough to cause the viceregal government to issue rules limiting the time of indebtedness, usually four to eight months. No doubt peonage inspired abuse but not uniformly so. Many workers had no debts, and many others may have been influenced to stay whether in debt or not because of the attractiveness of the wage, the *pepena* (worker's ore allotment), and the general living conditions.[80] Despite the falling population, Bakewell concluded that the terms of employment often played a larger role in creating labor shortages than did the demographic factors. In his view, "the availability of Indian labour [in Zacatecas] depended on the prosperity of mining, [rather] than the prosperity of mining on the availability of labour."[81]

Periodic labor shortages and the absence of a large-scale, state-run labor system notwithstanding, wages for Mexican mine and refinery workers do not appear to have been as high as or higher than wages for voluntary laborers in Peru. Comparing wages of mine workers within the same colony or between two colonies is risky because the evidence is scant and because wages were paid in cash, in kind,

[78] Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 121–25; "Notes on Mexican Mining," 396–98; and *Miners of the Red Mountain*, 181–89.

[79] Robert C. West, *The Mining Community in Northern New Spain: The Parral Mining District* (Berkeley, Calif., 1949), 48–51.

[80] Bakewell, "Notes on Mexican Mining," 398; and *Silver Mining and Society*, 126.

[81] Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 128–29, 200–01.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in ore shares, or in combinations of all three. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Mexican workers were paid, on a weekly basis, between 2 and 4 *pesos*, a wage that, if paid in cash, was more than the average *mitayo* received but not as much as the average *minga* received in Peru. An arrangement for a share of the ore (called both *pepena* and *partido*) could earn the worker two to three times his wage. Not all categories of mine or refinery workers qualified for ore shares, and the rates varied from camp to camp and from mine to mine.[82] Although the *pepenas* made mine and refinery workers Mexico's highest paid workers in an industry in which labor accounted for better than half of the total production costs, it did not become over the long term a prohibitive financial burden. Future research may show whether tying workers' wages to *pepenas* made the labor force more efficient and productive than relying solely on wages.[83] In the eighteenth century, some miners complained that high labor costs, in particular, the *pepenas*, in combination with rising costs for repairs and expansions, rendered mining less and less profitable. Some mine and refinery owners succeeded in reducing labor costs, although they were greatly aided in this by population growth that increased the competition among the workers for the jobs.[84] In general, the cost of labor to the employer on a daily or weekly basis held steady and may have even decreased in eighteenth-century Mexico, while it edged up in Peru.

PERU'S LOWER ORE QUALITIES AND HIGHER MERCURY AND LABOR COSTS made long-term financing less attractive there than in Mexico and further handicapped the Andean silver industry. Clearly, the trends, whether or not investors fully comprehended their significance, favored a more cautious approach in Peru. Since the early seventeenth century, the main source of capital for mining had been the merchant community. Merchants could become involved in different ways: they could advance cash or credit (*avíos*) to pay for wages and supplies; they could underwrite the cost of building adits and shafts, repairing tunnels, and erecting refineries; and they could purchase shares or partnerships in mining companies.[85] Extending *avíos* was widely practiced in both colonies. It entailed the least risk over the shortest time for the merchant, since he offered *avíos* only to producers who agreed to sell their refined silver to him. The merchant-*aviador* paid less for the silver than the mint did and considered the difference as his profit or commission. In Mexico, however, financial arrangements between producers and merchants evolved beyond *avíos*. In addition, we must recognize that the long mining

[82] Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 125; Bernard Bobb, *The Viceregency of Antonio María Bucareli of New Spain, 1771–1779* (Austin, Tex., 1961), 177–78; and Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 147–49, 184, 186, 193, 199, 201, 204, 277–78. There is little evidence that a system of *pepenas* to supplement wages developed in Peru, although in the late eighteenth century some miners began to offer a share of ore in order to attract new workers. Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 94.

[83] As Bakewell, Brading, and Fisher have all pointed out, there were risks, in that workers tried to reserve the best ores for themselves and might resort to cutting out the pillars (which supported the roofs) in order to get ores.

[84] Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 148–49.

[85] For brief discussions of mining capital, see Bakewell, "Mining in Colonial Spanish America," 2: 136–38; and Brading and Cross, "Colonial Silver Mining," 566–68. For an extended discussion of how capital was raised in late colonial Mexico, see Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, chap. 4.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

depression had reduced Peru's capital resources (for mineowners and merchants alike) and limited its economic growth. Peruvian merchants may have more readily accepted long-term risks in the flush times of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries than later. In the former period, merchants allowed miners to roll over their loans at increasingly higher interest rates. The worsening depression made that practice less popular.[86] Conversely, expansion in Mexico had replenished the capital pool and enhanced business in general. Mexican investors exhibited an entrepreneurial spirit, which Peruvians as late as the 1790s complained that Peruvian investors lacked: "The Kingdom of Mexico has always prospered on account of its Mines: Peru, whose mines are richer and more numerous, is barely kept alive by hers. This contrast arises solely from differing attitudes towards Mining in the two countries. There a rich merchant will advance 50,000 or 100,000 *pesos* for the working of a Mine, simply on the word of the Miner, and remain unmoved when he learns that the vein has been lost: here there is hardly an *habilitador* [backer] who advances 10,000 or 12,000 *pesos* (if, indeed, any provide so large a sum) without seeking to squeeze the Miner and his Mines until he has the *piña* [silver not yet cast into bars] in his hand, and his profit is thus assured."[87]

Less is known about how mining was organized and financed in Peru than in Mexico. It is plausible that, after the installation of the amalgamation process in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the structure of the viceregal mining industries followed different patterns: the scale of Peru's mining and refining operations became smaller as Mexico's became larger. A single comparison from the late eighteenth century is instructive but not definitive. For (Lower) Peru, John Fisher estimated that the average mine employed under twenty workers, while Pasco, its largest camp, had about thirty. No colony-wide ratio for late colonial Mexico exists yet. In Zacatecas, however, the average was fifty workers per mine. Pasco and Zacatecas had almost the same number of workers (2,500 versus 2,700), but productivity was higher in Zacatecas, with 40 percent fewer mines that averaged two to three times more silver than Pasco.[88] One result of the increasing participation of Mexico's merchant community was the establishment of many large, heavily capitalized, and vertically organized mining companies.[89] Mexican producers and investors had discovered the benefits of large-scale operations perhaps as early as the second half of the seventeenth century, whereas Peruvians had initiated few such operations by the late eighteenth century. The remarkable entrepreneur López de Quiroga was an exception to the long-term

[86] Andrien, *Crisis and Decline*, 32–33.

[87] From *Mercurio Peruano*, 3 (January 9, 1791): 21–22, quoted in Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 98; also see Fisher, "Mining and the Peruvian Economy," 52.

[88] Fisher stated in "Mining and the Peruvian Economy," 52, that "about a dozen" employees made up the average work force. In his *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 95, the ratio of mine workers to productive mines in 1799 is between sixteen and seventeen to one. For Zacatecas, a list of mines and the number of workers per mine for 1780 can be found in Archivo Municipal de Zacatecas, *leg.* 20, *exp.* 22.

[89] Brading's *Miners and Merchants*, chap. 4, remains the best overall treatment of the organization of Mexico's important camps and of the operations in those camps.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Peruvian pattern. Potosí had had other wealthy miners, such as Hernán Carrillo de Córdova and Pedro de Mondragón, but they were beneficiaries by and large of the original Potosian boom during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, when the processing of the tailings was so profitable. According to Bakewell, while these and other Potosians exhibited capitalistic traits, López de Quiroga represented a "new phenomenon," "the first capitalistic miner" in Potosí and perhaps in Spanish America. His wealth may have grown to tens of millions of *pesos* over the course of his career in mining, commerce, and ranching. What set López de Quiroga apart from other miners of his and earlier generations was the scale of his operation and the extent of his success at a time of few investments and numerous bankruptcies at Potosí. He possessed enormous capital resources with which he built a huge enterprise of mines, refineries, and the businesses that provided the products needed to keep the mines and refineries operating. With his knack for finding ways to streamline his operations and increase his profits, he proved to be an able and effective manager of an extensive financial empire.[90] Impressive as his achievements were, López de Quiroga did not become the model for other Potosian or Peruvian miners. Continued reliance by most on short-term *avíos* both reflected and reinforced the development of small-scale operations.

During the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Pasco's success as a mining center was in part the result of a departure from the *avíos* system. Silver was first discovered in Pasco around 1567. Production data, based on treasury receipts, exist only from the 1670s to the end of the colonial period. After posting figures in the range of 500 to 1,000 marks per year during the last quarter of the seventeenth century, output began to grow in the early eighteenth century.[91] In the early eighteenth century, few of Pasco's pits exceeded "30 *varas* [yards] in depth." The presence of underground springs and the lack of drainage facilities made the mines prone to flooding and costly to operate. It was not until the middle of the eighteenth century that an adit for drainage was installed so that miners could move beyond the water line. By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Pasco miners faced once again the need to construct a new drainage system, which in 1780 some fifty miners agreed to support. Fisher reported that the "new ores were not exceptionally rich, but [were] plentiful," plentiful enough, it would appear, to persuade the miners in 1794 to build a larger adit. Miners in Pasco had known of the need for adits to drain the mines since the seventeenth century, and the technology was fairly well understood. Several projects for building or enlarging adits were undertaken at Pasco, with some success between 1750 and 1850, but, because they were so costly, they were seldom finished on time or as designed. Such projects required a level of financing that few Peruvian miners individually could afford and, in the absence of mercantile capital, Pasco miners pooled their funds or tapped revenues available through the miners' guild to build the adits. From time to time, they had access to cheap Indian labor (with official approval), which kept costs down. Large import-export merchants, who could

[90] Peter J. Bakewell, *Antonio López de Quiroga (Industrial minero del Potosí colonial)* (Potosí, 1973), 35–36.
[91] TePaske and Klein, *Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America*, 1: 524–62.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have provided long-term financing, continued to prefer short-term *avíos*, which entailed less risk, a quicker return, and more profits.[92] Late eighteenth-century Peru was not as poor as it had been a century earlier, and yet Lima merchants, who were among Peru's wealthiest, continued to plead insufficient funds arising in large part, they argued, from losses incurred in the dismantling of the commercial monopoly. Among the merchants themselves, critics charged their colleagues with being provincial and inept in adapting to the changing commercial economy. It is little wonder that they found investment in mining so daunting. Without the broad participation of the colony's principal moneylenders, mining in Peru (in comparison to Mexico) was, according to Fisher, organized and financed as a "subsistence activity."[93]

In Mexico, silver entrepreneurs began to tap merchant capital for both long-term and short-term ventures in the seventeenth century, and they continued borrowing on an even greater scale in the eighteenth century. Although *avíos* remained the conventional financial mechanism, the merchant's role grew as production increased. In contrast to Peru, joint ventures between merchants and miners became commonplace. In the early eighteenth century, Zacatecan mining merchants joined miners as partners in enterprises, some of which were formed to rehabilitate but not to operate the mines, while others were formed to do both. In the second half of the eighteenth century, merchants and miners formed companies in which shares of stocks were issued and profits distributed. Zacatecas's Vetagrande Company was organized in the early 1780s and spent nearly 1.2 million *pesos* over the next twenty years before striking it rich. Brading described its stockholders as a "small group of Mexico City merchant-capitalists and finance houses which had dominated entire sections of the mining industry throughout the eighteenth century." The company had trouble paying its bills in some years, but it continued to invest in acquiring, consolidating, and rehabilitating its properties until the early 1800s, when it yielded dividends for the remaining stockholders of more than 3 million *pesos*.[94] Capital was also raised in many ways: from family members, from religious orders, or from the miners' own resources, but the merchant as *aviador*, *rescatador* (independent refiner), partner, or stockholder remained the primary source for capital or credit. Zacatecas, which suffered the longest slump of all the major districts during the eighteenth century, continued to attract enough capital to carry out some large ventures, although at times it needed more than it could raise. Quebradilla was counted among Zacatecas's richest mines, but it was only productive for about a dozen years between 1700 and 1810. Still, at least three companies were organized to drain and repair the mine during the mid-century slump (before José de la Borda successfully rehabilitated the mine in the 1770s). In all these ventures, which lost

[92] Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 112–14.

[93] British Library, Manuscript Division, Additions 15,981, fols. 22–34; and Fisher, *Silver Mines and Silver Miners*, 98. How much capital these merchants actually controlled remains undetermined. It is probable that, in part because of the long mining depression, Peru's merchants were by comparison poorer than Mexico's.

[94] Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 204–07; and Garner, "Silver Production and Entrepreneurial Structure," 179–80.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

several hundreds of thousands of *pesos*, merchants were the principal underwriters. One could argue that, on the basis of the roster of miners and refiners in mid-eighteenth-century Zacatecas, the number of merchants extending loans and acquiring mines was growing rather than decreasing as the camp's silver registrations continued to plummet. As risky as investing in Zacatecas may have been, it paid off for some, and that was enough to encourage others to try.[95]

Mexico's silver-production curve made risk-taking more tolerable. The rise in output over time made the slumps and depressions, some of considerable magnitude, appear less serious and more manageable. While many mining operations failed to make any profits and probably bankrupted their owners and backers, enough of them succeeded to add to the colony's overall wealth, particularly in the eighteenth century, when merchants poured capital into the opening and rehabilitation of mines, not only in Zacatecas but also in Pachuca, Bolaños, and Catorce. One characteristic that owners and backers shared was a willingness to plow profits back into the operations to make them more efficient and productive. The rising silver curve reinforced the expectation of success.

An important feature in the evolution of the industry was the emergence of more large-scale, efficient, and capital-intensive companies. In seventeenth-century Zacatecas, according to Bakewell, Bartolomé Bravo de Acuña found a way to combine operations of four different mines, and, as a result, he "improved the mines by linking them . . . and in due course he made a fortune from them."[96] A half-century later, Pedro Salazar, an *aviador*, won the support of mineowners who worked the same vein to create a fund by assessing each owner. The money was used to repair and maintain the shaft and adit that served all their underground workings. The plan continued in effect for nearly ten years (1715–1725), even though Salazar himself did not live to see it implemented.[97] This pattern culminated with the late eighteenth-century mining company, which had miners and merchants among its stockholders, which worked clusters of mines along the same veins, and which might even enjoy special concessions.[98] Of course, Mexico still had weaknesses and defects to overcome. Capital was scarce and during the last quarter of the eighteenth century almost completely dried up, as the Crown began to implement an aggressive policy of "voluntary donations" and forced loans.[99] The long-term success of mining was crucial in this regard, for while it consumed capital, it also generated capital. By contrast, Peru, except for the late

[95] The government also had a role in terms of granting credit and exemptions from taxes for the purchase of mercury to help to stimulate investment by cutting operating costs. For a general discussion of the economic role of the eighteenth-century Mexican merchant, see Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 95–128. On the role of the church as a lender, see Linda Greenow, *Credit and Socioeconomic Change in Colonial Mexico: Loans and Mortgages in Guadalajara, 1720–1820* (Boulder, Colo., 1983), 160–62, 203–06. For the applications of royal concessions in Zacatecas, see Garner, "Silver Production and Entrepreneurial Structure," 173–85.

[96] Bakewell, *Silver Mining and Society*, 135.

[97] AGI, *Guadalajara, leg.* 174.

[98] Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 277–78; and Garner, "Silver Production and Entrepreneurial Structure," 179–85.

[99] Richard L. Garner, "Exportaciones de circulante en el siglo XVIII (1750–1810)," *Historia mexicana*, 124 (1982): 577–88.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sixteenth and perhaps the late eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries, was predominately a consumer of capital.

The role of the merchant, who controlled so much of the flow and distribution of capital in Spanish America, differed sharply between the Andean and Mexican mining economies. The recovery of mining in eighteenth-century Peru as a result of new strikes and lower costs did not alleviate merchants' skepticism or fears to the extent that they changed their investment practices. In Mexico, on the other hand, the role of the merchant grew significantly in the eighteenth century. In 1761, Francisco Xavier Gamboa, an attorney for the Mexico City merchants' guild, published his famous *Comentarios de las ordenanzas de minas*. He painted, perhaps purposely, a bleak picture of the Mexican mining industry to show why the industry needed capital and how the joining of merchants and miners into a single organization would help to raise that capital and spur production. But the condition of the industry was not as bleak as Gamboa indicated. Production had been rising steadily since the seventeenth century, and the downturn around 1760 was both temporary and selective. Gamboa and his merchant clients were interested in a revised legal code that would directly enhance the position of the merchant in the industry. His approach amounted to an endorsement of the industry's economic potential.[100] But Gamboa's proposal had little chance of succeeding in Mexico, where, despite the long-accepted role of the merchant in mining, fear of the total domination of the industry by the merchant guild remained strong. Given the attitude of Peru's merchants, it is hard to imagine such a plan ever being adopted there.

I HAVE MADE NO ATTEMPT TO TREAT THE FULL RANGE of topics that might be considered within a comparative framework for the mining economies of the two viceroyalties of Peru and Mexico. Rather, I have chosen to describe and analyze long-term production trends and growth rates as a first and necessary step to any full-scale comparative analysis. I have also tried to suggest the ways in which the three crucial factors of mercury, labor, and capital may have influenced the movement or the shape of the various silver curves. The production trends for total colonial output, total Peruvian output, and total Mexican output rose over the 250 years of rule by Spain in the New World. But the growth rates for the two viceroyalties, the principal components of total colonial production, were significantly different, and, while the long decline in the seventeenth century was largely the result of a plummeting trend in Peru, it was tempered by modest growth in the output of Mexico's mines. In the last quarter of the seventeenth century, as Peru's production continued to slide, Mexico became and remained the chief silver producer in the Spanish New World. In the eighteenth century, recovery and

[100] Francisco Xavier Gamboa, *Comentarios de las ordenanzas de minas* (Madrid, 1761), 160–72; and Brading, *Miners and Merchants*, 149–52. After the third-quarter boom was well underway, Gamboa pressed the Mexican viceroy, Antonio Bucareli, to reconsider the merchant-miner guild, which the Crown had not yet approved (and did not ever approve). At this stage (with mining profits rising), the Consulado had even more reason to invest in mining. Sterling Library, Yale University, Latin American Collection, E-6.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

expansion in the camps of Peru and Mexico caused total colonial output to climb slowly but steadily until 1810. New discoveries helped to boost output in the eighteenth century, but more impressive was the application of financial and technical resources to permit rehabilitation of many poorly maintained but still potentially profitable mines in older camps.

Once Potosí's tailings were exhausted, mining costs became generally higher in Peru than in Mexico, and this difference may explain why Peru's mining problems proved to be intractable. The great surge in production of silver at Potosí during the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries may have distorted the view of both the mining industry and the Crown as to what would arrest and reverse the seventeenth-century depression. Just as the surge in mining had enlarged the capital base of the Andean economy (or economies), the contraction shrank it. For more than a century, Peru lacked an engine to drive the economy. By contrast, in Mexico, silver mining, which became more broadly based in geographic terms, grew over time, and in so doing it continually replenished the capital pool that was needed in the mining sector and the general economy. The main engine of the colonial economy slowed down and even went into reverse on occasion but never for extended periods. The eighteenth-century expansion may have resulted from infusions of merchant capital, as some have argued, but it was capital that was originally formed in the mining sector and then recycled through the general economy.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Trade between Western Africa and the Atlantic World in the Pre-Colonial Era

DAVID ELTIS and LAWRENCE C. JENNINGS

In 1728, PÈRE LABAT, A FRENCH MISSIONARY and enthusiastic imperialist, advocated the introduction into Africa of a wide range of manufactured goods. Africans, he believed, would become "hooked on French goods in the same manner as Europeans developed a dependency on tobacco." This dependency would induce them to offer "all their labor, their trade and their industry."[1] Labat was neither the first nor the last European to articulate this view, although his religious credentials make him one of the more interesting advocates. The conviction that fostering wants among domestic wage earners would create both a market-oriented supply of labor and a demand for goods and services was widely held by contemporary observers of European industrialization. This same conviction, it has been argued, was a cornerstone of British policy toward Africa in the mid-nineteenth century.[2] Most modern commentators accept the view that Europeans were at least partially successful in imposing this policy on Africa. If historians concede that Africa was thus pulled into the Atlantic economy, it is not such a large step to the view—also widely held—that Africa made indispensable contributions to the development of the pre-colonial, or pre-1870, international economy.[3]

The authors would like to thank Ralph Austen, Stanley L. Engerman, the late Marion Johnson, Henry A. Gemery, Jan S. Hogendorn, Herbert S. Klein, Joseph C. Miller, and the *AHR*'s anonymous referees for comments on earlier versions of this article. In addition, Marion Johnson, Joseph C. Miller, and Mary Turner kindly supplied unpublished data, and Barrie M. Ratcliffe provided information on exchange rates. Funding was provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

[1] Jean Baptiste Labat, *Nouvelle relation de l'Afrique occidentale*, 4 vols. (Paris, 1728), 3: 267–68, cited in William B. Cohen, *The French Encounter with Africans: White Response to Blacks, 1530–1880* (Bloomington, Ind., 1980), 173.

[2] Stanley L. Engerman, "Coerced and Free Labor: Property Rights and the Development of the Labor Force," forthcoming in translation in *Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations*; R. L. Gavin, "Palmerston's Policy towards East and West Africa, 1830–65" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1958).

[3] One of the more forceful advocates of these positions is Joseph Inikori. See his "Introduction," in J. E. Inikori, ed., *Forced Migration: The Impact of the Export Slave Trade on African Societies* (New York, 1982), 54–56; and "Slavery and the Development of Industrial Capitalism in England," in Barbara L. Solow and Stanley L. Engerman, eds., *British Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery: The Legacy of Eric Williams* (Cambridge, 1987). Clearly, however, there is no consensus. Compare, for example, the interpretations of two recent scholarly syntheses of African economic history, both based in part on the best available quantitative work. For Paul Lovejoy, *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa* (Cambridge, 1983), the external economy first of all pulled Africa into the international slave network and, then,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even those who argue against a strong Atlantic influence on pre-colonial Africa nevertheless point to some of its important macroeconomic repercussions in West Africa. This is true of both the detailed regional studies and the scholarly syntheses that have appeared in the last few years. In a similar fashion, quite apart from the debate on the effects of the slave trade, the subsequent rapid increase in commodity exports during the nineteenth century is seen as having had important consequences for Africa. Specifically, it is argued that the Atlantic demand for raw materials diverted the flow of slaves previously heading to the Americas into the new commodity export sector. Thus the end of the slave trade had little impact on the level of enslavement and the volume of the slave trade within Africa. These recent studies run counter to a theme entrenched in the older historiography, that the economic revolution through which the Atlantic economy was supposed to have pulled a traditional, stagnant Africa into the world economy began in the last years of the nineteenth century.[4] While recent work has shown the idea of an unchanging, pre-colonial African domestic economy to have been a myth, it has also reinforced the idea of a strong Atlantic influence on Africa, often pushing back the onset of such influence into the first part of the nineteenth century or earlier.[5]

How important was western Africa to the Atlantic economy, and how important was the Atlantic economy to western Africa during the two centuries preceding the

with the abolition of the slave trade, induced the transformation of slavery within Africa as a distinct mode of production at the same time that it caused the subordination of Africa to Europe. For Ralph Austen, *African Economic History: Internal Development and External Dependency* (London, 1987), the Atlantic economy increasingly obtruded on pre-colonial Africa, but the "commitment to export production remained rather marginal." The broad region most affected, western Africa, was able "to confront shifting European market demands without any evidence of systemic breakdown"; 98, 102, 268–69.

[4] Alan McPhee, *The Economic Revolution in British West Africa* (London, 1926); R. Szereszewski, *Structural Changes in the Economy of Ghana, 1891–1911* (London, 1965); and the literature discussed in C. W. Newbury, "Trade and Authority in West Africa from 1850 to 1880," in L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, eds., *Colonialism in Africa, 1870–1960*, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1969), 1: 66–69.

[5] Among regional studies, for example, Patrick Manning's work on Dahomey, *Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth in Dahomey, 1640–1960* (Cambridge, 1982), shows West African markets, the Dahomean state, and "the domestic mechanism of accumulation" to be more important forces behind secular economic change than external influences. Yet Manning saw the century of rapid growth in the Dahomean economy between 1840 and 1930 as stemming from agricultural exports, just as slave trade exports in the two preceding centuries "slowed the rate of growth . . . of domestic product" (49, 281–83). The West African regional studies that perhaps give the smallest role to the Atlantic are Werner Peukert's *Der Atlantische Sklavenhandel von Dahomey, 1740–1797* (Wiesbaden, 1978); Philip Curtin's *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade*, 2 vols. (Madison, Wis., 1975); and "The Abolition of the Slave Trade from Senegambia," in David Eltis and James Walvin, eds., *The Abolition of the Atlantic Slave Trade* (Madison, Wis., 1981), 83–97. Unfortunately, none covers the full development of the nineteenth-century economy. For a fuller survey of the regional literature for both West and west-central Africa, see David Eltis, *Economic Growth and the Ending of the Transatlantic Slave Trade* (New York, 1987), chaps. 5, 10. Among works of synthesis, Ralph Austen argued that integration of the African into the world economy was important enough that "Atlantic Africa, with the fullest exposure to European commerce, experienced the most impressive economic growth of any pre-colonial region on the continent" (*African Economic History*, 268–69), although much of this expansion came in the immediate pre-colonial period. Few economic historians of Africa would argue for less influence from the Atlantic in this period than Austen. Most would argue for a great deal more. See, for example, A. G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (New York, 1973), and the literature summarized in Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Three Stages of African Involvement in the World-Economy," in Peter C. W. Gutkind and Immanuel Wallerstein, eds., *The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa* (Beverly Hills, Calif., 2d edn., 1985), 35–63.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

European partition of the continent? In this essay, we wish to throw new light on the first of these questions and arrive at a fuller, though still partial, answer to the second by assessing trends in African Atlantic trade in the pre-colonial era. For Africa, these issues cannot be settled by statistics alone. Slaves constituted a large part of the exchange on the African coast and were obviously more likely than were commodities to be acquired by force or theft. Trade for slaves would thus have had a more socially disruptive impact than trade for the same value of commodities. Nevertheless, new assessments of the quantitative aspect of the economic relationships should help sharpen the focus on the issues.

The approach adopted here is comparative. Trends in world trade, as well as developments within the African domestic economies, are used as reference points whenever feasible. What makes such an approach possible is a new aggregation and interpretation of trade statistics. Trade figures form the only large body of data available for the pre-colonial era, but their wide dispersion in various national archives and their well-known variability in quality have hampered efforts to use them on a consolidated basis. The main sources for this material are in fact British, French, and U.S. customs records. According to a careful estimate of Africa's transoceanic trade made in 1868, goods to and from these three countries contributed 83 percent of total African commodity trade, with the Portuguese making up much of the remainder.[6] For earlier decades, the ratio would be less, but the British, French and North Americans likely always accounted for at least two-thirds of all Atlantic trade with Africa from the eighteenth century on. Given the practice by European customs authorities of treating the African coast as a single unit, the argument here will often ignore vital regional differences within western Africa, as well as shifts in the concentration of trade through time. Moreover, Africa's Atlantic trading partners were clearly defined political units, while the part of Africa affected by the Atlantic trade was politically and socially heterogeneous and varied in size. We have assumed that the African coast in European trade returns (including Senegal, where this is recorded separately) is roughly co-terminous with Patrick Manning's assessment of that part of Africa affected by the Atlantic slave trade. Manning's area covers more than just the Atlantic littoral, taking in, among others, Senegal, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, most of the forest zone of West Africa, Angola, and most of the Zaire basin. The greater part of the savanna areas is excluded. Comparisons between western Africa thus defined and specific countries elsewhere on the Atlantic littoral may appear odd to some. However, we hope that the insights generated by such comparisons and overviews will encourage readers to excuse the combination of disparate African regions.[7]

[6] Archibald Hamilton, "On the Trade with the Coloured Races of Africa," *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, 31 (1868): 48.

[7] Western Africa (using names and boundaries of 1931) comprises Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Guiné, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Gold Coast and British Togo, French Togo, Dahomey, Western Nigeria, Eastern Nigeria, French Cameroon, Gabon, Congo, Oubangui-Chari (portion), Equateur (portion), Angola, Kasai, and Katanga (personal communication from Patrick Manning, January 20, 1988). Clearly, parts of the savanna and other areas excluded here did trade with the Atlantic, although the volume cannot have been significant. The most recent of Manning's

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF AFRICAN TRADE with the Atlantic has led us to tabulate data for four periods, each one covering a decade. The first, and most poorly documented, is the 1680s, when the slave trade still occupied a relatively small part of the Atlantic trade. The second is the 1780s, when the commerce in slaves was at its peak. The third, the 1820s, saw the start of the reemergence of commodity trade, a development that was complete by the end of the 1860s, the last of the decades included in the current survey. The choice of these decades is determined in part by the availability of the data. These were also years relatively free from the distorting effects of war on the Atlantic sea lanes. For each decade, we will estimate the absolute value and volume of overseas trade, together with the purchasing power of exports relative to imports. The composition of that trade is also assessed. Examining the types of merchandise exchanged is essential, for if capital goods or slaves made up a high proportion of trade, it may be possible to argue for an impact greater than that implied by the absolute-value figures alone.

It is necessary first to determine the value and volume of merchandise and slaves entering and leaving Africa via the Atlantic. Unfortunately, in the case of valuations of both merchandise and slaves, those that survive were not carried out in Africa but rather in Europe and the Americas. As the extent of mark-ups to cover transatlantic freight and insurance are very imperfectly known, no attempt is made here to derive values at the point of entry or exit from Africa. All values of imports into Africa presented here are as calculated in the country of origin. Similarly, all exports from Africa are as valued at the point of arrival in the purchasing country.[8] Such a procedure ensures that African exports will be reckoned at values substantially higher than African imports, and, consequently, no inferences may be drawn from this about the African balance of payments.

The available data suggest that in the 1680s the current value of African exports of slaves and commodities to the Atlantic World totaled £6.5 million. African imports are estimated at £1.7 million. In the course of the next ninety years, total exports in current values expanded to around £31.7 million for the 1780s. Imports

demographic studies that employs this concept of western Africa is "The Impact of Slave Exports on the Population of the Western Coast of Africa," in Serge Daget, ed., *Communications au colloque international sur la traite des Noirs* (Paris, 1988).

[8] For the derivation of the estimates presented here, see David Eltis, "Trade between Western Africa and the Atlantic World before 1870: Estimates of Trends in Value, Composition and Direction," *Research in Economic History*, 12 (1988). Trade statistics, of course, are scholarly minefields because of careless recording practices, smuggling, circuitous trade routes, changing product definitions, and official, as opposed to actual or market, valuations. The usual method of valuing a nation's imports is "c.i.f.," or the cost of the merchandise at the point of purchase plus the insurance and freight incurred in shipping it to the port of entry. Exports are typically valued "f.o.b.," or free on board, meaning the value of the goods at the point of export. Here, by contrast, imports are valued f.o.b. in Europe and the Americas, and exports c.i.f. in Europe and America. For valuations of British, French, and U.S. imports and exports, see Ralph Davis, *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade* (Leicester, 1979), 77–86; "Observations préliminaires," in *Tableau décennal du commerce de la France avec ses colonies et les puissances étrangères, 1827 à 1836* (Paris, 1838); *Tableau général du commerce de la France avec ses colonies et les puissances étrangères pendant l'année 1860* (Paris, 1861), x; Douglass C. North, "The United States Balance of Payments, 1790–1860," in National Bureau of Economic Research, *Trends in the American Economy in the Nineteenth Century: Studies in Income and Wealth*, vol. 24 (Princeton, N.J., 1960), 588–94; and R. Elberton Smith, *Customs Valuation in the United States: A Study in Tariff Administration* (Chicago, 1948), 16–19, 51–77.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

increased even more dramatically to £18.5 million for that decade. By the 1820s, total exports had fallen back to £27.7 million and imports to £10.6. Over the next forty years, however, trade surged at rates comparable to those attained in the previous century, with exports at £51.8 and imports £41.3 million for the whole of the 1860s. The central event in these 190 years, as is well known, was the rise and fall of the slave trade. Estimates of trends in both the volume and the value of this trade are possible. Data on the number of slaves leaving Africa indicate that most of the eventual drop in the slave traffic, amounting perhaps to one-third of the value of total trade, came between 1806–1810 and 1811–1815, followed by a strong, but partial, recovery.[9] The events that triggered this fall, the abolition of the British and U.S. slave trades, have been thoroughly explored. Yet, clearly, commerce between Africa and the West involved much more than the slave trade.

To uncover a fuller picture, we must first take into account long-term changes in the prices of goods entering and leaving Africa. Precise measurements of movements in the prices of merchandise and slaves that make up these figures are difficult to develop,[10] but it is generally accepted that for most of the 190 years surveyed here the prices of slaves and African commodities increased, while the prices of goods exchanged for these African exports fell. More precisely, we can say that on the African export side prices of slaves, the major source of revenue in the eighteenth century, peaked in the 1780s after rising steadily in the previous eighty years. Slave prices declined in the nineteenth century, but the upward momentum in the price of African exports was quickly reestablished and maintained down to mid-century by rising values for commodities such as gum, palm oil, and, later, peanuts.[11] On the import side, by contrast, the cost of manufactured goods, particularly textiles, fell dramatically after the late eighteenth century.[12] The commodities of the Americas, also an important component of African imports, generally rose in price in the eighteenth century, but this trend was reversed after 1815. Obviously, economic growth in Europe, the continuing settlement of the Americas, and the exploitation of American resources were responsible for both these trends, but, after the 1780s, the fall in prices of African imports was considerably greater than the rise in prices for African exports.

The implications of this disparity for the volume of trade are clear. The quantities of merchandise (and people) exchanged between Africa and the North

[9] Eltis, *Economic Growth*, 43–46.

[10] Lack of an appropriate price index means that no formal statistical attempt is made here to convert current or market values into real or constant values. Domestic price indexes reflect price trends of imports and exports very imperfectly, especially in the African trade, in which little food, which anchored domestic price surveys, was traded. For example, textiles and metal goods produced in Britain were major components of cargoes sent to Africa, and the prices of these products declined in the last third of the eighteenth century, a trend counter to the general rise in prices as reflected in the available British price series.

[11] For slave prices, see Richard N. Bean, *The British Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade, 1650–1775* (New York, 1975), 139–40; E. Phillip LeVeen, *British Slave Trade Suppression Policies, 1821–1865* (New York, 1977), 114–15; David Eltis, "Prices of Slaves in the African Slave Trade after 1810" (unpublished paper, 1984). For commodity prices, see Curtin, *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa*, 2: 86–112; A. J. H. Latham, "Price Fluctuations in the Early Palm Oil Trade," *Journal of African History*, 19 (1978): 213–18.

[12] Albert H. Imlah, *Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 208–15; Curtin, *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa*, 2: 110; LeVeen, *British Slave Trade Suppression Policies*, 118–19.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Atlantic world after 1780 increased by much more than the current value totals for the 1780s, 1820s, and 1860s suggest. The volume of goods (and slaves) traded in the 1820s was certainly no less than it had been in the 1780s, and the increase thereafter to the 1860s was much greater than the more than twofold expansion shown by the current value totals for each decade. The volume of British exports to Africa increased ten times between 1817–1820 and 1846–1849, and there was a fivefold increase in the volume of British imports.[13] Although the slave trade eventually declined sharply in the nineteenth century, the same cannot be said of the quantity of goods exchanged for each slave. If the British data are any guide, trade volumes between Africa and the Atlantic World may well have quintupled between the 1820s and 1860s rather than more than doubling, as suggested by the current value figures.

Yet even these large increases in volumes did not match accelerating trends in world trade over this two-century period. Between the 1680s and 1780s, the growth rate in the volume of African trade with the Atlantic was probably about the same as that between England (after 1774, Britain), and the Americas.[14] This congruence is hardly surprising in view of the interconnection of the slave and plantation produce trades. But English trade with both Africa and the Americas increased much faster in these years than did English trade with the rest of the world.[15] After the 1780s, however, the Atlantic slave trade peaked in volume, and, once this peak had passed, African trade with the Atlantic fell behind in relative terms. Between 1800 and 1860, world trade increased nearly fivefold, measured in current values, and perhaps tenfold in quantity.[16] Whether we look at current values or volumes, the changes in British African trade between the 1780s and the 1860s look less impressive by comparison to world trends. It would appear that the slave trade had been the vital or dynamic component in the African trade, growing as it did much faster than commodity trade after the 1680s. The traffic in slaves continued to be of major importance in the nineteenth century, but once it stopped expanding in the 1780s, the growth of commodity trade was not enough to sustain Africa's relative position in world trade.[17] In this sense, Africa differed from other less developed regions, most of which participated fully in the nineteenth-century expansion of world trade. Indeed, it is probable that Africa's share of world trade

[13] Calculated from official values in the ledgers in Customs 4 and 8, Public Record Office. The official value series effectively indicates trends in volumes of goods.

[14] We assume here that trade between England and Wales and Africa may be taken as a paradigm for trade between the whole of the Atlantic World and Africa. Between 1701–05 and 1786–90, exports and reexports from England and Wales to the Continental colonies that became the United States of America increased eightfold. This is very similar to the rate of increase in English exports and reexports to Africa in the same years (calculated from Elizabeth B. Schumpeter, *English Overseas Trade Statistics, 1697–1808* [London, 1960], 17. Schumpeter's data are in official values). The years from 1786 to 1790 were perhaps the peak quinquennium for slave departures from Africa during the entire period of the slave trade.

[15] John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, *The Economy of British America, 1607–1789* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1985), 40.

[16] Imlah, *Economic Elements of the Pax Britannica*, 189. John R. Hanson, *Trade in Transition: Exports from the Third World, 1840–1900* (New York, 1980), 14.

[17] Hanson, *Trade in Transition*, 13–31. Hanson, however, includes Africa in his generally favorable assessment of the economic performance of less developed countries.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

continued to shrink into the twentieth century and has never again approached the levels attained when the slave trade was at its height.[18]

Despite this relative weakness in the nineteenth century, a second and more important conclusion is suggested by this broad review of price and volume trends. For most of the 1680–1870 period, Africans were able to buy an increasing amount of imported goods for a given quantity of exports. The terms of trade shifted in favor of Africa, a process that probably continued until the last third of the nineteenth century, when a sharp reversal occurred. It also appears likely that, in this respect, too, the West's relations with Africa differed from its relations with the rest of the world. Once more, these points are illustrated with the use of British data. Table 1 compares the terms of trade between Britain and the rest of the world with those between Britain and Africa. It is unfortunately not possible to link either eighteenth-century series with its nineteenth-century counterpart. In addition, there is nothing on the years before 1700, after 1849, and between 1800 and 1816, although it is highly unlikely that trends in these years would reverse the broad picture shown in Table 1.[19] The table indicates a shift in favor of the rest of the world during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as might be expected when the British were in effect exporting their industrial revolution. But the shift in favor of Africa was much longer in duration and deeper in impact. Indeed, it seems likely that the types of goods traded with Africa ensured that in no other large geographic region was this favorable shift as pronounced and as durable—at least, until the mid-nineteenth century.

While many goods, such as the English woolen "perpetuana" and the Indian cotton "guinée," all but disappeared from the trade by the nineteenth century, some comparisons of overseas merchandise that typical African exports could command is possible. In the 1680s, a slave at Whydah, in the Bight of Benin, might be exchanged for three or four East Indian textiles, two muskets, or one and a half barrels of gunpowder.[20] One hundred and thirty years later, a ship from Bahia at the same location paid two barrels of gunpowder weighing 120 pounds each, as well as one pipe of *agoardente* (126 U.S. gallons of a sugar-based liquor) and

[18] Ralph Austen has raised the intriguing possibility that trans-Saharan gold exports gave Africa an even larger role in the world economy in medieval times than it had in the slave trade era (*African Economic History*, 36–37). The assumptions on medieval trade and gold exports on which this position is based seem improbable, but in the absence of data we cannot reject this possibility out of hand.

[19] Gross barter terms of trade calculations are predicated on an equality existing between imports and exports (in other words, insignificant capital flows and service transactions). It seems clear, first, that capital flows and services could not have been large before the later nineteenth century and, second, that there is no obvious reason why the capital flows and service transactions that did occur should not have roughly offset each other. A probable European deficit in the capital account must be set against an African surplus on service transactions (canoes, translators, pilots). The calculation of Table 1 is based on official values. For the details and a discussion of possible bias in the Gemery, Hogendorn, and Johnson estimates for the eighteenth century, see Eltis, "Trade between Western Africa and the Atlantic World before 1870." It appears likely that of the three periods not covered in the table, only in the 1801–15 period is there a clear indication of reversal of the shift in favor of Africa.

[20] K. G. Davies, *The Royal African Company* (London, 1957), 236; Bean, *British Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade*, 140; W. A. Richards, "The Import of Firearms into West Africa in the Eighteenth Century," *Journal of African History*, 21 (1980): 50 n.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 1

Approximate Gross Barter Terms of Trade, England (later Britain and United Kingdom) with the Rest of the World, and England with Africa

	England/Rest of World	*England/Africa*
Part 1. 1701–1800		
1701–10	100.0	100.0
1711–20	102.5	112.5
1721–30	87.8	50.1
1731–40	95.7	74.4
1741–50	123.5	112.3
1751–60	118.3	69.6
1761–70	105.3	43.0
1771–80	86.8	34.8
1781–90	77.8	36.4
1791–1800	94.8	40.3
Part 2. 1816–1853		
1816–20	100.0	100.0
1821–25	99.0	75.3
1826–30	88.6	97.7
1831–35	106.8	98.8
1836–40	102.7	82.6
1841–45	120.5	75.7
1846–49*	108.4	71.9
1850–53*	130.3	48.8

*Four years only: index calculations adjusted accordingly

SOURCES: Part 1. H. A. Gemery, Jan Hogendorn, and Marion Johnson, "A Tentative Terms of Trade for Africa and England in the Eighteenth Century," *Explorations in Economic History* (forthcoming), Table 7, which is based partly on the series in Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, *British Economic Growth, 1688–1959* (London, 1969), 319–21.

Part 2. Column 1 calculated from Albert H. Imlah, *Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 95–96. Column 2 calculated from Customs 4, Customs 8, and Customs 10 ledger books, PRO; *Parliamentary Papers* (*PP*), 1842, 39, p. 283; *PP*, 1854–55, 52, p. 391.

twenty-five short iron bars in a typical transaction for each of twenty-two slaves.[21] In the 1860s, despite low slave prices in the final years of the Atlantic traffic, the price of a slave reached thirty bafts, forty bandanas, or fifty romals, cotton textiles

[21] These were regarded as typical prices by the Anglo-Portuguese mixed commission settling claims against illegal detentions of Portuguese ships by the British navy (see the entry in the commission's minute book for May 30, 1820, FO 308/2, PRO).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

made in England, not India. Moreover, a piece of English cotton was up to two-thirds longer than its Indian equivalent. Such a price was also equivalent to fifteen muskets, each superior to its 1680s counterpart.[22] Data on ivory for the 1680s are scarce, but, between 1701 and 1704, when prices were certainly higher than twenty years earlier, a hundredweight of mixed small and large tusks might command half a dozen pieces of nicanee, again an Indian textile, or seven muskets. By the 1860s, the same quantity of ivory would buy thirty romals, twenty-five bandanas, or twenty-three muskets.[23] Other goods are less easy to monitor, mainly because the major African exports of the 1860s had entered the Atlantic market well after 1700. But, given the above data, there is no reason to suppose that the increase in the barter value of slaves and ivory was atypical.

SINCE THE TERMS OF TRADE IN THE ATLANTIC ECONOMY moved in Africa's favor in the pre-colonial period, we should be able to plot this advantage in terms of the types of goods exchanged by looking at the long-run trends in the composition of trade between Africa and the Atlantic World.

The exodus of slaves has dominated the historiography of pre-colonial African Atlantic trade, even though its domination of the trade itself was relatively short-lived. Before the 1690s and after 1840, the value of slave exports did not exceed the value of commodity exports. In relative terms, the slave trade probably grew slowly from its inception in the fifteenth century before accelerating rapidly from the mid-seventeenth century on. By the 1680s, it amounted to half or just under half of all offshore trade.[24] The growth thereafter was strong in both relative and absolute terms. It probably accounted for over 90 percent of total trade in its peak decade of the 1780s, when 921,000 slaves departed from the African coast (including southeastern Africa) for the Americas. Abolition of the slave traffic by Great Britain and the United States in 1807 temporarily reduced the volume of the trade by about one-third. Falling slave prices in Africa lowered the value of the traffic even more. However, the expanding slave economies of Brazil and Cuba brought nearly 700,000 slaves to the New World in both the 1820s and the 1830s.

[22] Comparisons here are made on the basis of invoice valuations in England for both slaves and the merchandise exchanged for them. For the 1860s, see Eltis, *Economic Growth*, 263, for slave prices; and C. C. Ifemesia, "British Enterprise on the Niger, 1830–1869" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1959), 425–26, for merchandise. For sorts of goods exchanged for slaves in the nineteenth century, see Alex Marsden to Lord Castlereagh, May 30, 1820, FO 84/8, PRO; M. de Villa Real to George Canning, March 31, 1825, FO 84/41; W. S. Macleay to Lord Aberdeen, July 21, 1829, enc. FO 84/100; H. Macaulay and W. W. Lewis to Lord Palmerston, October 17, 1835, enc. A. I. to Pedro Martinez, August 30, 1835, FO 84/168; Buxton MSS., vol. 31, fol. 419, Rhodes House Library, Oxford; Great Britain, *Parliamentary Papers* (*PP*), 1821, 33, p. 246. For trends in firearms traded, see Gavin White, "Firearms in Africa: An Introduction," *Journal of African History*, 12 (1971): 173–84.

[23] Calculated from Davies, *Royal African Company*, 356–57; Harvey M. Feinberg and Marion Johnson, "The West African Ivory Trade during the Eighteenth Century: The '. . . and Ivory' Complex," *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 15 (1982): 445; Ifemesia, "British Enterprise," 425–26. Comparative prices for ivory are as near as possible f.o.b. on the African coast. This means that invoice values for the manufactured goods in Europe f.o.b. that were traded for ivory are increased by 50 percent, while ivory valued c.i.f. in Europe is halved in price.

[24] Philip D. Curtin, *The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Census* (Madison, Wis., 1969), 95–126; Richard Bean, "A Note on the Relative Importance of Slaves and Gold in West African Exports," *Journal of African History*, 15 (1974): 351–56.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, in the 1820s, the slave traffic still accounted for two-thirds of all African trade with the Atlantic. The elimination of some markets for slaves in the Americas, and the increasing difficulties in importing into those that remained open, reduced the slave trade further in the 1840s.[25] Yet the traffic in African commodities continued to grow. It is probable that at some point between 1840 and 1850 the traffic in African goods surpassed the slave trade in value. Taken as a whole, the 1840s were probably similar to the 1680s in that the slave and commodities trades were roughly balanced, with the commodities trade perhaps worth slightly more. Thereafter, the effective closing of the Brazilian trade in 1850–1851 meant the collapse of slave exports. Despite a strong recovery of the Cuban trade in the years 1857 to 1862, the slave traffic's share of total trade in the 1860s was less than 2 percent.

For a century and a half before 1850, no other commerce could approach the total revenues of the slave traffic. Gold was important in the seventeenth century and continued to be significant regionally for a few decades in the eighteenth century. Exports probably ceased altogether in the late eighteenth century; when they recommenced in the nineteenth, they were of little consequence.[26] Other products long traded on the African coast were probably never significant in relative terms. The quantity of annual British ivory imports from western Africa averaged about 45 percent higher between 1817–1849 than between 1699–1725. As the British were no doubt taking a much larger share of all ivory leaving Africa in the later period, total exports of ivory from Africa probably changed little despite rising prices from the late eighteenth century.[27] More important, the value of English ivory imports from Africa must have been between 2 and 3 percent of sales of slaves from English slave ships in the early eighteenth century,[28] and consistently averaged 3 percent or less of total British imports from western Africa (in official values) in the 1830s and 1840s. Scattered data on the non-British ivory traffic support this picture of relative insignificance.[29] Beeswax was a slightly more

[25] Eltis, *Economic Growth*, 31–61, 164–84, 248–49, adjusted by David Richardson's new findings on the volume of the British trade. See his "The Eighteenth Century British Slave Trade: New Estimates of Its Volume and Distribution," *Research in Economic History*, 12 (1988). For the relative importance of slave and commodity trades, see Eltis, "African Trade with the Atlantic World before 1870."

[26] Philip D. Curtin, "Africa and the Wider Monetary World, 1250–1850," in J. F. Richards, ed., *Precious Metals in the Later Medieval and Early Modern Worlds* (Durham, N.C., 1983), 241–52. In the British case, gold was not subject to Custom House entry, and not until mid-century is it possible to get annual returns from the *Parliamentary Papers*. The African Institution thought that African gold exports jumped in the aftermath of British abolition, but even their undoubtedly high estimate of £120,000 per year remains modest compared to total trade. See *Ninth Report of the Directors of the African Institution* (London, 1815), 138–40. In the 1860s, net exports of specie from Africa, including gold dust, were positive but amounted to less than 5 percent of annual West African imports into the United Kingdom and France.

[27] Feinberg and Johnson, "West African Ivory Trade," 448; Customs 8, PRO.

[28] This assumes a price for ivory of approximately £8 per hundredweight and 1,200 hundredweights traded (Feinberg and Johnson, "West African Ivory Trade," 448). It also assumes a slave price of £23 (Bean, *British Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade*, 210) and 17,000 slaves purchased by the British (Richardson, "Eighteenth Century British Slave Trade," 48). All figures are annual averages.

[29] Ivory exports from Luanda and Benguela were probably less than 3 percent of total exports from those ports in the 1780s and 1820s (Joseph C. Miller, "Imports at Luanda, Angola 1785–1823," in G. Liesegang, H. Pasch, A. Jones, eds., *Figuring African Trade* [Berlin, 1986], 241; and *Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade* [Madison, Wis., 1988], chap. 4).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

important component of Angolan trade than ivory in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and bar wood and teak made up more than 10 percent of British imports in the decade or so following 1807.[30] But, generally, other items of traditional African provenance were even less significant than ivory.

The nineteenth-century reemergence of African goods in the Atlantic trade was based on the new commodities demanded by an industrializing North Atlantic economy. Three major products, Senegal gum, peanuts, and palm oil and palm kernels taken together, so dominated the pre-colonial produce trade that the combined value of all other commodities leaving Africa in the nineteenth-century seaborne long-distance trade was always well below 20 percent of the value of the big three. Exports of the first of these, gum, began a secular increase in the mid-eighteenth century. Annual values were overtaken by palm oil in the 1830s. Thereafter, palm oil, and from the 1840s peanut exports, expanded rapidly. During the 1860s, perhaps three-quarters of all African exports to the Atlantic by value, including slaves, comprised palm oil (including palm kernels) and peanuts. Palm oil alone, the more substantial of the two, had a total value close to that of the slave trade when the slave traffic was at its peak in the 1780s. To the forest hinterlands of the Bights of Benin and Biafra, which produced almost all of the exported oil, the palm oil trade was far more important than the slave trade had ever been. The commodity traffic of west-central Africa lagged far behind that of West Africa, amounting perhaps to only half the value of trade in either the Bight of Benin or Biafra alone in the late 1850s.[31] Trade in the Congo may have rivaled that of the Niger by the 1880s, but there was no hint of this in the early 1860s. In Angola, however, the growth of ivory and beeswax exports was large enough by the 1860s that, as in the Bights, the commodity trade was earning more for the region than the slave trade ever had—even though ivory and beeswax were minor products in the total Atlantic Africa trading picture.[32]

It is thus apparent that Africa's trade with transatlantic regions continued to be highly dependent on the sale of one or two products. Gold in the seventeenth century was replaced toward 1700 by slaves, which in turn dominated exchange for a century and a half. Palm oil and peanuts then established predominance into the 1870s and probably beyond.[33] The rise of commodity production for export did not, however, influence the ending of the slave trade.[34] Suppression of the

[30] *Way of Death*, chap. 4. For British data, see Davies, *Royal African Company*, 360, for beeswax and wood. All values are official, although conversion to current or actual values would not change the direction of these conclusions. For the nineteenth century, Customs 4 is the source, but see Marion Johnson's full presentation of the ivory data in "Ivory and the Nineteenth Century Transformation in West Africa," in Liesegang, Pasch, and Jones, *Figuring African Trade*, 90–139.

[31] The Bight of Benin here ranges from Cape Three Points up to but not including the Rio Nun. The Bight of Biafra is taken as the Rio Nun to Cape Lopez inclusive. West-central Africa is the region south of Cape Lopez.

[32] This paragraph is based on Eltis, *Economic Growth*, 164–84, 223–32.

[33] Given the declining relative position of the Congo and Angola in western African trade down to the 1870s, this conclusion holds for all of western African trading with the Atlantic even though west-central Africa produced no peanuts and relatively small amounts of palm oil.

[34] Studies that focus exclusively on the growth of commodity trade between the United Kingdom and Africa in the forty years or so after the abolition of the British slave trade in 1807 show dramatic growth rates (see Imlah, *Economic Elements in the Pax Britannica*, 129; C. W. Newbury, "Credit in Early

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

slave trade was a political event rooted in complex ideological and economic developments in Europe that affected Africa, in the main, by shutting down the markets for slaves in the Americas.[35]

Europeans came into contact with numerous sophisticated African economies from the fifteenth century on. Internal trade among these economies, especially in West Africa, consisted of a rich diversity of cultivated and manufactured products. Yet these indigenous artifacts and foodstuffs only traveled to Europe or the Americas as curiosity items, with the single exception of the steady, though fairly modest, export of "country cloths" or Yoruba textiles to Bahia, a trade that survived down to the twentieth century in defiance of competition from British cottons.[36] Unlike their Asian counterparts, such products could not usually bear the cost of a long sea journey, although they could more than hold their own against overseas products in Africa. The palm oil produced in Dahomey and adjacent areas, and the peanuts cultivated in local riverine and coastal regions from the Senegal River to Sierra Leone came late in the pre-colonial period.

Pre-colonial African exports were always primary products, many collected rather than cultivated, although most required some processing. Except for the sale of human beings, this characteristic trade in primary products did not set African trade apart from the rest of Atlantic commerce in the pre-industrial era. Regional specialization in one or two products was the norm before 1800. The exotic East Indies trade should not obscure the fact that primary products such as wool, sugar, alcoholic beverages, and grain formed the basis of early modern world trade—including that of Europe. We should also note that, though the scale and the lateness of the African transatlantic slave trade were unprecedented, Atlantic Africa was not the first region to rely heavily on slaves for export earnings. In the centuries following the collapse of the Roman empire, Europe also relied on slaves to pay for a large share of imports—in this case, from the Mediterranean.[37] The new development in the post-1680s period covered here was an increase in the diversity and degree of processing of European exports. Africa did not emulate this but neither did most other non-European areas of the world—especially those with high land-labor ratios.

AFRICAN EXPORTS WERE DEPENDENT ON IMPORTS, and the composition of the merchandise flowing into Africa from the Atlantic has been the subject of

Nineteenth Century West African Trade," *Journal of African History*, 13 [1972]: 82–84). But, given the collapse of the British slave trade in 1807, these rates were from an almost negligible base, as Newbury pointed out. If the trends are carried into the third quarter of the century and compared to the contemporary growth of global trade, or the earlier slave trade, the growth in African produce traffic looks much less impressive.

[35] See Eltis, *Economic Growth*, 17–28, for full references on this point.

[36] Marion Johnson, "Technology, Competition, and African Crafts," in Clive Dewey and A. G. Hopkins, eds., *The Imperial Impact: Studies in the Economic History of Africa and India* (London, 1978), 259–69. For detailed descriptions of imports to Bahia from Africa in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, see the semi-annual reports of the British consul in Bahia printed in Class B of the annual slave trade volumes of the *Parliamentary Papers*, 1831 to 1860.

[37] Stefano Fenoaltea, "Europe in the African Mirror: The Slave Trade and the Rise of Feudalism" (unpublished paper, 1988).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 2

Estimated Relative Distribution of Imports into Western Africa, 1680s, 1780s, 1820s, and 1860s

	Textiles	*Alcohol*	*Tobacco*	*Misc. Manu-factures*	*Iron*	*Food*	*Guns and Gun-powder*	*Raw* Materials*	*Unas-signed*
1680s	0.500	0.125	0.025	0.125	0.050	0.050	0.075	0.050	0
1780s	0.564	0.097	0.081	0.105	0.035	0.018	0.086	0.017	0
1820s	0.394	0.116	0.070	0.090	0.018	0.086	0.146	0.026	0
1860s	0.316	0.120	0.117	0.048	0.012	0.085	0.077	0.046	0.173

*Includes cowries

SOURCE: Eltis, "Trade between Western Africa and the Atlantic World before 1870," Tables 8, 14, 16, and text.

considerable research, much of it based on the records of individual European states or trading companies. Table 2 aggregates these data and breaks down the broad categories of imported goods for the four decades. Because of the nature of the sources, the merchandise categories are neither as free of overlap nor as detailed as we would like. Moreover, the ratios in the table are all weighted means, and some of the breakdowns that form the bases of the weights are taken from distributions for only a single year in the decade.[38] Data are weakest for the 1680s, and their distribution is based on a crude adjustment of the well-known Royal African Company figures. Despite these limitations, the table may be taken as indicating broad trends worthy of note.

First, there was not a great deal of change in the range of goods entering Africa from the Atlantic in the two centuries before partition. The proportion of textiles probably dropped in the nineteenth century, although, without more information on the clothing component of the "unassigned" category in the 1860s, it is hard to be definite. If this fall did occur, much of it stemmed from the dramatic decline in the price of English textiles and was not large enough to threaten the overwhelming position of textiles as the leading import category. Second, despite this dominance by textiles, the great diversity of merchandise carried to Africa is striking. With the exception of tobacco, each of the column headings in Table 2 covers a great variety of types within the general category. The "unassigned" category for the 1860s, it may be assumed, comprised mainly miscellaneous manufactured goods. While the precise pattern varied along the coast, all importing regions shared in this diversity.[39]

[38] See Eltis, "Trade between Western Africa and the Atlantic World before 1870," for a survey of the literature and the detailed construction of this table.

[39] Cowries have received attention recently, but even in West Africa these did not constitute a significant share of total imports; they are included in the "unassigned" category in Table 2. In the 1780s, they accounted for about half of 1 percent of African imports from England, although they were of greater importance in earlier decades. A computation from Tables 5.1 and 8.1 in Jan Hogendorn and Marion Johnson, *Shell Money of the Slave Trade* (Cambridge, 1985), suggests that even then,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This last point is widely recognized, but what is less well known is that Africa's Atlantic trade was not unique in this diversity. A comparison of African imports with imports into the British Americas shows that apart from Africa's importation of alcohol and tobacco—for which we might in the Americas substitute slaves—the English-speaking Americas imported a very similar range of goods from the Atlantic in the eighteenth century. Indeed, except for grains in the early part of the century, the distribution of English exports to Africa was not much different from that of English exports in general.[40] In the 1820s, the only major difference between British exports to Brazil and Cuba on the one hand and Africa on the other (again, alcohol and tobacco excepted) was the relatively high armament component in the African trade.[41] European exports (and reexports) to all Atlantic regions until the mid-nineteenth century were dominated by a wide range of consumer-oriented manufactured goods, easily the most important of which was textiles. This was true both before and after the onset of industrialization, whose main impact, aside from lowering production costs, was to concentrate the manufacturing process in Europe, in particular, Britain.

The categories used in Table 2 are, as noted above, very general, and the discussion should not be left at this level. The most important trends took place within the categories. As is well known, East Indian cottons led the textile group before the nineteenth century, with English woolens almost matching the Asian product in value until the late eighteenth century. Both were replaced thereafter by English cottons.[42] The U.S. trade in African commodities, the Brazilian and Cuban slave trade, as well as British and even some French trade all relied on English cottons.[43] In the nineteenth century, a sub-theme of the abolitionist debate concerned the extent to which British manufacturers were producing cheaper cottons suited only for the African slave markets. While African preferences for particular patterns of imported cloth varied greatly throughout this period, no conclusive evidence emerges that the quality of the textiles taken to Africa was much different from that sold in other large markets. The English woolen "perpetuana," common on the coast before the mid-eighteenth century, was a good quality cloth, although it was given a special dye for the African market.

however, cowries could never have accounted for more than 5 percent of decadal imports into West Africa (for trade of all types) and usually took up no more than 1 or 2 percent. As a proportion of imports into all of Atlantic Africa, they would be of even smaller importance.

[40] Davis, *Industrial Revolution*, 94–95; McCusker and Menard, *Economy of British America*, 283–85; Schumpeter, *English Overseas Trade Statistics*, 12.

[41] For Cuba, textiles accounted for 57.3 percent; hardware, munitions, and iron bars 13.4 percent. For Brazil, the equivalent figures were 67.1 and 5.0; calculated from ledgers in Customs 8, PRO. The textiles were mainly cottons and were of great variety. It might be noted here that both Brazil and Cuba made armaments of their own, or imported them from countries other than England, so that this comment says nothing about total expenditures on armaments in Africa and the Americas.

[42] For the comments of a Manchester mill owner on this development, see J. A. Turner to Matthew Forster, April 28, 1838, Buxton MSS., vol. 31, fols. 401–07, Rhodes House Library, Oxford. The switch from Indian to English cottons is charted in Johnson, "Technology, Competition, and African Crafts," 264.

[43] Almost half the textiles imported into Senegal in 1860 (by value) were the indigo "guinées des indes"; *Tableau général du commerce de la France avec ses colonies et les puissances étrangères pendant l'année 1860* (Paris, 1861), 72. But in its continued preference for Indian textiles, Senegal was exceptional.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While certain Indian textiles, such as the coarser checks (*chilloes*) and calicoes (bafts) were favored, so also were the more expensive nicanees and romals. The evidence is mixed, but on balance the case for lower prices and qualities, as opposed to separate designs, seems unproven. Certainly, fewer of the finer cottons were sent, except as gifts to rulers, but relative to other regions the African market was not a dumping ground for cheap cloth.[44]

Miscellaneous manufactures (including "unassigned") and iron together made up the next largest grouping of imports over the period as a whole. First among these were copper bars, brass and pewterwares, a wide range of finished hardware, knives, beads, mirrors, and caps. This grouping maintained its share of imports over the two centuries, and an impressionistic comparison of the the Royal African Company data for the 1680s and the British Customs ledgers for the nineteenth century suggests that within this category the proportion of semi-processed or intermediate goods, such as copper and brasswares, tended to decline between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. The share of end products, or at least products not likely to be processed further, accordingly increased. The declining share of iron certainly supports this interpretation. By the 1860s, "iron, wrought and unwrought," which included some finished goods, was only 2 percent of British exports and a smaller share again of Atlantic exports to Africa as a whole.

The scale and role of guns and gunpowder imports have been contentious issues, which, given the socially disruptive potential of these products, is to be expected. The current data permit a new assessment of scale. The absolute value and volume of these goods, as with most African imports, grew rapidly from the 1680s to the 1780s, fell back in the 1820s, and thereafter rebounded, despite the fact that the 1820s to 1860s saw the slave trade dwindle to nothing. If we accept the average Royal African invoice price of £0.521, total imports of guns into sub-Saharan Africa were certainly less than 20,000 a year in the 1680s and probably less than 15,000.[45] For the 1780s, total imports were perhaps 190,000 a year, a tenfold increase in a century.[46] In the 1820s, the volume dipped somewhat,

[44] The debate was waged in the British parliamentary select committees on Africa and the slave trade of the 1840s. See in particular *PP*, 1842, 11, 12, *Report of the Select Committee on the British West African Possessions*. See also the letters from Manchester manufacturers in the Buxton MSS., vol. 31, on which Thomas Fowell Buxton built his case in *The African Slave Trade and Its Remedy* (London, 1840). Compare J. E. Inikori's discussion of the quality of guns traded in the 1757–1807 period, which indicates that only a minority of the trade guns could be classed as low quality; "The Import of Firearms into West Africa 1750–1807: A Quantitative Analysis," *Journal of African History*, 18 (1977): 355–61.

[45] Davies, *Royal African Company*, 173, 356. Total imports into Africa, valued f.o.b. Europe, were £1.45 million for the decade, or £145,000 per year. If guns and gunpowder formed 5 percent each of this total, then, at an invoice price of £0.521 (calculated from Davies, 356), total gun imports would have been 13,916 per year.

[46] Arms accounted for an estimated 14.3 percent of English exports to Africa in the 1780s and 8.5 percent of imports from all countries (Eltis, "African Trade with the Atlantic World before 1870," Table 7). Total African imports in the decade amounted to £17.8 million (f.o.b., Europe and the Americas), and the mean price of firearms was £0.53 (weighted average calculated from Inikori, "Import of Firearms," 356–57). According to David Richardson's sample of cargoes, about twice the value of guns relative to gunpowder was sent to the coast (calculated from Richardson, "West African Consumption Patterns and Their Influence on the Eighteenth Century English Slave Trade," in Henry A. Gemery and Jan S. Hogendorn, eds., *The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of Atlantic Slave Trade* [New York, 1979], 311–20). Thus about 1.9 million guns may have been sent to the whole of sub-Saharan Africa in the 1780s, or just under 200,000 a year.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to 140,000 a year,[47] and, by the 1860s, it recovered to approximately 200,000 a year,[48] although in terms of volume this recovery was not as strong as in textiles or miscellaneous manufactures. None of these estimates approach the figure of 300,000 and more posited by J. E. Inikori and W. A. Richards, but they are well in excess of what Marion Johnson inferred.[49] Guns as a share of total imports rather than an absolute count form a different pattern. Table 2 shows that, relative to other merchandise coming into Africa from the Atlantic, munitions were of maximum importance in the 1820s. There is a possible link here with the collapsing Oyo empire in West Africa, although it is still not clear if most arms imports were put to military use.

Trends within the remaining import categories may be dealt with more briefly. Foodstuffs were generally supplied for the European population on the coast. Some provisions were carried for slaves on the middle passage, but under normal circumstances the bulk of these was purchased in Africa. The high level of food imports in the 1820s suggests that circumstances were not normal, and much of this increase might be explained by the illegal nature of the trade north of the equator at this time. Slave traders used two strategies that would have necessitated more foodstuffs: they kept larger shore establishments to hold slaves until immediately prior to embarkation, and they sent out slave ships to the coast as fully prepared as possible to receive slaves.[50] Both these tactics would have raised the food component of cargoes headed for Africa.

Alcohol meant raw sugar-based spirits, wine, and, in the early decades, French brandy. The first of these predominated in the 1780s. Most rum, or *gerebita* as it was called in Angola, was produced in the Americas; the wine was European or Madeiran and consistently made up between one-fifth and one-third (by value) of all alcoholic beverages carried in the French and Portuguese traffic from the 1780s to the 1860s. Even the British carried wine (about 5 percent of all British-shipped alcohol in the 1820s).[51] Overall, wine made up perhaps 10 to 15 percent of alcohol

[47] The total value of African imports (f.o.b. Europe and the Americas) is estimated at £10.6 million (above, 939-40), and the ratio of guns and gunpowder at 0.146 (Table 2). The price of guns is taken to be £0.63 per unit and the share of guns in the guns and gunpowder category to be 0.56 (both British ratios calculated from the Customs 8 ledgers). This yields annual imports of guns and gunpowder at 140,000 units and 2.7 million pounds, respectively.

[48] A count of firearms from British trade returns yields 128,000 a year (*PP*, 1866, 68, *Annual Statement of Trade and Navigation of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British Possessions in the Year 1865*, 252, 260, 322, 394–96; 1871, 63, part 2, pp. 228, 236, 300, 370–72). French exports of guns and gunpowder totaled 45 percent of British exports by value in the 1860s. Applying this proportion to the British volume figure for guns, and making a small allowance for other exporters, who accounted for less than a third of African Atlantic trade at this time, suggests imports of about 200,000 a year.

[49] There is a puzzling and still unresolved tension in the English sources on arms exports to Africa in the eighteenth century. The Customs 17 ledgers list minor amounts of firearms; Marion Johnson, "Commodities, Customs, and the Computer," *History in Africa*, 11 (1984): 364; whereas port books and merchants' papers indicate large quantities of guns shipped; Inikori, "Import of Firearms into West Africa," 339–68; Richards, "Import of Firearms into West Africa," 43–59; Richardson, "West African Consumption Patterns." Richardson has suggested that guns were included under "wrought iron" in the Customs 3 records (personal communication). In the above discussion on aggregate trade volumes, the Customs-based data were adjusted upward to allow for possible lacunae in the guns category.

[50] Eltis, *Economic Growth*, 142–44.

[51] Calculated from *PP*, 1866, 68; and 1871, 63, part 2. For Luanda data, see Miller, "Imports at Luanda, Angola," 211. For French data, see Jean Tarrade, *Le Commerce colonial de la France à la fin de*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shipped to western Africa in the 1780s, 1820s, and 1860s, much of it consumed, presumably, by the European population on the coast of Africa.

Within the tobacco category, the salient feature was the rise and decline of the Bahian roll product.[52] This type was long in heavy demand in West Africa, the Bight of Benin area in particular, and until the 1850s, it accounted for at least two-thirds of the tobacco carried to the coast.[53] Moreover, consumption of imported tobacco in the Bight of Benin hinterland must have been much higher than elsewhere in Africa. A switch to leaf tobacco, already apparent in Bahia itself during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, developed rapidly after the end of the Brazilian slave trade, and by the 1860s the U.S. leaf product was dominating the tobacco category of the African trade. Finally, the "unassigned" category includes an increase in semi-processed and raw materials in the nineteenth century. The leading item among these was barrel staves—used to carry the large palm oil exports to Europe—but coal and, curiously, lumber, were also significant by the 1860s.

None of these trends disturbs the overall pattern of two centuries dominated by consumer goods imports. Only a small share of imported merchandise could be classed as capital goods or as inputs for further processing by African industry. Bar iron, blades, pans, small quantities of textiles used as yarn by local weavers, and perhaps arms are the obvious examples. However, the same could be said of imports to all countries—European included—at least before the modern era. Beads, and what some historians have termed worthless baubles, took up a tiny share of total imports. Indeed, we might divide consumer goods into those that satisfy the basic requirements of nutrition, clothing, and shelter, and those that satisfy psychological needs. In the pre-industrial context, the psychological group included sugar, tobacco, and alcohol, along with a host of purely decorative items, some textiles, and most luxury goods.[54] Such goods formed no greater a share of African imports than of the imports to most other parts of the world. It is likely, in fact, that luxurious textiles and other expensive gifts made up a considerably smaller share of Africa's overseas imports than elsewhere. Perhaps historians need to focus on what pre-industrial African trade had in common with that of other large regions, rather than what made it unique—at least as far as imports are concerned.

THE CRUCIAL ISSUE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF EXTERNAL TRADE to the Africans remains. Available data from the pre-modern period allow us first to estimate approximate quantities of major products imported on a per-capita basis and

l'Ancien Régime, 2 vols. (Paris, 1972), 1: 125; *Tableau décennal du commerce de la France . . . 1827 à 1836*, and volumes in the same series for the 1860s.

[52] Catherine Lugar, "The Portuguese Tobacco Trade and Tobacco Growers of Bahia in the Late Colonial Period," in Dauril Alden and Warren Dean, eds., *Essays Concerning the Socioeconomic History of Brazil and Portuguese India* (Gainesville, Fla., 1977), 26–57.

[53] Calculated from Eltis, "Trade between Western Africa and the Atlantic World before 1870."

[54] For the high income elasticities of textiles in West Africa, see Johnson, "Technology, Competition, and African Crafts," 266.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

second to compare levels of per-capita trade in Africa with those of Africa's main trading partners. Both of these measurements require some reference to population estimates. We have chosen to use Patrick Manning's estimates, which are for only those parts of sub-Saharan Africa affected by the slave trade. Manning posited a severe demographic impact from slavery and proposed a range of possible effects. The series used here lies midway between the upper and lower limits of Manning's estimates. Specifically, a population of 20.6 million is projected for 1860, 20.3 for 1820, 22.5 for 1780, and 23 for 1680.[55] A lower assessment of the demographic impact of the slave trade would generate larger populations than these and smaller per-capita trade figures than appear below.

The quantities of four products imported into sub-Saharan Africa over the two centuries preceding partition may be inferred from the customs data. Textiles, guns, alcohol, and tobacco together accounted for well over half of all imports. During each year of the 1860s, the British and French exported on average about 45 million yards of cotton textiles to Africa. A rough allowance for exports by other nations, and a further adjustment for the very small category at this time of textiles other than cottons, suggests that about 57 million yards of imported textiles of all kinds were traded annually in the decade 1861–1870.[56] Using the above population estimate of 20.6 million yields an average of nearly three yards per person; as a two-yard "wrapper" is sufficient to clothe one person, it would seem that overseas imports supplied a substantial proportion, if still a minority, of the region's textile consumption.

This volume of imports in the 1860s was much higher than in earlier times and much lower than it was shortly to become. For the 1820s, a similar procedure yields an estimate of 8 million yards per year and a per-capita consumption of 0.4 yards.[57] For the 1780s, the equivalent figures are 9.5 million yards in total and also 0.4 yards per person.[58] A similar calculation for the 1680s is not possible, but reference to the aggregate trade figures above indicates that only a small proportion of Africans could have been wearing imported cloth. On the other hand, in Dahomey between 1890 and 1914, imported cloth provided no less than fifteen yards per person each year.[59] Imported cloth evidently reached a wider African market in the eighteenth

[55] Calculated from Manning, "Impact of Slave Exports," Table 5. For the whole of West Africa, compare John D. Fage, "Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Context of West African History," *Journal of African History*, 10 (1969): 393–404; and "The Effect of the Export Slave Trade on African Populations," in R. P. Moss and R. J. A. R. Rathbone, eds., *The Population Factor in African Studies* (London, 1975), 15–23.

[56] *PP*, 1866, 68, pp. 252, 260, 322, 394–96; 1871, 63, part 2, pp. 228, 236, 300, 370–72, give the cotton yardage exported from Britain. French values are available from the *Tableau décennal*, and declared values per yard from the British data are used to estimate French quantities. The proportion of all textile exports accounted for by these two nations is calculated from Eltis, "Trade between Western Africa and the Atlantic World before 1870." Five percent is allowed for non-cotton textiles.

[57] The yardage of British cottons is taken from the Customs 8 ledgers, PRO, but this series is also in Newbury, "Credit in Early Nineteenth Century West African Trade," 83. Exports from Britain (as opposed to British-made goods) accounted for about a quarter of all cotton textiles taken to Africa, and an allowance of 20 percent has been made for non-cottons as well as cotton already made up into clothing.

[58] Calculated from Johnson, "Commodities, Customs and the Computer"; and Eltis, "Trade between Western Africa and the Atlantic World before 1870."

[59] Manning, *Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth*, 124.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

century but began to impinge on the domestic textile industry only as the slave trade was replaced by the traffic in commodities in the mid-nineteenth century. This increase in imported textile use was a function of the dramatic declines in the prices of English fabrics in the nineteenth century.

The population estimates permit a further perspective on gun imports. Per-capita gun imports were likely greater in the 1860s than in any of the major slave-exporting decades. Combined values of African imports of guns and gunpowder are estimated here at £0.008 per person for each year in the 1780s, or one gun per 118 persons; £0.009 in the 1820s, or one gun per 145 persons; and £0.016 in the 1860s, or one gun per 103 persons, all values measured f.o.b. in the source countries.[60] One further relative perspective might be considered. Census data for the United States makes possible a transatlantic comparison of guns and gunpowder. In 1820, a lower bound estimate of the value of these items produced in the United States implies a ratio of £0.013, larger than the African ratio for the 1820s, though somewhat below the 1860 figure.[61] By 1860 in the United States, however, Americans were producing £0.037 arms per person, more than double the contemporary African import ratio.[62] As net exports of guns and gunpowder from the United States were very small before the Civil War, and domestic production of armaments in Africa was negligible at this time, we can conclude that more guns and gunpowder were used in the United States, and probably by other societies in the Americas, than in that part of Africa affected by the slave trade. Similar comparisons are not possible for the eighteenth century, but in the 1780s, the African ratio of £0.008 worth of guns and gunpowder per person was lower than any of the above nineteenth-century ratios. Those claiming a major impact from arms will have to build their arguments on some basis other than just the volume of imports. The supply of arms obviously facilitated slave raids, and guns were likely to be highly concentrated geographically, so that local effects may well have been considerable. If this was the case, it is also clear that over large geographic areas their impact must have been small.

The other two imported products examined here made less of an impact per capita. Tobacco, in semi-processed form, averaged 12.8 million pounds per year in the 1860s, or about half a pound per person—not a large amount by modern standards. It was, nevertheless, more than double the per-capita consumption of

[60] Arms imports calculated from Eltis, "Trade between Western Africa and the Atlantic World before 1870." The value figures are in current prices, but conversion to real values would not affect the conclusion.

[61] Calculated from *Digest of Accounts of Manufacturing Establishments in the United States* (Washington, D.C., 1823). Data are not consolidated, being listed in the census abstract by county. In addition, complete information on total annual production of guns and gunpowder is not always supplied. In most cases, inference on the basis of other statistics that are listed is possible. Population figures taken from *Historical Statistics of the United States*.

[62] Bureau of the Census, *Manufactures of the United States in 1860 Compiled from the Original Returns of the Eighth Census* (Washington, D.C., 1865), 736–37. Valuation of the product under the census survey was probably not greatly different from the customs' valuation. For those who fear that approaching secession might have inflated U.S. arms output in 1860, it might be noted that per-capita output in 1850 was £0.023, calculated from *Abstract of the Statistics of Manufactures According to the Returns of the Seventh Census* (Washington, D.C., 1858), 58, 96, about where we might expect it to be, assuming a linear trend from 1820.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the 1820s or the 1780s, although exact comparisons are complicated by the switch from roll to leaf tobacco.[63] Alcoholic beverages averaged 0.75 million gallons in the 1780s, 1 million in the 1820s, and 6.1 million in the 1860s, again on a per-year basis. The annual per-capita consumption is calculated at 0.033, 0.05, and 0.3 gallons for the 1780s, 1820s, and 1860s respectively.[64] For the 1680s, consumption of both products by Africans must have been infinitesimally small. Again, perspective is provided by consumption ratios for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Dahomey was importing in this period four or five times the amount of both tobacco and alcohol per person that western Africa had in the 1860s.[65] The scale of pre-colonial imports of these products signals something less than a revolution in consumer behavior—even in the 1860s. Just as clearly, however, rapid growth did occur in the mid-nineteenth century. These figures suggest that merchandise distributed from the Atlantic was of small importance relative to what it was shortly to become. Furthermore, if elite groups took a disproportionate share of these goods, many, perhaps most, living within reach of the Atlantic would have had little experience of imports.

A second approach to the assessment of the significance of overseas trade to sub-Saharan Africa involves a simple comparison of per-capita trade values. Table 3 presents data for several of Africa's trading partners around the Atlantic basin. Western Africa must have had the lowest ratio of trade to population of any large trading area bordering on the Atlantic. Indeed, in view of the earlier comments on population estimates, the African ratio must be regarded as an upper bound figure, with the actual ratio more likely smaller than that shown here.[66] Moreover, despite the much larger ratios for Brazil and the United States, Brazil had a large subsistence economy, and for neither country did international trade contribute anything but a minor share to national income compared to domestic economic activities. The slave-based sectors of these economies were, of course, highly export oriented, but in both countries, as in western Africa, the non-export sectors were far more important.[67] Like the population of the Americas, most Africans were

[63] British exports in the 1860s were 2.5 million pounds per annum and accounted for just under one-fifth of all tobacco exports to Africa. In the 1820s, British exports were 0.286 million pounds per year and about 7 percent of total exports (for sources, see above n. 56 and 57).

[64] British exports were 1.25 million gallons a year and 20 percent of total exports of spirits in the 1860s, 1.1 million and 12 percent in the 1820s, and 0.28 million and 21 percent in the 1780s. For sources, see n. 57 and personal communication from Marion Johnson, July 4, 1987. The rapid growth of per-capita textile imports relative to imports of other goods in the mid-nineteenth century echoed productivity improvements in the British textile industry. Between 1780 and 1860, total factor productivity in the cotton industry grew four times faster than productivity in the economy as a whole and nearly 50 percent faster than average productivity in six leading industrializing sectors (Donald N. McCloskey, "The Industrial Revolution, 1780–1860: A Survey," in Roderick Floud and Donald N. McCloskey, eds., *The Economic History of Britain since 1700* [Cambridge, 1981], 114).

[65] In Dahomey in the early twentieth century, tobacco imports averaged one kilo per year per person, well before the mushrooming of cigarette sales. Imported alcohol ranged from four to seven liters for each person per annum (Manning, *Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth*, 122, 127).

[66] For a discussion of this issue, see Eltis, *Economic Growth*, chap. 5. Hanson, using the population of all sub-Saharan Africa as a base, has calculated an 1860 per-capita export ratio of only £0.1, compared to £1.2 for the whole of South America (*Trade in Transition*, 21).

[67] For the United States, see Claudia D. Goldin and Frank D. Lewis, "The Role of Exports in American Economic Growth during the Napoleonic Wars, 1793 to 1807," *Explorations in Economic History*, 17 (1980): 6–25; and the discussion in Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman, "U.S.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TABLE 3

Annual Average Per-Capita Trade in Selected Regions of the Atlantic Basin for the 1780s, 1820s, 1860s
(Half the Sum of Exports, Reexports, and Imports in Pounds Sterling at Current Prices Divided by the Population of the Region)

	1784–86	*1824–26*	*1864–66*
1. British West Indies	5.7[A]	7.7[B]	4.9[C]
2. Britain[D]	2.3	4.1	8.7
3. U.S.A.[E]	1.4[F]	2.0	2.4
4. Brazil	———	1.1	1.7
5. Western Africa[G]	0.1	0.1	0.2

[A]Population base is for 1780.
[B]Population base is for 1830.
[C]Population base is for 1871; values are for exports and reexports only.
[D]United Kingdom in 1860s. Population base is for census years.
[E]Imports are multipied by 1.5 to approximate c.i.f. values.
[F]1790.
[G]For definition, see n. 7.

SOURCES:
Row 1. Calculated from Ralph Davis, *The Industrial Revolution and British Overseas Trade* (Leicester, 1979), 91, 94, 98, 111, 119; John J. McCusker, "The Rum Trade and the Balance of Payments of the Thirteen Continental Colonies, 1650–1775" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1970), 692–701, 703; B. W. Higman, *Slave Populations of the British Caribbean, 1807–1834* (Baltimore, Md., 1984), 77; G. W. Roberts, "Movements in Population and the Labour Force," in G. E. Cumper, ed., *The Economy of the West Indies* (Kingston, 1960), 30; Alan H. Adamson, *Sugar without Slaves: The Political Economy of British Guiana, 1838–1904* (New Haven, Conn., 1972), 215; *PP*, 1884, 47, *Report of the Royal Commission . . . into . . . the Public Revenues, Expenditures, Debts, and Liabilities of the Islands of Jamaica, Grenada, St. Vincent, Tobago, and St. Lucia, and the Leeward Islands*, 252, 461, 655.
Row 2. Calculated from Davis, *Industrial Revolution*, 86; B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane, *Abstract of British Historical Statistics* (Cambridge, 1962), 5, 8, 283.
Row 3. Calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States* (Washington, D.C., 1976), 8, 884, 886.
Row 4. Calculated from Stanley J. Stein, *Vassouras: A Brazilian Coffee County, 1850–1900* (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 294; Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, *Anúario Estatístico do Brasil: Ano V 1939/40* (Rio de Janeiro, 1940), 1358.
Row 5. Calculated from above, 939-40; Patrick Manning, "The Impact of Slave Exports on the Population of the Western Coast of Africa, 1700–1850," in Serge Daget, ed., *Communications au colloque international sur la traite des Noirs* (Paris, 1988).

feeding, clothing, and sheltering themselves, as well as enjoying a multifaceted cultural existence, without overseas economic exchange.

The editor of a recent symposium volume on Africa's long-distance trade claims that "the period 1800–1914 was one of deep structural change in economic organization in many parts of Africa" and proceeds to link this change with

Economic Growth, 1783–1860," *Research in Economic History*, 8 (1983): 25–29. For Brazil, see Nathaniel H. Leff, *Underdevelopment and Development in Brazil*, 2 vols. (London, 1982). For similar arguments in the British case, see the essays in Floud and McCloskey, *Economic History of Britain since 1700*.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

growing external trade.[68] The evidence examined here suggests that such a link is misleading for the years before 1870—at least as far as the Atlantic is concerned. Except for some coastal regions, it is hard to believe that any significant domestic industry was threatened by overseas imports until well past mid-century.[69] With the exception of new food crops and possibly firearms—easily the largest of pre-colonial imports of capital goods—no imported technology appears to have exerted a large economic influence. West Africans had iron, sophisticated textiles, a range of indigenous metalwares, and, outside the tsetse zone, draft animals. Despite a prolonged shift in the terms of trade in favor of Africa, European products could not penetrate the African market until the second half of the nineteenth century. The same products had made greater inroads into other parts of the Atlantic World at much earlier dates. George Brooks has commented that Africans were remarkably self-sufficient in 1800 after three centuries of Atlantic trade.[70] The same may be said of 1870.

IN SUMMARY, WITH THE SINGLE EXCEPTION OF SLAVE EXPORTS, African Atlantic trade grew more slowly than, but was not markedly different in composition from, other major branches of world trade. In the nineteenth century, the growth of African commodity trade with the Atlantic basin began from a very low base and lagged behind the growth of world trade thereafter; its volume was not such as to allow the Atlantic a major influence over Africa, at least in the period covered here. If we include slave exports in the assessment, African trade with the Atlantic grew somewhat faster than other branches of Atlantic trade before 1800 and much more slowly afterward, partly because populations in the Americas were growing much more rapidly than western African populations. But more important than differences in vital rates and the demographic implications of the slave trade is the simple fact that overseas goods were less competitive in Africa than in the Americas. Per-capita figures in Table 3, which provide a crude adjustment for demographic differences, afford strong support for this assessment. The value of trade per person in western Africa probably more than doubled over the two centuries covered here but was still a minute fraction of ratios for Africa's overseas trading partners. Thus, despite the rapid growth of Atlantic trade and the steady shift in the terms of trade in Africa's favor, the rough quantitative evidence suggests that European products were only beginning to make an impact on Africa by the 1860s. Those positing a strong impact on Africa from the Atlantic World must show that Atlantic trade somehow had an effect out of proportion to its size. In the case of the slave trade, this would require stressing the means by which slaves were assembled for export rather than the absolute or relative value of the traffic. Any other viewpoint risks implying that, in the face of limited amounts of overseas

[68] Gerhard Liesegang, "Introduction," in Liesegang, Pasch, and Jones, *Figuring African Trade*, 2.

[69] For a discussion of the regional impact of imported cloth, see Johnson, "Technology, Competition, and African Crafts," 262–65.

[70] George E. Brooks, *Yankee Traders, Old Coasters and African Middlemen: A History of American Legitimate Trade with West Africa in the Nineteenth Century* (Boston, 1970), 10–11.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

goods, African social and cultural resilience as well as economic efficiency was considerably less than the quantitative evidence suggests.

By the end of the 1860s, the Atlantic economy was of rising significance to Africans in the sense that a greater share of what they produced entered Atlantic commerce than ever before. At the same time, Africa was of declining relative importance to the Atlantic economy. In quantitative terms, neither Africa nor the Atlantic economy was so dominant in these exchanges that without contact with its partner either would have been seriously affected. The majority of Africans and Europeans (although probably not those living in the Americas south of the Mason-Dixon line) would have been about as well off, and would have been performing the same tasks in the same socioeconomic environment, if there had been no trading contact between them. Domestic product, its consumption and exchange, was what mattered in Africa in the 1860s as well as the 1680s. Earlier writers such as Alan McPhee, who dated the key links between West Africa and the world economy at the end of nineteenth century, were quite mistaken in their depiction of pre-colonial African economies. But they probably had a more accurate picture of African overseas trade trends than did many subsequent scholars. Dependency theorists, Marxists, and liberals alike have exaggerated the significance of African Atlantic trade, particularly for the earlier part of the nineteenth century.

This is not to say that all parts of western Africa felt only small, measurable effects from Atlantic trade before 1870. On the coast itself, "trading enclaves" (to use A. G. Hopkins's phrase), such as the Cabinda Bay society or that controlled by the Efik traders in the Bight of Biafra, were clearly shaped by Atlantic commerce. Among larger regions, Senegambia was an exception to several of the trends described above. Philip Curtin has charted an expansion of Senegambian foreign trade between the 1730s and 1830s that is approximately double the rate of its English and French counterparts and occurred despite a precipitous decline of slave exports.[71] In addition, he suggested that, measured in per-capita terms, Senegambian external trade was less than that of West European countries but not by a large amount, particularly in the early eighteenth century. In both this and its continuous rapid growth in the face of declining slave exports, Senegambian trade was highly atypical. Even here, however, Curtin has been careful to give the domestic Senegambian economy precedence in his study. Other regions, including Asante, Dahomey, and most of the well-populated Yorubaland, cannot be said to have constituted an exception to the general rule about the weak influence of foreign trade on the economy, except perhaps on an intermittent basis of a kind that a more detailed study would uncover. It would certainly be difficult to argue that all of these major regions were subject to large quantitative effects throughout the period. Most of the preceding discussion has been conducted in terms of aggregate figures for western Africa, which of course includes the coastal trading enclaves and Senegambia. Adjustment for the greater responsiveness of

[71] Curtin, *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa*, 1: 334. For Cabinda, see Phyllis Martin, "Family Strategies in Nineteenth Century Cabinda," *Journal of African History*, 28 (1987): 65–86.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Senegambia, or any one of the above major regions would mean that, in quantitative terms, the rest of western Africa could have been very little affected by overseas trade.

If the slave trade had not been abolished, the impact of overseas trade would have been larger in the nineteenth century, since the slave trade was historically the most dynamic element in Africa's trade relations with the Western world. Without abolition in 1807, rising European needs for raw materials from plantations would have prompted an expansion of the traffic that might well have dwarfed the nineteenth-century migration from Europe.[72] Apart from the demographic results, such an expansion could have led to severe economic dislocation and restructuring for Africa. Nineteenth-century Western economic development would have affected Africa in much the same way that it affected the rest of the less developed world. Thanks to the abolition of the traffic, the key to understanding African economic history remains either developments internal to Africa or external factors whose effects are so subtle as to go far beyond what is suggested by the mere values of African Atlantic trade.

[72] Slave prices would have increased substantially, but this would not have prevented massive expansion of the traffic. See Eltis, *Economic Growth*, 45, 64–71, 139–40.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pachacuti: Miracles, Punishments, and Last Judgment: Visionary Past and Prophetic Future in Early Colonial Peru

SABINE MACCORMACK

THE SPANISH INVASION OF PERU, WHICH BEGAN IN 1532, and the resulting collapse of the Inca empire, initiated a long process of still continuing political, religious, and cultural transformation. Equally long lasting has been the process of reflection and questioning by both the conquered peoples of the Andes and the conquering Spaniards concerning the rationale and the import of this transformation. Having mastered their complex natural environment and created a series of advanced civilizations without contact or interference from the outside world, Andeans were for the first time in their long history exposed to ideas and styles of action entirely new and alien. The Spanish newcomers on their side had become aware of the sharp contrast between themselves and the peoples of America during their earlier occupation of the Caribbean and invasion of Mexico. Yet, in the Andes, they found forms of religious expression and political organization for which neither the Caribbean nor Mexico had prepared them. Within a century of the invasion, however, the newcomers in Peru had acquired a knowledge of Andean thought and conduct that enabled them to exercise effective political control. Andeans, for their part, had not only adjusted to the new dominant culture but had also taken initiatives in adapting many of its elements for their own use.[1]

It is all too easy to view the outcome in straightforward and simple terms, and to suppose that elements of Christianity and Hispanic culture and politics came to coexist with an Andean substratum in some kind of syncretism. As I will endeavor to demonstrate, this is not what happened. First, the convergence of Andean and Spanish ideas and strategies of political action was riddled throughout by tensions and conflicts that are still alive today. Second, while Andeans did accommodate

Research contributing to this article was funded by the Center for Latin American Studies of Stanford University, which made available to me a grant from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and by the Pew Memorial Trust. To both, I extend my thanks. I would also like to thank Professor Paul Robinson, who commented on an earlier draft of this article, and the four anonymous scholars who evaluated it for the *AHR*. Their corrections and comments were most helpful in preparing this final version.

[1] For the connection between knowledge and power, or political control, especially over colonial societies, see Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978); for the Spanish impact on the Andes, see P. Duviols, *La Lutte contre les religions autochtones dans le Pérou colonial: "L'Extirpation de l'idolatrie" entre 1532 et 1660* (Lima, 1971); N. Wachtel, *La Vision des vaincus: Les Indiens du Pérou devant la Conquète espagnole 1530–1570* (Paris, 1971); Steve J. Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640* (Madison, Wis., 1982); K. Spalding, *Huarochirí: An Andean Society under Inca and Spanish Rule* (Stanford, Calif., 1984).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

themselves to the invaders by sheer force of necessity, they also persisted in constructing their own logically coherent and complete interpretation of their world and their experience. Andean culture remained intelligible from within itself after the invasion, just as it had been before that event.[2] At the same time, a deeper understanding of the complex process whereby Andeans confronted the realities of alien invasion and government can be achieved by taking into account the mental furniture those aliens brought with them. I here study one aspect of this process. I juxtapose the Andean concept of *pachacuti*, which describes the termination and reversal of an established order whether past, present, or future, with the Christian concept of the Last Judgment, a definitive day of reckoning at the end of time. When thinking of *pachacuti* after the invasion, Andeans took cognizance of the Last Judgment, but they did so on their own terms.

Evidence presented here comes from Andean and Hispanic as well as European sources. Applying to this field a methodology I have developed elsewhere, I consider historical, mythic, and theological texts side by side with visual images so as to arrive at a three-dimensional representation of the complex reality that speaks to us from the Andean past.[3] The period covered extends from 1532 to the early nineteenth century, when the Peruvian viceroyalty gained independence from Spain. But the core of my argument focuses on the years between 1565, when the Spaniards successfully suppressed the first major revolt in the Andes, and 1615, when the Andean noble and historian Phelipe Guaman Poma de Ayala completed his *Corónica*. This work, a history of Peru from the Creation to the author's own time, is one of the most important available sources for the study of Andean thinking during the early colonial period and is central to this inquiry.[4] While the passing of every generation removed the empire of the Incas to an ever more remote past, Andean ways of thought, forms of social and political organization, and strategies of political action remained continuous with that past. This is not to say that they did not change profoundly. Continuity of Andean traditions stood in constant tension with radical discontinuity. The juxtaposition of *pachacuti* with Last Judgment constitutes one aspect of this tension. We will begin with the event that initiated the tension, the death of the Inca ruler Atawallpa in Cajamarca in

[2] On syncretism in the Andes, see M. Marzal, *La Transformación religiosa Peruana* (Lima, 1983); see also his *Estudios sobre religión campesina* (Lima, 1977), esp. 108–30. Anthropologists in particular have disagreed with such an interpretation. See, for instance, J. W. Bastien, *Mountain of the Condor: Metaphor and Ritual in an Andean Ayllu* (Prospect Heights, Ill., 1978); Gary Urton, *At the Crossroads of the Earth and the Sky: An Andean Cosmology* (Austin, Tex., 1981); B. Condori and R. Gow, *Kay Pacha* (Cuzco, 1982); T. Bouysse-Cassagne and P. Cassagne, "Volcan indien, volcan chrêtien: A propos de l'éruption du Huaynaputina en l'an 1600. Pérou méridional," *Journal de la Société des Américanistes*, 70 (1984): 43–68; M. J. Sallnow, *Pilgrims of the Andes: Regional Cults in Cuzco* (Washington, D.C., 1987); T. Platt, "The Andean Soldiers of Christ: Confraternity Organisation, the Mass of the Sun and Regenerative Warfare in Rural Potosí (18th–20th Centuries)," *Journal de la Société des Américanistes*, 73 (1987): 139–91.

[3] S. MacCormack, *Art and Ceremony in Late Antiquity* (Berkeley, Calif., 1981); "Christ and Empire, Time and Ceremonial in Sixth Century Byzantium and Beyond," *Byzantion*, 52 (1982): 287–309; and "From the Sun of the Incas to the Virgin of Copacabana," *Representations*, 8 (1984): 30–60.

[4] See the study of R. Adorno, *Guaman Poma: Writing and Resistance in Colonial Peru* (Austin, Tex., 1986); see also R. Adorno, ed., *From Oral to Written Expression: Native Andean Chronicles of the Early Colonial Period* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1982); and S. Jakfalvi-Leiva, *Traducción, escritura y violencia colonizadora: Un Estudio de la obra del Inca Garcilaso* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1984).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1533. Nearly forty years later, when he was an old man, Pedro Pizarro, brother of the conqueror Francisco Pizarro, wrote down what he remembered of that time.

PEDRO PIZARRO RECALLED THAT, before the Inca Atawallpa was executed, he told some followers and ladies of his court, "even if the Spaniards were to kill him, he would return to them if only his body were not burned, because his Father the Sun would resurrect him." Indeed, Atawallpa allowed himself to be baptized lest his body be burned. In the normal course of events, a deceased Inca, his body carefully embalmed and clothed, continued his existence among the living. In Cuzco, the embalmed bodies (*mallqui*) of dead Incas all had their palaces and were assembled regularly to feast with the members of their lineages in the main square. However, matters did not turn out as Atawallpa had anticipated. As Pedro Pizarro recalled in haunting detail:

> Once the Inca was dead . . . after some people had hanged themselves along with one of his sisters and other Indian ladies, saying that they were going to the other world to serve Atawallpa, two sisters remained alive and went about in deep mourning with drums and singing, telling the deeds of their husband. Then they awaited the time when the marquess left his dwelling and went to where Atawallpa used to be, and asked me to allow them to enter. Once inside, they began to call Atawallpa, looking for him everywhere, very carefully. But seeing that he did not answer them, they uttered a great cry of grief and left. I asked them what they were looking for, and they replied as I have told. I undeceived them and said that the dead did not return until the day of judgment.

Without fully realizing it, Pedro Pizarro had witnessed part of the long-established courtly ritual of an Inca's obsequies, curtailed though it had been by the unusual circumstances. During the first phase of this ritual, the lords and ladies of Cuzco searched and called out for the deceased in all the places he used to frequent when alive. After fifteen days, the most eminent of those present announced that the Inca was now dwelling with his Father the Sun. Later, certain individuals close to the deceased would kill themselves—which is what Pizarro witnessed. The ceremonial order also prescribed a procession of mourning ladies, their faces blackened with llama grease and ash and playing drums.[5] These were the ladies with whom Pizarro talked, and the same ladies had earlier performed an abbreviated version of the search for the dead Inca.

The supposition that the Inca could return was thus supported by the customary ceremonial. But Pizarro superimposed on this ceremonial and the Inca's abiding with his Father the Sun the Christian promise of resurrection at the end of time.

[5] Pedro Pizarro, *Relación del descubrimiento y conquista de los reinos del Perú*, G. Lohmann Villena, ed. (Lima, 1978), chap. 11, pp. 63 and 69–70; on Inca *mallquis* in Cuzco, see Miguel de Estete, "Relación del descubrimiento y conquista del Perú," in *Colección de libros y documentos referentes a la historia del Perú*, 2d ser., 8 (1924): 47, 54 and following; Pizarro, *Relación*, 10: 53. It was only as one generation of deceased Incas was added to the preceding that a specific deceased ruler would begin to recede into the past and become impersonalized. The process was identical for non-Inca lords; see R. T. Zuidema, "La Parenté et le culte des ancêtres dans trois communautés péruviennes," *Signes let langages des Amériques: Recherches amérindiennes au Québec*, 3 (1973): 129–45, 133. On Inca funerary ceremonial, see Juan de Betanzos, *Suma y narración de los Incas* (Madrid, 1987), Book 1, chap. 31, 145; Book 1, chap. 39, 177; Juan de Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui, *Antigüedades deste reyno del Perú*, in M. Jimenez de la Espada, ed., *Tres relaciones de antigüedades Peruanas* (Madrid, 1879), 278.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indeed, since the Inca had been buried in the ground by a Christian cleric, to expect for him a resurrection of the Christian kind was not unreasonable.[6] But this is not what Andeans expected. One of Atawallpa's brothers stole his body from its grave in Cajamarca and bestowed on it the honors a *mallqui* traditionally received, hoping thereby to establish his own title to succeed the deceased as Inca. Although the troubled times foiled this plan, a cluster of events and ideas associated with Atawallpa suggested that his presence in the world would continue, though not necessarily as a *mallqui* and not in any Christian sense. Some of Atawallpa's followers remembered after his death that he had instructed them to await him in his capital city of Quito, where he would appear to them as a serpent. This promise originated in an episode some three years earlier when Atawallpa had been captured by his Cañari enemies but was able to escape from the prison because, so he maintained, his god had turned him into a serpent, *amaru*. Possibly, this was why Atawallpa's palace in Cajamarca, inside which was a serpent carved in stone, was known as the House of the Serpent. Atawallpa was not the first Inca to be associated with *amaru*. The divine double of the eighth Inca, Viracocha, bore the name Inca Amaru, and one of the Inca myths of origin recorded that the first Inca was a "son of the serpent, *amaru*." In Andean cosmology, *amaru* augured the disruption of order by political or natural catastrophe.[7] Atawallpa's capture first by the Cañari and then by the Spanish amounted to such catastrophes. At the same time, his promise to return as *amaru* suggests that catastrophe was not final.

A preoccupation with the death and return of the Inca continues in the Andes and has been formulated in a variety of ways. In the early seventeenth century, Guaman Poma de Ayala struggled to conceptualize the death of the Inca without a successor. Guaman Poma recorded separately both the death of Atawallpa, who was strangled, and the death of the Inca Tupa Amaru, who was beheaded in the main square of Cuzco in 1572, after centrally organized Andean resistance against the invaders had finally broken down. But, at the same time, he conflated these two events, by depicting both Atawallpa and Tupa Amaru as being decapitated (see Figures 1–2). He thus created a stereotyped, generalized representation for the Inca's death. This is the earliest surviving formulation of what was to become an ever-recurring theme in Andean drama and myth. A Quechua play, *The Tragedy of the Death of Inca Atawallpa*, extant in several different versions, was possibly

[6] Pedro de Cieza de León, *Descubrimiento y conquista del Perú*, F. Cantú, ed. (Rome, 1979), hereafter, Cieza, *Descubrimiento*, chap. 54, compare 55; Betanzos, *Suma*, Book 2, chap. 26, 285.

[7] On the fate of Atawallpa's body, see Betanzos, *Suma*, Book 2, chap. 26, 285–86. Atawallpa promises to return as serpent, Cieza, *Descubrimiento*, chap. 54; turns into serpent, Pedro de Cieza de León, *Señorío de los Incas*, C. Aranibar, ed. (Lima, 1967), chap. 72; on Atawallpa's palace, see F. Xerez, *Verdadera relación de la conquista del Perú*, C. Bravo, ed. (Madrid, 1985), 108; on the Inca as "son of serpent," see Phelipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, *Nueva corónica i buen gobierno*, eds. J. V. Murra and R. Adorno, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1987), 82. See also C. Bravo, "Revitalización del mito de origen en la etapa final de la historia incaica," *Proceedings of the 42nd International Congress of Americanists*, 4 (1976): 327–33. On the Inca Viracocha's double, see Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, *Historia Indica*, *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, 135, chap. 25, p. 230. On Andean cosmology, see J. Earls and I. Silverblatt, "La Realidad física y social en la cosmología andina," *Proceedings of the 42nd International Congress of Americanists*, 4 (1976): 299–325, 314 and following; Bouysse-Cassagne and Bouysse, "Volcan indien," 57–59.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURES 1–2. The end of the Inca empire as seen by Guaman Poma:
1. Death of Inca Atawallpa in Cajamarca, 1533. The executioners are soldiers of Pizarro's invading army. *Nueva corónica*, 390.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



2. Death of Inca Tupa Amaru in Cuzco, 1572. Here, the executioners are the civilian administrators of the Spanish viceroyalty of Peru. But this difference to one side, Guaman Poma regarded the two executions as identical. In both cases, the Inca, wearing the imperial headband, holds a cross and dies as a Christian, that is, innocently. *Nueva corónica*, 451.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

performed as early as 1555 in Potosí and is still performed in Andean villages.[8] In many of these plays, the Inca Atawallpa dies by the sword, and the action ends with a promise of his return. Similarly, the myths of Inkarrí—the King Inca—promise that the Inca will return when his severed head will have rejoined his body or grown a new body.[9]

These expectations, which arise specifically from the Spanish invasion of the Andes, were continuous with an overall Andean system of ordering time that predated the invasion. A variety of myths collected by the Spanish in different parts of the Andes during the early colonial period described the Andean past and future in terms of distinct epochs, each of which terminated in an upheaval. Colonial sources often refer to these upheavals as *pachacuti*, and it is likely that the term was also current before the invasion, even though this particular upheaval endowed the concept of *pachacuti* with much greater prominence in Andean awareness. The historian Garcilaso de la Vega, who was the son of an Inca royal lady and a *conquistador*, and thus grew up speaking both Quechua and Spanish, wrote of "*pachamcutin*, which is to say the world turns around. For the most part [Andeans] say it when great things are turned from good to ill, and sometimes they say it when things change from ill to good." The seventeenth-century lexicographer of Quechua, Diego Gonzalez Holguin, listed the term as *pachacuti* and translates it as equivalent to *pacha ticra*, "the end of the world, or great destruction, pestilence, perdition or loss." These Andean epochs were marked by the departure and return of founding deities; the myth of the return of the Inca thus had counterparts in the divine world. The Creator, Viracocha, had departed over the ocean but promised to return. Christian missionaries, in an endeavor to make their message more convincing, identified Tunupa from the Titicaca region, another beneficent deity whose return was expected, with the apostle Thomas, who, so it was suggested, had in former times preached in the Andes.[10]

[8] For the performance in Potosí in 1555, see Arzans de Orsua y Vela, *Historia de la Villa imperial de Potosí*, eds. L. Hanke and G. Mendoza, 3 vols. (Providence, R.I., 1965), Book 4, chap. 2 (2: 98). For an edition of one manuscript and translation into Spanish, see Jesus Lara, *Tragedia del fin de Atawallpa* (Cochabamba, 1951). Rogger Ravines, *Dramas coloniales en el Perú actual* (Lima, 1985), surveyed a number of contemporary performances; see also E. Gonzalez Carré and F. Rivera Pineda, "La Muerte del Inca en Santa Ana de Tusi," *Boletin del Instituto frances de estudios andinos*, 11 (1982): 19–36; M. Burga, *Nacimiento de una utopia: Muerte y resurreccion de los incas* (Lima, 1988), especially Part 1.

[9] See the remarkable study by Jan Szeminski, *La Utopía tupamarista* (Lima, 1984), 139–46; and R. T. Zuidema, "The Lion in the City: Royal Symbols of Transition in Cuzco," *Journal of Latin American Lore*, 9 (1983): 39–100, 68 and following. Different versions of the myth of Inkarrí appear in Juan M. Ossio, ed., *Ideología Mesiánica del mundo andino* (Lima, 1973), 217 and following, 461 and following; A. Ortiz Rescaniere, *De Adaneva a Inkarrí: Una Visión indigena del Perú* (Lima, 1973); F. Pease, "Una Version ecológica del mito de Inkarrí," in R. Hartmann and U. Oberem, eds., *Amerikanistische Studien: Festschrift für Hermann Trimborn*, 2 vols. (St. Augustin, 1979), 2: 136–39; and D. D. Gow, "The Roles of Christ and Inkarrí in Andean Religion," *Journal of Latin American Lore*, 6 (1980): 279–98. In general, A. Flores Galindo, *Europa y el Pais de los Incas: La Utopía andina* (Lima, 1986).

[10] On *pachacuti*, see Garcilaso de la Vega the Inca, *Comentarios reales de los Incas*, *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, 133 (Madrid, 1963), vol. 1, Book 5, chap. 28, p. 188; Diego Gonzalez Holguin, *Vocabulario de la lengua general de todo el Perú llamada lengua Quichua o del Inca* (Lima, 1608), "el fin del mundo, o grande destrucción, pestilencia, ruyna o perdida o daño común"; similarly, the *Vocabulario y phrasis en la lengua general de los Indios del Perú, llamada Quichua*, published by Antonio Ricardo (1586; rpt. edn., Lima, 1951), "ticra" being the noun of "ticrani," "bolver lo de dentro a fuera o bolver el rostro atras," s.v. "ticrani"; on the apostle Thomas in Peru, see Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui, *Antigüedades deste reyno del Perú*, 236.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Accounts of epochs ruled by different deities varied from place to place, although they shared certain features, in particular, the cataclysmic nature of the shift from one epoch to the next. Thus the historian Agustín de Zárate, who was in Peru as inspector of the imperial finances and who published his *History* in 1555, collected a myth from near the great oracle and sanctuary of Pachacamac on the coast of Peru, according to which Pachacamac had displaced the original Creator, Con, converted the people that Con had made into animals, and brought forth a new generation of men. Pachacamac "endured for many generations, until the Christians arrived in Peru, and then he never appeared again." The cycle of myths from Huarochirí, written down in the early seventeenth century, also describes conflicts between deities who ruled during succeeding epochs. Pariya Qaqa, who was identified with water and received sacrifices of *mullu* (sea shells), coca, and *tiqti* (maize), displaced Wallallu, who was identified with fire and received human sacrifices. The narrator of the myth identified this supernatural conflict with political and cultural upheaval, because he thought that Wallallu's people were the Yunga and that they had been expelled to Antisuyo along with their deity.[11]

The most detailed account of Andean epochs was composed in the early seventeenth century by Guaman Poma and was reiterated by the Franciscan historian of Peru, Fr. Buenaventura Salinas y Cordoba, who appears to have had access to Guaman Poma's text.[12] By that time, Andean concepts of time and history had already been modified by Hispanic and Christian concepts, so that Guaman Poma begins with a Christian vision of the Creation. Nonetheless, Guaman Poma saw the past in Andean terms. The last of the Andean historical epochs before the coming of the Spanish was that of the Inca, *Inca pacha runa*. "From their lineage and country the world was renewed," according to the Jesuit missionary José de Acosta.[13] Indeed, in one sense, each Inca brought on a new epoch. Thus, in 1542, the Inca keepers of historical records (*quipucamayos*), whom the royal official Cristóbal Vaca de Castro questioned, described the outset of Atawallpa's reign as a time when "they had to begin a new world afresh." This new beginning was also made explicit in one of Atawallpa's titles, Ticci Capac, "Original Ruler." An Inca's

[11] M. Bataillon, "Zárate ou Lozano? Pages retrouvées sur la religion peruvienne," *Caravelle*, 1 (1963): 11–28, 23; these chapters were omitted from all but the 1555 edition of Zárate and were rediscovered by Bataillon. For a collection of colonial texts on Andean origins, see H. Urbano, *Wiracocha y Ayar: Héroes y funciones en las sociedades andinas* (Cuzco, 1981), 3–31. For the myths of Huarochirí, see ed. and trans. G. Urioste, *Hijos de Pariya Qaqa: La Tradición oral de Waru Chiri* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1983), hereafter, *Waru Chiri*, 1.6, 6.73, 8.95–109. On the Yunga, and the conflict between Pariya Qaqa and Wallallu, see *Waru Chiri*, 1.6; 8.96 and following.

[12] Fr. Buenaventura was a page in the viceregal household from the age of nine in 1601, until 1615. In this capacity, he could have been approached by Guaman Poma to arrange for the transport of his manuscript to Spain. In this way, the numerous parallels between Guaman Poma's and Fr. Buenaventura's accounts of Andean origins, which involve many details not found in other sources, could be explained. See Buenaventura de Salinas y Cordova, *Memoriál de las historias del nuevo mundo Pirú* (1630; rpt. edn., Lima, 1957), *discurso* 1, chap. 1. On the Andean epochs, see J. Imbelloni, "La Tradición Peruana de las quatro edades del mundo en una obra rarisima impresa en Lima en el año 1630," *Anales del Instituto de Etnografia*, 5 (1944): 55–94; and his *Religiosidad indigena americana* (Buenos Aires, 1979), 73–115.

[13] On the *Inca pacha runa*, see Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 79 and following, 367 [369]; José de Acosta, *Historia natural y moral de las Indias*, Edmundo O'Gorman, ed. (1590; Mexico, 1962), Book 1, chap. 25, "de su linaje y de su patria se abia renovado el mundo."

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

accession could thus be understood as a return of the world to its origins. So, apparently, could an Inca's death. Guaman Poma recorded that, when Tupa Amaru was executed, the Indians grieved for him, "Inca Vana Cauri, where have you gone?" The name by which they invoked their dead ruler, Guanacauri, was also a holy place, *huaca*, near Cuzco, which was associated with the first advent of the Incas in that region; moreover, a statue of Manco Capac that the Incas took with them into battle was also known as Guanacauri.[14] To call Tupa Amaru by the name that was borne both by an image of his earliest ancestor and by a primordial holy place makes clear the intimate connection and tension Andeans perceived between the origin and the overthrow of the established order.

A notable new beginning in the history of the Incas occurred in the mid-fifteenth century. At this time, the ruler Inca Yupanqui, renamed as Pachacuti because he saved Cuzco from the Chancas, laid the foundations of the Inca state as an empire.[15] Of this second founder, it was told that he had reentered the rock of Pacaritambo, the "place of emergence" of the Incas, and had come forth from there anew to inaugurate his governance. In this way, he imitated the example set by his mythic ancestor and predecessor, Manco Capac, who had also come forth from Pacaritambo. The name Pachacuti was thus explained to signify "he who turns or turns around or transforms the world," or "the turning about of time or the world." Another author called him "Pachacutec Yupanqui Capac Indichuri . . . turning about of the time, King Yupanqui, Son of the Sun."[16]

The term *pachacuti* thus not only described the duration and content of historical epochs but also interpreted present events as either restatements or reversals of the past. Faithful to this ordering principle, Guaman Poma observed that some kings are called Pachacuti because of the upheavals occurring in their reigns. Similarly, Pachacuti *runa* were the men who fought out the war between Guascar and his brother Atawallpa, which preceded the Spanish invasion. In effect, *pachacuti* in Guaman Poma's text is a synonym for disaster.[17] It was thus with good reason that Andeans used the concept of *pachacuti* when confronted with the

[14] *Relación de la descendencia, gobierno y conquista de los Incas*, J. J. Vega, ed. (Lima, 1974), 20, "de nuevo habian de comenzar"; for Ticci Capac, see *ibid* and p. 49; also Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui, *Antigüedades deste reyno del Perú*, 322; on Tupa Amaru's death, see Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 451 [453]; on the statue of Manco Capac, see Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui, *Antigüedades deste reyno del Perú*, 269. For the "beginning afresh" with each reign, see R. T. Zuidema, *The Ceque System of Cuzco: The Social Organisation of the Capital of the Inca* (Leyden, 1964), to be consulted along with J. H. Rowe, "La Constitución Inca del Cuzco," *Histórica* (Lima), 9 (1985): 35–73. *Huaca*, Quechua for holy place or object, is also spelled *guaca* in colonial sources. In the text of this article, I use *huaca* regardless of the spelling used in the original.

[15] See the study by Maria Rostworowski, *Pachacutec Inca Yupanqui* (Lima, [1953]).

[16] On the Inca Yupanqui at Pacaritambo, see Sarmiento de Gamboa, *Historia Indica*, *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, 135 (Madrid, 1965), chap. 30, p. 236; on the name Pachacuti, see Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios*, 5, 28, "el que vuelve o el que trastorna o trueca el mundo"; Bernabé Cobo, *Historia del Nuevo Mundo*, *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, 92, Book 12, chap. 12 (Madrid, 1964), "vuelta del tiempo o del mundo"; Betanzos, *Suma*, 1.17, 83.

[17] Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 94, 109; see, further, the excellent discussion by R. Adorno, "The Rhetoric of Resistance: The 'Talking' Book of Felipe Guaman Poma," *History of European Ideas*, 6 (1985): 447–64, 456–57; Guaman Poma, 911 [925] with Szeminski, *La Utopía tupamarista*, 124 and following; Guaman Poma, 94, 109, 911 [925]; for a rebel lord in the time of Tupa Inca Yupanqui calling himself Pachacuti, see J. H. Rowe, "Probanza de los Incas nietos de conquistadores," *Histórica* (Lima), 9 (1985): 193–245, 198, 214, 225.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Spanish invasion, for the invasion marked the end of an epoch more radically than any preceding upheaval had done.

EUROPEANS, ON THEIR SIDE, WERE BLIND TO THIS ASPECT of Andean experience. Nonetheless, they in their own right were engaged in speculations about the nature of the last times and the end of history. According to a historiographical principle pioneered in the Western Roman empire by Augustine of Hippo and still widely used in seventeenth-century Europe, the incarnation of Christ had inaugurated the sixth age, which was to come to an end with Antichrist and a period of tribulation. This vision of history was graphically depicted in the German world chronicle of 1493, which circulated widely in the Spain of Charles V. Having brought the sixth age to its conclusion with portraits of the pope and emperor of the day, the illustrators added three further pictures referring to the seventh age. Here we see the fall of Antichrist: he descends to earth along with three devilish creatures, while a swordbearing angel bars any return to heaven. Below, the preaching of Antichrist is juxtaposed with that of the prophets Enoch and Elijah. Next, there is the resurrection of all flesh, represented, however, as the dance of death. Finally, at the Last Judgment, in an iconographic scheme that had earlier been used by some late medieval Flemish painters, whose work was greatly admired in Spain, the good enter heaven, and the wicked are driven into hell, the scene being dominated by Christ enthroned on a rainbow with the earth as his footstool (see Figures 3–4).[18] The message of these images is a moral one, exhorting the beholder to conduct life in such a way as to be found on the last day among the saved rather than the damned. Specific historical references are omitted.

But the last things and Antichrist could also be represented within a concrete context of current events, such as the capture of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453. The Ottoman sultan could thus be regarded as Antichrist, and this theory was capable of being underpinned by referring to the prophet Daniel's account of Gog and Magog.[19] In the eyes of the German reformers, however, Antichrist was the pope. In 1527, when the troops of Charles V sacked Rome, Protestant descriptions of Rome as the whore of Babylon and the pope as the incarnation of

[18] R. Schmidt, "*Aetates mundi*": Die Weltalter als Gliederungsprinzip der Geschichte," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, 67–68 (1955–57): 288–317. Hartmannus Schedel, *Liber Chronicarum* (Nurenberg, 1493), translated as *Register des Buchs der Croniken und Geschichten mit Figuren* (1493); rpt. edn., *Die Schedelsche Weltchronik*, R. Portner, ed. (Dortmund, 1979), fols. 263v–264; the Last Judgment, Fig. 4 of this article. For the rainbow throne, a pictorial rendering of Ezekiel 1.28 and John the Divine, *Apocalypse*, 4.3, see J. Fournée, *Le Jugement dernier: Essai d'exégèse d'une oeûvre d'art: Le Vitrail de la cathedrale de Coutances* (Paris, 1964), 28 and following. For Rogier van der Weyden's "Beaune Last Judgment" and the closely related "Last Judgment" in Gdansk attributed to Hans Memling, see K. B. McFarlane, *Hans Memling* (Oxford, 1971), 16–27. For an example of this Flemish iconography in sixteenth-century Spain, see E. Bermejo, *La Pintura de los primitivos flamencos en España* (Madrid, 1980), 1: 139–41, on Vrancke van der Stockt's "Redemption," Prado inventory 1888–1892, formerly attributed to van der Weyden; inventory 1891 is the "Last Judgment," Fig. 3 of this article. A useful survey and discussion of depictions of the Last Judgment is by C. Harbison, *The Last Judgement in Sixteenth-Century Northern Europe: A Study of the Relation between Art and the Reformation* (New York, 1976).

[19] See, for example, Genebrardus, *Chronographia* . . . (Paris, 1567) *ad annum* 3586 (after the Creation); interestingly, the passage about Gog and Magog was deleted from the 1585 edition.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 3. A late medieval vision of the Christian life. Christ seated on the cosmic rainbow, his feet resting on the earth, with the Virgin Mary and John the Baptist interceding, judges humankind. The good (left) are led to heaven by an angel, the wicked (right) are driven into hell. On the arch are depicted the works of mercy a Christian should perform to merit salvation. Left wing of the "Redemption" triptych by Vrancke van der Stockt, Prado, Madrid.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 4 (cover illustration). Last Judgment and resurrection of the dead from Hartman Schedel's Latin history of the world, printed in 1493. The work enjoyed wide circulation in Spain. Similar engravings were later used as models by painters in colonial Peru. (See Figs. 15–17.) Photo courtesy of Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 5. "From his father the devil Antichrist receives the laws with which he tyrannizes the consciences of vassals and kings." The pope is represented as Antichrist in a Reformation treatise entitled *Image of Antichrist*. Photo courtesy of Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid.

Antichrist seemed to have been validated (Figure 5). It was in response to such theories that in 1533, the year Atawallpa died, Pope Clement VII commissioned Michelangelo to paint the Last Judgment in the Sistine Chapel, which, by way of counteracting Protestant propaganda, omitted specific references to contemporary events.[20]

While, in those times, many people thought of the end of the world in terms of punishments for the wicked, others looked forward to a final age of spiritual men such as had been prophesied by the twelfth-century visionary Joachim of Fiore. Between 1516 and 1527, the Augustinian hermit Silvestro Meuccio published in Venice five of Joachim's works. In his preface to Joachim's commentary on the *Apocalypse* (*Expositio in Apocalipsim*), Silvestro recorded the interest expressed in his

[20] André Chastel, *The Sack of Rome, 1527* (Princeton, N.J., 1983), 199 and following; F. Saxl, "A Spiritual Encyclopedia of the Later Middle Ages," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 5 (1942): 82–142, 131 and following. An apparently anonymous anti-papal treatise of the Reformation translated into Spanish is *Imagen del Antechristo conpuesta primero en Italiano y despues traduzida en Romançe por Alonso de Peñafuerte* (n.p., n.d.), Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, U 11097; it depicts the pope as Antichrist, Fig. 5 of this article. I would like to thank Gladys White for pointing out this publication to me.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

work by Giles of Viterbo, the reforming general of the Augustinian order of hermits.[21] Even earlier, in 1506, Christopher Columbus had already quoted Joachim in his *Book of Prophecies* to document the claim that his discoveries had inaugurated Joachim's age of the holy spirit. Jerusalem was to be rebuilt, that is, recovered from the Ottomans, and this would be done, so Columbus had read in a work attributed to Joachim, by a Spanish sovereign.[22] Here, Columbus saw himself as God's instrument, because his voyages had opened a new route to Zion. He expected the end of the world to come at the end of the seventh millennium after the Creation, which he calculated to be 155 years from his time of writing. By then, all prophecies would have been fulfilled, and the gospel would have been preached everywhere, in particular in the newly found lands. "Our Lord is hastening in this matter," Columbus added to one prophecy about the conversion of the gentiles, suggesting that this last phase of human history had already begun. In the mid-seventeenth century, the Peruvian missionary and extirpator of idolatries Fernando de Avendaño still thought that the preaching of the gospel throughout the world was a sign of the fulfillment of the times, of the approaching second advent of Christ.[23]

Throughout the sixteenth century and beyond, some members of the missionary orders of Mexico and Peru—Franciscans, Dominicans, Augustinians, and Jesuits—saw themselves as God's chosen instrument in the work of evangelization.[24] However marginal such individuals were to the main thrust of their orders' endeavors, the expansion of Christianity overseas supported the Catholic claim of universality and truth, and these same arguments fired the debates of the Counter-Reformation. In the 1630s, in distant Lima, Antonio de la Calancha, the historian of the Augustinian order in Peru, read and pondered Silvestro Meuccio's edition of Joachim's treatise on the Apocalypse, and the ancient text convinced him that his order in particular had been chosen to preach to the Indians. Yet Calancha

[21] M. Reeves, *Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages: A Study in Joachimism* (Oxford, 1969), 262 and following; on the millennial hopes of Giles of Viterbo, General of the Augustinian Order, see John O'Malley, S.J., "Fulfillment of the Christian Golden Age under Pope Julius II: Text of a Discourse of Giles of Viterbo 1507," *Traditio*, 25 (1969): 265–338. On his influence in Spain, see Catherine Swietlicki, *Spanish Christian Cabala: The Works of Luis de Leon, Santa Teresa de Jesús, and San Juan de la Cruz* (Columbia, Mo., 1986), 22 and following, 34.

[22] Christopher Columbus, *Libro de las Profecías*, in *Autografi di Cristoforo Colombo*, C. de Lollis, ed., Part 1, vol. 3. (Rome, 1892), 110, 147; an excellent study of Columbus's thought on these matters is by Pauline Moffitt Watts, "Prophecy and Discovery: On the Spiritual Origins of Christopher Columbus's 'Enterprise of the Indies,'" *AHR*, 90 (February 1985): 73–102. See also A. Milhou, *Colón y su mentalidad mesiánica en el ambiente franciscanista español* (Valladolid, 1983). On Joachimism in the New World, see M. Reeves, *Joachim of Fiore and the Prophetic Future* (New York, 1977), 116–35.

[23] On fulfillment of prophecies, see de Lollis, *Autografi di Cristoforo Colombo*, 106 and following; on gospel, de Lollis, 130, 142; compare Moffitt Watts, "Prophecy and Discovery," 94; de Lollis, 106; Fernando de Avendaño, *Sermones de los Misterios de Nuestra Santa Fé Catolica . . .* (Lima, 1648), sermons 1, 2.

[24] John L. Phelan, *The Millennial Kingdom of the Franciscans in the New World: A Study of the Writings of Geronimo de Mendieta (1525–1604)* (Berkeley, Calif., 1970); M. Reeves, "The Abbot Joachim and the Society of Jesus," *Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, 5 (1961): 163–81; compare Anello Oliva, *Historia del reino y provincias del Perú . . .* (Lima, 1895), 1.5, referring the vision of S. Brigid to the Jesuits in Peru; M. Reeves, "Joachimist Expectations in the Order of Augustinian Hermits," *Récherches de théologie ancienne et medievale*, 25 (1958): 111–41.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

was cautious in his statements: apocalyptic speculation was frowned on by the colonial church—indeed, it was dangerous to speculate on the prophetic future.[25]

But perhaps such ideas were more widely discussed in Peru at this time than is readily apparent. We may consider here Guaman Poma's vacillations in explaining the origin of the Incas. He had his own reasons for ambivalence. While in Guaman Poma's eyes, the rule of the Incas had been exemplary compared to colonial government, the Incas had nonetheless displaced his own ancestors as rulers of Lucanas. Guaman Poma's resulting hostility to the Incas had found expression in his interpretation of the myth that the Inca dynasty had sprung from *amaru*, a serpent. He recorded that the originator of the royal line, Manco Capac, was the offspring of a sorceress and of *amaru*, which he translated as "devil." This translation matched the Christian image of the devil as a serpent but was at variance with the Andean and Inca conception of *amaru*. On further thought, Guaman Poma therefore crossed out this statement. The statement is revealing, however, beyond the general Christian identification of devil with serpent and its supposed Andean equivalent because, according to sixteenth and seventeenth-century speculations, Antichrist was to be a son of the devil and a corrupted woman. Indeed, José de Acosta, whose *Historia* Guaman Poma referred to, wrote a Latin treatise on Antichrist that explains this genealogy.[26] The reign of Antichrist was to inaugurate a new epoch, what Andeans would consider a *pachacuti*. With some hesitation, and only at this one point in the *Corónica*, Guaman Poma viewed the origin—and by implication the fall—of the Incas analogously.

Guaman Poma repeatedly pondered the connection between the missionaries' exhortation to a perfect Christian life and the violent onslaught by representatives of the colonial state on the old Andean order. He was torn between Andean and European ways of understanding these events and endeavored to translate between the two cultures. Sometimes, however, he attempted no explicit translations but simply used the Christian vocabulary of perfection to highlight its absence in his own society. As seen by Guaman Poma, missionary orders and secular clergy all fell far short of the ideal that they themselves advocated and that Calancha had read about in Joachim's commentary on the *Apocalypse*. Guaman Poma therefore invariably described relations between clergy and Indians as relations of oppression. The Indians submit in "obedencia"; they offer alms and more alms but are always punished and afflicted. There is a single clear-cut exception to this refrain. It is the "holy hermit, sinner, and the other hermits of this kingdom." Guaman Poma describes two encounters between Andeans and the

[25] On Catholic propaganda, see Thomas Bozius, *De Signis ecclesiae libri xxiiii* (Rome, 1591); Gregorio Garcia, *Predicación del evangelio en el Nuevo Mundo, viviendo los Apostoles* (Baeza, 1625), 1.3; Luis de León, *In Abdiam prophetam explanatio* (Salamanca, 1582), 660; Swietlicki, *Spanish Christian Cabala*, 112 and following. Antonio de la Calancha, *Corónica moralizada del orden de San Augustín en el Perú* (1639; rpt. edn., Lima, 1983), 1.3, 9–10. On Fr. Francisco de la Cruz, see M. Bataillon, *Estudios sobre Bartolomé de las Casas* (Madrid, 1976), 353–67; on millenarian unrest in Peru during the later sixteenth century, see A. Milhou, "Du pillage au rève édénique: Sur les aspirations millenaristes des 'soldados pobres' du Pérou (1542–1578)," *Caravelle*, 46 (1986): 7–20.

[26] On the *amaru* as devil, see Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 82; on Antichrist, see José de Acosta, *De Temporibus novissimis* (Rome, 1590).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

holy hermit. In the first, an Andean of low status kneels behind the holy hermit saying, "obedience, saint; I respect you, saint" (Figure 6). In the second encounter, it is the hermit who kneels before a high-status Andean who says, "here is the alms, Father," and the hermit replies "for God" (Figure 7). In the later sixteenth century, Pedro de Quiroga, Canon of Cuzco Cathedral, had already proposed that a hermit, an individual without vested interests in church or state, should figure in a truly Christian relationship such as could be the norm in Joachim's age of the holy spirit, even though, so both Quiroga and Guaman Poma implied, this was unlikely to happen in the Peru of their own time. Since Joachim's writings circulated in Peru, one may perhaps find in these holy hermits an echo, however distant, of the spiritual men who had figured prominently in those writings and in the works of Joachim's sixteenth-century successors. In this case, Guaman Poma's drawing of King David playing a ten-stringed psaltery (Figure 8) could be understood as a reminiscence of the schematic drawings of ten-stringed psalteries illustrating the Venice edition of Joachim's *Psaltery of Ten Strings* (Figure 9).[27]

In their teaching addressed to Indians, however, most missionaries during the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, far from hastening the age of the holy spirit, sought to support the colonial order of society.[28] It was not up to the Christian faithful to look for either the incarnation of Antichrist or for a millennial kingdom. It was only on the last day that God's activity throughout human history would be fully revealed, although this activity was frequently made partially manifest in the miracles with which God favored his servants and the punishments he meted out to the wicked. In the footsteps of missionaries, some historians of the New World therefore found in the events they chronicled examples of both miracles and punishments. God had miraculously aided the conquerors, it was held, so as to replace from among the Indians the souls that the Catholic church had lost to the reformers. This providentialist claim appeared to be at loggerheads not only with the economic and political constraints of colonial government but also with the demographic collapse, the "wasting away," as early colonial writers expressed it, of the Indian population that characterized the first decades after the

[27] On the hermit, see Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 480 [484], 631 [645]. On King David, see Guaman Poma, 28 (unnumbered), with Joachim of Fiore, *Psalterium decem chordarum* (1527; rpt. edn., Frankfurt, 1965). Guaman Poma admired the Jesuits (see 635 [649] and following; note the drawing on 637 [651] in which the Jesuit is followed by a Franciscan and, significantly, the holy hermit holding his skull and cross). Both Franciscans and Jesuits considered Joachim's prophecies to be applicable to themselves; A. Prosperi, "America e Apocalisse," *Critica Storica*, 13 (1976): 1–61, with M. Reeves, "The Abbot Joachim and the Society of Jesus," *Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, 5 (1961): 163–81. Perhaps Guaman Poma had access to Joachite writings from his Jesuit contacts. On the *Psalterium* and its imagery, see M. Reeves and B. Hirsch-Reich, *The Figurae of Joachim of Fiore* (Oxford, 1972), 23 and following, 50–61, 199–211, 217; also compare the bust of God the Father in Guaman Poma, 28 (unnumbered) with Reeves and Hirsch-Reich, Fig. 45, bust of God the Father above ten-stringed psaltery: the gesture of God's right hand and the cross-bearing globe in his left hand are almost identical in the two drawings. The *Coloquios*, which seem to have been written in about 1562 (see 81, "treinta anos que ya gocais de libertad"), are conversations between three Andeans and two Spaniards, one of whom is a soldier and the other a hermit. Antonio de Quiroga, *Coloquios de la Verdad* (Seville, 1922). On Pedro de Quiroga himself, see "Libro de la visita general del Virrey Don Francisco de Toledo," *Revista histórica* (Lima), 7 (1921): 123.

[28] S. MacCormack, "'The Heart Has Its Reasons': Predicaments of Missionary Christianity in Early Colonial Peru," *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 67 (1985): 443–66.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURES 6–7. "Good government" and Christian social relations as they ought to be, according to Guaman Poma: an Andean of low status kneels behind a Spanish hermit, but, when this hermit meets an Andean lord, it is he who kneels to receive a gift of alms. *Nueva corónica*, 480, 631.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 7.

conquest. However, at the time, these events were usually analyzed in a cursory fashion, which easily gave way to the theological hypothesis that the Indians were being punished for past sins, just as the people of Sodom and Gomorrah, among others, had been punished in the Old Testament. In early colonial Peru, the idea of divine punishment was used by missionaries not only to urge conversion to

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 8. Guaman Poma's "fourth age of the world" as recorded in the Bible: King David plays a ten-stringed psaltery before God the Father in heaven. *Nueva corónica*, 28 (unnumbered).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 9. Psaltery of ten strings in Joachim of Fiore's *Psalterium decem cordarum* (Venice, 1527), representing the Trinity (God the Father at the top of the instrument, Son left lower corner, Spirit right lower corner). The strings stand for the hierarchy of created beings and for the virtues to be cultivated by holy men. A design of this kind may have inspired the psaltery played by Guaman Poma's King David.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Christianity but also to enforce submission to the new social and political order.[29]

In their different ways, during the early generations after the conquest, both Andeans and Spaniards were looking for an interpretive framework within which to understand the events of their time. Andean myths of ancient cataclysms invited comparison with European equivalents. The soldier-historian Cieza de León, who traveled extensively in the lands of the Incas during the early years after the invasion, outlined myths of the flood from Chucuito, Jauja, and the lowlands. But, unlike subsequent less critical observers, he suggested that these accounts could not refer to the universal flood of Noah but rather reflected distant memories of "some flood particular to this land, like that of Thessaly."[30] In this way, Cieza, like late antique Christian chronographers, made allowance for accounts of the past that differed from scripture but at the same time left the absolute truth of scripture unquestioned. Andeans in their turn applied their own categories to biblical history. While European historians and scholars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries investigated the precise year of Noah's flood, Andeans could classify this event without reference to the year of its occurrence either as a *pachacuti* pure and simple or else as the end of the first and beginning of the second age of human history.[31] Andeans understood Noah's flood as a marker in time, not a date.

Yet Andean and Christian theories of time and history did not simply run side by side without mutual interpenetration. Stories about Andean prophecies of the end of the Inca empire occur in most colonial histories of Peru. Cieza, with his characteristic sobriety, observed that such prophecies "could be fable," or possibly, he thought, they had been inspired by demons.[32] On a more factual level, however, the idea of a predestined end of the Inca empire corresponded to the Spaniards' conviction of their providential mission. Yet, however much visions of the end articulated purposes germane to the colonial state, they also expressed authentic Andean expectations. Like the mythic creator who, according to Zárate, had turned an earlier generation of men into animals, the destroyers of the Incas were to be newcomers. Garcilaso de la Vega and the Jesuit historian Anello Oliva, whose *History of the Kingdom and Provinces of Peru* received its ecclesiastical approbations

[29] Francisco López de Gómara, *Historia de las Indias*, *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, 22, prologue to the emperor; A. Vazquez de Espinosa, *Compendio y descripción de las Indias Occidentales*, *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, 231, chap. 2. N. D. Cook, *Demographic Collapse: Indian Peru 1520–1620* (Cambridge, 1981); on divine punishment for idolatry, see G. Dumezil, "'El Buen pastor': Sermon de Francisco Dávila a los Indios del Perú (1646)," *Diogenes* (Buenos Aires), 20 (1957): 85–103.

[30] Cieza, *Señorío de los Incas*, chap. 3; for different views, see Sarmiento de Gamboa, *Historia Indica*, chap. 6, p. 207; Oliva, *Historia del reino*, 1.2.1, 23; further, Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 51 with Szeminski, *La Utopía tupamarista*, 104. Compare Guaman Poma, 24, where two Andean animals, a llama and a jaguar, appear in Noah's ark, along with the European animals. For *pachacuti* and Andean epochs, see, further, Zuidema, *Ceque System of Cuzco*, 228 and following.

[31] Sarmiento de Gamboa, *Historia Indica*, chap. 6, p. 207a; Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 24–25, but note, the second Andean age is different; see Guaman Poma, 53–54 with N. Wachtel, "Pensamiento salvaje y aculturación: El Espacio y el tiempo en Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala y el Inca Garcilaso de la Vega," in his *Sociedad e ideología: Ensayos de historia y antropología andinas* (Lima, 1973), 163–228; and J. Szeminski, "Las Generaciones del mundo segun Don Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala," *Histórica* (Lima), 7 (1983): 69–109.

[32] Cieza, *Señorío de los Incas*, chap. 68; compare his *Crónica del Perú* (orig. pub. Seville, 1553), the only one of Cieza's works to be printed in his lifetime, chap. 44; López de Gómara, *Historia de las Indias*, chap. 115, believed that the Incas had prophesied the end of their empire.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in 1631, attributed the prediction of their advent to Viracocha Inca, who, in the traditional accounts of the Inca dynasty, was the father of Inca Pachacuti, originator of a new religious and political order. According to Guaman Poma, on the other hand, the prophesying Inca was Tupa Inca Yupanqui. This Inca, in his capacity of visionary of the past and prophet of the future, adopted the name of the god Viracocha, who had ruled in a past epoch and was to return in a future one.[33] According to Garcilaso, Andeans called the Spaniards "Viracochas" after the Inca who had foretold their coming. This explanation attempts to translate Andean theory into European fact. If instead we follow the argument of Guaman Poma, we see that the Spaniards were to be called Viracochas because they inaugurated a new epoch. What had formerly been prophetic future became present reality thanks to a *pachacuti*; Viracocha the Creator revealed another of his several faces, that of Viracocha the destroyer.[34]

Garcilaso and others relate that the prophecy of the coming invasion was repeated by the Inca Guayna Capac, father of Atawallpa, who advised his followers not to fight the invaders, because they would bring with them a better law. The prophecy, according to Garcilaso's principal Inca informant, was "more effective in overcoming us and depriving us of our empire than the arms your father and his companions brought to this country."[35] Diverse versions of this story were told to many Spaniards in Peru. The Incas themselves, it was repeatedly asserted, had known of a new law and a better religion, and were merely waiting for both.[36] Andean prophecies could thus be seen to have converged with European ones in foretelling the universal triumph of the Catholic church. Much of this was European wishful thinking, expatiating on the assumption that the "New World" was passively waiting for revelation to be mediated by divinely appointed European exponents. This, at any rate, was the message conveyed to Andeans by missionaries. Nonetheless, there was an Andean core to Inca prophecies of the end. These prophecies envisioned the age of the Incas coming to an end in the same way earlier ages had done.

The catastrophic nature of this ending is spelled out in Guaman Poma's repeated description of the colonial order as "mundo al rreves," or world upside down. The catastrophe also speaks in a quite different account of the Inca's prophecy by Juan de Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui, an Andean lord from the region of Canas and

[33] Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios*, 1.5, 28; Oliva, *Historia del reino*, 1.2, 13; Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 262 [264]: "Topa Ynga Yupanqui hablava con las *vacas* y piedras y demonios y savia por suerte de ellos lo pasado y lo venedero de ellos y de todo el mundo y de como avian de venir espanoles a governar y aci por ello el *Ynga* se llamo *Viracocha Ynga*." See R. Randall, "Qoyllur Rit'i, an Inca Fiesta of the Pleiades: Reflections on Time and Space in the Andean World," *Boletín del Instituto frances de estudios andinos*, 11 (1982): 37–81, 61.

[34] Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios*, 1.5, 28; Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 378 [380] with J. Benzoni, *La Historia del Mundo Nuevo*, trans. C. Radicati di Primeglio (Lima, 1967), 64 and following. Cieza, *Señorío de los Incas*, 5, explained that, initially, the future to be inaugurated by the Spanish was projected to be a reversal for the better, thus justifying calling the invaders messengers and sons of Viracocha.

[35] Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios*, 1.9, 15; compare Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 386 [388], which draws a moral lesson; Oliva, *Historia del reino*, 1.2, 12; Calancha, *Corónica moralizada*, 1.16, 7.

[36] Salinas y Cordova, *Memoriál*, 1.6; 1.7, 58, 71, respectively; Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui, *Antigüedades deste reyno del Perú*, 254; compare 256, 260, 261 and following.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Canchis, near Cuzco. According to him, one midnight near Quito, Guayna Capac saw himself surrounded by the souls of all those who would die as a result of the Spanish invasion, and those souls were his enemies. Soon afterward, an unknown messenger from the Creator, wearing a black cloak, brought the Inca a box that he was to open himself. When he did so, a host of phantoms like butterflies or little pieces of paper flew from it—this was the pestilence that preceded the invasion, and soon Guayna Capac himself died of it. These two visionary events epitomize the reversal of established order that is *pachacuti*: the Inca was surrounded by souls of his subjects, but they were his enemies, and the Creator, who was implored in prayer for good, sent evil.[37]

Like Garcilaso, Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui and Guaman Poma wrote in the early seventeenth century; by then, the colonial order had been established definitively, and this reality was reflected in the writings of these three authors. All three consciously and deliberately constructed bridges between European and Andean ideas in matters of chronology, religion, and ethics. Andean was integrated with European time, Andean religion was said to foreshadow Christianity, and Andean ideals of goodness were described in juxtaposition and comparison with Christian ones. Simultaneously, at a much more pervasive but less consciously articulated level, the three writers, especially Guaman Poma and Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui, drew on European ideas and artifacts to articulate Andean realities. Thus the *amaru* of the Incas is capable of sliding into the identity of the Christian devil, and the Inca Guayna Capac opens a Pandora's box of evils represented by butterflies, which were an Andean token of ill omen, and papers, which could only be European.[38] Indeed, Andean realities themselves changed with the presence of Spaniards in the Andes, so that Andean concepts, one of which was *pachacuti*, were expanded to apply to states of affairs formerly unimaginable.

In the 1560s, Andeans in many parts of Peru joined together in an organized movement known as Taqui Onqoy, "Dance of Disease," to reverse this process of change and adjustment that, a generation after the death of the Inca, was clearly discernible in Andean society. An early and persistent Andean reaction to missionary endeavors at spiritual conquest had been to reject Christian ideas wholesale whenever possible. Thus, in 1560, Augustinian friars noticed that, in Guamachuco, Andean religious leaders instructed their people not to obey missionary priests and to avoid going to Mass. The Taqui Onqoy transformed local rejection of things Hispanic and Christian into a coordinated body of theory and practice. The movement appears to have been organized by the Incas exiled in Vilcabamba and was in part religious, in part military. Rejection extended not only

[37] On the "world upside down," see Adorno, "Rhetoric of Resistance," 451; on Guayna Capac's vision, see Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui, *Antigüedades deste reyno del Perú*, 307. For the prayers, see Cristóbal de Molina, *Fábulas y ritos de los Incas*, in F. A. Loayza, ed., *Las Crónicas de los Molinas* (Lima, 1943), 38 and following; see esp. the prayers for the Inca, 41 and following.

[38] On butterflies, see Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 281 [283]; for papers as an adverse augury, compare my article "Atahuallpa y el libro," forthcoming in *Revista de Indias*.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to all Christian rituals but also to Spanish food, clothes, and other matters of daily life. The Taqui Onqoy marked the time when "the world was turning round." In terms reminiscent of Andean myths of creation, Andean leaders asserted that the victory of the *huacas* over the Spaniards and their god would shortly inaugurate a "new world" of "other people" and that the Spanish would be swallowed up in the sea.[39] As reported by the inquisitor Albornoz, the teachers of the Taqui Onqoy explained that "they were the messengers of the *huacas* Titicaca and Tiaguanaco, Chimboraco, Pachacamac, Tambotoco, Caruauilca, Caruaraco, and another sixty or seventy *huacas* . . . The . . . apostates said that they were warring against the god of the Christians and that soon he would be conquered and that his *mita* of command would come to an end."[40]

The Quechua term, *mita*, here describing the unique turning point when the Spanish invaders would be driven from the land, originally referred to certain annual festivals of the Andean calendar. One of these was Onqoymita, celebrated in early June, near the beginning of the Inca year. The festival marked the heliacal rise of the Pleiades. Among the Quechua names of this constellation was Onqoy, or "illness." Illness was expected in the Andes while the Pleiades were not visible, during late April, May, and early June. For, at this time, after a period of rain, and after the harvest had been collected and put into storehouses, the earth was sterile. Storehouses for the crops were known as *colca*, and *colca* was at the same time another name of the Pleiades.[41] In colonial times, the festival of Onqoymita continued being celebrated under the guise of Corpus Christi, the date of which roughly coincided with it.[42]

[39] "Relación de la religion y ritos del Peru, hecha por los primeros religiosos Agustinos que alli pasaron," in *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y colonisación de las posesiones españolas en America y Oceania* III (Madrid, 1865), 5–58, 45 and following; for the date, 55. On "daba la vuelta el mundo," see Molina, *Fábulas y ritos de los Incas*, 79. On a "new world," see L. Millones, *Las Informaciones de Cristóbal de Albornoz*, *Sondeos* 79 (Cuernavaca, 1971), 2/109; on the Spanish to be swallowed by the sea, see Molina, 79–80. Zuidema, *Ceque System of Cuzco*, 234–35, points out that 1565 was exactly 1,000 years after the date posited for the beginning of the Inca empire by Sarmiento. Also see Duviols, *La Lutte*, 112–20. Guaman Poma served the extirpator of the Taqui Onqoy as interpreter; see R. Adorno, "Las Otras fuentes de Guaman Poma," *Histórica* (Lima), 2 (1978): 137–58, 151 and following.

[40] Millones, *Informaciones*, 2/53; see also 8, 62, 88; compare Molina, *Fábulas y ritos de los Incas*, 78 and following; A. Yaranga Valderrama, "Taki Onqo ou la vision des vaincus au XVI^{e} siècle," *Les Mentalités dans la Péninsule Ibérique et en Amérique Latine aux XVI^{e} et XVII^{e} siècles: Histoire et problématique: Actes du XIII^{e} Congrès de la Société des Hispanistes Français de l'Enseignement Supérieur, Tours 1977* (Tours, 1978), 119–79, 154, 160.

[41] Molina, *Fábulas y ritos de los Incas*, 25, "comenzaban a contar el ano mediado Mayo, dia mas o menos"; R. T. Zuidema, "Catachillay: The Role of the Pleiades and of the Southern Cross and α and β Centauri in the Calendar of the Incas," in A. Aveni and G. Urton, eds., *Ethnoastronomy and Archaeoastronomy in the American Tropics* (New York, 1982), 203–31, 211 and 208, respectively; Randall, "Qoyllur Rit'i," 41 and following, 59; for the celestial storehouse, see Urton, *At the Crossroads*, 113 and following.

[42] Jose Arriaga, *Extirpación de la idolatría del Perú*, *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, 209 (Madrid, 1968), chap. 5, p. 213; in a letter of 1564, the Taqui Onqoy is described as *cuyllur oncoy* (disease of stars); see Yaranga Valderrama, "Taki Onqo," 167. This evidence makes explicit the connection between the Taqui Onqoy and the June festival of the Pleiades; for a different explanation, see Yaranga Valderrama, 131, 169 and following. For an important discussion of the issue, see Bruce Mannheim, "The Virgin and the Pleiades: Poetic and Religious Syncretism in Colonial Peru," forthcoming in T. Abercrombie, ed., *Civil Administration, Ecclesiastical Indoctrination and the Transformation of Andean Politics*.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Another Andean name for the Pleiades was Catachillay. The Pleiades shared this name with the constellation of the celestial llama, the lower culmination of which was noted in the Inca calendar in September and October. In September, the Incas celebrated the festival Coya Raymi, also known as Citua, when diseases and other evils were ceremonially expelled from Cuzco. Guaman Poma, first having described the ceremonies of Citua as celebrated in Cuzco, continues: "These [rites] were performed in the entire kingdom along with many other ceremonies, so as to drive out *taqui oncoc* [him who is sick from dance] and *sara oncuy* [disease of the maize], and *pucyo oncuy* [disease of springs]." The Incas thus performed rites relating to illness on two annual occasions, in June and September. In addition, Guaman Poma's account of Andean ritual specialists contains a list of ills to be remedied that is almost identical to his list of ills expelled during Citua, and is also headed by *taqui onqoy*.[43] *Taqui onqoy* was thus a recurring condition. The celebration of cures for *taqui onqoy*, observed twice a year, suggests that the movement of 1565 may be understood as a heightened expression, brought on by the conquest, of a perennial Andean theme. Yet this theme had been modified by invasion, conquest, and colonial government on two levels. First, as the leaders of the Taqui Onqoy saw clearly, the presence of the Spanish newcomers, speakers of a foreign language, bearers of alien ideas and modes of conduct, and above all of alien technology, had no precedent in earlier Andean history. Pre-Hispanic Andean history had seen a great deal of war and conflict, but these had been wars and conflicts among neighbors known to each other for millennia. Second, the behavior and thinking of Andeans was changed and modified irreversibly by the intrusion of Spaniards into their world, irrespective of such countermeasures as the leaders of the Taqui Onqoy might take to reject Spanish ideas and artifacts.

Nonetheless, this movement was attempting to cure the disease of invasion as expressed in the alien government of Spain and the alien religion of Christianity. Andean rituals and beliefs that articulated both the Taqui Onqoy and subsequent responses to Hispanization accordingly confronted and refuted the arguments and propositions of missionaries. For instance, in one Andean ceremony around 1565, a cross was set up along with certain *huacas* (here, holy objects), which, according to participants in the ceremony, "responded" to the cultic actions addressed to them while the cross did not. This was proof that "the *huaca* who speaks to us is our god and creator," while the cross was a mere "stick." This description of the cross is evidently a retort to missionaries who perceived the *huacas* as mute sticks and stones that, like the idols reviled in the Letter of Jeremiah, were incapable of speaking to their worshipers, let alone of granting them favors. For Andeans, by contrast, the *huacas* were givers of prosperity and life, while worship of Christian holy objects was, quite cogently, associated with death and the reversal and destruction of the established order. As some teachers of the Taqui Onqoy explained in about 1564:

[43] On the celestial llama, see Zuidema, "Catachillay," 221 and following, 211; on Citua, see Miguel Cabello Valboa, *Miscelánea Antárctica* (Lima, 1951), 2.19, 351; Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 252 [254]; but note Molina, *Fábulas y ritos de los Incas*, 29 and following, places this festival in August. See Guaman Poma, 252 [254], 280 [282] with 676 [690], on the extirpation of the Taqui Onqoy of 1565.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

While they worshiped the *huacas*, they would prosper in all their affairs, they themselves and their children and their fields. But if they did not worship the *huacas* or perform their ceremonies and sacrifices . . . they would die and would walk with their heads to the ground and the feet above, and others would turn into wild guanacos and vicuñas and into other animals and would throw themselves over cliffs and . . . these same *huacas* would make another new world and other people.[44]

This account, even though given by a Spanish observer, does capture the process of adaptation of Andean vocabulary and concepts to new circumstances and indeed to the end of the known order of things. For, when human beings are changed into wild animals, civilization as a whole ends.

Andean religious terminology thus expanded in its range of meanings; at the same time, new terms were incorporated into the Andean vocabulary. For example, some women teachers of the Taqui Onqoy called themselves by the names of "Santa Maria, Santa Maria Magdalena and by the names of other saints, so as to be revered as saints," while others described themselves as the messengers of the great *huacas* of Peru, just as the Spanish missionaries referred to themselves as messengers of the Christian god.[45]

The teachers of the Taqui Onqoy conceded to missionaries that the Christian god was indeed powerful, seeing that he had conquered the Inca at Cajamarca. But this did not mean that his power encompassed everything. Rather, even in the mid-seventeenth century, over two generations after the Taqui Onqoy had been ferociously suppressed by ecclesiastical and secular authorities, Andeans still argued that the Christian god was indeed the creator of Spain and of the Spaniards but that they themselves and their world had been created by the *huacas*. A map by Guaman Poma displaying Peru above and Castille below, in the Andean hierarchy of *anan* (upper) and *urin* (lower), also stresses the distinctness of the two worlds (Figure 10).[46]

Even in the middle and later seventeenth century, there were still Andean religious leaders, many of them women, who inculcated a systematic rejection of alien products and ideas. Such leaders considered it sinful for Andeans to attend Mass and catechism class, insisting that offenders confess and atone for their

[44] On the cross as a "stick," *palo*, see Millones, *Informaciones*, 2/136; the argument against idols is repeatedly outlined in the first three councils of Lima; Vargas Ugarte, ed., *Concilios Limenses*. Avendaño, *Sermones de los Misterios*, sermon 4, fol. 48, comments on the Letter of Jeremiah (printed after Lamentations in the Greek Old Testament). The quotation is from Millones, 2/109; see also 1/22, if the *huacas* were not believed, "los harian tornar a los yndios en guanacos e vicunas e otros animales." For the interdependence of cult of the *huacas* and wellbeing, see *Waru Chiri*, 140.

[45] Millones, *Informaciones*, 2/46; compare 2/62; on the absorption of Christian into Andean vocabulary, see H. Urbano, "Dios Yava, Dios Churi y Dios Espiritu: Modelos trinitarios y arqueologia mental en los Andes," *Journal of Latin American Lore*, 6 (1980): 111–27; Urton, *At the Crossroads*, 129–50; and T. Gisbert, *Iconografía y mitos indígenas en el arte* (La Paz, 1980); on messengers of the *huacas*, see Millones, 2/53; on messengers of the Christian god in the *requerimiento*, see Duviols, *La Lutte*, 75 and following.

[46] Millones, *Informaciones*, 1/17, "Dios era poderoso para aver fecho a Castilla e a los espanoles . . . pero . . . las guacas avian sydo poderosas para aver fecho esta tierra e a los yndios . . . e quel Marques Pizarro quando . . . subjeto este rreyno avia sydo porque Dios entonces avia vencido las guacas e pero que agora todas avian rresuscitado para dalle batalla e vencelle"; Molina, *Fábulas y ritos de los Incas*, 78; with Avendaño, *Sermones de los Misterios*, sermon 4; with Duviols, *La Lutte*, 280–85. For the map, see Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 42; on Guaman Poma's geographical ideas, see N. Wachtel, in L. Bethell, ed., *Cambridge History of Latin America* (1984), 1: 234 and following.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 10. The system of the world according to Guaman Poma: "The Indies of Peru above Spain, Castille below the Indies." In both Peru and Castille, the central capital city is surrounded by four provincial capitals. This model of organizing space was derived from the Incas, whose empire, Tawantinsuyo, "the four parts" of Peru, had its center in Cuzco. Mountainous Peru illumined by the sun is set above a sunless Castille in the plains in accord with the Andean hierarchy of *anan* (upper) and *urin* (lower). *Nueva corónica*, 42.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

actions.[47] Furthermore, the expectation of another *mita*, which would cause the times to turn about, endured far beyond the suppression of the Taqui Onqoy. Andeans kept stone figures of the Inca among the domestic holy objects that safeguarded and embodied the generative energy of plants, animals, and humans. Sometimes, the Inca appeared in dreams and visions, explaining that he himself had sent the ills from which his people were suffering so as to induce them to "recover their senses," that is, to return to their old religion and to avoid the use of Spanish artifacts and objects of worship. This explanation formed a direct response to missionaries attributing the suffering of Andeans to God's punishment for Andean idolatry. In expectation of the return of the Inca, Andeans continued using quipus to account for the contents of state storehouses in the seventeenth century, and by this time also, some Andean communities had ritualized the anticipated return of the Inca in annual performances of the *Tragedy of the Death of Inca Atawallpa*.[48] Such statements of Andean identity notwithstanding, missionary preaching, reinforced by the coercive action of the state, penetrated everywhere and forced Andeans into debate, compromise, submission, and the reformulation of their values. Andeans, the most articulate being Guaman Poma, thus found inescapable the notion that the *pachacuti* of the conquest had brought on a permanent state of chaos, a "world upside down" that could not generate any return to order.[49]

GUAMAN POMA EXPLAINED THIS WORLD UPSIDE DOWN by juxtaposing the Christian concepts of miracles and divine punishments. These figured regularly in missionary preaching and in the early historiography of Peru, but Guaman Poma had found his own authority for the juxtaposition in Fr. Luis de Granada's *Treatise on the Christian Life*. Guaman Poma accepted the paired concepts of miracle and punishment unconditionally: the idea that the Christian god intervened in history both positively and negatively presented no difficulties for him. Quite the reverse: miracles and punishments listed interchangeably enabled him to articulate his bewilderment at the random injustice of colonial life. In repeating or alluding to the Christian examples of miracle and punishment, Guaman Poma therefore changed the scope and effect of both. For, on the one hand, he regarded as historical and theologically meaningful many episodes from the Bible and from the history of the conquest. But, on the other hand, he explained the moral significance or, rather, the absence of it in these episodes from an exclusively Andean standpoint.

[47] Millones, *Informaciones*, 1/17, 2/25, 2/52 and following; Molina, *Fábulas y ritos de los Incas*, 78; Archivo Arzobispal, Lima, Idolatrias 4.19, 5.15; Arriaga, *Extirpación*, chap. 5, p. 212. Also see Irene Silverblatt, *Moon, Sun and Witches: Gender Ideologies and Class in Inca and Colonial Peru* (Princeton, N.J., 1987), 198 and following.

[48] Polo de Ondegardo, "Relación de los fundamentos acerca del notable daño que resulta de no guardar a los Indios sus fueros," *Libros y documentos referentes a la historia del Perú* III (Lima, 1916), 77; S. MacCormack, "'The Heart Has Its Reasons,'" 458. For stone figures of the Inca, kept among domestic holy objects, see *Tercer catechismo* (Lima, 1585), sermon 18; on visions and dreams of the Inca, see *Monumenta Peruana* (Rome, 1970), 4: 208 and following.

[49] See the prayer cited by Spalding, *Huarochirí*, 262, "You see that the times are all in reverse, and you take no heed of us, and we give you all this . . . because we are persecuted and in another time."

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Accordingly, Guaman Poma accepted as historical the intervention of the Virgin Mary on behalf of the Spaniards during the siege of Cuzco in 1534.

> Saint Mary of Peña de Francia, a very beautiful lady . . . and when they saw her, the Indians were afraid and they say that she threw earth into their eyes, who were infidel Indians. For thus God performed a miracle to do . . . a favor for the Christian Spaniards, or rather, the Mother of God wanted to do a favor for the Indians so that they might become Christians and the souls of the Indians might be saved.[50]

The story echoes a frequent argument of missionaries, who explained that while the miracles of the Christian god advanced the conquest they also led to the salvation of Indian souls.[51] Another story Guaman Poma heard from the missionaries was about the activities in the Andes of one of Christ's original apostles. He termed the advent of this apostle in the Indies a miracle and associated with it a series of divine interventions in the world. These are described interchangeably as miracle, punishment, or judgment:

> The fall of that angel was a great judgment . . . the fall of all the human race and the punishment of all the world in the waters of the flood. A great judgment was the election of Jacob and the reprobation of Saul and the perdition of Judas Iscariot, and the vocation of Saint Paul and the reprobation of the people of the Jews and the election of the gentiles along with other miracles and punishments that pass among the sons of the people of this world. And thus, there have been many other miracles and punishments in the time of the Inca . . . and so we write the sum of them all. Therefore the punishment of God is called *pachacuti, pacha ticra*. And hence some kings were called Pachacuti, and in this life we have seen the outbreak of the volcano and a rain of the fire and dust of hell on [the] city of Arequipa.[52]

This survey of world history led Guaman Poma to enumerate further disasters in his own time—earthquake, unseasonable snow and hail, plagues of noxious animals, failure of the harvest, and the depopulation of the Indies—all of which he describes as miracle, punishment, or pestilence. A very similar list occurs in his account of ecclesiastics and their activities in Peru. Consistent with this convergence of miracle and punishment, Guaman Poma described Arequipa as a

[50] Santa Maria de Peña de Francia, una señora muy hermosa . . . De velle se espantaron los yndios y dicen que le echava tierra en los ojos a los yndios ynfieles. Como hizo Dios milagro para hazelle merced . . . a los espanoles cristianos, por mejor dezir que mas quizo hazer merced la Madre de Dios a los yndios porque fuesen cristianos y salvasen las animas de los yndios." Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 403 [405]. The story was first told by Betanzos, *Suma*, 2.32, 300.

[51] Garcilaso de la Vega, *Historia general del Perú*, *Biblioteca de Autores Españoles*, 134 (Madrid, 1960), Book 2, chap. 25, reports and discusses the Virgin's appearance at the siege of Cuzco; for related arguments, see Avendaño, *Sermones de los Misterios*, sermon 1.

[52] "Gran juicio fue la cayda de aquel angel . . . la cayda de todo el genero humano . . . el castigo de todo el mundo con las aguas del diluvio. Gran juicio fue la eleccion de Jacob y la rreprovacion de Sau y el desanparo de Judas Escariote y la bocacion de San Pablo, la rreprobacion del pueblo de los Judios, la elicion de los gentiles y como otros milagros y castigos que pasan en los hijos de los hombres del mundo. Y anci avido otros muchos milagros y castigos en el tiempo del Ynga . . . Y aci se escrive toda la suma; por eso el castigo de Dios le llaman pachacuti, pacha ticra. Y anci algunos rreys fueron llamados Pachacuti. Y en esta vida como emos visto el rreventar el bolcan y llover fuego del ynfierno y arena solar una ciudad." Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 94–95. As Rolena Adorno has discovered, the biblical episodes in this passage are quoted from Fr. Luis de Granada, *Memorial de la Vida Cristiana* 2.3, 4; see R. Adorno, "El Arte de la persuasión: El Padre de Las Casas y Fray Luis de Granada en la obra de Waman Puma de Ayala," *Escritura* (Caracas), 8 (1979): 167–89; and Adorno, *Guaman Poma*, 257 with n. 31.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

god-fearing city that displayed "much charity," and saw no incompatibility between such an assessment and the divine judgment that fell on Arequipa in the volcanic eruption of 1600, when God punished the city and "wished to burn it with fire from hell" (Figure 11). Other Andeans considered this eruption as a sign of turning times, while the Spanish were quick to point to the hand of their god.[53] But the problem was that nothing changed in the political and social order of Peru.

According to Christian teaching as reiterated by Guaman Poma, the good are rewarded in heaven and the wicked punished in hell. But in the world upside down he described, in which all social and moral order had been so obliterated that the humble Andean steward could wear the tunic (*uncu*) of an Inca lord, and the actions of Spanish figures of authority flagrantly violated their own precepts, there was no room for such straightforward justice. While Guaman Poma hoped that Christ might return again "to judge and punish the wicked and give glory to the good," he realized that in effect there was, as he so often repeated, "no remedy."[54] Guaman Poma reached the conclusion that "there are no Christians or saints because they are all in heaven." But were the saints really in heaven? Guaman Poma depicted a "city of heaven" with no inhabitants other than the Trinity and Mary (Figure 12). His hell by contrast is crowded (Figure 13).[55] There could be no more graphic testimony of the depth of his despair.

The lessons of Christianity did not cohere for Guaman Poma in the way that the missionaries had intended.[56] He expressed the aspect of the Catholic theological and moral system that is articulated in the concepts of God's miraculous intervention in history, and in God's punishment and final judgment of human actions, as experienced by Andeans, not as explained by missionaries. In the eyes of the missionaries, miracles and divine punishments had a twofold purpose: they were didactic, and they achieved a particular outcome. For Andeans, on the other hand, while the outcome—the conquest and its results—was inescapable, the lesson to be learned remained highly dubious. As an explanatory system underpinning colonial moral and social values, miracles and punishments were therefore a failure. Thus Guaman Poma, like other Andeans before and after his time,

[53] For a list of disasters, see Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 95, 640 [654] and following; on Arequipa, see Guaman Poma, 1053 [1061] and following, 1077 [1087]; see also T. Bouysse-Cassagne and P. Bouysse, "Volcan indien."

[54] On reward and punishment, see Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 938 [952] and following; see also Murra and Adorno, eds., *Nueva corónica*, p. 1355, note on 954; on Inca *uncu*, see Guaman Poma, 800 [814]; I would like to thank Professor Zuidema for bringing this drawing to my attention; on the Spaniards, see Guaman Poma, 643 [657] and following; on "no remedy," see Guaman Poma, 1106 [1116], compare 902 [916].

[55] Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 923 [937], 938 [952] and following.

[56] MacCormack, "'The Heart Has Its Reasons'"; see also T. Beidelman, *Colonial Evangelism: A Socio-Historical Study of an East African Mission at the Grass Roots* (Bloomington, Ind., 1982). The conclusions of this book, which offers a critical evaluation of missionaries' descriptions of their own work, as well as an assessment of the impact of Christianity on African converts, are also relevant to Latin American missions. Contrast P. Borges, *Métodos misionales en la cristianisación de America, siglo XVI* (Madrid, 1940); F. de Armas Medina, *Cristianisación del Perú (1532–1600)* (Seville, 1953); and even the seminal work of R. Ricard, *La Conquète spirituelle du Mexique* (Paris, 1933), in which the self-evaluation of missionaries is taken as a guideline; thus the contradictory, and even destructive, impact of Christianity on converts and potential converts fails to emerge. On the other hand, Duviols, *La Lutte*, confronted this problem.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 11. Miracle and punishment as understood by Guaman Poma: the eruption of the volcano Huaynaputina in the year 1600 engulfs the city of Arequipa in a rain of fiery ashes. A penitential procession moves across the main square in the apparently forlorn hope of appeasing divine wrath. *Nueva corónica*, 1053.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURES 12–13. Guaman Poma's heaven and hell.
12. The "City of Heaven for good poor sinners" with "water of life [in the] Upper World" is empty. The plan of the city, with buildings surrounding a central square, follows the layout of Peruvian cities of Guaman Poma's time. (Compare Figs. 11, 14.) *Nueva corónica*, 938.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



13. "City of Hell," for "the punishment of proud sinners and the rich who do not fear God." The mouth of hell, drawn according to the traditional European iconography, contains a cross-section of colonial society headed by a Spaniard. *Nueva corónica*, 941.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

retained the explanatory system of the old religion, describing radical change quite simply as the turning about of *pachacuti*, which was miracle, punishment, and judgment all in one. *Pachacuti*, unlike for instance the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah in the Hebrew Bible, occurs irrespective of human merit. This is made plain in an Andean myth recorded by the missionary Martin de Murúa, whom Guaman Poma knew. During the reign of the first Inca, Manco Capac, the earth "wanted to turn about and destroy itself" in torrential rains. At this time, Ynga Yupangui, one of Manco's sons, encountered at Sapi above Cuzco a huge person who was about to blow a trumpet. Ynga Yupangui begged this person to desist, lest "the earth turn about."[57] The desire of the earth to turn in this myth has nothing to do with humans. Similarly, Guaman Poma's divine punishments, miracles, and judgments occur for reasons that require no explanation.

Even so, Guaman Poma wrote from a Christian viewpoint because overtly, at any rate, he accepted Christianity as true. Other Andeans, although they shared a similar vocabulary, did not. Thus, in 1613, a Jesuit extirpator of idolatries heard from an Indian of Huamantambo that his arrival had been foretold to the village by a *huaca* that the extirpator identified with the devil. According to the extirpator, the devil had said to his worshipers, "For me has now arrived the *cutipacha*, which is the judgment, because these clerics and fathers who are coming will destroy my *huacas*, churches, and places of worship. Woe unto you, for ill is going to befall you and you have to suffer hunger, pestilences, and deaths, because you have revealed my secrets." Similarly, in Chavin, the rock that was the principal *huaca*, Auqui Chanca told the Indians that "for the *huacas* the day of judgment had come and that the Indians should no longer worship them in their churches and other appointed places, nor, out of respect for the visitor, should they gather together as a community, because he was a great enemy of the *huacas*. And they should not reveal anything to the visitor . . . or make confession, because he would consume them with travail and deaths."[58] The term *cutipacha*, as used by the speaker from Huamantambo, is synonymous with the Quechua *pachacuti* and the Spanish *juicio*. It describes the overthrow of the existing order, which in the speaker's mind was Andean religion and society. In Chavin, on the other hand, the overthrow of *huacas* and their worshipers was described by the Christian term "day of judgment." Guaman Poma, for all his Christian and Spanish erudition, also continually intertwined the imported ideas with Andean ones, as in his speculations about a restoration of the Inca empire and the eventual remedy to the ills of his time. In a drawing adumbrating an Inca restoration, the hoped-for new Inca, dressed in the traditional regalia, stands surrounded by the rulers of the four parts of his empire on top of the mountain of Potosí. But this drawing is not an antiquarian reconstruction of an iconography of power belonging to the past. The Inca is endowed not only with Andean but also with Spanish symbols of royalty, being sheltered beneath the coat of arms of Castille and León and flanked by the two columns of

[57] Martin de Murúa, *Historia general del Perú*, M. Ballesteros-Gaibrois, ed., 2 vols. (Madrid, 1962–64), 1: 86, 2: 3.

[58] Carlos Romero, "Idolatrías de los Indios Huachos y Yauyos," *Revista histórica* (Lima), 6 (1918): 192, 196–97.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 14. Guaman Poma's vision of Peru's mining capital, the "rich imperial city of Potosí," overlooked by the mountain where in 1545 the first silver mine was discovered. The Inca standing on the mountain's peak is surrounded by the lords of the four parts of his empire (compare Fig. 10) who hold over his head the crowned coat of arms of Castille and León on two columns symbolizing Gibraltar, the terminus of the known world before the discovery of America. *Nueva corónica*, 1057.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Charles V's Plus Ultra (Figure 14). The description of this drawing spells out its composite message: "The rich imperial city of Potosí. Thanks to this mine exists Castille, Rome is Rome, the pope is pope and the king is monarch of the world, and holy mother church is defended and our holy faith is preserved by the four kings of the Indies and by the Inca emperor."[59] Andean symbols are here integrated with European ones into one coherent image of empire, but the empire is Andean.

Simultaneously, Guaman Poma had absorbed Christian and European millenarian thinking to the extent that the idea of "the Last Judgment" entailed a Christian ethical message, that is, the ultimate righting of the social and political ills of his time. Even here, however, he set aside Christian terminology in favor of the old Andean vocabulary of turning about: "There is no one who turns for the poor of Jesus Christ, if it is not that he himself turns about and returns for his poor ones." The return mentioned here may be read both in general terms as Christ's return in the Second Coming, when "God shall wipe all the tears from their eyes,"[60] and in a specifically Andean sense as a return inaugurating the political and social reform of colonial society.

A LATE CONTEMPORARY OF GUAMAN POMA, the Cuzqueño painter Diego Quispe Tito, was possibly thinking along similar lines when he painted his great picture of the Last Judgment in the Convent of San Francisco in Cuzco (Figure 15). The iconography of this epic depiction is derived from European prototypes inspired by the visions of the prophet Ezekiel and John the Divine. In these paintings and engravings, Christ enthroned on the rainbow, his feet resting on the globe of the earth as his footstool, was represented presiding over the Last Judgment (above, Figures 3–4).[61] In the upper center of Diego Quispe's painting in Cuzco, accordingly, Christ judging the living and the dead is enthroned on an arch colored in the hues of the rainbow, while beneath, the archangel Michael defeats the devil in the shape of a dragon. Some years later, a follower of Diego Quispe Tito painted a simplified version of this work for the church of Urubamba.[62] Other renderings of Christ seated on the rainbow include Marcos Zapata's painting of the Last Judgment for Cuzco Cathedral and a further Judgment done in a more popular style that is now in the Convent of Santa Catalina (Figure 16).

[59] "Ciudad la villa rica enpereal de Potocchi. Por la dicha mina es Castilla, Roma es Roma, el papa es papa y el rrey es monarca del mundo y la sta madre yglesia es defendida y nuestra santa fe guardada por los quatro rreys de las Yndias y por el enperador Ynga." Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 1057 [1065]. But note also Guaman Poma's ambiguities on the subject of sovereignty in Peru: 1111 [1122], and the complaint of three poor women against the extirpator of idolatries, Francisco de Avila: "Quisa se dolera nuestro Ynga que es el rrey," as opposed to 904 [918], "Quien es el Ynga? El rrey catolico."

[60] "No ay quien buelba por los pobres de Jesucristo, cino que torne otra ves, buelba al mundo por sus pobres"; Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 485 [489]; John the Divine, *Apocalypse* 7.17 and 21.4; reminiscences from Isaiah 25: 8.

[61] See above, n. 18. Among major depictions of the Last Judgment not cited by Harbison, *Last Judgement*, are Albrecht Dürer's *Die Heimliche Offenbarung Johannis*; see F. van der Meer, *The Book of Revelation in Western Art* (New York, 1979), 283 and following; also, Jehan Duvet, *L'Apocalypse figurée* (1561; rpt. edn., London, 1962), engraving for John the Divine, *Apocalypse*, chap. 6 with 9.

[62] For Diego Quispe Tito's painting, see T. Gisbert and J. de Mesa, *Historia de la Pintura Cuzqueña* (Lima, 1982), Fig. 171, and, for the imitation by a follower, Fig. 187.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 15. The beginning and end of history according to Diego Quispe Tito from Cuzco. Christ on the rainbow judges the world. Below him, the archangel Michael fights the devil, below whom (left) Adam and Eve are expelled from Paradise. At the bottom, the condemnation of the wicked. Convento San Francisco, Cuzco. Photo courtesy of World Monuments Fund, by kind permission of the Archbishop of Cuzco.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 16. Last Judgment by an anonymous eighteenth-century painter from Cuzco. Christ on the rainbow flanked by the saints is adored by angels. Below, the devil masquerading as St. Michael presides over hell. At left, a glimpse into purgatory. Convento Santa Catalina, Cuzco. Photo courtesy of the Instituto Nacional de Cultura, Cuzco.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

An eighteenth-century anonymous picture, also from Cuzco, depicts St. Jerome in his study (Figure 17). The saint, holding a book, sits at his table beneath which is the customary lion, while Jerome's other attribute, the ascetic's skull, has been transformed into a desiccated corpse such as might have been extracted from a pre-Hispanic Andean burial. An angel next to Jerome points into the distance, where Christ is enthroned on a rainbow while resting his feet on a globe. This painting, like its European prototypes, employs the traditional iconography of the Last Judgment to represent a visionary experience such as was appropriate for Jerome the commentator on the prophet Daniel.[63]

But Andean painters did not always follow European models so closely. A picture belonging to a series on the life of Catherine of Siena shows this saint sitting on a rainbow (Figure 18). An inscription informs the beholder that St. Catherine had a vision while searching for solitude but mentions no rainbow, which would in any case be incompatible with the terminology of traditional piety in which the inscription is couched.[64] Here, then, the Cuzqueño painter departed from conventional Catholic iconography. His intention evidently was to convey a Catholic message, but he did so in a language of images that diverged from what a European model or even the inscription of the picture would prescribe. Another painting of this type, possibly dating from the eighteenth century, hangs in the museum of Riobamba, Ecuador. It shows the Virgin and Child seated under a rainbow. At the Virgin's feet are four of her devotees, while below, five further devotees are shown as souls in purgatory. Here also, the rainbow is an alien element in what for the rest was a traditional Catholic iconography.

However, when understood in broader terms, the rainbow may be seen to enhance and add to such Catholic iconographies in two respects. If, on the one hand, we consider the rainbow as an indicator of the Christian Last Judgment and the end of time, the Virgin's rainbow at Riobamba points to the final destiny of the Christian souls that she is depicted as protecting. And St. Catherine's rainbow spells out the glorious future of a saint of God. We may thus conclude that in these two pictures, the Andean painter has simply used an established Christian image more freely or independently than a Spanish or European painter would have done. On the other hand, rainbows also have an Andean meaning that is distinct from, though not incompatible with, their Christian one. An Andean meaning cannot be excluded when interpreting these paintings. In the Andes, the rainbow, like the *pachacuti*, indicated a new beginning or the reversal of a given order. According to the myths of Huarochirí, a rainbow thus appeared when, clothed in a red puma skin, Wathiya Uquri, son of the powerful deity Pariya Qaqa, defeated his enemy. Similarly, Sarmiento de Gamboa and Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui recorded that, before Manco Capac founded Cuzco, he saw a rainbow at

[63] Eugene F. Rice, *Jerome in the Renaissance* (Baltimore, Md., 1985), 111 and following, 148; Harbison, *Last Judgement*, 84–88.

[64] The painting belongs to Santa Catalina, Cuzco. The inscription reads: "Estando N[uestr]a M[adr]e S. Catalina contemplando en las vidas de las Santas que las pasaron en los desiertos se salio de su casa en busca de la soledad a poco trecho fuera de la ciudad se paso en orasion y arrebatada en extasis a las oras de nona bajo una nube que la puso en las puertas de la ciudad de donde se fue a su casa sinque en ella la uviesen echado menos."

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 17. St. Jerome, absorbed in study, is shown by an angel a vision of Christ on the rainbow throne at the Last Judgment. Eighteenth-century anonymous painter from Cuzco. San Cristobal, Cuzco. Photo courtesy of the Instituto Nacional de Cultura, Cuzco.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 18. St. Catherine of Siena seated on a rainbow is removed beyond space and time in a state of ecstasy. Anonymous painter, eighteenth century. Convento Santa Catalina, Cuzco. Photo courtesy of the Instituto Nacional de Cultura, Cuzco.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Guanacauri and interpreted it as a sign of greatness to come.[65] The late colonial version of the Inca coat of arms that is reproduced in the Betancur dossier (Figure 19) displays a rainbow sustained by two serpents; this composite image may be understood to refer to the origins of the Incas, that is, both to the rainbow of Guanacauri and to the descent of the Incas from *amaru*.[66] Similarly, in his drawing of the universe, Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui depicted a large rainbow above the image of the earth, which he labeled as both "mother earth" and "lord earth."[67] It was thus possible to connect the rainbow not only with Inca origins but also with the origin of humankind at large.

Like the *pachacuti*, Andean rainbows could carry a negative as well as a positive meaning. An eighteenth-century painting depicting the death of Atawallpa in the Museo Arqueologico, Cuzco, shows, beneath a rainbow, the beheaded Inca placed behind a structure resembling a Christian altar, from which blood streams down (Figure 20). This scene is also described by an eighteenth-century Quechua poet in an elegy addressed to Atawallpa, with only one change: the rainbow is black.

> What rainbow is this black rainbow that rises?
> The horrible thunderbolt of Cuzco's enemy flashes,
> And everywhere a sinister hailstorm strikes.

There follows an extended and slow-moving description of the death of the Inca and the grief of his people. Only at the very end is there a hint of consolation:

> Will your heart allow, o powerful Inca,
> that we may be completely lost, separated,
> dispersed, subjugated by others, trampled on?
>
> Come and open your sweet eyes that dart beams of light;
> come and stretch your generous hands;
> and comforted by that happiness, bid us good-bye.[68]

[65] Sarmiento de Gamboa, *Historia Indica*, chap. 6, p. 207a; Cabello Valboa, *Miscelánea Antárctica*, 3.9, 262, used the same source, which perhaps is Cristóbal de Molina's lost history of the Incas; Santacruz Pachacuti Yamqui, *Antigüedades deste reyno del Perú*, 241; *Waru Chiri*, 5.63; this text, along with the Quechua elegy cited below at n. 68, is the least likely to have been contaminated by biblical and European ideas about rainbows (see, beyond material discussed here, Genesis 9:13–14 on Noah; possible connections made in colonial Peru between Manco Capac's rainbow and that of Noah are left aside here, but note Nuremberg Chronicle, Latin text (Schedel, *Liber Chronicarum*, f. xi r), in which Noah's rainbow is said to betoken both the Flood and the Last Judgment, and is therefore of interest to the present argument. Further, R. T. Zuidema, "La Imagen del sol y la huaca de Susurpuquio en el sistema astronómico de los Incas en el Cuzco," *Journal de la Société des Américanistes*, 63 (1974–76): 199–230, 214 and following.

[66] *Genealogia de Don Diego Felipe de Betancur y Tupac Amaru Hurtado de Arbieto*, vol. 1, Archivo Departamental, Cuzco; and above notes 7 and 26. The importance of the Andean rainbow was recognized by Avendaño, *Sermones de los Misterios*, sermon 4, asserting that the rainbow, like springs, sun, moon, lightning, and rivers, "no es dios." Andeans worship the rainbow: see Polo de Ondegardo, "Instrucción," *Revista histórica* (Lima), 1 (1906): 192.

[67] Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, MS 3169, fol. 144v, reproduced in Jimenez de la Espada, *Tres relaciones*, 257.

[68] Translation cited from M. Lopez Baralt, "The Quechua Elegy to the All-Powerful Inka Atawallpa," *Latin American Indian Literatures*, 4 (1980): 79–86.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 19. "Coat of arms bestowed by his Caesarian Majesty our King and Lord Don Carlos I, King of Castille and León, on May 9, 1545, to Don Juan Tito Tupa Amaro, his sons and descendants, and their sons and descendants." The claim here declared was false, but aspects of the iconography displayed on the coat of arms, in particular, the rainbow supported by two serpents, depict authentic Andean concepts. Betancur Genealogy, vol. 1, Archivo Departamental, Cuzco. Photographed by the author, reproduced here by kind permission of Don Horacio Villanueva Urteaga.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

There is, then, a hint that the Inca might return. Expectations of such a return were also aroused by performances of the *Tragedy of the Death of Atawallpa*, which represented the death of the Inca as a wrong that must be avenged and reversed. In the play's last scene, the king of Spain recognizes his own countenance in that of the decapitated Inca and orders vengeance on the house of Pizarro. The play was performed regularly in colonial Peru. During one such performance in Lima, a riot broke out and the site was closed to further performances.[69]

The play envisages that vengeance for the dead Inca will be taken in some mythic, nonspecific time. At the same time, however, hopes for an Inca restoration became concrete and entered the realm of explicit political action when they focused on descendants of the Incas among Andean aristocrats. Thus, in 1667, Don Alonso de Arenas Florencia Inca, corregidor of Ibarra near Quito, claimed to have been descended directly from the Inca dynasty and substantiated his claim by means of a genealogical painting. Andeans knelt before him, and triumphal arches were erected to grace his arrivals in towns and villages of his *corregimiento*. In due course, the colonial authorities, fearing a rebellion, arrested Don Alonso and sent him to Lima for trial.[70] But other revolts led by descendants of the Incas followed, culminating in the uprising of José Gabriel Tupa Amaru in 1780, which covered Peru, Bolivia, and parts of Argentina. Although this uprising also failed, the Andean countries eventually gained their independence from Spain. A painting by Santiago Juarez in the Museo Histórico in Cuzco affords a small glimpse of an Andean interpretation of these events. The picture, dated July 5, 1825, is entitled "Homage to the Liberator Simon Bolivar" (Figure 21). Amid portrait busts of Bolivar himself and other generals of the wars of independence appears a circle containing the sun, moon, and stars, and inside it a schematic depiction of a landscape surmounted by a large rainbow. According to the painter, Bolivar had brought about the *pachacuti* that had been awaited for so long. In 1825, it was still too early to see clearly that, for Andeans, the benefits of independence were ephemeral.

WE MAY NOW RETURN TO DIEGO QUISPE and the other Andean painters who depicted rainbows in a Christian context, whether they did so in the accepted and traditional imagery of the Last Judgment or whether they created images independent of explicit European prototypes, such as the portraits of the Virgin in Riobamba and St. Catherine in Cuzco. The image of the rainbow links the Christian Last Judgment and Christian visions of the seventh age to the Andean *pachacuti*. As we have seen, Guaman Poma understood judgment, miracles, and

[69] See above, n. 8. For a description of the play as performed in eighteenth-century Trujillo, see Baltasar Jaime Martinez Compañón, *Trujillo del Perú a fines del siglo XVIII* (Madrid, 1936), plate 66 taken from vol. 2 of the manuscript in the Biblioteca del Real Palacio, Madrid. I was unable to consult the recent facsimile edition of this volume. On the riot, see A. F. Frézier, *A Voyage to the South Sea and along the coast of Chili and Peru in the years 1712, 1713 and 1714 . . . with a postscript by Dr. Edmund Halley* (London, 1717, I was unable to consult the French original), 273. Further, Wachtel, *La Vision des vaincus*, 255 and following.

[70] I would like to thank Carlos Espinosa for showing me this document on which he is currently working in the Archivo Histórico Nacional in Quito.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED




FIGURE 20. The death of Inca Atawallpa according to an anonymous eighteenth-century painter from Cuzco. Beneath a rainbow of ill omen, the headless body of Atawallpa leans over an altar-like structure flanked by Fr. Vincente de Valverde, who baptized the Inca before his death, and by Francisco Pizarro. Museo Arqueologico, Cuzco, photograph by R. T. Zuidema by kind permission of the Director.

divine punishment as a single whole, which he described as *pachacuti*. The colonial "mundo al rreves," like the death of the Inca, were intelligible to him only insofar as they could be integrated into an Andean conceptual universe.

From the very beginning, some Andeans had linked the death of the Inca to some kind of return: after Atawallpa's death, certain individuals anticipated his return as a serpent. Later, the Inca's return was foretold in some versions of the *Tragedy of the Death of Inca Atawallpa* and in the myths of Inkarrí. The very idea of the return of an Inca was, however, the product of the colonization of the Andes; for, in the normal course of events, an Inca would be succeeded by one of his kin. The idea of the Inca's return thus conjoins the old with the new, the Tawantinsuyu of the Incas with Spanish Peru.

At the same time, to think of the return of Atawallpa implied thinking of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



FIGURE 21. Painting by Santiago Juarez honoring Simon Bolivar. The heraldic iconography is that of republican Peru, but the central image, a landscape surmounted by a rainbow of auspicious augury, is a traditional Andean one. Museo Historico, Cuzco. Photographed by the author, reproduced here by kind permission of the Director.

alternatives to the status quo, such as were also adumbrated in the Christian Last Judgment. In Andean terms, Diego Quispe Tito's painting can be read as incorporating an allusion to the death of Atawallpa. This death was the *pachacuti* that had inaugurated the colonial epoch, when the established order of the Incas was reversed, just as in Christian thought, the Last Judgment will reverse the established order of the world. The Andean rainbow could convey an auspicious meaning: thus, for Manco Capac, it had been an augury of Inca glory. In Diego Quispe Tito's painting of the Last Judgment, this auspicious aspect of the rainbow points on the one hand to the reward of the just, the punishment of the wicked, and to the future reign of the City of God, and, on the other hand, it points to the return of the Inca. Yet Tito's was in no sense a subversive painting, for it depicts

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the Christian Last Judgment in an iconography that would have satisfied the ecclesiastical censor but that, for the Andean beholder, was capable of conveying a very different message.

Colonization transformed Andean religious thinking and brought into existence a new religious vocabulary. In this new vocabulary, Andeans posited alternatives to the dominant religion, while the dominant religion contributed to defining and describing those alternatives. Andeans looked back to their pre-Hispanic past but in doing so were capable of expressing themselves in the ancient terminology of Christian apocalyptic. However, a shift occurred in the meaning of this Christian and European terminology as used in the Andes. In Europe, from late antiquity onward, Christian apocalyptic had been a means of articulating programs of political and ecclesiastical reform.[71] These programs of reform tended to look back to a state of perfection in the long distant past and deployed the moral imperatives of Christianity in order to affirm as tonegiving the practices and values of the primitive church. In the Andes, by contrast, it was the past of the Incas that inspired the present and lent purpose and significance to the religious ideas that lay at the root of *pachacuti*, even in its new Christian guise. As a result, perceptions of this Inca past changed. Guaman Poma, in his account of the Inca empire, had voiced numerous criticisms of its governance. When he reached the colonial period, however, he set aside these criticisms and made the Incas into the yardstick to measure the failures and injustices of Spanish government.[72] Similarly, the portrait of Atawallpa as a gentle ruler of his people in the *Tragedy of the Death of Atawallpa* is incompatible with the historical figure of this monarch. It is a well-known commonplace of Andean historiography that the Spanish conquest fragmented Andean historical awareness. But this is not the whole story. For it was also the Andean people themselves who reformulated their past so as to contend with their present, and this they continue to do.[73]

[71] N. Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium* (Oxford, 1970); and G. B. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform: Its Impact on Christian Thought and Action in the Age of the Fathers* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959).

[72] Guaman Poma, *Nueva corónica*, 339 [341], "no avia tanto dano como agora"; 657 [671], priests from Spain should have the status of conquered peoples (*mitimaes*), as they would have done under the Incas; the Inca and Spanish moral order compared, 914 [928].

[73] Franklin Pease, *Del Tawantinsuyo a la historia del Perú* (Lima, 1978), 31–114 and literature there cited; R. Gow, "Inkarrí and Revolutionary Leadership in the Southern Andes," *Journal of Latin American Lore*, 8 (1982): 197–223. O. Harris, "De la fin du monde: Notes depuis le Nord-Potosí," *Cahiers des Amériques Latines*, n.s., 6 (1987): 93–118.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Reviews of Books

GENERAL

HAYDEN WHITE. *The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1987. Pp. xiii, 244. $26.50.

The present book might be considered the third part of a trilogy whose two earlier installments were *Metahistory* (1973) and *Tropics of Discourse* (1978). *Metahistory* took the form of a systematic treatise that laid down the principles for Hayden White's poetics of historiography. *Tropics of Discourse* was a collection of essays that played significant variations on those thematic principles. *The Content of the Form* is another collection of essays in which still further and at times more significant variations are in evidence.

The essay may be the best form with which to investigate the complex, controverted methodological and theoretical bases of historiography. In any case White is clearly a master of this form. In the present collection he examines such important topics as the value of narrativity in the representation of reality, the role of narrative in contemporary historical theory, the political dimensions of historical interpretation, Johann Gustav Droysen's *Historik*, Michel Foucault's discursive style, Fredric Jameson's Marxist rehabilitation of narrative, Paul Ricoeur's metaphysics of narrativity, and the general issue of method and ideology in intellectual history. The essays, written over the last seven years, have all appeared elsewhere, but it is extremely valuable to have them assembled between the covers of one book. One hopes that a paperback edition will soon appear to make the book more available for use in courses.

Narrative is the obvious leitmotif of these essays, but it is complemented and supplemented by a strong concern for ideological and political dimensions of historical inquiry. White's role has been central in focusing attention on the problem of narrative in historiography and literary criticism, and he has provided one of the most influential and provocative theories of narrative in contemporary thought. It is impossible to do justice to the richness of White's reflections in a short review. I would simply indicate what would seem to be some significant developments or even departures with reference to his earlier views.

In partial contrast to his well-known earlier emphasis on the conditioning if not determining role of tropes, White's recent insistence on the axial role of ideology in the writing of history is especially prominent in his essay on Droysen, which is subtitled "Historical Writing as a Bourgeois Science." Somewhat ironically, White praises Droysen's *Historik* as being "unique among nineteenth-century tracts on historical thinking inasmuch as it openly embraces this ideological function as an aim or purpose" (p. 88). The ideological function in question, which "dominant social groups will . . . favor," is the fundamentally legitimating one of producing a reading subject who is imbued with the mentality of a "law-abiding" citizen. Thus, White focuses attention on the problem of the kind of reading subject a form of discourse may be argued to produce. Historiography—at least historiography of a conventional sort—is for White particularly adapted to the production of the "law-abiding" citizen "because in its featuring of narrativity as a favored institutional practice, it is especially well suited to the production of notions of continuity, wholeness, closure, and individuality that every 'civilized' society wishes to see itself as incarnating, against the chaos of a merely 'natural' way of life" (p. 87). When this ideological function becomes covert or is simply institutionalized in the operating assumptions of a profession, it becomes less open to question and more insidious than it was in Droysen. The obvious issue White leaves to his readers is that of the extent to which historiography in our own time embodies the ideological function that he has analyzed with the aid of Louis Althusser's conception of ideology as crucial in the production of a certain kind of society, particularly in and through the role of conventional narrative.

White's discussion of Ricoeur's recent work on narrative may be challenged as an interpretation of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ricoeur. But it is significant for what it indicates about mutations in White's own views. Earlier, White, in rather familiar "existential" terms, conceived of a sharp divide between "life" and "narrative" whereby life itself was considered to be intrinsically chaotic and meaningless while narrative was viewed as a purely fictive reconstruction that endowed life with meaning and value. The historical record was taken to be an unprocessed datum more or less analogous to life itself.

In his discussion of Ricoeur, White emphasizes precisely what diverges from the conception of the relation between life and narrative White himself at one time espoused, and by implication he indicates the general but differential role of ideology as a mediating force. Now narrative codes, which are in White's conception favored conduits for ideology, are seen to be common to both life and discourse, and "actions are in effect lived narrativizations" (p. 54). A focus of attention is "transcoding," a process whereby overdetermined complexities are introduced into a specific text or artifact. Conversely, a chronicle, which may seem to be close to a mere reflection of the unprocessed documentary record, is itself a product of representational procedures that are now argued to be protonarrative in nature. Hence, White tends to stress the continuity between elements that he earlier saw in terms of a sharp dichotomy. He also becomes more nuanced and more urgent in stressing the role of ideological forces in the way we represent the past. Particularly forceful (and controversial) is "The Politics of Historical Interpretation," in which he treats the problem of representations of the Holocaust in terms of the role of ideological or political constraints and commitments.

One may argue with certain of White's emphases and specific interpretations. But he has clearly made significant advances in laying a foundation for a better understanding of the intricate interaction between narrative representation and what it purports to represent in both history and literature. Although he may at times both exaggerate the role of the narrative imagination in history and underemphasize the way certain approaches to narrative may contest as well as convey ideologies, White has enabled us to appreciate better not only the significant place narrative indeed has but also the broader network of ideological forces in which it is implicated. More generally, he has helped raise historiography to a point where it may enter more fully as a critical "voice" in the contemporary debate over discursive and interpretive issues of interdisciplinary importance.

DOMINICK LACAPRA
Cornell University

JOHN MICHAEL KROIS. *Cassirer: Symbolic Forms and History*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1987. Pp. xvii, 262. $25.00.

Ernst Cassirer was one of a generation of philosophers (R. G. Collingwood and Benedetto Croce were two of the others) who believed that philosophers should know history or, better still, write about it. Cassirer wrote very good history; his best works, which are studies of Renaissance and Enlightenment thought, are still widely read by scholars today. Historians may, however, be less familiar with Cassirer's writings on epistemology, ethics, and metaphysics. It is with these, and with Cassirer's powerful philosophy of history, that John Michael Krois deals. He does so with grace and rigor, and he shows beyond question that Cassirer was one of the major philosophical thinkers of the early twentieth century.

Cassirer's position defies easy classification. Although schooled in the traditions of German historicism, Cassirer never became a thoroughgoing relativist. Indeed, after the Nazi seizure of power Cassirer wrote a defense of natural law from his exile in Sweden. And, although he was a celebrated idealist, Cassirer rejected the intellectual absolutism that marked the thought of Croce and Collingwood. To Cassirer, who was a philosopher of science, mind was not the only thing that was real. Phenomena were too. However much they might seem to change, Cassirer argued, there was something that did not. This is the idea of the *Urphänomene*, which has equal bearing for the history of science and for historiography.

Cassirer offered a philosophy that was more balanced than undiluted historicism or radical idealism. Of greatest interest for the historian, however, is Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms. In part a metahistory of thought, the philosophy of symbolic forms portrays mind as advancing from animism and myth to theory and abstraction. Incidentally, Cassirer held that regression was possible, and after 1933 he cited Nazism as a case in point. The theory of symbolic forms also led to an analysis of the nature of historical thought. For Cassirer, and here his humanism is most evident, it was important not only to relate historical inquiry to other forms of mental activity but to deal with that which is most central to history, the question of meaning.

This is, in brief, a major study of an important philosopher. Krois deals with his subject with lucidity and authority, and he gives close attention to the connections between the thought of Cassirer and that of the Viennese logical positivists and the Heideggerian existentialists (among others). Krois pays less attention to the historians who were the contemporaries of Cassirer, even though Cassirer held views remarkably close to those of Friedrich

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Meinecke. Perhaps historians will take this excellent work as an invitation to further study of Cassirer and his place in history.

STEPHEN BAILEY
Knox College

GIOVANNI BUSINO. *La permanence du passé: Questions d'histoire de la sociologie et d'épistémologie sociologique*. (Pratiques sociales et théories; Travaux de droit, d'économie, de sciences politiques, de sociologie et d'anthropologie, number 152.) Geneva: Droz. 1986. Pp. 348.

La permanence du passé is a collection of essays of Giovanni Busino. The book's twenty-three chapters deal mainly with problems in sociological theory, those of classical authors such as Marx, Pareto, Croce, Piaget, and Aron, as well as those of less well known figures such as Norbert Bobbio, Jean-Blaise Grize, and Brunello Vigezzi. Busino is competent and often insightful in analyzing a vast panorama of social theory. His erudition impressively extends to historiography. One chapter wends its way through the thickets of what is alternately called "the transition problem," the Brenner debate, and the origins of industrial capitalism. But the historian will appreciate Busoni's mastery of a great many historical controversies and issues.

In fact he is deeply concerned with the relation of sociology to history, recommending in one chapter that the disciplinary division be entirely abolished since each field has much to offer the other. Moreover, each field, in Busino's view, suffers from lack of cooperation. Historians badly lack theoretical and methodological sophistication; sociologists work without sensitivity to the historical context. Busino is able to name many sociological efforts that were badly flawed by dint of ignorance of the historical literature on the topic. Although historians might nod in agreement here, they are less likely to be convinced that sociology is their natural partner. Many would point to anthropology, psychology, political science, and economics as equally likely helpmeets.

I find Busino's proposal of disciplinary marriage puzzling given his serious reservations about the state of sociology in the introduction. In the chapter entitled "From History to Sociology and from Sociology to History," his own field is presented as worthy of the alliance in a somewhat official sounding outline of virtues. In the introduction sociology is presented as in a state of shambles with its main disciplinary assumptions riddled with problems and contradictions. He complains that, contrary to what its practitioners think, sociology is not a science, the social world is not "totally comprehensible," the "instrumental" epistemology that divides "the cognitive from the normative and the expressive" is fundamentally mistaken. Busino does not hesitate to label this state of disciplinary affairs a "crisis." Such an unflattering portrait does not encourage the interest of historians in the match.

It would seem that Busino's reflections on sociology underwent considerable change from the time he wrote the marriage proposal to the time he wrote the introduction. Such discordance is a risk in all collections of this kind. In this case, the book would benefit from revision of the earlier pieces. (One annoyance in an otherwise well assembled volume is the lack of references to the original place of publication of the essays or, if they did not appear elsewhere, to the date of composition.) The book would also benefit from a study of the literature on "interpretive social science." Busino cites none of the authors who, aware like him of the serious limitations of standard sociological epistemology, have attempted to mobilize the positions of poststructuralists, ethnomethodologists, and others who have fruitfully wrestled with these issues. In the same vein his extensive list of authors cited has not one mention of Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, or Lacan, a stunning indication, it seems to me, that there is much work ahead in the theoretical reconstruction of sociology.

MARK POSTER
University of California, Irvine

PETER STALLYBRASS and ALLON WHITE. *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1986. Pp. xi, 228. Cloth $29.95, paper $12.95.

Bakhtin bites back. In response to social historians' ideas that absolutist rulers and constipated bourgeois successfully suppressed carnival and other collective expressions of popular sensuality, Peter Stallybrass and Allon White draw on the work of literary critics to argue that carnival is still with us—fragmented, marginalized, sublimated, and repressed, yet somehow inextinguishable. Bahktin captured the primal energy of carnival, they say, but failed to distinguish two very different situations: where the high and low mingle in the common pursuit of earthly pleasure and where the sensual and the commercial "hybridize" to the consternation of the bourgeoisie. English literature, literary criticism, and interpretive writings on social history provide Stallybrass and White with the material to illustrate their interpretation of the carnival's transmutation. The wandering exploration of this theme takes our two critics through discussions of pigs as symbols of attractive filth, of the transformation, interpretation, and decline of Bartholomew Fair, of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sewers, of Lord Mayor's Day, of nineteenth-century sanitary reformers, of Sigmund Freud's and Walter Benjamin's fixations on nurses and nursemaids, and of a dozen other topics. Their *randonnée* brings them to some interesting places. They almost see, for example, how such shaming rituals as rough music licensed and contained vulgar disorder on behalf of rigid morality and almost recognize how such places as eighteenth-century Southwark operated as bounded zones in which not only outcasts and revelers but also dissidents gathered in relative freedom before reentering more disciplined spaces such as Westminster and the City of London.

Yet the enterprise fails. It fails because Stallybrass and White flit from topic to topic, because they never develop a clear sense of the evidence it would take to substantiate or invalidate their theses, because they take little care to situate the transformations they perceive in time, space, or social class, because the chief arguments themselves feature "ambiguity and contradiction," and because the authors retreat over and over again into opaque statements such as this explication of the public festivals that Pope and Swift often presented as the site or metaphor for creative writings: "These regular cycles of festivity embodied a diacritical symbol logic . . . the rhythmic ritual oscillation enabled groups to play out a set of body categories particularly to do with expenditure, consumption, and pleasure. What this meant in practice was a *diachronic* separation of the normative and its obverse, of structure and antistructure into an historical series of alternating binary terms. The *disjunctive* relation of classical and grotesque was thus mediated by temporal switching from one to the other. At set times the 'dirty,' the 'excessive,' the transgressive and the body as pleasurable subject of consuming and discharging were celebrated in corporate ritual" (p. 106). If you enjoy and understand this sort of argument, this book will no doubt enlighten you. If not, it will not.

CHARLES TILLY
New School for Social Research

BERNARD YACK. *The Longing for Total Revolution: Philosophic Sources of Social Discontent from Rousseau to Marx and Nietzsche*. (Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1986. Pp. xvii, 390. $35.00.

Bernard Yack's aim in this study is to define and to account for a specifically modern state of mind that he labels "the longing for total revolution." This "state of mind" is really a configuration of thinking, entailing assumptions, problem formulations, patterns of reasoning, rhetorical tropes, and so on, that Yack regards as fundamental in the thinking of Schiller, the young Hegel, the left Hegelians, Marx, Nietzsche, and the contemporary disciples of the latter two. What Yack wants to do is to isolate the components of this configuration of thought, to show that it is a philosophical position, based on the appropriation of Kantian concepts, and not a secularized version of religious commitments, and to argue that it is a way of thinking about the politics of modernity that is inherently self-defeating because it involves a contradiction that cannot be resolved.

The chief components of this configuration of thinking are: the appropriation of the Rousseau-Kantian figure of authentic humanity in terms of human freedom, that is, freedom from external determination, accepting thereby implicitly the Kantian chasm between natural necessity and human freedom; the historicizing formulation, after the disappointments of the French revolution, of the obstacle to reaching authentic humanness as the dehumanizing spirit of modern social interaction (specified variously by the thinkers considered); the adoption of the categorical assumption that the character of societies in specific historical epochs could be understood in terms of determinative subpolitical spheres of social interaction; and therefore the emergence of the longing for a "total revolution" that would change the fundamental character of social interaction and usher in a historically new age; the commitment of each thinker to the identification and elimination of the obstacle (the particular form of external determination) that they argued prevented a world without social sources of discontent.

The importance for Yack of seeing this position as a philosophical one is twofold. First, it shows that changes in conceptual frameworks can mark significant historical discontinuities and can be fundamental for understanding what is happening in and with "states of mind." In this case the positing of a particular image of human value leads to the new formulation of the obstacle to human advance, which leads to a new longing to overcome that obstacle, which leads to new goals and new means of reaching them. Over against the Skinner-Pocock stress on the general discursive contexts of political thought, Yack wants to demonstrate the constitutive importance of conceptual paradigms and changes in them for what thinkers take up and how they approach their subject.

Second, seeing this position as a philosophical one allows Yack to examine its validity in terms of its logical cogency. He does so and finds it wanting, indeed entailing a fundamental contradiction, because the "definition of humanity in terms of the individual's ability to resist external conditioning rules out the realization of our humanity in the external world . . . [because] any institution that conditions our behavior will be dehumanizing, as long as we hold this understanding of man's humanity,"

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and "if every social phenomenon is always shaped by the spirit of social interaction that informs its epoch or society as a whole, then social phenomena will always be externally conditioned" (pp. 366–67).

Historians will find Yack's general conception of his inquiry suggestive. His attempt to delineate a specifically philosophical, and specifically modern, infrastructure of reasoning subtending the thought of some of modernity's major critics is a promising and important direction of analysis. Something like the complex of notions, commitments, and desires that Yack calls "the longing for total revolution" is surely an important aspect of modern and contemporary cultural criticism.

Yack's particular construction of this complex in this study is not wholly persuasive, however. While the configuration he proposes characterizes the thought of Schiller and the left Hegelians well, the treatments of Marx and Nietzsche are less convincing. It is at least arguable that the mature Marx of *Capital* and of the political writings of his last twenty years is as attuned to the contingencies and limitations in social change as Yack is willing to grant the mature Hegel. To make a sound countercase one would at least have to deal directly with these texts more fully than Yack has.

The same is true with Nietzsche. Yack's analysis is based on a close reading of a limited number of major texts and a speculative reconstruction of the "metaphysical pathos" that colors Nietzsche's thought. The rich complexities and multiple contradictions of Nietzsche's work are given a much more persuasive reading in the wider textual and thicker contextual analyses by Peter Bergmann in *Nietzsche, "the Last Antipolitical German"* (1987).

JOHN KIRKLAND
Bucknell University

ANDREW LEVINE. *The End of the State*. London: Verso. 1987. Pp. 198. Cloth $29.95, paper $11.95.

What is one to make of a book that in today's world argues for the plausibility of a coming "end of the state" and its replacement by a Kantian "republic of ends"? One would like to be sympathetic to an effort that cuts so sharply against the grain of contemporary history and current intellectual fashion. And one does find in it the same qualities of intelligence, moral and political intensity, and plain but engaged style that have marked the author's three earlier book-length forays into related territory. Unfortunately, he ultimately undermines at least my sympathy by failing to engage the most obvious questions that such an inquiry would seem to require.

Andrew Levine believes that one can "investigate the possibility of replacing coercive political arrangements with cooperative associations of individuals and groups" without examining modern societies and history (p. 1). His "goal, like Rousseau's, is to defend a certain vision of ideal arrangements by exhibiting its cogency" (p. 3). But this cogency is purely theoretical. Levine jettisons that side of Rousseau that recognizes that the "ideal arrangements" he defended were incompatible with the modern world. Rather than pondering whether there is any wisdom in this view, Levine seeks in his first four chapters "to liberate the pro-revolutionary elements of Rousseau's thought from their uneasy coexistence with opposing views" (p. 17).

Likewise, he deplores the "widespread identification of communism with Communism" but offers no argument for why we ought not to take the identification seriously (p. 3). He is not unaware of the omission: he claims only to be offering a "philosophical brief for taking the idea [of communism as the end of the state] seriously" (p. 9). The problem is whether one can take seriously a philosophical brief that leaves contemporary history out of account.

Ironically, Marx would not have. Marx believed deeply in the value of concrete historical analysis above all for constructing historical goals. (On page 146 Levine confesses his uncomfortableness with this aspect of Marx.) Marx did not see his socialism being born out of a theoretical head. He believed he could see it emerging in historical reality and saw his own work (at least after 1844) as providing practical guidance but also, and above all, making theoretical sense out of what was occurring historically. Marx could hardly have approved of Levine's way of recounting his work. In chapter 5 we find a wholly bloodless Marxian "theory of history," and in chapter 6 socialism is presented without any reference to the historical aspirations or struggles of workers.

The only factor of a quasihistorical kind I can find to which Levine appeals for the plausibility of his scenario is the idea that "democratic participation" once instituted will provide "a school for citizenship." Yet, after admitting that even Rousseau lacked faith in this idea, he goes on simply to assert that "as transformative politics works its effects, as people are progressively changed, what makes states necessary will be progressively undone" (p. 138).

In Levine's theoretical world, an ideal construct may be "plausible" without our considering whether it is supported by historical development or what practical problems would have to be overcome to make it plausible. Readers who worry about such matters will have to turn elsewhere for help.

WALTER L. ADAMSON
Emory University

EKKEHART KRIPPENDORFF. *Staat und Krieg: Die historische Logik politischer Unvernunft*. (Edition

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Suhrkamp, neue Folge, number 305.) Frankfurt, F.R.G.: Suhrkamp. 1985. Pp. 435.

This is a book one wishes well when one first picks it up. It wants to help free us from the threat of self-destruction by a grand and daring analysis of what over the course of history has caused nations to go to war, although the way Ekkehart Krippendorff puts it the problem goes even deeper: "The question is *not* 'why war' but why THE MILITARY as the irreplaceable means of waging war?" His answer leads to the concept of "THE STATE with its monopoly of force" (p. 10). We have, in simplest terms, forever been conned into accepting that authority and its sole legal right of dealing in death.

But, although the book's intent is admirable, its execution is not. We are bombarded with facts, observations, and long quotations—on the American revolution and the Russian, on the causes of World War I and the (incomplete) transformation of medieval knighthood to a courtly aristocracy that only partly succeeded in freeing it from "force and social arrogance" (p. 241), on Jonathan Swift and Max Weber and Leo Tolstoy—without any notable or at any rate credible guidance on Krippendorff's part. (Not too many readers, one suspects, will follow him in the jump from the changes in medieval knighthood to Britain's decision to go to war with Argentina in 1982, for instance.) Hence, large parts of the book read like the triumph of a file collection, a radical scholar's collection, to be sure, but file cards nonetheless. The author's "crab walk" approach—starting with the present and ending up in antiquity—does not help, although an even more basic flaw may be that the book is based on a series of lectures given at Berlin's Free University and that what can sound stimulating and original to listeners may sound repetitious and dubious to readers. Assertions such as that "arms races have a statistical probability of 82 percent of leading to war" (p. 9) or that 1914 brought "the war of capitalist states and their political classes and cliques trained for leading such states" (p. 116) may pass for fact or insight if spoken quickly enough and with conviction but will run into trouble on the printed page. Such things can be tricky.

Perhaps one would feel more charitable if, in addition to constantly attacking the crimes of the leaders and the stupidity of the followers, Krippendorf offered some sort of alternative vision in a world that, as William Wyler once put it so nicely, "does not have enough Quakers." But that, according to Krippendorff, is not his task (although by strong indirection he does offer the plea for anarchism). "The criticism offered by political economy," he writes, "is and was nothing but a criticism of the existing state of affairs, which plays its own melody in order to induce it to dance" (p. 12). Alas, it is hard to do that if the tune is elusive and the conductor hidden by a pile of notes.

JOACHIM REMAK
University of California, Santa Barbara

HARVEY J. GRAFF. *The Legacies of Literacy: Continuities and Contradictions in Western Culture and Society.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1987. Pp. x, 493.

In this book Harvey J. Graff promises us a "highly interpretative synthesis based on my reconceptualization of a tremendous amount of research," an achievement that would certainly be welcome (p. vii). What he provides, however, is more a summary than a synthesis, and a summary that omits many key works at that.

Omissions from Graff's research are most conspicuous in the chapters on the period before 1500. These make up a significant portion of the book, taking up more than one-quarter of the total pages. Yet Graff cites a bare handful of works in languages other than English, and those studies he does employ too often are outdated general works such as Frederick J. Artz's *Mind of the Middle Ages* (1953), H. O. Taylor's *The Medieval Mind* (1938), and J. W. Thompson's *Literacy of the Laity in the Middle Ages* (1939). Things get better in the chapters on more recent periods, and especially in the sections dealing with nineteenth-century developments (Graff's specialty), but the weakness of the early chapters is enough to compromise the value of the book as a survey of literacy over a long period of time.

The real problem with this book, however, lies less in the omissions from the bibliography (which are almost unavoidable in a work of this scope) than in Graff's uncertainty whether his subject is the ability to read and write, the cultural implications of literacy, or the entire history of education. Thus, the subjects Graff discusses in the book seem generally to depend more on what have been the interests of previous research than on any clear or consistent conception of what is important to his subject. When discussing the later Middle Ages, Graff gives us a few pages on Renaissance humanism—an upper-class movement that changed the content of reading but had no discernible effect on the ability to read of either elites or nonelites. When treating the early age of printing, he treats primarily matters of technology and marketing. And, when his subject is nineteenth-century America, he focuses principally on the effects of schooling of immigrants. All of these issues are important, and they may indeed be related to each other or to literacy. But in discussing them Graff confines himself to repeating what others have already said, developing no original line of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

analysis that either opens new perspectives on these phenomena or discovers relationships that had eluded more narrowly focused researchers.

Curiously absent from the book, except in the introduction and conclusion, is much discussion of the effect of literacy on what, or how, people thought. We learn how the Reformation led to certain early literacy campaigns, as Protestants tried to make Scripture accessible to believers, but nothing about how literacy affected people's response to Protestantism. This is not entirely for lack of sources; Carlo Ginzburg's *The Cheese and the Worms* (1976) is, after all, principally an analysis of how an Italian miller's reading changed him, just as his texts became very different as he reflected on them. But perhaps it is an issue for cultural rather than for social historians.

CHARLES M. RADDING
Michigan State University

LEWIS FEUER. *Imperialism and the Anti-Imperialist Mind*. Buffalo: Prometheus. 1986. Pp. vi, 265. $22.95.

Few studies of modern imperialism regard the activity with favor. Lewis Feuer adds to that number, and he does so with verve and erudition. As he surveys the historical landscape over which armed hordes and laden merchants have roamed, he stresses the nature of "progressive imperialism," which is nothing less, and nothing more vague, than "the liberation of creative energies and leadership on the world stage" (p. 23).

Here is something of Toynbeean grandeur at work, a sort of challenge and response that makes the particular act in the particular place a part of a metaphysical whole. Citing Bergson's notion of a "vital urge," Feuer contends that the primum mobile of progressive imperialism is "a creative motive to develop civilization" (p. 25). This assertion, a forceful rejoinder to those who look at the goods, not the good, of imperialism, is bound to engender intellectual protest and dissent. There is nothing mean-minded in this progressive imperialism—quite distinct from the "regressive imperialism" that the Nazis made so infamous. This is the imperial mood of Rome, of Great Britain—and the mood that should have guided U.S. foreign policy when the sun shone brightly on American efforts.

Modern empire ended because of a sense of guilt assumed by its practitioners and because of the uncomfortable realization that the only way the dominant order could continue would be through an "egalitarian, self-denying immigration of races" (p. 168). Guilt-ridden and fearful, the nations of the Western world retreated homeward.

Whatever his or her favorite governing theory of empire, the student of the subject will find Feuer's book compelling, even if irritating. The many materials presented and the various situations covered are almost always trenchantly analyzed and are regularly presented in remarkable prose. (Consider only the striking simplicity of this statement: "The desire for glory is a complex of latticed emotions" [p. 150].)

A broad historical analysis that is occasionally a polemic, this study is a special distillation of the knowledge of a scholar whose intellectual interests have never been narrow. A lifetime of thought—a bit like Whistler's lifetime of art—has gone into this little work. Whether the proverbial test of time will allow Feuer's study to rest comfortably on a bookshelf next to Joseph Schumpeter's work—or Hobson's and Lenin's—is beyond any current review to determine.

What the reader will immediately encounter in this book is a forceful argument, well got up. Feuer should be read.

RAYMOND F. BETTS
University of Kentucky

A. A. FURSENKO. *Neftianye voiny (konets XIX–nachalo XX v.)* [The Oil Wars of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries]. Leningrad: Nauka, Leningradskoe Otdelenie. 1985. Pp. 207. 80 k.

Since the early 1960s Soviet historians have made major contributions to a better understanding of the international petroleum industry before 1917. A leader in these efforts has been A. A. Fursenko, who has in his latest work on the "oil wars" achieved something of a tour de force. Combining extensive new research with pithy presentation, he has written a remarkable interpretive survey of international petroleum relations between about 1880 and 1925.

As the title implies, the theme of Fursenko's work is the international struggle for petroleum markets and, later, crude oil deposits. According to the author, the main capitalist oil companies—Standard Oil, the Russian Nobels, the Paris Rothschilds, Royal Dutch Shell, and lesser, would-be giants—battled against each other in an unrelenting struggle. As this competition sharpened, the big oil companies found additional support from their governments, which saw the enormous military and economic significance of oil long before the world war. Developing his theme in seven chapters, Fursenko begins with the emergence of the American and Russian petroleum industries—each producing roughly half the world's crude oil in the 1890s—and the resulting unsuccessful negotiations to divide up world markets. He then analyzes the surge of French and British capital into the Russian industry before 1900 and the competition for Asian markets that accompanied the consolidation of Royal Dutch Shell as a

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

third major international force. The complex struggle for the rich German market and Germany's failure to form a state oil monopoly receive a chapter, as does the British government's interest in oil for its battleships and the creation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The concluding chapters examine the contest between British and American interests for control of Mexican oil and the impact of world war and Bolshevik nationalizations on the international oil industry.

In analyzing the industry's evolution, Fursenko stresses the role of governments and power politics. More generally, he probes his subject like a diplomatic historian, although his examination of the international diplomacy of oil necessarily focuses first on the private companies and then on the governments concerned. Correspondingly, Fursenko is at his best as a painstaking empiricist. His command of both Russian and U.S. archival collections is extremely impressive, and he has successfully used a vast body of printed sources in several languages. As a result of his wide-ranging research and erudition, Fursenko buttresses his interpretation very effectively. One may disagree on various points—his close linkage of the origins of French and British investment in Russian oil companies to the tsarist government's dependence on foreign loans, for example—and still find a wealth of unexpected material and stimulating insight on almost every page.

A few reservations may be noted. First, I found the four chapters on Russian and European developments the most carefully researched and the most convincing. The discussion of the politics of oil both before and after the Mexican and Bolshevik revolutions seemed more superficial and introduced a polemical note seldom seen elsewhere. Regarding methodology, as already suggested, Fursenko has successfully followed the well-traveled path of many diplomatic and business historians, who believe that the intensive study of the top decision makers is the best way to illuminate their concerns—in this case the evolution of monopolistic (really oligopolistic) competition. Yet the coupling of this approach to an absence of any detailed economic or statistical analysis will probably strike some readers as one-sided and impressionistic, especially since the author's underlying Marxist model remains somewhat illusive. Finally, there are assumptions that oil was and is critical for industrial economies and that the major oil companies and their governments have engendered extremely dangerous international conflicts. This view can easily become exaggerated when it is projected back to the industry's age of kerosene, which lasted into the twentieth century and which is the subject of the greater (and better) part of Fursenko's book. In those years oil was mainly a consumer-based industry, with a high degree of concentration but with limited strategic and macroeconomic significance.

Such reservations aside, this is an impressive work, a valuable synthesis that has no real counterpart in any language. It deserves a wider world audience than it is likely to find. The publisher should seriously consider an English edition.

JOHN P. MCKAY
University of Illinois

CHRISTOPHER HALL. *Britain, America, and Arms Control, 1921–1937*. New York: St. Martin's. 1987. Pp. vii, 295. $37.50.

As with the curious incident of the dog in the nighttime, remarked on by Sherlock Holmes, it seems curious at first sight that Britain did nothing, in the early twentieth century, to combat the rising power of the United States. While the British worried over the German navy, they hardly noticed that the American fleet, by 1913, had become just as large. After World War I, the U.S. Navy was perceived to be overtaking the Royal Navy itself. Nevertheless, as Christopher Hall stresses, British leadership was transferred peacefully to America, largely by means of the naval treaties of the 1920s and 1930s.

The crucial step was the first, the Washington Treaty of 1921–22, "the only arms limitation treaty ever concluded which brought about a major reduction in numbers of deployed weapon systems" (p. 31). This laid down the 5–5–3 formula for capital ships, giving the United States parity with Britain; the lesser figure for Japan was balanced by the barring of Anglo-American bases in the western Pacific. Hall notes that exceptional conditions made an Anglo-American-Japanese agreement possible: the memory of the wartime alliance, the fervent desire for peace, the need (especially in Britain) for financial retrenchment, and the particular political situations of Warren G. Harding and David Lloyd George. Hall also points out that doubts already existed as to the future of the dreadnought-type battleship. Thus, the sacrifice of some dreadnoughts, and even more of predreadnoughts, was hardly onerous except for flag officers who lacked seagoing commands.

Hall later alludes to the idea of a Pax Anglo-Americana; here, I believe, the unspoken assumption of an Anglo-American kinship does more to explain the peaceful transfer than he allows. There were, to be sure, resentments and rough patches in Anglo-American relations, notably over cruisers and relations with Japan. And there were bitter quarrels between Italy and France over the relative strengths to be assigned to them. These last powers were never brought into the Treaty of London of 1930,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and in 1935 the Japanese refused to accept less than parity.

Hall's book provides an able survey of one insufficiently studied side of interwar world politics; students of arms control should find it especially useful. He has used unpublished British and American private papers and government records, and he winds up his account with a thoughtful discussion of the Washington treaty system. In describing the multilateral treaty negotiations, he might have given more attention to the thinking behind Japanese (and also French and Italian) policy; failing a study of sources in Japanese, he could have consulted James B. Crowley's *Japan's Quest for Autonomy* (1966) and Stephen E. Pelz's *Race to Pearl Harbor* (1974). One would also like more information on the evasion of treaty limits and on Anglo-American knowledge of such evasion. Overall, this work offers little in the way of new discoveries or theories. Still, Hall has given us a handy, straightforward account, one that fills a need.

EDWARD W. BENNETT
Carlisle, Massachusetts

PAUL D. MAYLE. *Eureka Summit: Agreement in Principle and the Big Three in Tehran, 1943*. Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Presses for University of Delaware Press, Newark. 1987. Pp. 210. $29.50.

While the Yalta conference has received an abundance of scholarly attention, the Big Three meeting at Teheran has nearly gone unnoticed. The present book helps correct the imbalance and provides a well-written and interesting account of the meeting. Clearly at ease with the debates and statements of the conference, Paul D. Mayle does a masterly job weaving the words and observations of the participants into an understandable and lively description of the summit. In doing this, he has accomplished his stated goal, "to tell the story in the words of the participants" (p. 12).

The relationship between the three leaders was established early as Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin jockeyed for establishing a time and place for their meeting. Churchill, the least anxious for the meeting, reluctantly acceded to the American insistence for the summit, hoping to gain Roosevelt's support for a site on British turf in the eastern Mediterranean. But neither Churchill nor Roosevelt could overcome Stalin's obstinacy, and, finally, both flew to the Iranian capital. The pattern was set; Roosevelt wanted to work with Stalin and pulled Churchill along, while Stalin, working from positions of geographical and military strength, needed only to state and restate Soviet desires to achieve his goals. This pattern was duplicated in the debates over the second front, Germany, and Poland, with Roosevelt at times belittling Churchill to obtain accord with Stalin.

Like the participants at Teheran, Mayle focuses the majority of his attention and analysis on the military issues. British efforts to sidetrack and delay Operation Overlord in favor of Mediterranean operations are well documented and explained. Less attention is paid to the discussion of political issues, and there is little new in the account of the debates over Poland's government and borders, the postwar status of Germany, and Turkey's entry into the war. More important, Mayle makes little effort to place the political issues in a broader context or connect them to the individual goals and interests of the Big Three.

Without that broader context, without having the Polish, German, and other issues placed within the framework of Soviet, American, and British planning and goals, the reader knows what happened, but without a clear picture of what was at stake. Consequently, when Mayle concludes that the Eureka summit was a success, the reader can easily agree but is unsure exactly why.

JAMES L. GORMLY
Pan American University

GEOFFREY TWEEDALE. *Sheffield Steel and America: A Century of Commercial and Technological Interdependence, 1830–1930*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. xv, 296. $49.50.

Geoffrey Tweedale has written a fascinating account of the technological and business links between the manufacturers of "special steels" and steel products in Sheffield and their American counterparts between roughly 1830 and 1930. He examines the evolution of crucible and alloy steelmaking in the first half of the book and devotes the second half to manufactured steel products, including cutlery, files, saws, and other edge tools. Throughout the study Tweedale contrasts steelmaking technologies on both sides of the Atlantic, examines the transfer of those technologies, and assesses the Sheffield producers' changing competitive position in the American market. Tweedale identifies a set of economic and technological relationships between the Sheffield and American steel industries that scholars have largely ignored.

High-quality steel produced in Sheffield with the crucible or cast steel process developed by Benjamin Huntsman in the 1740s dominated the American market before the Civil War. But a crucible steel industry that grew up around Pittsburgh achieved rough cost parity with the Sheffield producers by the late 1860s. American steelmakers used cheaper fuels and more machinery than their English coun-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

terparts, who had to bear transportation costs and import duties as well. Sheffield steel nevertheless enjoyed great success in the American market through the end of the nineteenth century, in part because of its reputed quality. In the first two decades of the twentieth century, American crucible steel producers quickly adopted electric furnace technology, which reduced costs substantially and gave them a widening advantage over their conservative Sheffield competitors.

English steelmakers were world leaders in developing new varieties of special steels. In the 1880s and 1890s, Sir Robert Hadfield developed steels with manganese, silicon, and chrome-vanadium as alloys; Robert Mushet's work with tungsten in steel in the 1910s led to the development of high-speed steel for tools; and Harry Brearly, a Sheffield metallurgist, discovered stainless steel in 1913. Sheffield firms had considerable success in the American market until the early 1920s, when increased duties on their products killed the trade. As late as 1907, Sheffield supplied more than half of the high-speed tool steel sold in the United States.

Sheffield's steelmakers also lost the American market for cutlery, razors, saws, files, and other edge tools by the 1920s. They paid dearly for their unwillingness to mechanize production and to emphasize cheaper goods. American technology, using the "American system of manufactures," drove the Sheffield producers from the market. To counteract rising American duties on imported steel, many Sheffield producers entered into licensing agreements with American firms or established subsidiaries in the United States, but these invariably yielded few profits.

Tweedale has produced an impressive study of commercial and technological changes in this industry on both sides of the Atlantic and complex interdependence that developed between 1830 and 1930. He has produced a valuable study of the international transfer of technology. Tweedale also develops several comparisons of technologies, cost structures, and marketing strategies of these transatlantic competitors, which shed much light on Britain's declining position in the international markets. In short, this is a useful study.

CHARLES K. HYDE
Wayne State University

IRMGARD STEINISCH. *Arbeitszeitverkürzung und sozialer Wandel: Der Kampf um die Achtstundenschicht in der deutschen und amerikanischen Eisen- und Stahlindustrie 1880–1929*. (Historische Kommission zu Berlin, number 65; Beiträge zu Inflation und Wiederaufbau in Deutschland und Europa 1914–1924, number 6.) New York: Walter de Gruyter. 1986. Pp. xiv, 640. DM 138.

The study of industrial relations is certainly one of the most neglected fields in modern history. Comparative analyses transcending national boundaries hardly exist. In her book Irmgard Steinisch has undertaken this difficult task, and she has done so with great success. Her excellent pioneering study of the hard and bitter struggle over the introduction of the eight-hour day in the German and American iron and steel industries not only is a major contribution to the history of industrial relations in the two countries but also sheds new light on the development of industrial society in general. This study is based on thorough archival research in both company and state archives. For a number of reasons, including availability and access of sources, the policy of German companies is better documented than the American side. Furthermore, Steinisch has exploited a wide range of manuscript collections and draws on a wealth of secondary works. Forty-four tables with statistical data provide information about production in the iron and steel industries, work hours, overtime, the age structure of workers, fluctuation, income, industrial profits, and food rationing during World War I, to name only a few of the most interesting.

The book divides into three chronological sections. First, Steinisch discusses the period 1890 to 1914 and gives a general survey of technological change in both the German and American industries. Next is a chapter on structural change and industrial relations under the impact of World War I. The third part deals with the return of the peacetime economy, the problems faced in both countries, and the different attitudes developing toward the eight-hour day. While the U.S. iron and steel industry more or less accepted the eight-hour day, German industrialists enforced the return to a twelve-hour day. In her concluding chapter, Steinisch finally interprets the differences and common developments.

The book's range and results can only be suggested here. It certainly is more than just a discussion of the eight-hour day. In her careful and persuasive study, Steinisch analyzes workers' mobility, the structure of the work force and its division into unskilled and skilled workers, the attitude of trade unions toward the organization of different groups, and the importance of state intervention for the mediation of conflicts between labor and industry. Some of her findings show the importance of comparative studies. In both Germany and the United States, trade unions did not succeed in organizing the bulk of industrial workers. One reason was the strength and anti-trade-union front of employers; the other, that the largely unskilled and very heterogeneous work force was difficult to organize. These difficulties were increased, however, by one-sided state intervention in favor of industry.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Steinisch also shows that in those industries in which skilled workers dominated the shortest work hours existed and trade unions were strongest. World War I brought significant changes in both Germany and the United States. Despite the extreme differences in the effect and results of the war in both countries, certain parallel developments, independent of social and political structures, can be identified. The duration of the war necessitated the submission of private industry to military needs. State intervention in industrial relations increased. Since the loyalty of workers was crucial for the war effort, trade unions became more accepted, as did the eight-hour day in the United States, while in Germany it was largely the result of the revolution. Demobilization and the return to a peacetime economy brought similar problems, but they were dealt with differently. Under the impact of the revolution and the threat to the political system, German industry gave in to labor demands. Once the danger was over, the struggle for a return to the twelve-hour shift, one of the crucial problems of industrial relations, started in Germany and led to the defeat of labor. In contrast, American labor, for a number of reasons, did not suffer a similar defeat.

In general Steinisch has submitted a well-argued, highly interesting study that deserves to be read widely.

HERMANN-JOSEF RUPIEPER
German Historical Institute
Washington, D.C.

WILLIAM COLEMAN. *Yellow Fever in the North: The Methods of Early Epidemiology*. (Wisconsin Publications in the History of Science and Medicine, number 6.) Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1987. Pp. xvi, 202.

William Coleman has made an exhaustive study of yellow fever epidemics in three ports in an effort to show the evolution of European epidemiological thought in the nineteenth century. The first of these outbreaks, which struck Gibraltar in 1828, killed somewhere between 1,200 and 1,500 people. The second, in Saint-Nazaire in 1861, was on a much smaller scale, affecting 41 individuals and causing 28 deaths. The third epidemic, which occurred in Swansea in 1865, struck down 29 persons and killed 16 of them.

Coleman's chief concern is the methodology of the commissions and individuals who studied these outbreaks. At the time of the first epidemic in 1828, the concept of disease specificity was only beginning to make headway. Although the commission reporting on the Gibraltar outbreak took no position on the great issue of the day—contagionism versus noncontagionism—the views of Nicolas Chervin, the most outspoken member of the commission, were thought to reflect the commission's views. Chervin, a leader in the emerging sanitary movement and a firm noncontagionist, believed that yellow fever, like most other fevers, arose spontaneously from certain atmospheric and environmental conditions.

By the 1860s the evidence in favor of disease specificity was mounting, and the studies of the Saint-Nazaire and Swansea epidemics show a far more sophisticated approach. Coleman argues that the limited size of the last two outbreaks was an advantage since it was possible to trace each individual case. The final chapter, entitled "What Was Epidemiology," both defines epidemiology and traces its development from the 1840s.

Since the American contributions to medicine in the nineteenth century were limited, Coleman logically concentrates on the impact of these epidemiological studies on French and British medical theory. Yet Americans had far more experience with yellow fever, and by 1850 few of them questioned that the disease was imported. No disease gave rise to more investigation and theorization than this terrible pestilence. Moreover, one can find many detailed case studies and analyses of the hundreds of yellow fever epidemics in North America. The European methodological approach and speculations about the fever have a familiar ring to anyone acquainted with the literature on American yellow fever outbreaks and the evolution of American medical thought. Nonetheless, Coleman has made a contribution to the history of epidemiology.

JOHN DUFFY,
EMERITUS
University of Maryland

DANIEL M. FOX. *Health Policies, Health Politics: The British and American Experience, 1911–1965*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1986. Pp. xi, 234. $25.00.

This is a book about progress—not progress in medicine or health policy, a concept in which the author openly avows disbelief, but the effects faith in medical progress had on health policy. By the early 1900s, Daniel M. Fox suggests, a fundamentally new belief had arisen in the power of medical science to vanquish disease and guarantee health in unprecedented measure. Health policy, once focused on managing the physical and social environments, merged in most British and American minds with medical care policy. Through a subtle narrative, Fox shows how this deeply embedded belief in the potential benefits of science applied to medical practice propelled changing health policy in Britain and the United States over the first two thirds of the twentieth century.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

At the core of Fox's analysis is what he terms hierarchical regionalism, a "ponderous phrase," he acknowledges, but one that wins over even the skeptical reader by its sheer descriptive power. Fox represents by this phrase a set of widely shared, remarkably durable assumptions about the desired ends of health policy. People in both Britain and America assumed that laboratories of medical schools and teaching hospitals were the wellsprings of knowledge about medical science that would lead progressively to better health. This knowledge, they further assumed, was to be disseminated downward through a hierarchy of institutions and personnel serving particular geographical regions. Accordingly, the creation and strengthening of regional hierarchies through which the fruits of medical progress could be broadly disseminated seemed self-evidently the proper objective of health policy. By the 1920s these assumptions were more often taken for granted than explicitly spelled out. Nevertheless, Fox deftly displays their pervasiveness in the rhetoric and behavior of the historical actors through the 1960s.

The volume is structured chronologically, with each chapter on the British experience followed by a narrative on the United States during roughly the same period. By keeping a steady focus on the animating power of a commitment to hierarchical regionalism, Fox brings new understanding to even the most familiar of the stories he tells, such as the genesis of the National Health Service and the Hill-Burton Act. His adroit handling of the comparative approach makes the argument especially compelling. The persistent goal of health policy in both countries, he urges, was improving health by organizing services to increase access to medical procedures. But Fox goes on to show in concrete instances how the divergent political cultures and economic realities of the two countries translated a shared allegiance to hierarchical regionalism into sometimes strikingly different policy enactments.

Although the emergent confidence in medical progress that undergirded hierarchical regionalism is ably described, further explanation for it commensurate with the campaign against historicism that the author wages might have been particularly helpful to readers not immersed in the recent historiography of medicine. As it stands, though, this is a splendid book. Fox has written a thoroughly engrossing narrative and has convincingly argued a thesis that will profoundly alter the study of twentieth-century medical history.

JOHN HARLEY WARNER
Yale University

RICHARD SORABJI, editor. *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 253. $42.50.

That late Greek commentators on the works of Aristotle, such as Simplicius, Philoponus, Themistius, and Alexander of Aphrodisias, had a significant impact on Islamic and Latin philosophy and science up to the seventeenth century has been well known for some time. Our knowledge of these influences has, however, been fragmentary and *ad hoc*. To alter this serious deficiency in our knowledge of the history of philosophy and science, Richard Sorabji has recently initiated a translation project the goal of which is to render into English the whole corpus of late Greek commentaries. It is fitting that the first of these volumes be the *contra Aristotelem* of John Philoponus (ca. 490–570), a Christian Neoplatonist, not only because he was the most noteworthy member of the group but also because the title of the work reveals at a glance the thrust of his intellectual effort.

In recognition of the special importance of Philoponus, whose commentaries were in opposition to much of Aristotle's basic physics and cosmology and even provided Galileo with arguments, Sorabji has edited the volume under review (the project originated in a conference on Philoponus in 1983) and given it a most appropriate title. Here we find twelve articles, two by Sorabji himself, the first of which ("John Philoponus," pp. 1–40) serves as an introduction to the life and thought of Philoponus, where his views on natural philosophy (topics include creation, impetus theory, motion in a vacuum, vacuum and space, extension, Aristotle's fifth element, the directionality and transmission of light), and Christianity (Tritheism and the Resurrection) are briefly and lucidly described.

Of the remaining chapters, seven are concerned with aspects of natural philosophy. Of these perhaps the most significant is Michael Wolff's "Philoponus and the Rise of Preclassical Dynamics" (pp. 84–120) wherein the author, in pursuing three theses from a late nineteenth-century article on Philoponus by Emil Wohlwill, draws the startling conclusion that the origin of Philoponus's impetus theory lies in the concept of spontaneity governing "freedom of action and will" by means of which the soul "is able to act immediately on corporeal nature" (p. 118). In the ancient world, Wolff reminds us, "nature and natural phenomena had a moral significance and were not irrelevant for ethics and practical life" (p. 119). The possible influence of Philoponus's impetus theory on Islamic authors is explored in a much briefer paper by Fritz Zimmerman ("Philoponus' Impetus Theory in the Arabic Tradition," pp. 121–29). Despite the availability of Philoponus's opinions in Arabic translation and the similarity of their opinions with his, Arab supporters of impetus theory did not acknowledge any debt to him (p. 124). In contrast with A. Maier's view, Zimmerman is also convinced that Latin impetus theory was

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

drawn from Arabic sources in Latin and Hebrew translations (p. 129). But his case remains unproven until he can cite specific Arab sources in Latin garb that speak of the transmission of an incorporeal force from the motive power to the body set in motion.

Judging from Charles Schmitt's illuminating article ("Philoponus' Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* in the Sixteenth Century," pp. 210–30), the opinions of John Philoponus had their greatest vogue and influence in the sixteenth century, as a glance at a list of editions of both Greek texts and Latin translations (pp. 228–30) makes readily apparent. Moreover, because of his possible influence on Galileo (on which see page 226), Philoponus's name has become known to a wide circle of modern scholars who would have been unlikely otherwise to have heard of him.

In chapter 6 David Furley presents (pp. 130–39) a useful summary account of Philoponus's views on place and void following section by section his commentary on the fourth book of Aristotle's *Physics*. This is appropriately followed by David Sedley's chapter, "Philoponus' Conception of Space" (pp. 140–53), where we learn that Philoponus identified space and vacuum, which Aristotle had treated as separate entities.

Two further chapters (9 and 10) are also concerned with natural philosophy focusing on the creation or eternity of the world. In "Infinity and the Creation" (pp. 164–78), Sorabji describes the manner in which Philoponus challenged Aristotle's defense of an eternal world with no beginning or end. Sorabji considers two of Philoponus's arguments: that the world must have had a beginning or the absurd consequence would follow that an infinity of years would have been traversed and, second, that, if an infinity of years has been traversed up to the present, then another absurdity follows, namely that an actual infinite can be increased, since additional days and years will occur in the future. In "God or Nature? Philoponus on Generability and Perishability" (pp. 179–96), Lindsay Judson examines the consequences of Philoponus's invocation of Plato as a supporter of the opinion that the cosmos had a beginning, an opinion that was rejected by orthodox Neoplatonists.

Two chapters, the second and third, treat of religion from Christian and pagan points of view. Henry Chadwick's "Philoponus and the Christian Theologian" (pp. 41–55) summarizes Philoponus's views on a few theological issues, especially that of the natures involved in Christ and the Trinity (for these opinions he was condemned in 680–81, a century after his death) and concludes that Philoponus "was more successful as a philosopher and scientist than as a theologian" (p. 54). By contrast Philippe Hoffmann ("Simplicius' Polemics," pp. 57–83) analyzes Simplicius's commentary on Aristotle's *De caelo* within the context of a Neoplatonic religious and spiritual document. It is a treatise in which Simplicius repeatedly attacks Philoponus both as a Christian and as one who used Plato to attack Aristotle rather than to reconcile their thought, as most Neoplatonists did.

Two more articles remain to be mentioned. In chapter 8 Wolfgang Bernard ("Philoponus on Self-Awareness," pp. 154–63) analyzes a single passage from Philoponus's commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*. In it Philoponus takes up the problem of self-awareness, namely *prosektikon*, which, as Bernard describes it, "is a special faculty of the soul cognising the acts of the soul" (p. 157). Finally, Christian Wildberg's "Prolegomena to the Study of Philoponus' *contra Aristotelem*" (pp. 197–209) revises our understanding of that important attack on Aristotle, a work that survives only in fragments drawn from Simplicius's commentaries on *De caelo* and *Physics*, and from certain other Greek, Arabic, and Syriac fragments (see pages 233–34). An important segment of the article is devoted to its relative dating, from which a revised chronology emerges.

The twelve articles, taken together with useful bibliographies on the works of Philoponus, an index locorum to the writings of Philoponus, and a general index, comprise a good introduction to the thought of an extraordinary Greek thinker of the sixth century. What we learn here only whets our appetite for more. And, thanks to Sorabji and his colleagues, we are now more likely than ever to get it.

EDWARD GRANT
Indiana University

STEPHEN M. STIGLER. *The History of Statistics: The Measurement of Uncertainty before 1900*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1986. Pp. ix, 410.

The title of Stephen M. Stigler's book is appropriate, for this is a history of important theories of statistics rather than a history of statisticians or a social history of statistics. It is a straightforward history of ideas, in which the concepts appear to have an independent existence and various "heroes" who approach or grasp the critical concepts are introduced in chronological order—except when the logical development of statistical theory demands otherwise. Stigler's analyses are conditioned by this viewpoint. He is much concerned with "successes" and "failures" relative to today's accepted standards, often translating the language of the past into the analytical form of the present in order to facilitate those comparisons, even though, as he acknowl-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

edges, this also distorts the past. Even at a deeper level, his explanations proceed on the whole along intellectual lines with only scant references to obstacles exterior to the conceptual problems themselves.

Despite these self-imposed restrictions, Stigler's is an outstanding publication. Stigler has done a great deal of historical research, and his footnotes and bibliography contain an excellent selection of primary sources and secondary works. His analyses and judgments within the limitations outlined above are convincing. His writing, especially the mathematical, is an exemplar of lucidity; only the most dogmatic mathematical illiterates will find the mathematical symbols an impenetrable barrier. For the latter, and for those who want to delve deeper into the social history of statistics, there is a nonmathematical, more socially oriented history that complements Stigler's: Theodore M. Porter's *The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820–1900* (1986).

Stigler, of necessity, transcends disciplines because statistics developed as an ancillary field. The first one-third of Stigler's book concentrates on the eighteenth century and the first quarter of the nineteenth, and here the discussion revolves around attempts to tease maximum certainty out of inherent observational errors in astronomy and geodesy. This, however, is mere preparation for Stigler's main concern in the last two-thirds of the book: the development of a "hard" science of statistics on the basis of defining uncertainty in data within genetics and the social sciences in the nineteenth century. The major historical question for which Stigler provides an answer is why there was a fifty-year lapse betwen the discovery of the method of least squares and the development of regression analysis, since, in modern statistical theory, regression analysis involves almost wholly the method of least squares in its various forms.

For readers who are stymied by abstract mathematical analysis, there is a glimmer of hope in Stigler's data, one he does not make explicit, probably because, as illustrated throughout the book, he has much more empathy for analytical mathematics than for the older intuitive-geometric style. Many of the basic discoveries were made by means of geometric diagrams (Thomas Simpson), tables and charts (Adolphe Quetelet), and simple mechanical devices (Francis Galton). High-powered analysts extended and generalized these foundations, but they did not originate them. Today, nonmathematicians, including historians, have the computer to extend their insights.

HARVEY W. BECHER
Northern Arizona University

MICHAEL J. CROWE. *The Extraterrestrial Life Debate, 1750–1900: The Idea of a Plurality of Worlds from Kant to Lowell*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1986. Pp. xix, 680. $59.50.

The straightforward title of this book gives a good idea of its content; its import is clearly stated by the author in his conclusion: "The historical materials in these chapters . . . provide a massive refutation of the widespread assumption that the debate [over extraterrestrial life] began in this century and that finally in recent years the 'long-standing belief that the only intelligent life in the universe exists on our planet, Earth, is gradually disappearing'" (p. 547). Michael J. Crowe has indeed amassed a prodigious amount of research to show how the doctrine of "pluralism"—the belief that life, even intelligent life, exists on the moon, the planets, even the sun, and the undoubted solar systems spread throughout the universe—gained ascendancy in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Although speculation about extraterrestrial life went back to the atomists of classical antiquity, it was in the seventeenth century, under the aegis of Cartesianism, that the pluralist doctrine began to gain adherents among scientists and science enthusiasts. It is with the eighteenth century that Crowe's study begins its course in detail; he provides abundant evidence of the gathering momentum in favor of pluralism among scientists, philosophers, and literati in Europe and America. With astronomers in particular, pluralistic beliefs "made extraordinary progress" (p. 161).

Crowe also notes that the "conjectural component was large" in the espousal of pluralism by astronomers and others. Why, then, were eighteenth-century scientists and literati generally so positive concerning their pluralistic beliefs? Crowe finds an answer in the religious ("physicotheology") and teleological orientation still common in eighteenth-century thought. Its principal component was belief in divine plenitude: if God had taken the trouble to create planets like the earth and stellar systems like the solar system, he would hardly have left them uninhabited. Such an orientation could (and did) encompass a wide range of thinkers, from the deeply devout to radical deists such as Thomas Paine. Moreover, for some pluralists, the planets and stellar systems served as analogue or surrogate to traditional "heaven"; the inhabitants of the celestial regions were often conjectured to be morally (and intellectually) superior to human beings. The celestial habitations were even considered to be theaters of transmigration of souls in the afterlife.

The social, political, and cultural upheavals that marked the turn of the nineteenth century apparently caused hardly a ripple in the steady ascendancy of pluralism. Also, rapid developments in the sciences did not result in any significant damping of enthusiasm among scientists. Notwithstanding Wil-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liam Whewell's skeptical *Of the Plurality of Worlds: An Essay* (1853), to which Crowe devotes considerable attention, most scientists and writers interested in the subject continued to espouse belief in extraterrestrial life throughout and beyond the time period covered by Crowe.

The last part of the book deals with the period 1860–1900 and focuses on that cause célèbre, the "canali" on Mars "discovered" by Giovanni Schiaparelli in 1877 and espoused and elaborated by the American Percival Lowell until his death in 1916. On the face of it, the turn-of-the-century controversy would seem to be a satisfactory way to round out this study. In my opinion, however, it sidetracks and even derails Crowe's earlier account. This is because he uses the episode to express his own animus against pluralism and draw a moral: "If history can teach a lesson on this matter, it is that should a comparable controversy arise, astronomers may wish to emulate the actions of Antoniadi, Campbell and Maunder [the skeptical opponents of Schiaparelli, Lowell, and Camille Flammarion]" (pp. 545–46).

Even if Crowe's manner of handling this episode and his verdict that scientific belief in Martian canals had been decisively defeated by the time of Lowell's death are deemed acceptable (and I question both), this mode of concluding his book begs the fundamental question implied in the first quotation I cited. Did pluralism decline after 1900, and, if so, was this decline brought about by the secular controversy over the Martian canals rather than (or in addition to) changes in religious sensibilities regarding natural knowledge? We are not even given a conjecture on these issues because Crowe is so concerned with delivering his moral lesson. This is a disapppointment in a book that otherwise deploys such a wealth of scholarship to build up a fascinating story of the ascendancy of pluralism before 1900.

SEYMOUR H. MAUSKOPF
Duke University

UWE GRANZOW. *Quadrant, Kompass und Chronometer: Technische Implikationen des euro-asiatischen Seehandels von 1500 bis 1800.* (Beiträge zur Kolonial- und Überseegeschichte, number 36.) Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner. 1986. Pp. 381. DM 58.

In this college textbook Uwe Granzow seeks to explore the consequences of the maritime expansion of Europeans into Asia from the fifteenth century. After a brief introduction explaining the scope of the work, the main part, some two hundred sixty-five pages, describes and discusses five trading routes to the East, beginning with the Portuguese voyages from Lisbon to Goa and thence to Nagasaki, followed by the Dutch to Batavia and to Ceylon, ending with the English East India Company's London to Canton trade route. Throughout, the technical problems of navigation, the instruments and methods, are emphasized, for there was a crucial interaction between the economic gains from the long trade routes and the accuracy of navigational techniques and the skills of the officers who used them.

During the seventeenth century the French, Dutch, and British were all concerned to build observatories for the solving of the problem of longitude. More accurate positional astronomy allowed planetary theory to develop, with the eventual breakthrough of Isaac Newton and the law of gravitational attraction. Such a complete mathematical description was necessary in order to compute tables for future stellar and planetary positions, since on a long voyage the navigator had to be equipped for many months to come.

The last pair of chapters considers the process of technical innovation and its social consequences. The book ends with notes, a bibliography, and an index of charts but, unfortunately, no other index. The printing is from unjustified typewriter copy, using a small sans serif typeface, which I find offputting. The charts are reduced copies from previously published originals, and they have been printed poorly in some cases.

The author is better in the historical two-thirds of his book than on the sociological aspect. As the notes and bibliography show, he has plenty of sources to draw on for the historical accounts, but for the last part he is more or less on his own. The consequences of opening up the whole world to European trading vessels to bring about the "Ende der Welt" is not a theme that is well developed here. Nevertheless, it is most welcome that a work on this subject can place its emphasis on navigational techniques and instruments.

G. L'E. TURNER
Museum of the History of Science
University of Oxford

ALFRED W. CROSBY. *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900–1900.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1986. Pp. xiv, 368.

About 870 A.D. Norsemen went ashore in Iceland to establish one of Europe's first overseas colonies. A millennium later Europeans were thriving on islands halfway around the world. This epoch of expansion has been studied by so many historians from so many perspectives that one might wonder what still another book about Europeans abroad could possibly add. Yet this first-rate environmental history by Alfred W. Crosby manages to breathe some new life into that well-known scheme of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

events. Crosby turns our attention away from the political and military aspects of European expansion and instead asks us to consider the plants, animals, and microbes that accompanied explorers and colonists. Those organisms, the author asserts, so altered the landscapes of Australasia and the Americas that parts of those regions became "Neo-Europes" with ecosystems ideally suited to sustain the new settlers.

To illuminate this "ecological component" (p. 7) of European imperialism, Crosby begins 180 million years ago when the supercontinent Pangaea broke up to form the land masses recognizable today. Some 40 thousand years ago, wandering bands of humans left their home continents of Eurasia and Africa and crossed into the new worlds of Australia and the Americas. Melting ice caps and rising oceans isolated these immigrants, leaving them to adapt to life with plants, animals, and diseases vastly different from those of the Old World. Unsuccessful attempts at expansion by the Norse and Crusaders briefly opened corridors that allowed for the exchange of organisms with America and the Middle East. But it was West European mariners, with their knowledge of the ocean winds, who brought the biota of their homeland into prolonged conflict and competition with that of other continents.

In certain regions, such as tropical West Africa, European organisms and emigrants were slow to take hold. However, in temperate zones (from the Azores to the Americas to Australia), Old World plants, animals, and humans did much better. Set loose in familiar climes, European grasses, weeds, and crops (which, as Crosby demonstrates, all share a "weedy" adaptation to open or disturbed ground) crowded out local flora. Imported livestock proliferated, providing a crucial source of food for the colonizers. The Europeans' chief ecological allies were their diseases. Those pathogens killed nonimmune natives in droves, allowing the newcomers the time and space to gain a foothold. For a case study of such ecological disruptions, Crosby turns to New Zealand. There a long isolated and unique ecosystem first underwent a transformation at the hands of the Maori who migrated from Polynesia. In the nineteenth century, a second human invasion by missionaries, soldiers, and settlers sent the Maori population into sharp decline and turned the islands into a "Neo-Europe."

Almost all historians will find something familiar in this comprehensive story. Those who know Crosby's other work will recognize elements of earlier articles and his book *The Columbian Exchange: Biological and Cultural Consequences of 1492* (1972). But the present book cannot be dismissed as merely a larger synthesis of existing material. The book is distinctive in its scale and depth of analysis. In probing the reasons for the triumph of Old World organisms across the seas, Crosby adopts a global perspective that challenges the reader to see new connections between European invaders, native peoples, and their associated biota. Drawing on the controversial theories of paleontologist Paul S. Martin, Crosby shows how the initial human inhabitants of the Neo-Europes (Indians, Aborigines, Maori) may have hunted large prehistoric land animals into extinction. That ecological void, Crosby suggests, allowed European livestock to prosper with only minimal competition from indigenous wildlife. Crosby also provides a cogent biogeographical analysis of human and animal diseases. Consequently, we learn that in places such as New Zealand and New England both livestock and their masters were generally healthier than their counterparts in Europe.

Crosby's work should appeal to a wide audience. His global perspective and comparative approach make the book a natural for courses in European history and Western or world civilizations. His graceful style and attention to detail make it a delight to read. Even if it replows a bit of old ground, this book is a more than welcome contribution.

TIMOTHY H. SILVER
Appalachian State University

HENRY HOBHOUSE. *Seeds of Change: Five Plants That Transformed Mankind.* New York: Harper and Row. 1986. Pp. xv, 252. $18.95.

The "seeds of change" in this study are those of cinchona (the bark yielding quinine), sugar cane, cotton, tea, and the potato. That the five plants in question have had an enormous impact on human history is the central thesis of Henry Hobhouse, and of this he leaves no doubt. Whether, however, they "transformed mankind" is debatable, as is much of the hyperbole that characterizes this book, which is apparently aimed at a popular audience.

That audience will doubtless find it fascinating, for the author boldly deals with large themes: quinine made possible the European colonization of Africa and Asia and underlies the modern chemical and synthetic industries; sugar demanded the enslavement of millions of Africans; cotton production revived slavery in the United States, which brought on the American Civil War and massive economic dislocations for the proletariat in England; tea caused the near destruction of Chinese civilization when the British hit on an India-China opium trade to retrieve specie paid for Chinese tea; the potato precipitated a massive increase in the population of Ireland, which was abruptly decreased again by death or migration during the failed harvests of the nineteenth century. Efforts in England to bring

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

about free trade were aided by the potato famine of the mid-nineteenth century, setting the stage for that country's subsequent industrial decline.

The four pages of bibliography that generally omit the latest studies do not inspire confidence in Hobhouse's research, and his reading of those materials will outrage (or amuse) practically every history specialist. Students of the expansion of Europe, for example, will be startled to learn that "the starting point . . . had nothing to do with, say, religion or the rise of capitalism—but it had a great deal to do with pepper" (p. xi). Latin Americanists will question whether Huayana Capac, who triggered civil war by splitting the Incan empire just prior to the arrival of Pizarro, was the "greatest" Inca (p. 13), and Brazilianists will be rightfully upset to find their area of study (and the Dutch) not mentioned in the story of sugar. American military historians will doubtless wonder at the declaration that "without synthetic quinine, Japan would have won the war in the Pacific" (p. 33), and students of Iberia at the statement that in 1640 Spain "relinquished" dominion over Portugal (p. 55). Historians of slavery in the hemisphere will be surprised to learn that slaves were "better treated in Barbados than elsewhere" (p. 59), and many will wince at hoary allegations of massive "slave breeding" in and massive illegal slave importations into the North American slave states. Caribbean and Latin American scholars will learn that Dominica is really Haiti (p. 74), that the Good Neighbor Policy began in the 1940s as a ploy to prevent a fascist takeover, and that "before 1939 South America was virtually an Iberian/British sphere of influence" (pp. 81 and 90 n. 37).

Medical historians must also confront this sort of revisionism. Yellow fever (an African disease to which West Africans were relatively resistant) becomes a "new" disease for the Caribbean slaves and the "worst" to threaten them (p. 87 n. 19). Moreover, yellow fever was identified as a separate disease entity carried by the aedes mosquito only after the Panama Canal was built (p. 32). In addition "by the late 18th century malaria was contained by quinine" (p. 79), and there is little evidence of malaria in East Africa "until the white man arrived in force, after the seventeenth century" (p. 31).

On occasion the misinformation presented in this book is dangerous, as with the author's discussion of blacks and sickle cell anemia. Indeed, he defines "Negro" in the book as "a West African black with sickle cell anemia" (p. 4, 90 n. 34). This is the kind of terrible nonsense blacks in the United States have been suffering from for years at the hands of insurance companies, physicians, and misinformed lawmakers who do not know the difference between sickle trait and sickle cell anemia. Moreover, since frequencies of sickle trait generally average 25 percent or less even in areas of endemic falciparum malaria in Africa, the definition would hardly have been proper even had the author not confused anemia with the trait.

In sum the book's scholarly appearance created by the use of notes, scientific terms, and bibliographic citations belies a veritable catalogue of historical and medical misinformation, all irritations to which are added a liberal sprinkling of tiresome homilies. Hobhouse has the right idea. The plants in question and their histories are of extraordinary importance to the past of humanity. It is a shame he does not treat their study with the respect he correctly insists they deserve.

KENNETH F. KIPLE
Bowling Green State University

WALTER KENDRICK. *The Secret Museum: Pornography in Modern Culture*. New York: Viking. 1987. Pp. xi, 288. $18.95.

Walter Kendrick is at his best in describing the legal battles over pornography in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, first in Great Britain and then in the United States. He is conscious of the class and gender distinctions in the battle over pornography, makes use of the term "young person" to emphasize the indeterminate sex of the person to be protected from pornography (which differed between countries and over time periods), and in general gives a scholarly and liberal view of the topic. He is critical of writers such as Steven Marcus who emphasized that pornography was both regressive and debilitating.

The title of Kendrick's book is derived from the section of the museum in Naples where the erotic treasures from Pompeii were kept. It was to describe these collections that the term pornography was first used in English in the nineteenth century, an adaptation of a classical term used by Athenaeus and others literally meaning the "writings of prostitutes." The English dictionaries first limited the term to studies of prostitution but soon gradually extended it to other works previously labeled as curiosa, erotica, scatology, *et al.* By dating the term from the nineteenth century, Kendrick can ignore what went before in England and in America although writings and illustrations deemed pornographic existed before the word was recoined to describe them. In fact there is a strong English tradition of "pornographic writers" such as Thomas Nash, Henry Parrot, Samuel Pick, William Fennor, and Sir John Harington, and there was considerable ambivalence even in their own day about their subject matter. All of them are ignored by Kendrick, although he does mention Lord Rochester. By ignoring the English tradition of pornography and the influence of these early writers on others such as Shakespeare,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kendrick gives a somewhat misleading account of English and American attitudes toward pornography. He argues in effect that legal attempts to define pornography gradually limited prohibited material over time, first removing scientific works from the category, then the Greek and Roman classics, then English classics, until in recent years the definitions of what constitutes pornography have been so ambiguous (except for "child porn") that almost anything goes. He concludes with the efforts of women against pornography. Although I can agree with most of what Kendrick says, the question is far more complex, and, by ignoring what had gone before, at least in terms of English references to erotic literature, and by ignoring the contradictions about individual books such as *Aristotle's Masterpiece*, he makes the matter appear far more simple and linear than I believe it is. He also entirely ignores such phenomena as industrialization or urbanization, poverty, and the nineteenth- and twentieth-century feminist movements, which played such a role in the changing of attitudes about pornography. In sum Kendrick makes an important step forward in understanding pornography, but there is still a lot more to be done.

VERN L. BULLOUGH
State University College of New York, Buffalo

MARGARET F. STIEG. *The Origin and Development of Historical Periodicals*. Birmingham: University of Alabama Press. 1986. Pp. xi, 261. $31.95.

This is a librarian's-eye view of one of the staples of the historical profession, the scholarly article and its vehicles. In terms of quantity this genre has apparently never been healthier, in terms of access ("bibliographical control") it has never been in greater disorder, in terms of use never more neglected (largely because of the historian's laziness or lack of training), and in terms of quality—well, this is anyone's opinion, and everyone seems to have one. Margaret F. Stieg's book is in the first instance an institutional and sociological study, relying casually on statistics, opinion surveys (rundowns on stated editorial policies, submission and publication patterns, sources of funding, periodical services such as "nonarticle material," and so on), but it is also a historical account that makes use of interviews, personal letters, and manuscript sources, especially editorial correspondence. Further, it is a prescription for filling the needs of historians in the throes of the "communications revolution," when library science may be called on more often than paleography or sphragistics.

Historically, the focus is on the classic models of the professional periodical beginning in the age of "scientific history"—the *Historische Zeitschrift*, the *Revue Historique*, the *English Historical Review*, and the *American Historical Review*—their founding and later fortunes. More sporadically, the discussion moves to the spread and proliferation of periodicals, their specialization along lines both geographical (*Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, and the *Journal of Southern History*) and topical (*Zeitschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, the *Catholic Historical Review*, and the *Journal of the History of Ideas*), and their ventures into interdisciplinary areas. There is not much in the way of criticism, but there is some scandal (Heinrich von Sybel and Friedrich Meinecke's troubles with the *HZ*, for example, Arthur O. Lovejoy and J. H. Randall's squabbles over the *JHI*, and the threat of revolution against the "ring" controlling the *AHR* in 1915), and there is a certain amount of politics (national prejudices, involvements with government policies, shifting ideological enthusiasms in the *AHR*, and so on). It is a minor point, but it might be noted that the founding editor of the *JHI* was not a "professional historian" (as is the present one) but a philosopher—accounting in part for the character of this journal, which belongs in the "interdisciplinary" rather than the topically specialized class.

On the whole this is a well-informed and useful book but selectively, unevenly, and rather uncritically so. It confronts the current predicament of historical scholarship, when information, and "information science," is outrunning the historian's craft and when lack of "coordination" slows down the advancement of learning. Yet it does this on the basis of optimistic and rather unreflective Baconian premises, which require surrender to the "knowledge explosion" (it is also an "opinion explosion"), which assume that the newest is the best, and which aspire to international consensus despite "political" obstacles such as national prejudice and government policies. These conditions are perhaps no more than marginal inconveniences for library science, but they are inseparable from the predicament and the future of contemporary historical scholarship, and going "on-line" is only part of the solution.

DONALD R. KELLEY
University of Rochester

ALLEN GUTTMANN. *Sports Spectators*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1986. Pp. viii, 236. $24.95.

Allen Guttmann's new book comprises a historical survey of sports spectators to the present day and a more sociological analysis of modern spectators focused on the effects of television, the idea that sport functions as an "opiate of the masses," spectator violence, and the motivations of sports spectators.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As the author frequently concedes, his work as a historian has been complicated by the problem of scanty or nonexistent evidence. A second, and related, problem is that his treatments of the ancient, medieval, and early modern periods are too brief and rely to some extent on familiar material.

Nevertheless, the historical narrative achieves a good deal of continuity by focusing on the social status, gender, and behavioral norms of sports spectators. As the author points out, this data (and the "sports" being watched) come from diverse cultures and periods, and he offers the appropriate caveats. Guttmann is not an overgeneralizer, but his evidence suggests that sports spectatorship broadly defined is a specific type of human experience, historical variations notwithstanding. In addition there are interesting observations on the evolution of separate roles for players and spectators, the role of the press in discouraging spectator violence, and the likely, if hypothetical, contribution modern sports have made to what Norbert Elias has called the "civilizing process."

As a sociological observer, the author combines cautious theorizing, which works well in the case of spectator violence, with an empirical approach. For example, his accounts of modern sports journalism and televised sport are based largely on survey data. But this sort of empiricism has its limits. One might point out that sportswriters and commentators are specially empowered spectators whose rhetorical strategems and ideological agendas affect large audiences. This factor alone renders problematic the author's otherwise sensible criticisms of certain neo-Marxist assumptions about the effects of spectator sports. As the author shows, there are good reasons to doubt any simple correlation between sports spectatorship and social apathy or the sort of catharsis that diminishes aggressive feelings. But this argument—and the survey data on which it is based—do not address deeper questions about the psychology of sports spectators that require a more speculative, Frankfurt-style approach. Here an analysis of sports journalism, print and electronic, could help refine the analysis of sport as a form of mass culture.

Finally, it would have been interesting to see Guttmann relate his work to such studies as Herbert Gans's *Popular Culture and High Culture* (1974) and Patrick Brantlinger's *Bread and Circuses: Theories of Mass Culture as Social Decay* (1983). Such discussions would have added theoretical substance to an otherwise engaging book.

JOHN M. HOBERMAN
University of Texas

CELIA BERTIN. *Marie Bonaparte: A Life*. Paperback edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1987. Pp. xvi, 286. $12.95.

Marie Bonaparte (1882–1962) is best known to the world as the princess who secured Sigmund Freud's escape from Vienna after the Anschluss and as the disciple who preserved Freud's letters to Wilhelm Fliess in defiance of his wish that they be destroyed. As a psychoanalyst, she is known for her writings on female sexuality, in which she accepted and enlarged on Freud's view of women as essentially passive, masochistic, and poorly endowed with libido.

As Celia Bertin's interesting biography makes clear, Bonaparte's friendship with Freud and her work as a psychoanalyst constitute only a portion of an extraordinarily full and complex life. Great granddaughter of Napoleon's brother Lucien and married to Prince George, son of King George I of the Hellenes and grandson of King Christian IX of Denmark, Marie Bonaparte was related to half the royalty of Europe. As Princess George of Greece, she plunged into a lifetime of public responsibilities from the organization of military hospitals during the Balkan Wars to attendance at the marriage of her nephew, Prince Philip, to Princess Elizabeth of England. In addition, she took up causes that were hardly conventional for European royalty, joining in vigils for Sacco and Vanzetti and for the Rosenbergs and near the end of her life mounting an energetic but futile campaign to save the rapist and murderer Caryl Chessman from execution. Possessed of a boundless interest in people, she cultivated acquaintances ranging from Gustave LeBon to Jomo Kenyatta. And, driven by a compulsive search for the love denied her by both father and husband, she took many lovers, among them Aristide Briand and Rudolf Loewenstein. Intellectually gifted but long thwarted by her family, she searched restlessly for a profession, a search that was to be fulfilled only in 1925 when, at the age of forty-three, she met Freud and discovered the work and the cause that would dominate the remainder of her long life, first as student and analysand, then as clinician and theorist, always as its richest and most generous patron.

It would take a book twice the length of Bertin's biography to do justice to such a life. What we have instead is sometimes little more than a log of her familial, ceremonial, erotic, and intellectual encounters, too often written in an irritatingly artless style. Although extensive quotations from Bonaparte's letters and memoirs provide insight into aspects of her character and motivation, Bertin fails to integrate the multiple dimensions of her complex personality and richly varied life. Symptomatic of the difficulty of containing such a life within so brief a compass is the decided speeding up of the narrative pace about half-way through, so that, for example, capsule accounts of major public events in the 1930s alternate with stories from Bonaparte's private life with little serious attempt to relate them to one

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

another. In short, although the intrinsic interest of the life depicted carries over to the book itself, Bonaparte's definitive biography remains to be written.

ISABEL F. KNIGHT
Pennsylvania State University

ANCIENT

MALCOLM DAVIES and JEYARANEY KATHIRITHAMBY. *Greek Insects*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1986. Pp. xvi, 211. $24.95.

From Aesop's ant and "grasshopper" and Aristophanes' dungbeetle and wasps through Burns's louse and Dickens's cricket to Kafka's Gregor Samsa and Don Marquis's immortal Archy, insects have done more than scurry beneath our feet and crawl on our bodies. Sluggards do well to regard the industrious ant and busy bee, for the latter is also a model of chastity, according to Aristotle, Vergil, and Plutarch. A careless scanner of titles might assume that *Greek Insects* is a cache of trivia chewed over by bookworms, when in fact it is an informative and sensible initial volume ("Ant" through "Mantis") of a comprehensive survey of what we know or think we know about Hellenic views of the insect world. In the process we find that Aristotle was no more and no less "scientific" about insects than he was about most things and that Greek farmers, poets, and artists were fairly astute observers, even though they lacked magnifying glasses and were prone to anthropomorphize the social insects and other crawlies.

This book is a product of conjugal and scholarly cooperation; Malcolm Davies is a classicist and Jeyaraney Kathirithamby a zoologist, so they know of what they write. Although obviously they cannot dispense with Pliny, the authors have tried to exclude purely Roman data, but they salt their Hellenic samples with bits of comparative insect lore from exotic places (including modern Britain). I regret that their high standards prevent the inclusion of my favorite horror-of-war, the insect-laden grenades of Hatra (Herodian 3.9.5), which sticks-in-the-mud dismiss as "an old campaigner's story." The authors redeem themselves, however, by pointing out the symbolic connection between butterflies and semen and the light this may throw on the theme of Eros and Psyche (pp. 104–07). They also aptly warn social and cultural historians to consider all the evidence: "Allusions to the butterfly are scanty and rare in Greek literature," but "visual artists seem to have laboured under no such inhibitions" (pp. 100–01). The authors have a fine sense of social reality and cite Pausanias 10.10.7 on the Spartan worthy whose "wife 'among other endearments placed his head on her knees and began to pick out the lice.' There is no implication that this state of affairs was out of the ordinary" (p. 169).

Though better for browsing than for sustained reading, this book is reliable and packed with data, hence valuable for the historian. With regard to the many-legged creatures who infest its pages, let us recall that "the spider has wove his web in the Imperial palace" (Gibbon) and that, as for "the kings of crete . . . the spiders bite their feet following an old convention dating back to jeremiah" (Archy).

THOMAS W. AFRICA
State University of New York, Binghamton

ALAN WATSON. *Roman Slave Law*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1987. Pp. xxii, 157. $18.50.

This short but stimulating book is intended for readers who know little or nothing about the Roman law of slavery and especially for those who lack Latin. The subject is notoriously intricate; however, Alan Watson gets across at least the most important points by selecting and translating at length key legal texts, which are briefly discussed but basically left to speak for themselves. For Roman legal historians, the book offers little new, but even in difficult areas Watson's exposition is quite lucid, so much so that his few omissions (the most prominent are the effects of natural kinship and the lease of slaves) are the more regrettable.

Watson was inspired to write this book by his conviction that the "moral and economic nature of slavery is fundamentally affected by whether or not slavery is racist in character" (p. 3). Watson believes that Roman slavery was fundamentally nonracist in the sense that it did not depend on the ideology of a superior race subjugating an inferior one, and he argues that this fact resulted in "the very different configuration of the law of slavery in the American South and at Rome" (p. xvii). This proposition is interesting if perhaps debatable; certainly, the Romans thought that many other peoples (especially those of Anatolia and Syria) were "born for slavery." In any case the proposition is neither explained nor systematically applied within the book, even in discussing topics, such as the widespread use of slaves as managers (pp. 90–101), for which it seems most pertinent. However, Leon Higginbotham's brief foreword at least touches on some areas for further comparative analysis.

This book will come as a surprise to those who are familiar with Watson's recent books on legal history. In them Watson has repeatedly urged that legal rules develop with little relation to social and eco-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nomic needs. Here, by contrast, Watson more plausibly sees the Roman jurists as developing a law that was in basic harmony with Roman values and that was constantly informed by its underlying purpose, "to maximize the benefits of slavery for the owner" (p. 1). The resulting law was complex and often contradictory; Roman law equipped masters with extensive disciplinary powers (pp. 115–38), but it also found many ways to recognize slaves' basic humanity (see especially p. 95) and to make use of their human capacities. In this respect, Roman slave law differs notably from the slave law of the Americas.

Throughout his book Watson confidently assumes that he can infer "the attitudes that are revealed by legal rules and contemporary discussion of them" (p. 6). This confidence may be misplaced; Watson seldom refers to nonlegal sources on Roman slavery or to what is known about the social and economic operation of slavery in Rome. The nonspecialist will therefore probably profit most by reading this book alongside Thomas Wiedemann's fine collection of translated sources, *Greek and Roman Slavery* (1981), from the same publisher.

Unfortunately, the index to Watson's book is inadequate (for example, it has no entry for fugitive slaves), and the glossary of Latin terms is much too brief. The bibliography presented in footnotes is also far from comprehensive and in some cases does not report recent work that is also not reflected in the text. Those seeking a more exhaustive and analytical treatment of Roman slave law will still have to rely on W. W. Buckland's formidable masterpiece, *The Roman Law of Slavery* (1908), which Watson's book does not try to replace. Still, *Roman Slave Law* will prove helpful to nonspecialists who want an easy introduction and, perhaps especially, to historians of modern slave law.

BRUCE W. FRIER
University of Michigan

EDGAR PACK. *Städte und Steuern in der Politik Julians: Untersuchungen zu den Quellen eines Kaiserbildes*. (Collection Latomus, number 194.) Brussells: Latomus. 1986. Pp. 420. 1,900 F.

The study of the emperor Julian has much in common with that of Alexander the Great, quite apart from Julian's ultimate admiration for the mighty Macedonian (Libanius 17.17). Both complex, larger-than-life figures captured the imaginations of their contemporaries and all succeeding generations; both occasioned the most sharply polarized evaluations. Just as Ulrich Wilcken sensibly remarked that each student has his own Alexander, likewise for Julian. Each can only be found amid the totality of remarkably varied activities, a point Edgar Pack seems not to have grasped in his decision to focus on Julian's economic and legal relations with the cities of the Roman empire.

Pack rightly claims that the strong reactions to Julian's religious agenda have distorted evaluations of the emperor (pp. 9–35). Consequently, his remedy lies with jettisoning religious considerations except as they directly relate to the study of Julian and the cities (pp. 379–80). Three problems arise. First, Julian's religious programs and the polemic they have engendered constitute historical givens. It is implausible to deal with them by banishing them—rather, they must be reexamined and rethought. After all, religion represents the major means to legitimate secular political arrangements; focus on the latter tells but half the story. Second, Pack is not true to his exclusionary principle. On the one hand, he devotes more space than necessary, by his logic, to the notorious edict on teachers (pp. 261–300). On the other hand, he mentions Julian's attempt to rebuild the temple at Jerusalem so briefly as to be enigmatic, missing not only the point but much bibliography as well (p. 314). Third, Pack considers the evidence of the law codes the best way to find the "real" Julian (pp. 43–55 and chap. 2). This not only smacks of the nineteenth century's legal empiricism in historical studies but also has dubious validity, since it implies a false one-to-one relationship between intent and final legal outcome.

More generally, lack of historical context undercuts Pack's chosen theme. Julian's secular arrangements must be measured against the work of his predecessors and successors. How typical was Julian in light of, for example, the large-scale legal and economic repression of the curial orders throughout the century? Pack skirts the issue, despite his interest in legal evidence; the reluctance to discuss religious matters undercuts what claims he does make.

Certain problems of presentation also exist. Although Pack subdivides his three huge main chapters, those still-bulky sections often ramble. Anglophones will find the obscure German style a real barrier to comprehension. Prosopography, so vital for understanding the fourth century, is notable by its absence, for example, the very sparse references to *The Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, 1 (1971). The bibliography retails only a fraction of the important material in the notes: thus, Peter Brown's fundamental review (*Times Literary Supplement*, April 8, 1977) of Robert Browning's *The Emperor Julian* (1975) languishes (p. 257 n. 678, p. 298 n. 128). Finally, although the book represents a revision of a 1981 doctoral dissertation, Pack has missed salient works. In general Geoffrey de Ste. Croix's *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World* (1981) has much to offer. More specifically, Geoffrey Rickman's *The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(1980) and the many articles by Brown and John Matthews merit inclusion.

Despite these cavils, Pack's book will be useful for specialists, who will find the stray additional reference in the full footnotes. But nonspecialists will be baffled or imbibe a lopsided view. They should begin with Glen Bowersock's eminently useful *Julian the Apostate* (1978) and Brown's aforementioned review. Pack's introductory material (chap. 1) will then be useful as a guide to problems of tradition and evidence. But this book provides only partial material for those who seek either a total picture of Julian or help in constructing their own.

C. ROBERT PHILLIPS III
Lehigh University

MICHAEL MCCORMICK. *Eternal Victory: Triumphal Rulership in Late Antiquity, Byzantium, and the Early Medieval West.* (Past and Present Publications.) New York: Cambridge University Press or Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, Paris. 1986. Pp. xvi, 464. $49.50.

In the ancient world rulership and military success were virtually inseparable. Most Roman emperors had gone out of their way to celebrate their victories in vast pageants and parades, especially when circumstances of crisis or defeat made those ceremonies least accurate but most necessary. Not only did late Roman and Byzantine emperors continue the habit but many of the barbarian kings in the successor kingdoms of the Latin West also adopted the ceremonies. Michael McCormick's book is a meticulously thorough survey of such imperial and royal victory ceremonies that extends from the reign of the emperor Constantine I into the eleventh century in the Byzantine empire and the ninth century in the Frankish empire. Characterized by exhaustive scholarship and careful analysis, his book makes significant contributions to several important topics.

First, this is a book about emperors, both Roman and Byzantine. In contrast to other recent studies that assume that the essence of the emperors is to be found in their actual behavior, McCormick stresses both the public images of the emperors and the complex political messages that they wished to convey through those images. In the later Roman empire celebrations of victories conjured up political harmony, despite the presence of imperial colleagues and even the actual division of the empire. They also clearly demonstrated the overarching superiority of emperors, even when lesser generals were in fact responsible for the victories: emperors always remained "the distant, impassive cause, focus, and goal of the campaign and its symbolic conclusion, the victory parade" (p. 99). The messages implicit in the ceremonies could furthermore be tailored to specific audiences, whether the general population lining the streets of Rome or gathered in the Hippodrome at Constantinople or the senatorial aristocracy who greeted and socialized with the emperors.

Because these ceremonies of victory were part of a discourse about the distribution of power, others might appropriate the symbolism, among them usurpers, triumphant army commanders, and even provincial magistrates who staged miniature imitations of imperial ceremonies. McCormick also analyzes this diffusion of imperial gestures and apparatus, in particular from Rome to Constantinople and then to the barbarian kingdoms that gradually took over in North Africa and Western Europe. Since most barbarian kings had to strike a balance between their own barbarian soldiers and the native Romans they now governed, a Roman ceremony that stressed military success was especially appealing. And, since most of these barbarian kings faced challenges from powerful aristocrats, a ceremony that allowed them to imitate the Roman emperors considerably enhanced their prestige. In fact, Frankish monarchs pushed the ceremony to its limits by encouraging a liturgical and sacred aura that Byzantine emperors minimized.

Finally, in surveying and collecting the evidence for the actual ceremonies, this becomes a book about a myth of eternal victory. Romans, Byzantines, and barbarians seem to have swallowed the myth whole—literally so in some cases, since archaeologists have found bakers' molds that produced pastries with the impress of triumphant emperors. But, according to McCormick, because this myth was usually one step behind events, celebrations of victory were only symptoms and not agents of historical change: "each performance responded to the specific needs of the moment" (p. 388). This perspective on the role of myths in society is inherently self-limiting. Although McCormick is consistently attentive to changing nuances in the celebration of these victory ceremonies, he proposes few connections with other images of rulers as personifications of virtues, benefactors, judges, or even divinities, and he never employs comparative material from other historical periods or from cognate disciplines such as social anthropology or sociology that might have brought out the mutually influential interplay between myth and circumstances. In particular his fundamentally antiquarian approach produces a one-dimensional myth that was reactive, not active, a consequence of imperial and royal propaganda rather than a model for imperial behavior. In fact, the myth not only shaped the actions and intentions of emperors and kings; in the case of Charlemagne

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

it was perhaps a catalyst in the transformation of a king into an emperor.

RAYMOND VAN DAM
University of Michigan

MEDIEVAL

MICHEL MOLLAT. *The Poor in the Middle Ages: An Essay in Social History*. Translated by ARTHUR GOLDHAMMER. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1986. Pp. viii, 336.

Michel Mollat's wide-ranging investigations on medieval poverty, developed in numerous articles and Sorbonne seminars since 1962, have made him the reference point for virtually all that is written on the subject. In this book, originally published in 1978, Mollat gathers his findings for the general reader in a series of discourses in loose chronological order. His "essay" presumes, however, a greater familiarity with the history and culture of medieval Europe than most readers, at least in this country, will possess.

Mollat is interested primarily in the evolution of the concept of poverty from the late Roman empire through the Renaissance and in the various attempts to alleviate the afflictions of the poor. In the early Middle Ages the poor (as opposed to the indigent, who possessed nothing at all) were depicted as those who, because they were incapacitated by disease, famine, or economic reverses, became powerless against their landlords. Although the Benedictines provided hospitality to transients and later endowed almonries to aid the local poor, not until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries did lay people exhibit a sense of responsibility toward the needy by founding hospitals, leprosaria, parish confraternities, and poor tables. The Franciscans and Dominicans, by popularizing their own voluntary poverty, enlarged the meaning of poverty, especially in the overgrown cities, where by the fourteenth century the "working poor" constituted a new class created by birth rather than misfortune. The pauperization of large segments of rural as well as urban communities overwhelmed the resources of the old charitable institutions, concludes Mollat, and accounts for the violent social clashes of the late Middle Ages, but only in the sixteenth century was serious thought given to the elimination of poverty altogether through social engineering.

Mollat's original and stimulating book, based on an extensive reading of diverse sources, is less a synthesis than a collection of perceptive observations that he acknowledges are likely to be modified by monographs rooted in time and place. The total number of poor, for example, certainly increased in the late Middle Ages, but it is not at all clear that the working poor were a new phenomenon at that time. Also, although the meaning of "pauper" may have changed, as did sensitivity to the needs of the poor, it is debatable whether the nature of poverty itself evolved in the course of the Middle Ages.

Mollat's meager notes will place most of his interesting material out of the reach of nonspecialists, and the bibliography, unfortunately, remains unsatisfactory. Important works originally written in English are cited here by their French translations (for example, Norman Cohn's *Pursuit of the Millennium* [1957] and Natalie Zemon Davis's "Poor Relief, Humanism, and Heresy" [1968]), and no attempt has been made to update the bibliography with English-language publications of the last decade (such as Lester K. Little's *Religious Poverty and the Profit Economy in Medieval Europe* [1978]). Arthur Goldhammer's translation is excellent, as one would expect, save for a number of infelicities that might puzzle the English reader ("Uguccio" for Huguccio, "Trèves" for Trier). Given the potential readership of this book, it is regrettable that Yale University Press did not see fit to make this edition useful to nonspecialists.

THEODORE EVERGATES
Western Maryland College

WENDY DAVIES and PAUL FOURACRE, editors. *The Settlement of Disputes in Early Medieval Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1986. Pp. xii, 304.

The jacket indicates that the ten essays in this collection use the case-law approach "to reveal the realities of the settlement process in the behaviour and interactions of people" between the collapse of the late Roman state and the legal revival of the twelfth century. The contributors are aware of the limitations of their evidence (for example, virtually all the cases are concerned, directly or indirectly, with disputes over land won by a church), but the authors insist that documents such as the Frankish *placita* offer a better insight than law codes into how the law functioned in actual practice. The cases are translated or paraphrased in the articles and published in their original language in an appendix. The articles deal with Merovingian and Carolingian Gaul, Brittany, Spain, Lombard-Carolingian Italy, the Byzantine provinces in the tenth century, Anglo-Saxon England, and Ireland. The last article, by Jenny Wormald, about a sixteenth-century Scottish dispute, is intended to show the survival and sophistication of early medieval procedures for settling disputes. The book is remarkably coherent because the contributors read and criticized each other's work. Patrick Wormald's introduction and the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

three-part conclusion written by Roger Collins, Paul Fouracre, and Chris Wickham are the product of the group's joint deliberations.

The authors attack the traditional view expressed by such luminaries as Frederic William Maitland that the early medieval legal system was ritualistic and used such "irrational" proofs as oath helping, lots, and ordeals. Early medieval courts relied instead on documentary evidence and witnesses. Indeed, the widespread use of writing is striking. There were, of course, significant regional differences, say, between the bureaucratic Byzantine state and kin groups of Ireland, but it is the similarities and continuities that are most impressive. Decisions were usually based on the collective judgment of experienced amateur judges. Courts met on a regular basis and were accessible, as Wendy Davies's study of eastern Brittany suggests, even to peasants. The court was the place where the state, defined as an external public authority based on some sense of collective identity, impinged on local society, but the decision was based on local relationships. As a result, the resolution of conflicts emphasized mediation and the maintenance of peace more than adjudication and impartial justice, but Wickham insists that these are not opposites in actual practice. The authors argue that such events as the Carolingian legal revival and the Norman Conquest did not cause any fundamental changes in the procedures for settling disputes.

Several of the authors reject the dichotomy between Roman and more "primitive" Germanic practices; medieval people borrowed elements from both traditions. It is surprising, therefore, that none of the articles deals with East Francia. Are we to suppose that no documented cases survive from east of the Rhine, a significant fact in itself, or is this one more example of the shameful neglect of medieval Germany in Anglo-American scholarship? Still, this is a provocative book that might be the subject of a seminar about early medieval Europe.

JOHN B. FREED
Illinois State University

EKKEHART ROTTER. *Abendland und Sarazenen: Das okzidentale Araberbild und seine Entstehung im Frühmittelalter*. (Studien zur Sprache, Geschichte und Kultur des islamischen Orients, new series, number 11.) New York: Walter de Gruyter. 1986. Pp. 290. DM 158.

By a painstaking examination of West European observations of Arabs and Arabia between 570 and 740, Ekkehart Rotter delineates an area of inquiry broader than the religiously circumscribed topic of Christian knowledge of Islam and Muslims pursued by such authorities as R. W. Southern and Norman Daniel and investigates a time period they dismiss. He demonstrates that accurate knowledge regarding Arabs and Arabia, as well as limited information regarding Islam, was available in Western Europe by 750 and that on some points, such as the ancestry of the Arabs, competing plausible theories existed. Moreover, through his numerous citations, Rotter indicates vigor in European intellectual life even during this allegedly "dark" age.

An outgrowth of the author's doctoral dissertation of 1979, the work consists of close studies of brief notices concerning Saracens, a term eschewed by modern scholarship as indicative of medieval romantic imagination or religious hostility but rehabilitated by Rotter as the standard term by which pre-Islamic and Islamic Arabs were known in the medieval West. The material is organized into three chapters treating eyewitness accounts of pilgrims to the Holy Land, descriptions of Arabia and the origin and descent of the Arabs, and notices of Arabs and Saracens in historical works; a brief concluding chapter presents the resultant portrait of the Arabian peoples.

Rotter is a master both of the early medievalist's art of making much of little and of the Germanic tradition of close textual study. Through examination of the available sources in their various scholarly editions, he establishes minute insights that accumulate to produce a comprehensive picture. For example the seemingly simple statement "on the other bank [of the Jordan River] on the Arabian side" launches a lengthy discussion of the territory Arabia supposedly and actually included. Likewise, he convincingly explains how the mystifying placename Cypias, equated by some modern scholars with the Caspian and used as evidence that ignorant medieval Europeans located Arabs in the Caucasus, resulted from simple transliteration into Latin of the unfamiliar sigma and rho in the Greek term "Syria."

Rotter assigns major roles in shaping early Western views of the Saracens to the so-called Chronicle of Fredegar and to the work of Bede but gives scant attention to the pseudo-Methodius and the works of Spanish historians, so the West of his concern is Italy, France, and England. Sometimes he thoughtfully pauses to remind us what contemporary readers innocent of modern scholarship would understand from a specific passage or work, but he neglects to consider such matters as how many people actually read such works, what picture a reader consulting several works would develop, and what the prominent or dominant understandings were.

Rotter's disagreements with other English and American scholars besides Southern and Daniel and his inclusion of few English-language items in his extensive list of works consulted constitute something of an indictment of English-language scholar-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ship on the early medieval period. His work sets a standard that few studies emulate, and his treatment of this facet of the early medieval *Ideenwelt* is likely to remain authoritative.

JAMES WALTZ
Eastern Michigan University

ROBERT CHAZAN. *European Jewry and the First Crusade*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 380. $39.95.

For well over a century, historians of the Jews have focused on 1096, the date of the First Crusade, as a milestone in the European Jewish experience. Owing to the decimation of several Rhenish Jewish communities that accompanied the Crusade, many have deemed 1096 a watershed in medieval Jewish history, a year of critical damage to the security of European Jews from which they never recovered. The violence notwithstanding, others have responded that the Crusades helped inaugurate a period of unprecedented prosperity and cultural creativity for all of European civilization, including the Jews. It is indeed surprising, therefore, that several generations of modern scholarly debate never produced a comprehensive overview of the interaction between the Jews and the First Crusade—that is, of the events and of their significance.

Culminating nearly two decades of research and publication on medieval Ashkenazic Jewry, Robert Chazan here seeks to fill this historiographical void, and his book represents a welcome contribution to the field. The author first sets the anti-Jewish violence of 1096 against the backdrop of the sociocultural vitality that characterized the age—that which gave rise to "budding new urban centers, along with small but significant Jewish settlements, and the physical and spiritual vigor that engendered the First Crusade" (p. 16). Considering all of the available documentary sources but relying primarily on the lengthy Hebrew chronicle attributed to Solomon ben Simson and the shorter "Mainz Anonymous," Chazan next classifies recurring patterns in the attacks on the Jews and in the ensuing Jewish responses. Subsequent chapters consider the aftermath of 1096 in different respects: the rapid recuperation of twelfth-century German Jewry, the lasting memories and cultural impact of the violence, and the posture of the church and the Jewish communities during the later Crusades. The author's translation of the two Hebrew chronicles comprises an appendix to the volume, offering an alternative to Shlomo Eidelberg's 1977 translation of the same documents.

Throughout his book Chazan scrutinizes the regnant scholarly assumptions concerning his subject. He refuses to consider the massacres the exceptional, aberrant behavior of an undisciplined mob, having little to do with the essential mission of the Crusade. Economic considerations may have fueled the anti-Jewish animus, but they too did not constitute its cause. Rather, the violence entailed unprecedented, "*organized* efforts to destroy major Jewish communities"; it was "inspired primarily by ideas and ideals" central to the spirit of the Crusade (p. 64). Although the papacy never sanctioned such violence, others enlarged and distorted the papal call for a holy war, so that "efforts to convert the Jews if possible or, if necessary, to exterminate them" became "a correlative of the general call to do battle against the enemies of God and Christendom" (pp. 75, 77). On the other hand, the massacres laid considerably less waste to the European Jewish community than is commonly believed. The predominant preference of the victims for martyrdom rather than submission and baptism perhaps did more to enrich the cultural fervor of Ashkenazic Jewry than to deplete its ranks beyond repair. As depicted in the Hebrew chronicles, self-sacrifice constituted resistance to the Crusade in kind, whereby the zeal of contemporary martyrs, inspired by the memory of ancient martyrs, withstood an attack and merited salvation as a result. The massacres continued to inspire liturgical poetry and pietistic tendencies among Ashkenazic Jews, which number among the lasting hallmarks of medieval Jewish civilization. In all, the violence of 1096 was neither an insignificant event nor a "watershed" for medieval Jews but a glaring indication that their destiny and the history of Latin Christendom were inextricably intertwined—for better and for worse.

Lucid in its style, deliberate and even-handed in its argumentation, this book ably integrates many of the complex dimensions of its subject within a single well-crafted volume. On one particular issue, however, I did feel short-changed. Acknowledging the central theological motivation of his Hebrew sources, Chazan nonetheless insists on their credibility and accuracy. Only in a footnote does he hastily cite—and then dismiss—the 1982 essay (*Prooftexts* 2:40–52) of Ivan G. Marcus, "From Politics to Martyrdom: Shifting Paradigms in the Hebrew Narratives of the 1096 Crusade Riots." On the basis of exacting textual analysis, Marcus proffered a strong case that ideological concerns determined the selection and description of the events that these documents recorded. Historical accuracy mattered little and resulted only by coincidence. "The events actually reported qualify for inclusion only when they fit the narrator's preconceived literary schema. Medieval chronicles are in this sense fictions: imaginative reorderings of experience within a cultural framework and system of symbols." From such a perspective, the texts underlying Chazan's study provide minimal insight into what really took place

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in 1096. Chazan's response, that the polemical intentions of his sources "do not distort the historical narrative," must be argued at length, not merely asserted (p. 329, n. 59). One hopes that Chazan will soon return to this issue and confront it directly, thereby enhancing the value of his important volume.

JEREMY COHEN
Ohio State University

G. MERLO, editor. *Esperienze religiose e opere assistenziali nei secoli XII e XIII*. Turin: Segnalibro. 1987. Pp. 192.

This collection of five essays edited by G. Merlo addresses medieval religious experiences and charities in five Italian cities: Voghera, Treviso, Verona, Padua, and Spoleto. The rich and largely unexploited source materials available in small cities enable the authors to demonstrate that broad generalizations about religion and charity should rest on carefully presented local evidence.

Daniela Rando's work on the hospital of All Saints in Treviso reveals the desires of some lay people to lead a life between the secular world and the orders of the church. This hospital provided the laity with a range of ways to participate in religious life. Some men passed their days at the hospital and returned at night to their families in Treviso; others lived near the hospital, but some of these continued to take meals with their wives and children. In 1229 a group of cloistered women associated with the hospital objected to these perceived irregularities. The women were poor and chaste but did not belong to a religious order. Rando observes that the men were leading a hybrid life, with strong ties to family and religion. The church favored greater order, and by midcentury a monastery and convent existed at the hospital.

Giuseppina Gasparini explores how lay people in Verona assisted the lepers of their town. By 1223 the city had gathered together Verona's lepers at one site, and this act uprooted the sick from scattered huts built for them by charitable lay people. Gasparini makes two important points. Spontaneous acts of private charity again succeeded in creating a need for a more formal arrangement; by 1235 the Dominicans were running the lepers' church. Lay compassion toward lepers was producing tangible results long before the preachers came to Verona. As in the example of St. Francis himself, spiritual impulses to care for lepers, perhaps less common than acts of cruelty, nevertheless merit attention in any study of medieval leprosy.

Successful hermits hoped to leave few traces in the historical record, but really good ones attracted followers and donations. Antonio Rigon has searched the notarial records of Padua for traces of hermits in the foothills west of the city. He finds that solitaries are difficult to pin down, and the sources reveal more about the donors than about the recipients of charity. Close study of hermits at Venda reveals that initially these hermits were monks seeking a purer life but that charity from the rural nobility enabled them to exist. This community expanded beyond its monastic and elite base to inspire a lay confraternity in Padua and gifts of land from rural communes.

These three fine essays exemplify the benefits of solid local history and the fruitful work taking place outside Florence and Venice.

STEVEN EPSTEIN
University of Colorado

ANNE BARSTOW. *Joan of Arc: Heretic, Mystic, Shaman*. (Studies in Women and Religion, number 17.) Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen. 1986. Pp. xxiii, 163. $49.95.

Anne Barstow's intention in this clearly written study is not to offer another narrative biography of Joan of Arc. Rather, she focuses on the aspects of Joan's behavior and society that enabled her, as a woman and illiterate peasant, to act autonomously and to acquire authority. Her analysis draws primarily on recent scholarship in French and English, as well as on the records of Joan's trial of 1431 and her posthumous retrial of 1450–56.

The book's six chapters deal, respectively, with Joan's roots in popular religious culture, her status as mystic, shaman, heretic, and witch, and, finally, the significance of Joan's life for women in our time. The appendix provides an English translation of Jean Gerson's *De quadam puella*, which reveals how controversial Joan was, even before the victory at Orleans in 1429.

Barstow argues that Joan's supernatural voices (she attributed them to Saints Michael, Catherine of Alexandria, and Margaret) provide the key to her prophetic career: when recognized as authentic, the voices endowed Joan with the status of mystic and shaman; when denied authenticity, they branded her as a heretic and a witch. This approach to Joan differs from that of another women's historian, Marina Warner (*Joan of Arc: The Image of Female Heroism* [1981]). Warner's book focused primarily on Joan's image and on how that image challenged or was modified to fit society's categories of male and female; Barstow's book focuses on Joan's autonomy, rather than on her image. More important, however, Barstow wishes to redress Warner's assertion that, because her prophetic message was so worldly and because it was not grounded in biblical culture, Joan lay outside of the late medieval mystical and prophetic traditions. Barstow replies that

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Joan lay within these traditions. Her voices exemplifed both the mysticism of women, who had no recognized channel for public authority except through supernatural charisma, and the propheticism of popular religion, which stood outside of and in tension with official Christianity. Joan's voices, Barstow insists, were rooted in popular religious "individualism," which emphasized each person's unmediated relationship with the holy.

Those who are familiar with recent literature on popular religion and on women's spirituality will recognize the argument, reappropriated here, that mysticism was a source of authority for the powerless and especially for women. They may take issue, however, with Barstow's emphasis on the opposition between popular and elite cultures. This emphasis prevents Barstow from adequately interpreting Joan's intense devotion to the eucharist. It also leads to an exaggerated distinction between the saintly mysticism of Catherine of Siena and the heretical mysticism of Joan of Arc. Heretics, Barstow assumes, were more autonomous, but she is apparently unaware that Catherine, too, was suspected of witchcraft. Barstow's use of the term "individualism" is also problematic. To be sure, lay people found ways to bypass the clergy in seeking relationships with the holy and the supernatural. In employing the term "individualism," however, Barstow fails to acknowledge that the modern sense of this term may not apply to medieval society, and she ignores a rich literature on the collective nature of medieval religious expression.

SHARON FARMER
University of California, Santa Barbara

JUDITH M. BENNETT. *Women in the Medieval English Countryside: Gender and Household in Brigstock before the Plague*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. xv, 322. $34.95.

In this study of the public life of women in the village of Brigstock before the Black Death, Judith M. Bennett has analyzed a variety of sources using the quantitative techniques developed by Ambrose Raftis and his students. Unlike previous monographs proceeding from that group, Bennett's study concentrates on the gender system that defined women in public life, adding a detailed account of her methods for using court appearances to reconstruct some aspects of private (undocumented) life. Bennett supplies comparative data where possible to enhance the specificity of Brigstock. The most useful sources are court rolls; other sources tend to reflect only the public and economic roles held by men, although they confirm the exclusion of women.

Everyone apparently accepted the subordination of women as natural, and Bennett argues convincingly that this affected other data such as the low rate of reported male violence against women and the frequency with which women were fined for "unjustly" raising the hue and cry against men. She also demonstrates that lack of legal experience and lack of a network of favor doers weakened women's stance in law, making them dependent on family support. Concurrently, the early separation of adolescents from their parents as they went out to work compounded the break between daughters and their natal families normally consequent to marriage.

At the center of Brigstock life was the conjugal household, which established its social norms and operated as a productive unit. At an early age, tasks assigned children established gender roles that were flexible but inescapable. Parents gave daughters less care and attention because of the legal preference for male heirs and the movement of daughters to husbands. Girls and boys followed a roughly similar path through adolescence, separating from their parents and working in productive, agricultural, or service jobs, but boys were more successful than girls at accumulating money and purchasing land. Their destinies radically differed at marriage.

Adolescent independence favored individual choice of marriage partners, which argues against the "low affect" family that other authors have seen in the Middle Ages. Peasant couples related to each other legally and economically about the same way as did nobles. Husbands controlled their wives' property. Women's work was indispensable, but it tended to be subordinate, characterized by compatibility with housework. Women generally worked as hired labor at trades defined as unskilled to supplement their husbands' labor and supply a labor pool for busy seasons. In Brigstock women dominated the brewing trade because men found more profitable work outside the household. But by law their incomes remained in their husbands' hands, and alewives were excluded from public functions, even ale tasting.

Widows and young girls had a larger public role than wives, as Bennett demonstrates by comparing one spinster to her married sister. On the other side, records of land transactions illustrate the economic disadvantages that pressed women into marriage while age and a lifetime of subordination often prevented widows from taking full advantage of their opportunities. A woman's life was characterized by discontinuity compared to the steady progress of a man's. The social structure was only prepared to deal with women as wives. As both daughters and widows they were anomalous. Except for a brief mention of reproduction in the economic activity of wives, "mothers" are excluded from this

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

book, as they were from Brigstock's public notice. Dissimilarity of social roles, economic restrictions, and legal disabilities produced an interlocking gender system, reinforcing itself at every point.

We can hope that when people were not dealing with the law their relationships were better balanced, but Bennett's cautious deployment of her sources convinces me that the undoubted hardships of peasant life contained no compensation in rough equality for women.

JO ANN MCNAMARA
Hunter College

CONSTANCE HOFFMAN BERMAN. *Medieval Agriculture, the Southern French Countryside, and the Early Cistercians: A Study of Forty-three Monasteries.* (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, number 76, part 5.) Philadelphia: The Society. 1986. Pp. 179. $18.00.

Popular and scholarly wisdom has long accepted the claims of twelfth- and thirteenth-century Cistercian monks that their austere order established its houses and farms on wild and empty sites where their own labors brought forth rich agricultural yields from previously untouched lands. Constance Hoffman Berman has studied forty-three Cistercian houses in southern France to test the validity of this interpretation.

Berman examines the Cistercians' own records, mainly chartularies but occasionally financial accounts, both in published editions and in fifteen French archival collections. Her findings well support judicious revision of the traditional position. Like recent students of some individual Cistercian houses in France and elsewhere, she finds the Cistercians rarely settled on genuinely virgin and unoccupied lands. Many were previously lightly used "waste," that reserve of uncultivated land so important to the extensive agropastoral enterprises of the earlier Middle Ages. From other parts of the new Cistercian estates, the monks had removed previous cultivators. Cistercian agricultural management in southern France was especially directed to the physical and legal consolidation of their holdings into large blocks under their sole authority and to the creation of their own inexpensive labor force, the *conversi*, or working brothers. These they recruited from local peasant populations, sometimes directly so transforming former cultivators of Cistercian lands.

Direct operation of large farms called "granges" and technical advances in pastoralism were thus the principal means for Cistercian prosperity in southern France. Grange agriculture gained from economies of scale, from labor by *conversi* and monks without dependent families to support, from austere Cistercian ethics, and from Cistercian exemptions from taxes and tithes on their own production. Having early acquired rough and uncultivated pasture lands far from their monasteries, the Cistercians organized and institutionalized movement of their flocks and herds between summer grazing in the hills and winters on the plains. From the larger herds thus supported, several benefits flowed: improved manuring of Cistercian arable, increased market sales of stock, and liquid capital for further acquisition of lands and rights to land.

Cistercian houses were established in twelfth- and thirteenth-century France to meet religious needs. The order had, however, economic as well as religious impact on the region. Cistercian agriculture placed food in large quantity and meat of improved quality on regional markets. Cistercian profits financed the economic prosperity of the monasteries and, when recycled through land purchases and the credit market, imitative economic improvements by other landowners.

Berman has made a valuable contribution to understanding the real operation and complexity of medieval rural economies.

RICHARD C. HOFFMANN
York University

MICHAEL JONES, editor. *Gentry and Lesser Nobility in Late Medieval Europe.* New York: St. Martin's. 1986. Pp. 230.

The ten papers in this collection, nine of which were delivered at a conference at Nottingham in 1984, include three on the English gentry, one on the Scottish, and one each on Gascony, the rest of France, Castile, Germany, the Low Countries generally, and the Burgundian Netherlands. Most of the articles concentrate on the fifteenth century, when social distinctions were becoming more rigid everywhere. Every region of Europe with meetings of "estates" had a legally defined nobility, but nowhere was the process as complete as in England, where the development of a parliamentary peerage distinguished not only nobles from commoners but also titled nobles from the lesser nobility or gentry. On the Continent greater and lesser nobles generally sat together as a noble estate, whereas in Scotland all groups met together in a unicameral assembly. Distinguishing a vertical order of nobles from the permeable social class of gentry thus often becomes a matter of intangibles. Nowhere is this problem as acute as in the Burgundian Netherlands, where the extreme degree of social mobility and the fact that the nobles were a semibourgeois group in the fifteenth century make "lesser" nobility an essentially arbitrary distinction.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Even within the same region there are problems of definition. In the papers concerning England it is not always clear whether the subject is the three nonpeerage grades of gentleman, esquire, and knight or simply gentleman. There is some disagreement between authors: D. A. L. Morgan argues that the gentry were not necessarily rich or landed but only that they aspired to land and wealth, whereas Christine Carpenter and by implication Keith Dockray see the gentry as a rural group, although open to outsiders. Carpenter indeed finds lordship over men to be the distinguishing mark of gentility in the fifteenth century. Possession of a coat of arms was always required.

The inconsistency of the sources is also a problem. Some French writers used "gentilhomme" in a sense similar to the English, but the word generally meant the upper ranges of nobility, which was using antiquity of noble lineage to distinguish itself from simple knights. In Castile, however, knighthood carried more prestige than did nobility *per se*. Although the term "gentilhombre" existed, Angus MacKay finds that the closest equivalent of the English gentleman was the hidalgo who had not been dubbed a knight. Yet the presence of a substantial ministerial nobility in Castile and the fact that mounted military service was required of all persons above a certain level of wealth blur the equation. Although F. R. H. Du Boulay admits that the German knights performed functions in the rural areas similar to those of the English gentry, he takes refuge in semantics to deny comparability, since German burghers either remained in the towns or had themselves dubbed knights without passing through the halfway house of becoming "gentlemen," a word that does not exist in German. For Jenny Wormald the facts that the Scottish lairds played little role in national politics and were not distinguished juridically or often in terms of their style of life from their social inferiors distinguish them from the English gentry.

Most of these papers are based on original archival research and are well written and convincingly presented. M. G. A. Vale's article on seigneurial fortification in Gascony, although interesting, seems to have nothing to do with the subject of the other papers, and J. M. van Winter's contribution on the Netherlands simply recapitulates material previously published elsewhere, becomes mired in definitional quibbles, and deals with a period long before the fifteenth century. The papers would have been more useful if everyone had agreed simply to discuss the lesser nobility. I became impatient with the obsession of several authors with the words "gentleman" and "gentry." Although Michael Jones provides a brief introduction, a longer summary of the considerable regional functioning similarities, as well as of the more obvious terminological differences, would have been very useful.

DAVID NICHOLAS
University of Nebraska

MARIA ASENJO GONZALEZ. *Segovia: La ciudad y su tierra a fines del medievo*. Segovia: sn. 1986. Pp. 689.

María Asenjo González is one of the best and hardest-working historians from among a group of young Spanish medievalists who are rewriting and, in some cases, discovering the history of Castile. The author of numerous and impressive preliminary articles on Segovia, she has now completed the first full-fledged study of the city and its territory in the late Middle Ages. Segovia was one of the main cities in Old Castile and an important textile center at the onset of the early modern period. With its royal stronghold of the Alcázar, a fabled Roman aqueduct, and the preferred royal residence of Henry IV in the late fifteenth century, Segovia has long waited for an enterprising historian to reveal its history. Asenjo González proves to be such a historian. This rich, informative, and lucid book offers a complete history of the city and its surrounding countryside. In four extensive chapters—in reality four sections divided into short chapters—the author examines in careful detail every aspect of Segovia's setting, its social, economic, and political structures. Her accomplishments here and her command of the sources come very close indeed to what an ideal *histoire totale* ought to be.

In her first section Asenjo González examines the spatial organization of the town and countryside, as well as the dual nature of Segovia as head of and part itself of a vast territory. Because of its origins as a vanguard of a moving frontier in the eleventh century, Segovia was a "community of town and land." As was usual with most large town councils settled between the river Duero and the Central Sierras, villages in the hinterland also shared in urban liberties and franchise. Of particular interest is a richly documented aside on the city's water supply and sanitary conditions, and we can see an urban administration sensitive to those civic needs often associated with Renaissance cities. Her powerful image of two cities—an aristocratic and clerical city within the walls and an artisanal and rural community without—serves as a departing point for a careful examination of the economic and social structures of city and country in the region of Segovia in the next two sections. Asenjo González offers a dynamic model of economic and social change. Her descriptions of agricultural and ranching activities, on the one hand, and of manufacturing and other trade occupations, on the other, help make clear the close ties between city and country in

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

late medieval Castile. She also dispels some of the stereotypes about the rise or lack of capitalism in Castile. As she argues correctly, the failure did not lay with artisanal groups but rather with the landed nobility and mercantile elites who refused to sacrifice their immediate profits in the imported cloth and wool trade to an industrial future.

In addition we observe the rise of oligarchical government in the city, articulated through the monopoly of political and economic power in the hands of two urban *linajes* (really extended family clans). On the other hand, the commons were not entirely subdued, and there are echoes of their grievances and political strength in the final years of the fifteenth century. Her study of the role of Jews, Moors, and *conversos* in the life of Segovia also testifies to the complex and heterogeneous character of the city. One must note the inclusion in this third section of extensive prosopographical studies of Segovian families, which illustrate clearly the nature of economic and political power in the region. A final section explores the institutional organization of the city and its place in the political life of the realm. Maps, the edition of relevant documents, extensive footnotes from archival sources, and an excursus on the church in Segovia complement and add to the value of this book.

Asenjo González's book is an excellent and valuable contribution to our knowledge of urban life and to the bonds between city and country in late medieval Castile. She has advanced our understanding of Spanish society on the eve of imperial expansion. This is indeed an excellent example of what is best about recent Spanish historiography and what a first-rate historian can do with such a rich subject.

TEOFILO F. RUIZ
Brooklyn College

ELISABETH VESTERGAARD, editor. *Continuity and Change: Political Institutions and Literary Monuments in the Middle Ages; A Symposium.* (Proceedings of the Tenth International Symposium, Centre for the Study of Vernacular Literature in the Middle Ages, 1985.) Odense: Odense University Press. 1986. Pp. 134. 150.00 KR.

Continuity or change—a fundamental problem for all scholars in the humanities and the social sciences—was the subject of the tenth symposium organized by the Centre for the Study of Vernacular Literature in the Middle Ages at Odense University in Denmark. It is a pleasure to report that the six papers, distributed among anthropologists, literary scholars, and historians, are uniformly rich and stimulating.

Using Old Norse (five) and French sources, the articles evenly divide between the issue of continuity and change. Against Einar Ólafur Sveinsson's classic study, *The Age of the Sturlungs* (1940, English translation 1953), Jesse Byock argues that continuity was the most consistent feature during the Sturlung age of mid-thirteenth-century Iceland. Similarly, Howard Bloch sees medieval misogyny as a cultural constant reaching from Old Testament roots to the fifteenth century. Showing the influence from ideas previously developed in *The Scandal of the Fabliaux* (1986), this article is notable more for provocative questions than for solutions. The two anthropologists, Kirsten Hastrup and Elisabeth Vestergaard, see both continuity and change in their sources. Hastrup distinguishes between the Icelandic sagas, in which a constant process of self-identification is revealed as the sagas are being "said," and the laws, corresponding to a changing society, which portray discontinuity as they are being "laid down." Vestergaard explains the similarities and differences in family attachments that developed between the *Volsungasaga* and the *Nibelungenlied* by examining the societies that produced these works. The two historians, Sverre Bagge and Gábor Klaniczay, emphasize change. In a brilliant essay on the new sociological and historical analysis of society apparent in the Norwegian treatise *The King's Mirror* and in Snorri Sturluson's *Heimskringla* from the middle of the thirteenth century, Bagge explains the early appearance of this rational thinking in Norway by the absence of a university. Instead, the royal court became the intellectual center, naturally promoting an interest in society and history that had been inherent in the twelfth-century renaissance but was abandoned for other interests in the university milieu. Klaniczay examines Hungarian royal saints and offers a masterly survey of the political use of royal sainthood in Europe from the sixth to the fourteenth centuries by showing how the institution changed in different settings and times. This discussion is marred only by the use of German epithets for Old Norse figures in an English text.

JENNY M. JOCHENS
Towson State University

MICHAEL BORGOLTE, *et al.*, editors. *Subsidia Sangallensia I: Materialien und Untersuchungen zu den Verbrüderungsbüchern und zu den älteren Urkunden des Stiftsarchivs St. Gallen.* (St. Galler Kultur und Geschichte, number 16.) St. Gallen: Staatsarchiv und Stiftsarchiv. 1986. Pp. 756. 68 FR.

The book is divided into two parts, the first dealing with the *Verbrüderungsbücher* of the monastery of St. Gall, the second with its charters from the early eighth to the early tenth centuries. An edition of the memorial books of the monastery is planned for the *Libri memoriales* section of the *Monumenta Germaniae*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Historica. Karl Schmid, Dieter Geuenich, and Roland Rappmann offer a new hypothesis about the St. Gall memorial book and attempt to reconstruct it. The key contention is that the book previously known as the St. Gall *Verbrüderungsbuch* was originally not one book but two separate *Verbrüderungsbücher*, which they label as the older and younger memorial books. In 800 Abbots Werdo of St. Gall and Waldo of Reichenau agreed that their abbeys would memorialize each other. The older *Verbrüderungsbuch* was a result of this agreement. The younger or newer *Verbrüderungsbuch* was put together in the latter half of the ninth century, perhaps because of the building of the church of St. Othmar. Schmid argues that the older book continued to be used in the abbey church, while the newer one was kept at St. Othmar's.

Geuenich argues that the *Censualium hominum rotulus* that is found in the *Codex traditionum* of 1645 was originally part of the newer memorial book. Further lists from both books were copied and preserved by Melchior Goldast, who resided at St. Gall between 1599 and 1606, in his *Alamannicarum Rerum Scriptores*.

Schmid offers a reconstruction of the older book, here designated as *A*, and of the newer one, marked as *B* (pp. 88–145). The older book was divided into three sections, of which the first is entirely lost but of which the contents can partially be reconstructed. The second section survives entire, and of the third ten out of sixteen pages remain. Schmid argues that this book used columns topped by arcades to separate its lists. The younger book consisted of six sections. Instead of arcades above the columns, the newer book's columns were trabeated. Of the six sections, more than half of the first, second, fourth, and fifth are lost, whereas about three-fourths of the third and sixth remain (pp. 147–276).

The reconstruction of both books requires that the folios of the surviving book be reordered. Ink stains have been one of the key means of doing this, and a list of these is provided by Rappmann (pp. 277–83).

The second half of the volume is devoted to studies of the surviving charters from the eighth through the early tenth centuries. Michael Borgolte studies the charters recording grants from the Alaholfinger family, attempting to use them to reconstruct the self-consciousness (*Selbstverständnis*) of a noble kindred (*Verwandtengemeinschaft*) from the Alemanni during the late Merovingian and Carolingian eras. He reconstructs the genealogy (p. 305) and argues that the Alaholfinger became connected to the Carolingian house by marriage and that the title of *Graf* was used by the Alaholfinger as a family right, not as the result of a Carolingian official designation. Borgolte sees evidence in the charters of Carolingian penetration of the region of the Folcholtsbaar on the upper Danube and of Alaholfinger efforts to counter this by grants to monasteries, including St. Gall.

Borgolte devotes much of the second part to a commentary on the charters of St. Gall that were printed by Hermann Wartmann in his *Urkundenbuch der Abtei Sanct Gallen* (1863–66). First of all Borgolte gives a list of Wartmann's 778 charters. For each one he gives the writer, the place where the charter was written, and a brief list of the places that were being donated (*Guterort*). In a footnote to each charter, Borgolte gives a commentary of varying length. Forty-two additional charters are added to the list at the end. Next there is an index of the places where the charters were written and that were donated. The bulk of the space is given to a register of all of the people named in the 814 charters, some 22,100 people. The register is arranged by grouping the names according to stems or *lemma*. Hence, under Agi-, names such as Acconis, Eccho, Hacco, and Heio are grouped (p. 517). Another index lists the names by office. A map is given at the back of the book that shows the places listed in the commentary.

The second part of the book will be of use to early medieval historians. Borgolte's article on the Alaholfinger should attract fairly general interest; the commentary and registers, more specialized researchers. The first half will attract only those interested in the history of memorial books and especially the memorial book of St. Gall.

E. RANDOLPH DANIEL
University of Kentucky

MODERN EUROPE

BRIAN P. LEVACK. *The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe*. New York: Longman. 1987. Pp. xii, 267. $24.95.

Brian P. Levack treats this complex and emotion-provoking topic objectively, analytically, and conservatively. He painstakingly avoids sensationalizing an exotic topic and carefully reexamines statistics of prosecutions and executions as well as the "collective hysteria" of the time. He is equally careful in weighing his definitions, discussing the differences and similarities between such concepts as witchcraft, magic, religion, "witch hunt," and "witch craze."

Levack's basic approach to the understanding of the history of witchcraft is one of multicausality. This requires of him the formidable task of scrutinizing the complex of psychological, sociological, theological, economic, and political conditions that were responsible for the rise, duration, and decline of witchcraft from the late Middle Ages through the early modern age.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

He commences the task by analyzing the intellectual foundations of witchcraft belief, particularly what he terms the "cumulative concept of witchcraft," including the figure of the devil in Christian theology, the pact with him, the witches' sabbath, and the witches' flight. These assumptions were apparently imperative for the development of what was the "abominable collective crime." Levack then examines legal foundations, the impact of the Reformation on witchcraft belief and persecution, social and political circumstances, the dynamics of witch hunting, the chronology and geography of it, and the decline and survival of witchcraft.

Levack's logical sorting of a prodigious amount of material has resulted in one of the most informative and comprehensive works of its genre. The author is not merely aware of the major contributions in the field but also able to judge their relative value and integrate them into a meaningful overall picture. He superbly renders the vital scholarly function of integrating and summarizing the findings of scores of field and archival researchers, thereby maintaining the line of communication between the researcher and the lay person. Particularly strong are the discussions on legal foundations and regional differences of witchcraft, where he examines the circumstances that explain, for example, why Germany, Switzerland, and Poland had "witch crazes," whereas Italy, Russia, and the Scandinavian countries had moderate "witch hunts."

Obviously, a work of such vast scope and so brimful of information cannot help but open itself to some criticisms. For example the juxtaposition of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism as the philosophical backdrop of witchcraft belief should be more detailed to make sense to a nonphilosopher. Also, the role that the *Malleus* played in widening the circle of persons vulnerable to the accusation of heresy if they as much as doubted the existence of witches or the practice of witchcraft should be expatiated. More seriously, the formulation of the "cumulative concept of witchcraft" should include the role of torture as it was used in the inquisitorial process. This aspect is discussed in another chapter, but Levack neglects to emphasize its role as the perpetuum mobile that was apt to create an avalanche of prosecutions and involve ever larger numbers of victims. But, in view of the overall excellence of the work, these criticisms are relatively minor. I recommend the book to other scholars, as well as to so-called lay persons, including our college students, who may gain unbiased and rich information on a subject so often misrepresented and misunderstood.

HANS SEBALD
Arizona State University

ANTONI MĄCZAK. *Rządzący i rządzeni: Władza i społeczeństwo w Europie wczesnonowożytnej* [The Rulers and the Ruled: Power and Society in Early Modern Europe]. Warsaw: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy. 1986. Pp. 326.

Recent challenging surveys that address European absolutism directly (for example, Perry Anderson's) or indirectly (for example, Immanuel Wallerstein's) have hardly done justice to the mass of new monographic literature on the subject in many languages. Antoni Mączak's Polish-language study pulls this literature together with lucidity, spirit, and a gift for clear summary of the work of others and for apposite quotation. The author begins with a discussion of the estates, whose undoubted decline as a political force over most of the Continent nevertheless left plenty of scope for both cooperation with and opposition to sovereign authority, and proceeds to an analysis of the state as an enterprise, which concentrates not only on the economic domination of rulers over their subjects, especially through the management of regalian rights, but on the growing role of churches and armies as government agencies. A chapter under the fashionable title of "Center and Periphery" examines issues ranging from charisma to clientage, with particular stress on the tendency toward oligarchy. Another on elites sustains that theme, with much material about the criteria for nobility and its degrees of exclusiveness in different countries, although parallel trends within nonnoble society are not ignored. Finally there are sections on the crucial phenomenon of rising officialdom, a force for modernization whose ethos remained nevertheless largely premodern (Mączak is good on corruption and sale of office but perhaps neglects the extent to which education too failed to impart useful, practical knowledge), and on the court itself, where the question of its antagonism toward the country at large provides a focus.

Mączak proves himself extremely well versed in the Western literature, including that on areas often neglected, such as Scandinavia (a pity that his book is so poorly and confusingly annotated). But he offers more than that, for here is a scholar from an East European tradition addressing central issues of high political history after decades when orthodoxy demanded a concentration on material foundations and popular aspirations. Mączak is no dogmatist—disarmingly, he even attributes Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach to Engels (p. 76)—and he allows the lessons of Polish history to impinge fruitfully on his analysis. Particularly interesting is his claim that the Polish *Sonderweg* was neither evident before the mid-sixteenth century nor complete before the mid-seventeenth, when it was hastened not by "noble anarchy" as such but by an excess of *magnate* power and by a triumph of the periphery over the center that the union with Lithuania did much to accelerate. He might, however, have cast his gaze more

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

generally over the countries of Eastern Europe: Hungary is ignored and (very Polish this!) the Bohemian situation somewhat distorted. A greater weakness lies in the failure of this thoughtful book to press its larger arguments consistently. The growth of central authority under monarch and court, mediated by bureaucracy—so Mączak implies—involved not so much the defeat as the incorporation of the estates; real power was exercised by an oligarchy of old and new nobles, whose spheres of clientage embraced both the public and the private domain. But this thesis has to struggle to emerge from the haphazard organization of so much fascinating evidence. The author is an excellent *cicerone* (not for nothing is he an expert in the travel literature of the period), and he covers an immense amount of ground, with a constant and proper insistence on the *genius loci*, but his itinerary and time schedule might have been tighter and more coherent.

R. J. W. EVANS
Brasenose College
University of Oxford

A. LONDON FELL. *Origins of Legislative Sovereignty and the Legislative State.* Volume 3, *Bodin's Humanistic Legal System and Rejection of "Medieval Political Theology."* Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gunn and Hain. 1987. Pp. xx, 415.

In the first two volumes of his projected five-volume study, A. London Fell argued that much of the foundation of modern political thought had been laid in the sixteenth century by Johannes Corasius, a French jurist hitherto noted for his involvement with the case of Martin Guerre. This third volume goes on to try to explain why the person usually believed to be the founding father of modern political thought, Jean Bodin, managed to recapitulate much of Corasius's thought without bothering to mention Corasius, a man he had known personally at Toulouse and whose works he had certainly read. Fell's answer is that Bodin used Corasius's ideas without attribution, and he corroborates this by showing other unacknowledged borrowings by Bodin from Guillaume Postel and Thomas Smith. An argument on the basis of circumstantial evidence is carried episodically through the text and on into the several appendixes. Since Bodin ordered his manuscripts destroyed just before his death, there is much room for speculation about his early intellectual debts. Fell concentrates on early publications of Bodin that have usually been granted little attention, especially his *Iuris universi oratio* and *Iuris universi distributio*, rather than on his *Six Books on the Republic*.

The Bodin-Corasius question is only part of the story of this book, however, since a great deal of time is spent on the Aristotelian hierarchy of causes (formal, efficient, material, final) as developed by Aquinas and Marsilius of Padua.

Fell's treatment of three distinct concepts of time (eternity, sempiternity, and event-time) is extremely stimulating, since Bodin's rejection of the notion of sempiternity was entailed in his rejection of the existence of immortal entities such as the Holy Roman Empire. In order for Bodin to defend the eminently historical political powers of the French monarchy, he had to attack the existence of political entities that, although created in time, were immortal. This entailed a rejection of "medieval political theology" in theory at a time when it was also in the course of ceasing to be part of the ceremonial pageantry of the French state. This is the most successful part of Fell's study, although I believe it would make sense to ask how much Ernst Kantorowicz's own thesis concerning the king's two bodies accurately reflected the medieval political tradition before dissecting Bodin's attitude to that tradition.

One appendix includes corrections to the earlier volumes, and another deals with the social and intellectual situation in Toulouse in the mid-sixteenth century. The meandering course of the study is such that most of us will not be able to judge its propositions with any finality until the fourth, or even the fifth, volume is out.

STEVEN ROWAN
University of Missouri, St. Louis

DOMINIQUE JULIA *et al.*, editors. *Histoire sociale des populations étudiantes.* Volume 1, *Bohême, Espagne, États italiens, Pay germaniques, Pologne, Provinces-Unies.* (Les universités européennes du XVI[e] au XVIII[e] siècles.) Paris: Editions de l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales. 1986. Pp. 260.

This volume presents aspects of the social history of universities in the Holy Roman Empire, Bohemia, Poland, Italy, Spain, and the Dutch Netherlands between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries. References to French and English universities are also introduced, and a forthcoming second volume will be devoted to France and to necessary syntheses only briefly alluded to in this tome. Volume one offers readers an introduction by Dominique Julia and Jacques Revel, who set forth research guidelines, and a final essay with valuable multinational perspectives sketched by Roger Chartier.

The other contributors offer essays of unequal length, and not all address every line of inquiry posed by the French directors of this comparative

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

history. Central to the essays, however, is the role universities played in European societies during a period traditionally regarded as one when intellectual life in universities declined and remained stagnant. Quantitative methods are employed to analyze student populations and to suggest correlations between university study and career patterns and social mobility. Also looming large are references to Lawrence Stone's thesis on an "educational revolution" in English universities between 1560 and 1640. Noting that Oxford and Cambridge enrollments then reached a size not seen again until the late nineteenth century, Stone attributed the early surge to the increase in job possibilities offered by the expansion of bureaucracies accompanying the growth of the modern state. He also connected the educational revolution and England's political revolution. By the 1630s not all educated men could find employment commensurate with their university training, and some became political rebels. After England's upheaval of the 1640s, enrollments declined. According to Willem Frijhoff, who here studies German university enrollments from 1576 to 1815, seventeenth-century Germans also identified the issue as an excess of "intellectuals."

Historians of other nations have tried to confirm or deny the existence of an early modern educational revolution by measuring enrollments and the numbers of men prepared for posts in law, medicine, churches, or universities. If this volume's authors agree that university students were affected by the larger society and, in turn, affected that society, they differ in conclusions about the most important social, cultural, economic, and political influences on particular universities. The four essays on Bohemia and Poland emphasize students' social origins and religious issues, and Frantisek Šmahel and Irene Kaniewska use urban roots as the criterion for bourgeois status. Šmahel's study of the University of Prague from 1433 to 1622 stresses its bourgeois character and loss of an international student body in the wake of the Hussite revolution. Jiri Pešek and David Šaman's investigation of Bohemian students studying elsewhere in Central and Western Europe between 1596 and 1620 concludes that students left Bohemia primarily to find hospitable Lutheran, Calvinist, or Catholic settings or a "savoir vivre" presumably no longer available to nobles at the University of Prague. Similarly, Kaniewska's two essays on the University of Cracow from 1433 to 1780 delineate an increasingly bourgeois student body, the loss of German and Hungarian students after the Reformation and Battle of Mohács, and the loss of noble students in the wake of the seventeenth-century creation of Jesuit secondary schools. For the seventeenth-century Dutch Netherlands, Frijhoff asks what kind of bourgeois student went to universities. He concludes that during the early period of national independence and accompanying commercial expansion proportionately fewer students came from prosperous coastal areas. Instead, students from inland areas were more likely to seek the university credentials leading to "safe" bureaucratic or professional careers. As dramatic economic growth ceased, however, students from coastal areas became more numerous.

Eighteenth-century university enrollments were typically lower than those of seventeenth-century peak periods, but historians differ over whether high enrollments constituted an educational revolution or whether falling enrollments signified unmitigated decline. Richard Kagan's essay on Italian universities from 1500 to 1700 rules out an educational revolution, as does Šmahel for Prague. Once French universities are discussed in the second volume, Julia and Revel promise a thorough critique of Stone's thesis. Several essays suggest a correlation between lower university enrollments of the eighteenth century and the increase in secondary schooling opportunities attractive to students who might earlier have gone to universities, but the theme is not developed adequately to enlighten readers unfamiliar with parallel research on Old Regime *collèges*. Mariano Peset and Maria Mancebo's data on eleven Spanish universities in the eighteenth century offer a mixed picture since eight universities experienced rising enrollments. The volume's authors do agree that the growth of the nation-state, religious divisions, and wars dramatically reduced the international composition of student bodies.

Chartier's stimulating concluding essay sketches a multinational model of university development and underscores the significance of the seventeenth-century formulation of the idea that too many educated men existed. Clearly, universities had more students during the seventeenth century than during the sixteenth or eighteenth centuries, but the national "peak" moments varied. Chartier's four-phase model for relating university enrollments and social realities starts with the growth stimulated by bureaucratic expansion and clerical training and moves to a second period of "saturation" of the job market for graduates. A final period during which graduates sought jobs other than those for which they had prepared was preceded by a third phase when people became aware of the disequilibrium between degrees and available positions and began to turn away from universities. Looking at representations of the gap between university degrees and jobs, Chartier cites Richelieu, Colbert, and German contemporaries who saw an excess of educated men endangering social stability. Appropriately, Chartier concludes not only that this representation was the work of preindustrial elites eager to ensure positions for the sons of established families but also that the idea, once formulated, acquired a life of its own.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, the July Monarchy's liberals echoed earlier concern about the dangers of educating the sons of *le peuple*. The 1848 revolutions reinforced that concern, and, Chartier suggests, vestiges of it still exist.

LINDA L. CLARK
Millersville University of Pennsylvania

STUART WOOLF. *The Poor in Western Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*. New York: Methuen. 1986. Pp. xix, 240. $57.50.

Although entitled *The Poor in Western Europe*, Stuart Woolf's excellent new book draws primarily on Italian sources to address some of the general questions and problems posed by social historians of poverty. The book consists of eight essays, five previously published only in Italian and therefore not readily accessible to a wide audience. Contending that the poor constitute "a distinguishable if fluctuating social category" (p. 48), Woolf focuses on eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Italy, and particularly Napoleonic Tuscany (1808–14). Although the Napoleonic regime did not construct particularly innovative policies toward poverty, its concern with bureaucratic oversight and uniform statistics has provided posterity with a cache of quantitative and qualitative data. Woolf uses these data to construct an analysis on two levels: of the poor themselves and of elite attitudes toward them.

For Woolf the study of the poor forms part of the history of the *longue durée* since the slow, gradual process of falling into poverty has changed little over the centuries and invariably correlates with lack of jobs and precarious stages in the life cycle of families. In early modern Europe, all members of the laboring classes faced the possibility of poverty and a large proportion did fall into destitution sometime during their lives. Woolf estimates that only 4 to 8 percent of the early modern population was "structurally poor," that is, permanently unable to work or become self-supporting. But another 20 percent was at any one time "conjuncturally poor" because of temporary problems such as loss of employment, death of a spouse, or an excess of dependent children. In time of crisis, such as famine or war, up to 70 percent of the population might fall below the level of subsistence. Woolf does not rely uncritically on his quantitative sources but identifies the biases in statistics of poverty, noting for example that their static quality masks the fluid and shifting nature of the poor population.

Woolf argues that attitudes to the poor, in contrast to the relatively timeless character of poverty, often changed rapidly. For example, whereas medieval thought held the poor to be blessed creatures who offered the elite the opportunity of bestowing charity, attitudes hardened in the fifteenth century. Since then most institutions of charity or welfare—whether religious, municipal, or national—have distinguished between the deserving and undeserving poor, helping the former but punishing or interning the latter in workhouses, hospitals, or prisons. In perhaps his most fascinating and innovative essay, Woolf analyzes how one such institution, the Congregation of San Giovanni Battista in Napoleonic Florence, perceived and responded to those who applied for charity. Taking into account the size, income, and respectability of each household, the congregation carefully apportioned different types of aid. It preferred to grant bread to small families bereft of wage earners, sheets to the sick who might spread contagion, and beds to large households, especially those in which teenage daughters slept with male relatives. Only the very old (over seventy) and the blind were licensed to beg. The undeserving poor, such as able-bodied vagabonds, received no sympathy.

In several essays Woolf mentions that the majority of poor in early modern Italy, as in the United States today, were children, widows, or members of female-headed households. Yet he never really develops this tantalizing insight into an analysis of how women and children, as opposed to adult men, perceived and experienced poverty. He might have taken advantage of Joan Scott and Louise Tilly's *Women, Work, and the Family* (1978) or other feminist scholarship that has begun to analyze how life cycles and work, or lack of it, intersected to shape women's options and strategies for survival. The fact that women and their children constituted the bulk of the poor must also have influenced what Woolf calls the "ideology" of poverty or elite attitudes toward the poor. For example, did the policies and practice of charity institutions reflect changes that the Reformation and Counter Reformation brought to the image of women or Rousseau and the romantics to the image of children?

Woolf's thoughtful book will interest historians of the poor, laboring classes, demography, family, and statistics. As a collection of essays, it contains some repetition but never leads to boredom. It deftly combines innovative primary research in an often neglected period of the Italian past with theoretical insights shaped by a thorough grasp of the general historiography of European poverty. The extensive and international bibliography, broken down by country, usefully summarizes this historiography. Together with his *History of Italy, 1700–1861* (1979), this book makes Woolf the foremost interpreter of Italian social and economic life during the complex and confusing period preceding unification.

MARY GIBSON
John Jay College of Criminal Justice

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

JACOB KATZ, editor. *Toward Modernity: The European Jewish Model.* New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books. 1987. Pp. vii, 279. $24.95.

This important collection of essays is the product of a symposium organized by the Leo Baeck Institute in the spring of 1983 in Haifa and chaired by the editor of this volume, Jacob Katz, one of the preeminent Jewish historians of our day. The title of this book does not in truth reflect the central question around which the essays revolve, which is (as the editor explains in his introduction) the extent to which the modernization of the Jews in Germany—as opposed to Europe as the title suggests—was paradigmatic or, at the very least, in what ways the fate of German Jewry influenced the course of the transformation of Jewish communities throughout Europe and America. Behind this seemingly innocent set of questions lies a historiographical debate of formidable pedigree. The first professional historians of the Jews were products of the German university system in the mid-nineteenth century, and they—and especially Heinrich Graetz, probably the most important, influential, and widely read modern Jewish historian—promoted a vision of Jewish modernity that was decidedly and indeed unabashedly Germanocentric. For Graetz and his disciples, modern Jewish history began in Berlin with the rise to fame of Moses Mendelssohn and the birth of the Jewish version of the Enlightenment movement. The truth fanned out from Berlin to other parts of the German-speaking world, and, ultimately, to the more benighted ends of the Jewish globe.

This vision of the primacy of German Jewry was challenged quite early in the annals of modern Jewish historiography by East European Jewish historians, and the arguments have continued to this day, joined, in recent years, by the concurrent rise of interest in the Jewries of East Central Europe and by the appearance of a new generation of Jewish historians influenced by the currently fashionable theories of social history and local history, which of course challenge the intellectual and ideological thrust and the global generalizations of the Germanocentric model.

The eleven contributions to this volume are for the most part extremely interesting and readable ponderings on the relations between German and other Jewries. Unlike most editors of similar volumes, Katz does not merely summarize or praise his colleagues in the introduction to the volume but challenges and criticizes some of their conclusions and premises and provides a most valuable guide to the question at hand. The volume then moves from east to west, with short but cogent pieces by Emanuel Etkes on Russia and Israel Bartal on Galicia; more substantial essays by Robert Wistrich, Hillel Kieval, and Michael Silber on Vienna, Prague, and Hungary respectively; an enlightening reflection on the shifting relations between French and German Jewries by Michael Graetz; a somewhat pedestrian piece on Dutch Jewry by Joseph Michman; an excellent examination of the fascinating Jewish community of Trieste by Lois C. Dubin; a cogent statement of the anti-Germanocentric position by Todd Endelman aptly entitled "The Englishness of Jewish Modernity in England"; and a valuable entry on the fate of German-Jewish identity among American Jews by Michael A. Meyer.

In the end, despite the fact that most of its contributors seem to shy away from the notion of one model for Jewish modernization, the volume does not speak with one voice and certainly does not resolve the debate around which it was constructed. That is probably fortunate, and certainly not surprising, for in many respects the question of whether the modernization of German Jews was paradigmatic for other Jewries may well be a classical *question mal posée*. As several historians have recently argued, German Jewry's own process of modernization was not so monolithic or ideologically radical as has been assumed by both sides of the "paradigm" debate, and the doubts raised by the advocates of the new social history about the centrality of the German Jewish experience may well be dispelled as more is discovered about the social and cultural history of Jews throughout the countries covered in this collection.

Be that as it may, this is a useful and intelligent addition to the library on modern Jewish history. One technical criticism must be voiced: the introduction and the several essays written by nonnative speakers of English have unfortunately not been translated or edited as well as they ought to have been, and thus some awkwardness clouds the customary eloquence of their authors.

MICHAEL STANISLAWSKI
Columbia University

PAUL M. BAUMGARTEN. *Die römische Kurie um 1900: Ausgewählte Aufsätze.* (Kölner Veröffentlichungen zur Religionsgeschichte, number 10.) Edited and with a Foreword by CHRISTOPH WEBER. Cologne: Böhlau. 1987. Pp. xx, 261.

Christoph Weber's latest work is centered on an admittedly obscure figure, one Paul M. Baumgarten (1860–1948), a German priest who lived in Rome for several decades around the turn of the century. Although Baumgarten attended the Papal Diplomatic Academy and bore the title of monsignor, he never held any official position in the Catholic church, earning his living as a free-lance journalist

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and also producing a number of scholarly works, especially on early medieval church history.

This might not seem like entirely promising material to work with, but Weber is interested in Baumgarten primarily because of his position as insider and outsider in the Vatican. As a priest, a resident of Rome, and a former student of the Papal Diplomatic Academy, Baumgarten was well connected and had inside information about the curia, but, since he did not hold an official position in the church, he was under no obligation to be discreet about his knowledge. In a lengthy introductory essay, Weber uses Baumgarten's journalism as a means to explore controversies within the world of Catholic historical scholarship and, more broadly, Catholic intellectual life, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Weber emphasizes a theme he has explored with great sophistication in his previous work: the clash between orthodoxy and liberalism, between integralists and modernists, in this case, the extent to which historical criticism of such subjects as the lives of the earliest popes or the miracles performed by saints might come into conflict with church dogmas. Weber also uses another topic of Baumgarten's writings, the organization of the papal universities and the Vatican's diplomatic corps, to consider the relationship between intellectual currents and organizational structures and the extent to which these institutions met the organizational requirements of the twentieth century. The second half of the volume contains reprints of several essays by Baumgarten and a bibliography of his voluminous writings.

Although bits and pieces of material in this book may be of interest to historians, it is less successful as a unified work. The author does not seem to have decided whether he was writing about Baumgarten or about issues raised by Baumgarten. Weber's introductory essay ranges widely over theological controversies, the papal bureaucracy, and, occasionally, the influence of these on the politics of German Catholicism, in the course of which Baumgarten vanishes from sight completely. The essays that Weber reprints tend to show that Baumgarten was a deservedly obscure figure. They are a good deal less interesting than the implications that Weber draws from them. The bibliography of Baumgarten's works might be useful as part of a biography of him, but many aspects of Baumgarten's life, such as his diplomatic activities during World War I, seeking to gain Polish support for the Central Powers, are only touched on tangentially. All in all, this book does not entirely stand on its own. It might have been better as an article or part of a larger, more substantial work.

JONATHAN SPERBER
University of Missouri

HELEN GRAHAM and PAUL PRESTON, editors. *The Popular Front in Europe*. New York: St. Martin's. 1987. Pp. vii, 171. $32.50.

In 1986 numerous conferences and sessions at historical meetings were devoted to the fiftieth anniversary of the European popular fronts. As a parallel development, one may expect some edited collections of essays on the subject, of which the present book is a good example. The editors do well to point out in their introduction that the popular fronts were "a welter of ambiguities and contradictions"; unfortunately the essays, of very uneven quality and focus, do little to impose a satisfactory intellectual synthesis on the subject. If there is a common theme to the contributions, it is perhaps to show that the internal divisions of the Left in the 1930s were too deep to be successfully overcome, even under the threat of fascism, and that even if a successful unification of the Left had been achieved it would have made no difference in the eventual outcome. The 1930s remain fundamentally part of a "fascist epoch" for these authors, which relegates study of the popular fronts to the margins at best. There is no doubt some merit to this view. But one wonders what to do with statements such as "only if resistance is held to be an absolute principle can it be argued that the enormous human cost of defeat in 1934 and again in 1939 was worthwhile" (p. 7). The intent here is to criticize antifascists of the period for a lack of realism in evaluating the strength of their opposition. The result, however, is to impose the hindsight of the historian on the participants in the events themselves and, worse, to imply that because those events turned out the way they did no alternatives were possible.

Thus, Stephen Salter argues in his essay on the German Left that socialist-Communist unity in Germany was impossible, that even if it were achieved it would have made no difference, and therefore that the passivity demonstrated by the Social Democratic party (SPD) in the face of the Nazi onslaught was in fact the only reasonable course of action open to it. To assert this is to misremember the simple fact that unity on the Left in 1925 could have averted the election of Paul von Hindenburg. It might equally have made possible a repetition of the general strike of 1920 in opposition to the Kapp Putsch when Franz von Papen carried out his coup in Prussia, just to single out one major event among many. Did not the SPD's passivity weaken it by driving more militant members to an acceptance of the Communist party's (KPD) class-against-class analysis, thereby in turn solidifying the KPD leadership in the belief that its line was correct? Martin Kitchen deals with different concerns in Austria, where a popular front would not have mattered simply because the Austrian Communists were so weak. But Otto Bauer's

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

socialists similarly neglected a growing antifascist militance among their own rank and file and accepted the gradual erosion of liberties until, at the time of the Vienna street battles, it was too late. Kitchen's portrait of Bauer is enlightening yet ambiguous. He faults the Austrian leader for an ineffective balancing act between the moderate and militant wings of his party yet suggests that the concept of "integral socialism" might have been a workable alternative to the dilemmas of the era.

David Levy adds another contribution to an extensive historical literature that treats the French Popular Front as an abject failure. There are those who prefer to follow Joel Colton in characterizing it as at least a "qualified success." But Levy does not deliver on his announced aim to explain the circumstances of the presumed failure, and his critique of Léon Blum's judgment is often tendentious and misleading. A number of recent writers have stressed Blum's concerns for rearmament and for building an alliance structure with the Anglo-Saxon world within which he thought French security had the best chance of being achieved. These aims placed inevitable constraints on Blum's domestic policy, which Levy ignores. Also, Blum did not come to power with the intention of using force to restore order in the strikes of June 1936. On the contrary, he announced in his investiture speech that he would not do so, and he kept that pledge. On the other hand, it is true that Blum's obsession with security prevented him from capitalizing on the dynamism of the mass movement that threatened to overflow the boundaries of his legalism. The same was true in Spain, although, as Paul Preston shows, the Popular Front there was the inverse of the French. The fruit of Manuel Azaña's efforts and popularity, it began as a Radical-Socialist alliance and was only later extended to the Communists. Helen Graham is correct to emphasize that the debate between those who wanted to persevere in the Spanish revolution and those who wanted to concentrate on winning the war was in fact an argument about the structure of postwar Spanish society. But it cannot be demonstrated that the Spanish Popular Front failed because of its internal contradictions rather than the inability or unwillingness of the allies, particularly France, to help it.

Concluding essays by Donald Sassoon and Jonathan Haslam highlight some less well known aspects of Comintern strategy. Palmiro Togliatti's appeal to Fascists and his argument that the regime could be reformed from within had parallels in French and Spanish Communist tactics and raises the question of whether the Comintern wanted popular fronts or national unity everywhere against Germany. One may therefore accept Haslam's claim that the Comintern changed its strategy in 1934 in response to the mass movement in the West, particularly in France, but doubt that the shift really meant greater autonomy for Communist parties.

The editors have put together a stimulating series of essays, the best of which are those they contributed themselves. One wonders whether this does not argue the need for a coherent approach to the period by a skilled comparative historian rather than a collection of diverse contributions. The existing specialization among historians, alas, appears to preclude that possibility.

IRWIN WALL
University of California, Riverside

DONATELLA BOLECH CECCHI. *Non bruciare i ponti con Roma: Le relazioni fra l'Italia, la Gran Bretagna e la Francia dall'accordo di Monaco allo scoppio della seconda guerra mondiale*. (Quaderni della rivista "Il Politico.") Milan: A. Giuffrè for the Facoltà di Scienze Politiche dell' Università di Pavia. 1986. Pp. ix, 527.

Chronologically and stylistically, this book continues the same author's *L'accordo di due imperi: L'accordo italo-inglese del 16 aprile 1938*, published in 1977 in the same series (reviewed *AHR* 84 [1979]: 143–44). Here, Donatella Bolech Cecchi opens with the demonstration in Fascist Italy's parliament for Jibuti, Tunisia, and Corsica on November 30, 1938, staged to avert a Franco-German rapprochement as well as augment the new Roman empire. Neville Chamberlain's visit to Rome in January 1939 is next presented, conventionally, with the British not the Italians as supplicants. Then follow the linked Prague-Albanian crises, the Pact of Steel of May 22, 1939, Galeazzo Ciano's disillusioning visit to Salzburg in August, and, finally, Benito Mussolini's choice of "nonbelligerency" on the outbreak of World War II. The triangular and shifting relationship between Rome, London, and Paris during these episodes has been conscientiously researched in all three countries' diplomatic documentary publications and archives. There is good historiographical commentary on other Italian scholarship, notably by R. Quartararo and R. De Felice, although some significant non-Italian works are conspicuously absent (for example, L. R. Pratt's *East of Malta, West of Suez* [1975], the conference papers printed by the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique in *Les relations franco-britanniques 1935–39* [1975], and essays by P. Stafford on Chamberlain's Rome visit and by F. Bédarida on Edouard Daladier). Overall, however, this is a worthy example of traditional diplomatic history, sound if limited.

Hewing close to the standard political-diplomatic sources, Bolech Cecchi slights certain aspects of the problem. For one thing, Anglo-French military and naval planning both shaped and reflected the de-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gree to which the Western democracies regarded Italy as a hostile power. Further, the intelligence dimension should not be overlooked. Material purloined from the British embassy by Italy's Servizio Informazioni Militari contained personal comments on the Duce, important since Mussolini's caprice effectively dictated Italian policy.

Heavily factual, this book affords minimal consideration of the Mussolinian psyche. But in a brief analytical conclusion the author reveals her membership in that fashionable school of thought that holds that Fascist Italy evinced a "desire to realize an autonomous policy, which would make of Rome the *trait-union* between the London-Paris entente on the one hand and Berlin on the other." In this scenario the Western powers can be held partially responsible for pushing Mussolini into Hitler's arms; this book makes much of France's "intransigence" in rejecting Italian colonial claims despite British urging and "recognition of Italy as a Mediterranean power" (p. 507). Now, it is conceivable that Mussolini imagined his diplomatic position, even after the Pact of Steel, to be independent, for he was capable of massive self-delusion. Yet, in the prelude to the war, his international role was anything but even-handed; partiality to his Axis partner and animus to the "demoplutocracies" was undisguised. In fact such was no more than a function of the Duce's "march to the ocean" ambition and mentality, which guaranteed friction with the British empire just as much as with France. In turn this rendered any Italian mediatory position between the power blocs illusory. This monograph's narrative is exemplary, its interpretation debatable at least.

ALAN CASSELS
McMaster University

DAVID LOADES. *The Tudor Court*. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble. 1987. Pp. 250. $30.00.

This excellent study fills a long-felt need: it covers the period from the accession of Edward IV until the death of Elizabeth. David Loades deals with everything he could be expected to: the *Domus Providencie* (the domestic household), the *Domus Regie Magnificencie* ("designed to sustain and focus the *maiestas* of the ruler [p. 9])," finance, life and politics at court, and the effect on it of religion. We learn that the Tudor court was "never less than enormously expensive but just how expensive it is very difficult to say" (p. 73). There are fascinating comparisons: "Elizabeth expected her courtiers' and ministers' patronage to do her work for her [with respect to scholarship, learning, and the art of limning] and to a large extent it did . . . with only a fraction of the royal patronage which Henry VIII had bestowed" to lesser effect (p. 132). Henry VII seems sensible and restrained, Edward IV heedless and irresponsible.

Two characteristics of the court become clear. It was fundamentally conservative. This was not the consequence of the existence of a strong sense of tradition but, rather, the result of the fact that many people in its employment had much to lose if things were changed—that is, whenever positions were eliminated. All the monarchs whose courts are dealt with were themselves conservative. At the same time, change was, if not constant (much remained relatively static during the long reign of Elizabeth, for example), inherent in the system since the system existed to support the monarchs, who had their own ideas as to how the court should function and, at least within the context of the court, were absolute—a frustrating circumstance for the would-be constructor of models.

This book reveals not just the unsurprising conservatism of the court but its total failure to justify its existence. There is no sense that any of the Tudor monarchs had an objective other than their own aggrandizement when it came to spending the money that went to maintaining the court. This may be understandable; it is hardly admirable—yet admiration is what is usually, even by historians, directed at the Tudors.

The author has attempted a survey of an institution over the course of 132 years. He probably should not be criticized for what he has not done. Nevertheless, what I would like to see in print is a description and analysis of a Tudor court on a particular day. I get too little sense here of "what actually happened." I have myself always felt a desire (indeed a need) to be able to walk around the Palace of Whitehall as it was in Elizabeth's time. I still cannot. Maybe it is not possible because there is not enough evidence. Yet John Morris conjured up Londinium for me, as E. W. Ives brought Anne Boleyn to life, with comparatively little to go on. I suppose when I found myself invited to review a book entitled *The Tudor Court* I expected that I was to be transported inside the sixteenth-century equivalent of Buckingham Palace in, say, 1588, 1509, or 1547. This book does not quite take me there.

MICHAEL B. PULMAN
University of Denver

JEROME FRIEDMAN. *Blasphemy, Immorality, and Anarchy: The Ranters and the English Revolution*. Athens: Ohio University Press. 1987. Pp. xiv, 336. $32.95.

Ranters have been the subject of growing attention, particularly in first-rate studies by J. F. McGregor and J. C. Davis. Davis's brilliant, if debatable, book, *Fear, Myth, and History* (1986), argues that the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ranters were not a religious sect but "a projection of the fears and anxieties of a broader society" (p. x)—in short, a myth. It is, then, a matter of considerable interest when a Continental Reformation specialist depicts the Ranters as the heirs of a heretical tradition of dualists that included Gnostics, Bogomils, the Cathari, and the Brethren of the Free Spirit. Jerome Friedman, however, can only suggest parallels, not demonstrable links, between his Ranters and these groups; hence, the Ranters are also portrayed as the product of revolutionary upheaval in the 1640s and 1650s. The key question is whether "Rantism" existed. In contrast to Davis's focus on antinomianism and pantheism as two central elements of alleged Ranter thought, Friedman postulates a core of Ranter tenets that includes dualism, pantheism, class-oriented anarchism, staunch individualism, and the repudiation of religious institutions, heaven, and hell.

Friedman groups his Ranters into admittedly arbitrary categories: philosophical Ranters such as Richard Coppin and Jacob Bauthumley, the "movement's" principal thinkers; sexual libertines such as Abiezer Coppe and Laurence Clarkson, who sought redemption through the embrace of flagrant sensuality; revolutionary Ranters such as George Foster and Joseph Salmon, whose vengeful God would destroy the world; divine Ranters such as John Robins, who some followers apparently thought was God, or William Franklin and Mary Gadbury, who reportedly passed themselves off as Christ and the Bride of the Lamb; gentleman Ranters such as Captains Francis Freeman and Robert Norwood, who espoused "consensus Rantism" but not radical social views; and two Ranter parsons, Thomas Webbe and John Pordage.

The problem of determining whether such persons can appropriately be called Ranters is doubly enigmatic. First, their tenets are difficult to ascertain, partly because some are reported primarily in hostile, biased sources, partly because these people were seldom reticent to retract controversial assertions, and partly because a few of these sectaries may have been insane. Second, "consensus Rantism" is probably an illusion. Davis has shown that Bauthumley and Coppe were not proponents of pantheistic antinomianism; Freeman and Norwood were not anarchists or advocates of radical apocalypticism; Pordage and Coppin were ascetics, not libertines; the existence of a localized hell was denied by such disparate authors as the Leveller William Walwyn, the Digger Gerrard Winstanley, the Socinian John Biddle, and Thomas Hobbes; and dualism was not the exclusive tenet of Ranters. If there was a shared Ranter ideology, Friedman has not demonstrated its existence.

Friedman's methodology—a series of biographical and ideological case studies—has its advantages, although a good deal of redundancy results. His weakness is factual accuracy. There are inaccurate dates, erroneous book titles, incorrect names of modern historians, and erroneous titles for Archbishop William Laud (p. 313) and Major General Thomas Kelsey (p. 258). Incorrectly citing the names of obscure English villages is understandable, but identifying Suffolk, Essex, and Kent as cities is not. There are also substantive factual errors. The assertion that property was a sign of predestination and poverty of damnation is a myth; the "sectarian movement" did not end in 1660; the Blasphemy Ordinance of 1650 does not mention Ranters, rendering improbable the notion that it was "aimed exclusively" at them; the parallel between Thomas Tany and Isaac Newton (p. 191) is absurd. There is no evidence that Ranters represented the views of a large segment of English society. Friedman is also too quick to accept professions of academic ignorance and madness by his authors and should have paid heed to Christopher Hill's suggestion that feigned insanity might have been a useful device to avoid prosecution. A competent copyeditor would have caught the spelling errors and the slang (England was "a mess"; Salmon wrote "poor quality stuff"; some of Tany's works are "off all four walls"; if Bauthumley was a pantheist he was "a queer duck"). Despite these problems, it would be a mistake to dismiss this book, for it provides useful surveys of the work of assorted radical sectaries, whether Ranters or not.

RICHARD L. GREAVES
Florida State University

JOSEPH M. LEVINE. *Humanism and History: Origins of Modern English Historiography*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1987. Pp. 297. $29.95.

This scholarly and sometimes provocative collection of eight essays, most of them previously published, argues that Renaissance humanism shaped English culture and historical thought from 1500 to 1800. As Joseph M. Levine suggests, they provide insights and partial views of facets of problems in the evolution of English historiography.

One of the themes that emerges from these essays is that modern historians have not paid sufficient attention to the contributions of humanism to seventeenth-century thought and have tended to see English humanism in terms of the Tudor period, on the one hand, and the neoclassicism of the eighteenth century, on the other. Too often Milton has been viewed as the last of a dying breed. Levine correctly points out the continuities of the humanist tradition without detracting from the role played by the development of the scientific tradition in shaping English culture.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Although Levine does not develop the point, several of the essays contain evidence that suggests that scholars need to look further into the connections between antiquarian scholarship and the scientific movement. For instance, although not giving much weight to the episode, he notes that enthusiasm and interest in the discovery of the Stonesfield Roman pavement were greater in the Royal Society than elsewhere and that antiquarian finds were discussed by the society and reported in its *Transactions*. Another link between the new science and humanist historiography to which Levine pays some attention is to be found in the development of the chorographical, topographical, and antiquarian histories that stemmed from Flavio Biondo, John Leland, and William Camden. Although these studies did, of course, have classical origins, they were also inspired by and closely linked to the development of natural history. Efforts to replace fables and fictions with matters of fact inspired the efforts of naturalists as well as antiquarians.

One of the most important contributions to be derived from these essays is a better understanding of the complexities of the humanist movement and the diverse ways in which the classical tradition and classical scholarship inspired historiography and historical thinking. If the finding that humanism is crucial to an understanding of English historiography will come as no surprise to anyone already interested in the subject, Levine's description of the emergence and subsequent development of an uneasy relationship between "perfect history" inspired by classical norms and antiquarian scholarship inspired by humanist philological studies constitutes an important contribution. Although he, as well as others before him, has found that Edward Gibbon represents the marriage between the dual legacy of the humanists—literature and scholarship—I would suggest that the tension has never been fully resolved. The conflict between a readable narrative history that provides political and moral lessons in a rhetorically pleasing style and scholarly investigations requiring complex apparatus and analysis continues to bedevil historians and their public. The literary and philological contributions of seventeenth-century humanism were central to this continuing tension of history as both art and science.

Because many of these essays were written some years ago and are largely unrevised, he did not take into account Martine Brownley on Clarendon and the rhetoric of historical form, Denis Hay on the development of European historiography, or my work on the links between seventeenth-century civil history and natural history.

There are, as the author recognizes, both advantages and disadvantages to the form he has chosen. Although the essays are linked together by subject matter—historiography—and theme—the role of humanism—the linkage is rather loose, and the reader often longs for the missing narrative and analysis. The collection thus suffers from the very dilemma that Levine describes as the fate of historical writing from the late seventeenth century onward: the disjunction or at least the partial disjunction between history as scholarship and history as literature. The collected articles are surely a fine example of the former. Levine suggests that he will soon turn to providing the narrative and analysis he feels so important. His own erudition and knowledge of early modern historiography and cultural history more generally make him ideally suited to this task.

BARBARA SHAPIRO
University of California, Berkeley

J. C. D. CLARK. *Revolution and Rebellion: State and Society in England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1986. Pp. x, 182. Cloth $34.50, paper $9.95.

J. C. D. Clark's book surveys two recent historical controversies that are usually viewed in isolation from each other: the well-known debate over the politics of early seventeenth-century England and the (to many readers) less familiar one over the significance of the Hanoverian period in the next century. It takes the form of a rambling and rather repetitious running commentary on the work of selected historians of both periods. Clark argues that the issues underlying the two debates are similar: in both, he concludes, traditional orthodoxies based on either outmoded Whig assumptions or what he dismisses as socioeconomic reductionism have been, or are in process of being, replaced by forms of explanation more firmly founded on historical reality.

Readers looking for a balanced account of the two debates will not, however, find it in these pages. The book is disfigured by a typology borrowed from J. H. Hexter, which divides Clark's adversaries into "Old Hat" (Whig), "Old Guard" (socioeconomic reductionist), and "class of 1968" historians—although this last category quickly disappears from the scene. Clark is avowedly a partisan, an uncritical admirer of historians who, like the early seventeenth-century revisionists associated with Geoffrey Elton and Conrad Russell, emphasize continuity rather than change. The alleged revolutions of the 1640s and of 1688 turn out to be only "petulant outbursts" (p. 130), minor ripples on the surface of an essentially unchanging social and political order. Clark argues, as he has previously done in *English Society, 1688–1832* (1985), that Britain remained a monarchist and aristocratic "confessional state" until

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the decisive break with the old order in 1828–32. Historians whose views can be made to fit this interpretation receive favorable treatment; those whose views can not are often caricatured or ignored.

Clark denies that revisionists embrace a common stance toward contemporary politics, yet his own prejudices constantly intrude, and he is not loath to attribute similar biases to other groups of historians: the localist interpretation of the early Stuart period, he observes, is in part "an historiographical echo of the value-nexus of the SDP" (p. 57). Behind much of Clark's writing can be sensed the conservative assumption that government is a mystery beyond the reach of the uninitiated, whether garrulous M.P.'s or awkward extra-parliamentary radicals. Anglo-American historians, he thinks, should abandon their sentimental preoccupation with representative assemblies and popular protest movements and should concentrate instead on the finer details of government and administration.

So, although Clark has some clever and provocative observations to make along the way, this is a heavily slanted and selective view of recent English historical writing, particularly on the seventeenth century. A glance through the index reveals, for example, the conspicuous absence of such names as Patrick Collinson, William Hunt, Margaret Spufford, Keith Thomas, and Keith Wrightson, all of whose work bears crucially on one of Clark's favorite themes, the central importance of religion to English life (which he seems to think "Old Guard" historians are unaware of). And, as is the common fate of historiographical essays, Clark's has become obsolete before its publication. Seventeenth-century revisionists, at least, no longer seem the confident standard bearers of a new orthodoxy in the way they appeared to be only a few years ago; Clark has been left behind as the debate moves on to other issues.

DAVID UNDERDOWN
Yale University

GERALD NEWMAN. *The Rise of English Nationalism: A Cultural History, 1740–1830*. New York: St. Martin's. 1987. Pp. xxiii, 294. $27.50.

As a synthesis of evidence from history, literature, and the graphic arts, this interdisciplinary study is exemplary. Gerald Newman fulfills his intention of reinterpreting English history and culture in the era of George III by showing that England was probably the first modern nation formed by a profound experience of nationalism, the most pervasive modern creed.

His thesis is twofold. First, nationalism in England was the spearhead of an attack on feudalism, the old order that depended on a "theatre of greatness" (p. 26) that displayed the cosmopolitan culture of the Francophile aristocracy. Their participation in the international cultural system of the Old Regime was intended to demonstrate a superiority that, in eighteenth-century England, excluded the lower classes from power more systematically than ever. Historical clichés about England's becoming a more open society during the late eighteenth century are therefore in error. Patriotism, on the other hand, manifested the lower classes' attachment to a culture that was local. Second, the patriotic attack on aristocratic cosmopolitanism depended on the crucial role of artists and intellectuals, especially writers, who asserted the worth of English culture. By instructing their fellow citizens in the virtues of native mores, they roused the nation against Continental invaders long before Napoleon became a threat.

Newman is at his best as an "intellectual bush pilot" (p. 52) operating outside the habitual limits of the publish-or-perish system. His combination of theories from leading social scientists, such as Clifford Geertz, with extensive evidence from English history and the general authorities on the period, such as Robert R. Palmer, makes this book stimulating for historians of many fields. Newman skillfully combines methodologies as well as evidence from literature, history, and the social sciences. Such interdisciplinary scholarship is experimental, even tenuous. It is, however, essential in order to maintain the vigor of our discipline.

Newman's attempt at a synthesis falls short, however, in the performing arts and religion, two crucial areas that reached a wide public. Among the performing arts, opera, in particular the career of Handel, who receives a casual one-half sentence (p. 63) in this work on eighteenth-century cultural history, could have provided a convincing extension of Newman's thesis. Opera had been the liturgy of the aristocracy, dominated by foreign arists such as Handel, the greatest composer of the reigning Italian—and "popish"—international style of composition. When Handel's Italianate opera company went bankrupt, he was driven to invent a new type of very English musical theater: vernacular, Protestant, and biblical oratorios whose Old Testament libretti hinted that the English were a new Chosen People. Familiarity with the work of a few leading interdisciplinary musicologists such as Paul Henry Lang would have made Newman's book more convincing.

As for religion, the opera of the common people, there is not even an entry for it in the index. Although the Church of England and Evangelicalism are mentioned and cross referenced, they are not cross referenced to the skimpy entries on Methodism. Historians might look to the recent work of Robert Isherwood, James Leith, and French historians such as Michel Vovelle for examples of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

methodology that aims to make the "mass media" of a preliterate society central.

The inadequate evidence from the performing arts and religion is, unfortunately, balanced by too much from certain areas of common knowledge, such as French cultural hegemony. Then, when Newman speaks of history, he omits to mention that the writing of history was itself one of the most important tools in the creation of nationalism. He also protests wrongly that few experts "bother with" nationalism (p. 52). Yet, in all, one can only admire this detailed and well-written contribution to one of history's most controversial and difficult fields, cultural phenomena as evidence and determinants of historical trends.

CONRAD L. DONAKOWSKI
Michigan State University

JOHN SAINSBURY. *Disaffected Patriots: London Supporters of Revolutionary America, 1769–1782*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 305. $35.00.

According to Edmund Burke, the American question was "being beat backwards and forewards as the tennis ball of faction," merely one set in the political game being played between the Whigs and Lord North. Although there is truth in Burke's analysis, John Sainsbury's study makes it clear that there were "disaffected patriots" in London who were motivated by principle, not political expediency. For a brief time in the 1760s and early 1770s, the pro-Americans used the London Common Council and the enthusiasm for John Wilkes to articulate a republican program for Great Britain. London's radicals not only attacked ministerial corruption but also called for political and social equality.

The outlines of this story are well known. Sainsbury's book adds a detailed description of the radical movement, its leaders and followers, and its legacy that in subtle ways alters the accepted analysis. First and most important, Sainsbury argues that the Wilkesite faction not only embodied the "ideological connection between domestic and colonial grievances" but was a political force of some significance well into 1775. As late as May 1775, for example, William Lee, an American living in London, was elected an alderman thanks to Wilkesite votes. And, in September 1775, a small group dominated by London tradesmen linked to the Wilkesite political machine risked charges of sedition in order to publish a circular letter tying the cause of English liberty to the success of the American revolution. Of course, neither of these groups—nor any other radical protest—affected British policy toward America. As J. H. Plumb pointed out years ago, it was the disillusionment of gentlemen of the first rank during the winter of 1780 that brought about North's fall.

The pro-American movement, however, had a significance that went beyond the peace treaty of 1783. Sainsbury's careful analysis of the split between London's active loyalists and pro-Americans (both groups petitioned the crown in October 1775) reveals that there were sharp economic and social differences between the two groups. More than two-thirds of the signers of a pro-American petition were retailers and craftsmen who, Sainsbury tells us, felt victimized by the economic and political corruption of the government. Like the Real Whigs, the pro-Americans believed that London was underrepresented in Parliament, that the king's justice was often arbitrary, and that the chief beneficiaries of the modern financial revolution were a wealthy elite who were dependent on a corrupt ministry. In other words, the American revolution did not create the political rift within London but, rather, provided an issue that focused existing hostilities. Thus, the enduring legacy of the split within London over the American revolution was the birth of English radicalism, the beginning of a long struggle for parliamentary reform.

Although this thesis is not new, Sainsbury's book is a full, useful, and well-written account of the relationship between pro-Americanism and radicalism in the decades surrounding the American revolution.

ALAN ROGERS
Boston College

JAMES WALVIN. *England, Slaves, and Freedom, 1776–1838*. Jackson: University Press of Mississippi. 1986. Pp. vii, 202. $20.00.

For many decades historians of British slavery and its abolition ignored the fact that the abolition campaigns took place in a society with a small but significant black community and left unexplored the impact of the Jamaican slave rebellion of 1831 on the final stages of the emancipation agitation. James Walvin, whose pioneering *Black and White: The Negro in English Society, 1555–1945* (1973), brought to light the history of blacks in Britain, undertakes in this deft essay to place abolition in the context of black history both in Britain and the British West Indies.

The essay opens up suggestive new perspectives. James Somerset, for example, becomes both the central figure in an antislavery court case and a representative of the majority of British-based blacks of his generation. They were domestics, both slave and free, common enough by the mid-eighteenth century to have lost their cachet as exotics: aristocrats preferred the oriental look. The court case itself acquires a British, as well as an

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imperial, antiracist dimension. Lord Mansfield's judgment did not instantly destroy property in black persons, but it was a significant political defeat for the planters. Proslavery propaganda was characterized thereafter by racist attacks of a distinctly modern flavor, a transition facilitated by an influx of former slaves, fallout from the American revolution, who in the following decade made London's "black poor" a visible social problem. Characterizations of blacks as lazy, stupid, and, worse, virile—threats to racial purity—were found in literature and were reflected in popular perception. Ignatius Sancho, an intellectual and Westminster shopkeeper who concluded, "I am only a lodger—and hardly that," proved to speak prophetically for successive waves of twentieth-century immigrants (p. 83).

In the face of hostility and indifference, blacks in free British society managed to carve niches for themselves both in London, where the majority were concentrated, and scattered in towns through the provinces. In some ways the most impressive achievement recorded here is not the emergence of artists such as G. F. P. Bridgetower, violinist and friend of Beethoven, or of intellectuals such as Sancho and Olaudah Equiano but the establishment of family life by a predominantly male black working population. They acquired white wives, became baptized, educated their children.

Their characteristics were mirrored in the abolitionists' antiracist black stereotype: industrious, pious, family-oriented, all potentially and some exemplarily Christian. The blacks who gave this propaganda image flesh-and-blood reality were not, however, British blacks but the Caribbean slave converts of Protestant missionaries, sent to the West Indies in significant numbers after the Napoleonic wars. The planters' periodic persecutions of slave church members and their missionary mentors were used with great effect to mobilize popular and, increasingly, parliamentary support for emancipation.

Walvin here points to some interesting questions that deserve closer investigation. Why, for example, *did none of the black British-based intellectuals* become prominent in the abolition movement? In the closing stages of the emancipation campaign some former slave Nonconformist converts, under the close supervision of their churches, found a place on public platforms advocating freedom. When the attack on the slave trade was in progress, however, British-based black intellectuals seem to have played no such role; even Olaudah Equiano is credited with no more than provincial abolitionist connections.

A work of this length on such a complex topic necessarily opens up unexplored vistas. The author, however, effectively outlines the black history context of abolition and records the ultimate defeat of the liberal humanitarians by the increasingly elaborate racist ideology used to justify mid-nineteenth-century Britain's growing imperial hegemony. By that time the global racial division of black and white, inferior and superior races informed the imagery of domestic class divisions. The white poor also became "a caste apart, a race of whom we know nothing, whose lives are of quite a different complexion from our own" (p. 92).

MARY TURNER
Institute of Commonwealth Studies
University of London

DONALD SULTANA. *The Journey of Sir Walter Scott to Malta*. New York: St. Martin's. 1986. Pp. xvi, 190. $25.00.

Sick and dying, Sir Walter Scott sailed to Italy in late 1831 in search of health. He spent three weeks in Malta, a visit sketched in the biographies written by John Gibson Lockhart and Edgar Johnson. Now, Donald Sultana presents a thorough study of the journey in a volume of 190 pages (of terribly small print). The narrative itself covers 109 pages. In one appendix, Sultana prints the full text of Mrs. John Davy's diary of Scott's visit to Malta, which Lockhart had relied on and bowdlerized. In a second appendix, Sultana prints ten miscellaneous poems and prose pieces that arose out of Scott's journey. Twenty-six pages of notes (containing 1,065 items) buttress the narrative.

No one is better qualified to write on this subject than Sultana. He has a comprehensive knowledge of Scott's life and works. He has lived on Malta and written about it. He has an unsurpassed knowledge of Scott's unpublished novel, *The Siege of Malta*, written during this journey. The only question is whether the subject warrants such extensive treatment. Sultana has not discovered any significant new information. Rather, just as Scott often used his story as an opening to other things, so Sultana uses the journey to bring in all kinds of curious material *from Scott's life and works. For example, Scott* visited the government and garrison libraries of Malta. He was unable to compare the Malta garrison library with its counterpart at Gibraltar because he had never seen the latter, but Sultana makes the comparison for the reader. Since such libraries provided an expanding market to publishers, Scott's relations with John Murray are discussed. In the government library, Scott was seen by James Clay, a friend of Benjamin Disraeli. Therefore, Sultana discusses Scott's relations with Disraeli and then with his father, Isaac D'Israeli. A focused, coherent, rapid narrative this is not, but it contains much curious information.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Sometimes, however, Sultana's erudition seems to serve as mere filler. For example, he reports that the governor of Malta was General Sir Frederick Cavendish-Ponsonby. A paragraph of facts follows. Ponsonby was a hero of Waterloo, where he lost an arm. Scott described the battle in prose and verse. Several relics of Waterloo were at Abbotsford. Scott's link with Ponsonby started with the general's mother, who is described. The general's father had called at Abbotsford, accompanied by a sister of Lady Caroline Lamb. Lady Caroline's autobiographical novel, *Glenarvon*, shadowed her relationship with Byron. Scott nicknamed her "Calantha." Then, only after another paragraph of heterogeneous facts does Sultana reveal that Ponsonby was absent from Malta during Scott's stay and played no part in the story.

Sultana's comprehensive knowledge and meticulous scholarship can be put to better use. Here, the mountain brings forth a mouse. Serious students of Scott, the only audience for this book, already know this material, thanks in part to Sultana's previous work. The corrections of previous biographers, especially Johnson, are all minor. The full text of Mrs. Davy's diary and the letters of Susan Frere add nothing of significance. No new understanding of Scott is gained. It is probably not in the subject. Sultana's earlier book, *Coleridge in Malta and Italy* (1969), covers an important period in Coleridge's career and life, but when Scott reached Malta his career was over, and his life nearly so.

MARK A. WEINSTEIN
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

LEE HOLCOMBE. *Wives and Property: Reform of the Married Women's Property Law in Nineteenth-Century England*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1983. Pp. viii, 311. Cloth $35.00, paper $12.50.

Lee Holcombe has written an account of the campaigns in Britain for the establishment of married women's property rights. She considers the legal changes that resulted through the Divorce Act of 1857 and the Married Women's Property Acts of 1870 and 1882. In order to explain these developments, she first has to explain the complexities of the four existing bodies of law: common law; equity, administered by the Court of Chancery; church law, which dealt with matrimonial causes and wills; and, briefly, since it is not germane to her main purpose, the specialized maritime law. She includes in appendixes the applicable provisions of the 1857 act, the texts of the other two acts, and a list of legislation relating to married women's property up to 1975. The book is obviously of great use not only to students of this aspect of the law but also to readers interested in women's studies. Holcombe's introduction to the four kinds of law prevailing in the first half of the nineteenth century is crisp and concise (pp. 9–13). She is equally brisk when analyzing the contents of the acts.

It is the more surprising, therefore, that her schematic treatment and chronology are at times confused. For example, by attempting to heighten interest by opening chapter 2 with a summary of husbands' and wives' property rights, she moves from her real concern at this point, the critical distinction between different kinds of property in common law. The reader is left wondering how the list of spouses' rights fits in. There is a similar lapse at the start of chapter 4, a digression into the reasons why social reform movements occur when they do. Twentieth-century developments occasionally interrupt the flow of information on nineteenth-century events instead of being included in the summary at the end of the book. Thus, the expense of divorce as an aspect of "one law for the rich, one law for the poor" is treated up to 1973 in chapter 5.

There are repetitions, for instance, the highly important evidence of changes in census classifications as a guide to numbers of married women doing paid work (pp. 7–8, 49), medieval survivals and influences (pp. 9, 93–94), and Florence Nightingale and the Crimean War (pp. 50, 69). Potted histories not only of members of the Married Women's Property Committee but also of famous signatories of its petition of 1855 and other supporters and antagonists may save readers from having to refer to other works but at times threaten to turn this book into a dictionary of biography. Holcombe's intermittent slackness is the stranger since she mentions in her bibliography a classic example of how to handle a mass of facts and personages over an even longer time span, Ray Strachey's account of the whole of the women's movement, *The Cause* (1928). We must, however, be grateful for so lucid a guide to the intricacies of these vital legal changes, her only major omission being differences between the Scottish and English legal systems.

SHEILA LEWENHAK
University of London

SUSAN KINGSLEY KENT. *Sex and Suffrage in Britain, 1860–1914*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1987. Pp. x, 295. $29.95.

In this intelligent and thoughtful work, Susan Kingsley Kent contends that the campaign for women's suffrage was not narrowly political but was, rather, the culmination of a unified feminist movement whose chief objective was the abolition of "the double standard of morality, prostitution, and the sexual objectification and abuse of women" (p. 7).

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Her purpose is to establish that there was a unity to the feminist movement during the more than one-half century with which she is concerned, that the unifying factor was a demand for sexual autonomy, and that achievement of the suffrage became the chief symbol for that sexual autonomy.

To establish her thesis, Kent begins with an analysis of the misogynist attitudes that lay beneath the ideology of domesticity and then discusses some aspects of women's activism that were, in her view, all primarily concerned with challenging male views of female sexuality. These include feminist campaigns against prostitution and against male-dominated medicine. Throughout her discussion, in which she focuses on the views of prominent movement leaders, she attempts to emphasize the links between these areas and the unifying symbol of suffrage.

Kent argues that most historians of middle-class women's suffrage in Britain have been too narrow in their approach. It is true that much recent work on the middle-class suffrage movement in Britain has not attempted an extended analysis of the social and economic radicalism of the movement. (It should be noted, however, that Sandra Stanley Holton's recently published *Feminism and Democracy: Women's Suffrage and Reform Politics in Britain, 1900–1918* (1986) does significantly contribute to our understanding of the political radicalism of the suffrage cause.) But there has been no analysis of the middle-class suffrage movement in Britain like that of Ellen DuBois, who argues in her pathbreaking work, *Feminism and Suffrage* (1978), that suffrage was the most radical facet of the nineteenth-century women's movement in the United States, because it posed the most forthright challenge to nineteenth-century ideology concerning the family. Kent's claim to break new ground in the history of British women's suffrage rests on her efforts to document the links between suffrage and other aspects of the women's movement and to establish her thesis that a radical challenge to the double standard informed all of them.

Kent is only partially successful in this endeavor. First of all, her book does not in fact document many new links between suffrage activism and the other aspects of the women's movement with which she deals. Furthermore, Kent's attempt to establish the existence in Britain of a unified feminist movement, focused on a radical challenge to the double standard, is not entirely convincing and rests in some cases on a highly selective use of evidence. For example, in her analysis of Victorian medicine, Kent argues that the campaign to gain the admission of women to medical training was primarily a "moral crusade" and only secondarily a struggle for the right of middle-class women to share with the men of their class the social and economic benefits of professionalization. Kent's argument carries some weight with reference to Elizabeth Blackwell, but it would carry less weight if it were applied to other early female physicians.

Perhaps because of the author's wish to establish a unity of thinking among feminists, her book at times gives insufficient consideration to the way in which the views of the middle-class leaders who are the subject of her study were shaped by their social class. This is especially evident in her treatment of the campaign to repeal the Contagious Diseases Acts. In her chapter on prostitution, she has relied heavily on Judith Walkowitz's work (in *Prostitution and Victorian Society* [1980]), but, in doing so, she has incorporated Walkowitz's analysis of gender while largely ignoring her analysis of class.

In spite of these weaknesses, this is a lively, well-written and clearly argued book. Kent may not have established that the desire to abolish the double standard was the unifying feature of British middle-class feminism from 1860 to 1914, but, in her attempt to do so, she has written a valuable study of the ideas that influenced British feminists in this period, a study that provides an insightful synthesis of recent work on the women's movement and that gives the issue of suffrage the importance it deserves.

DEBORAH GORHAM
Carleton University

J. P. PARRY. *Democracy and Religion: Gladstone and the Liberal Party, 1867–1875*. (Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1986. Pp. xiii, 504. $59.50.

What gave life and meaning to the political party rivalries of nineteenth-century Britain was neither "the Victorian origins of the British welfare state" nor social class but religion. A number of historians, myself included, have given emphasis to this thesis in the course of the past twenty-five years, and in that respect J. P. Parry's book is not novel. No previous historian, however, has delved so intensively into archives, pamphlets, and parliamentary debates in order to illuminate the religious assumptions (and their political significance) of the generation of Liberals who dominated British politics during the years that spanned the struggle over the Second Reform Bill and William Gladstone's first resignation as party leader.

In the campaign to disestablish the Church of Ireland that dominated the general election of 1868 and the first year of the new Gladstone ministry, religion did indeed forge a bond of union between the latitudinarian Whig-Liberals, the High Church Gladstonians, the radical Nonconformists, the Scot-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tish Presbyterians, the Irish Roman Catholics, and yet smaller groups that made up the Liberal political spectrum of the day. It is one of Parry's central and persuasively argued theses, however, that for much of that time period religion did as much to divide as to unite the party and that a fissure already visible in the early 1870s—although temporarily bridged in 1879–80—between many of the Whig-Liberals and most of the rest led ineluctably to the great party split of 1886 over Irish Home Rule.

Part 1 of the book provides an exhaustive (and at times mildly exhausting) exercise in religious prosopography, as Parry examines topically the party's major religious subdivisions. He pays most attention to the Whig-Liberals, if only because their views generally have been taken for granted (although they included people as diverse as the evangelical Lord Shaftesbury and the skeptical Thomas Henry Huxley). Yet they agreed on the importance of preserving an enlightened and tolerant Church of England to supervise a moral reformation of the nation and to keep at bay such assorted evils as ritualistic clerics, exclusive dogmatists (whether Roman Catholic or Protestant Nonconformist), hedonistic materialists, and popular demagogues. He also devotes a chapter to the Nonconformists (many of them staunch advocates of Anglican disestablishment) and another primarily to Gladstone, whose paradoxical blend of High Church principle and evangelical fervor, of traditional Christian doctrine and individual religious liberty, is elucidated as satisfactorily as it can be. Even if no other Liberal viewed religion precisely as did Gladstone and even if he often differed on specific issues from a majority of his political compatriots, Gladstone remains for Parry "one of the most influential spiritual leaders of the British people" (p. 452).

Part 2 of the book is a chronological account of the often symbolic yet intense religious disputes of the era. These included the quarrel over the possible "concurrent endowment" of Irish Roman Catholicism, the type of religious primary education to be provided by the act of 1870, disestablishment, the role of the papacy, and the regulation of ritualism within the Anglican church. By the time one has finished the volume, one can fully understand what Benjamin Disraeli meant when he declared in 1874 that "an attempt to deal with National Education in Ireland . . . has broken up two governments" (p. 4). One can also agree with Parry that the electoral defeat that year of the first Gladstone ministry had much less to do with Nonconformist disenchantment or with a "torrent of gin and beer" than with the apathy of the Whig-Liberals. Whatever his virtues as both administrator and orator, Gladstone had proved too erratic and at times too demagogic for their taste.

Parry's book is one of the most significant contributions of the decade to our understanding of the interaction of religion and politics in Victorian Britain. It is exhaustive in its research and judicious in its approach, and it provides a most valuable bibliography. It demonstrates anew that, if we wish to understand Victorian political reality, we need to know about religious predilections as well as social classes, about popular passions as well as high politics.

WALTER L. ARNSTEIN
University of Illinois

S. P. ROSENBAUM. *Victorian Bloomsbury: The Early Literary History of the Bloomsbury Group*. Volume 1. New York: St. Martin's. 1987. Pp. xvi, 316. $24.95.

There may be literary scholars in the world who have not given much thought to the Bloomsbury group, but, if that is true, it is because they have been buried in the intricacies of early Anglo-Saxon or something equally esoteric. For that reason, a new book on the Bloomsbury writers must have something significant to offer. This one does. With its announced companion volume on Edwardian Bloomsbury, it will be of considerable help to older scholars because it provides linkages and connections in a concrete and intellectually supportive way. In addition it will provide new scholars and beginning students with a rational guide to the people, ideas, and significance of this remarkable group of English writers.

The Bloomsbury group, or movement, is significant because of its members and their impact on our literature. S. P. Rosenbaum has set himself the task of determining the common elements and origin of their ideas. In his two middle chapters, which dissect Cambridge and the impact of the education received there, we are truly instructed. The persons who were part of the Bloomsbury group, and their other colleagues, were trained from a very early day to perform in a critical atmosphere. Here their work was subjected to continuous discussion. They were expected to write to a style and a level of performance and analysis fostered by older members of the group. This approach was closely rooted in biographical (that is to say, personal) reconstruction. Rosenbaum uses Virginia Woolf's surviving work (including some not yet well known), comparing, contrasting, and classifying that work with her father's somewhat similar offerings, while showing how it produced a sense of attachment (and revulsion) to the past. The result was the bittersweet thing we call Bloomsbury (or perhaps Edwardian) literature.

Attached to and overriding this material is a close analysis of Cambridge from about 1885 to 1905,

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

when many of the leading figures were educated. Cambridge, much more than Oxford at this time, led the way into modern English thought. Shucking some of the more cloying ideas of establishment religion, fusing it with new science (more might have been made of this), and binding it in place in the reworked tripos in classics or history, that renewed Cambridge education was much broader and more analytical than many have believed before.

Of course, among the reasons for this were the place of the Apostles, as well as King's College and later Trinity, in refining the received education. The roles of singular persons, such as Oscar Browning, J. T. E. McTaggart, Jane Ellen Harrison, and Walter Raleigh are surveyed. Cambridge did not have an English tripos, so these persons could and did educate their students in literature, as opposed to structure, philology, and other dry remnants. Rosenbaum makes a good deal, perhaps not quite enough, of this concept. The great query that this produces in the reader's mind, is, of course, what would Virginia Woolf have been like as a writer if she had not had to absorb all this at second and third hand? Would it have made her more conformist and less important, or would it have accentuated her drive for equality and difference?

The book offers equally good material on the work of Lowes Dickinson and Bertrand Russell. It closes this part of the study by recalling the early writings of the Bloomsbury group, those used at home in their own critical meetings, those surviving from Apostle meetings, and those submitted for prize contests while students at Cambridge.

After reading this important book, one finds oneself educated, better prepared for the autumn's teaching and writing, and with a new book to suggest to students, while anticipating the discussions afterward. The book has useful notes, which are not intrusive but stir further thought, and a very good brief bibliography.

DAVID C. SMITH
University of Maine

RICHARD DORMENT. *Alfred Gilbert*. Paperback edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1985. Pp. vii, 350. $14.95.

Alfred Gilbert was responsible for creating two of London's grandest public sculptures, the spirited *Eros Fountain* (1886–93) in Piccadilly Circus designed as a memorial to Lord Shaftesbury and the graceful *Alexandra Memorial* (1926–32) at Marlborough Gate near St. James's Palace. As these dates suggest, Gilbert's career spanned the Victorian and early Modern periods. His artistic style, however, was shaped by the imagery of Pre-Raphaelitism, and, although Gilbert went on to embrace *fin-de-siècle* symbolism, he never capitulated to abstraction. Richard Dorment in his biography of the sculptor wittily observes that toward the end of Gilbert's life he was "a figure out of Toulouse-Lautrec in the age of Picasso" (p. 258).

Dorment presents a well-written and beautifully illustrated biography of a sculptor whose eventful life makes fascinating reading. He is fortunate in having as his subject an artist who willingly talked about his art. Gilbert confessed, for instance, that his *Icarus* (1884) represented his own unbridled zeal: "It flashed across me that I was very ambitious: why not 'Icarus', with his desire for flight?" (p. 46). Drawing on the sculptor's letters, interviews, and studio diaries, Dorment convincingly stresses autobiography as the raison d'être for Gilbert's art, from the early *Perseus Arming*, which he argues is an analogue for Gilbert readying himself for life, to the midcareer *Comedy and Tragedy*, in which the author identifies a world-weary spiritual anguish.

Comedy and Tragedy (1891–92) foreshadows the downward spiral of Gilbert's career: bankruptcy, exile in Belgium, and resignation from the Royal Academy. Just when we begin to think of him as yet another tortured romantic soul who succumbed to defeat, Dorment chronicles his victorious return to England in 1926 where, after being removed from the royal family's blacklist, he was subsequently reinstated in the Royal Academy and knighted. The fact that Gilbert achieved his return to grace and favor by untruthfully denying that he had sold statues designated for the duke of Clarence's tomb to a dealer makes his victory ring hollow. He was also guilty of peddling replicas of the figures he made for this tomb without the permission of King Edward VII. That the ethical issues involved in this act continue to haunt Gilbert's reputation is evidenced by the recent debate in the *Times Literary Supplement* (see October 4, 1985, and letters, November 22 and December 20, 1985).

Dorment, however, does not explore the philosophical implications of Gilbert's behavior. By focusing on the narrower issue of how one man's art mirrored his life, he enriches the iconography of Gilbert's *oeuvre* but forfeits the rewards of contextualism. Surely, during the twenty-five years the sculptor spent in Bruges he was aware of the Belgian symbolists. Nowhere in Dorment's analysis are we offered visual or verbal comparisons between Gilbert's art and that of Fernand Khnopff or Jean Delville, for example, who were simultaneously delving into the mysteries and ambiguities of the human condition. Nor is Gilbert contrasted with that other giant of symbolist sculpture, Auguste Rodin. Because Dorment reserves his deepest analysis for the internal rather than the external causes

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that shaped Gilbert's art, his work has limited appeal for historians.

DIANNE SACHKO MACLEOD
University of California, Davis

STANLEY L. JAKI. *Chesterton, A Seer of Science*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1986. Pp. x, 164. $12.50.

Stanley L. Jaki is a Roman Catholic priest, theologian, physicist, and historian of science. The four chapters of his book on Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1874–1936), the noted English writer who converted to Roman Catholicism, were first given as lectures at the University of Notre Dame in 1983.

The book's title intrigued me, for I had read biographies of Chesterton yet could recall no discussion of science in them. My curiosity was satisfied by Jaki's survey of the principal works on Chesterton's thought. Because the authors of these works were versed in literature and not in science, they overlooked a facet of Chesterton that Jaki illuminates, namely, that, although Chesterton was scientifically illiterate, he occasionally spoke with insight on science-related matters. Jaki not only tells us what little this kindred spirit said but suggests what he would have said on issues that arose only after his death and presents his own more numerous views on scientific and science-related subjects. Above all Jaki is anxious to prevent science, "the most stupendous thing of modern life," from turning into "a stupefying monster" (p. 116).

Chesterton is depicted as an antagonist of scientism, defined as "an intellectual imperialism that makes ever greater demands in the name of science" (p. 29). Jaki's method is to knit together Chesterton's scattered remarks against scientism and at the same time inject his own views. Chesterton criticized what he perceived to be the scientism of Herbert Spencer, Ernst Haeckel, and H. G. Wells; Jaki criticizes that of the physicists J. Robert Oppenheimer and I. I. Rabi and that "highly publicized pundit of scientism" Jacob Bronowski (p. 53).

Chesterton is portrayed as a critic of "evolutionism," a term Jaki does not define but what is seen to mean the theory of evolution by natural selection. Concerning the claim "that the Darwinian evolutionary mechanism (the interplay of chance mutations with environmental pressure) has solved all basic problems," Jaki holds "it to be absurd and bordering at times on the unconscionable" (p. 139). As for Chesterton, he judged natural selection on one occasion "an extravagantly improbable conjecture" and on another "sheer mythology" (p. 69). Nothing, says Jaki, would be more mistaken and unfair than to downplay Chesterton's Catholicism in his reaction to Darwinian evolution, adding: "Many centuries before integral Darwinism turned man, body and soul, into a chance product of purely accidental physical forces, true anthropology was defined in the dogma of Incarnation" (p. 79).

For Jaki the validity of science is to be decided by its compatibility with Christianity. Although the theory of evolution fails the test, modern cosmology passes it, as is seen in Jaki's depiction of Chesterton as a "champion" of the universe. What Jaki means by this puzzling characterization is that for Chesterton "the universe was the only strict alternative to solipsism and its logical corollary, pessimism" (p. 88). Chesterton, according to Jaki, grasped the basis of the only good philosophy, which is "a commitment to things in all their actual variety and specificity" (p. 114). The word "specificity" is a key one for Jaki because it implies a deliberate choice, and in his view Christianity validates modern cosmology because of the latter's specificities. His outlook may be seen in his remark that Chesterton "on seeing the embarrassment of agnostic scientists, who cannot help seeing in the specific harmony of gluons, neutrons, protons and other subparticles a pointer to a choice that only a Creator could make" would recall a phrase from *Orthodoxy* (1909), his work of Christian apologetics: "Modern science moves toward the supernatural with the rapidity of a railway train" (p. 111). For the moment Jaki has forgotten that the theory of evolution is part of modern science.

This is a provocative little book, though not one easy to read because of its discursive nature.

WILLIAM MCGUCKEN
University of Akron

ALEC CAIRNCROSS. *The Price of War: British Policy on German Reparations, 1941–1949*. London: Basil Blackwell. 1986. Pp. x, 249. $34.95.

This illuminating study of British reparations policy toward Germany during and after World War II is by a distinguished economist who served as Treasury representative in Berlin and head of the Economic Advisory Panel from 1945 to 1946. Beginning with an outline of changing wartime views on the handling of the defeated enemy, Alec Cairncross appraises the four main themes of ministerial discussion: disarmament and militarization, decentralization, dismemberment, and dismantlement and deindustrialization.

British policy took shape very gradually. At Yalta, where the first international discussion of reparations took place, the Americans and British made no attempt to engage in joint planning, and the Soviets, who had suffered enormous loss of life and more extensive damage than other countries, took the initiative. To their proposal that huge reparations

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

be paid in kind, half by capital removals, half in current deliveries over a period of ten years, both Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden indicated fear that Britain might eventually have to finance and feed Germany because of payment of reparations. Already the differences were emerging that boded ill for any joint policy on Germany after the war. The Potsdam Agreement contained reparations clauses that were contradictory and obscure, naming no total that Germany was to pay and leaving the level of industry it was to be allowed for later settlement. Although a reparations plan was finally hammered out in 1946, it very quickly became a dead letter. It was vital for Britain to make Germany self-supporting and no longer dependent on external aid. Reparations from current production were clearly unacceptable, and the alternative, to supply them through dismantling, was not only repulsive but incompatible with a program of industrial recovery. In the event the plan itself was soon dismantled.

Cairncross makes quite clear, of course, that the battle over reparations was incidental to the political struggles that divided the wartime Allies when the conflict ended. In those struggles Britain's contribution was to help persuade the Americans to stay in Europe and to promote the economic and political recovery of France. If British policy was rarely decisive, he concludes, it was at least rarely regrettable. On the economic side, he emphasizes the differences in the lessons offered by the western zones of Germany and those that might be learned from the eastern one. The one common lesson is the difficulty of dismantling, reerecting, and transporting capital equipment at the end of a long war when labor and materials are scarce, communications inadequate, and information on the plants themselves very hard to come by. On current deliveries the Soviets had no problem in absorbing reparations. If their requirements set back East Germany's recovery from the war, the East German standard of living nevertheless soon soared above that of the Soviet Union despite the transmission of a substantial part of its gross national product to the Soviet Union. For the British and the West in general, it made little sense to cripple the rebuilding of the western zones by such exactions while at the same time pouring large sums into Germany in the form of food and various raw materials. Much of this has been elaborated in a host of excellent studies, but Cairncross brings to his account a unique combination of personal involvement and high scholarly skills. His argument is a persuasive one, and he makes it with clarity and moderation. His book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the troubled peace settlement after World War II.

HENRY R. WINKLER
University of Cincinnati

PETER MEAD. *Orde Wingate and the Historians.* Braunton: Merlin. 1987. Pp. 206. £6.95.

Winston Churchill called Major General Orde C. Wingate, the unorthodox exponent of "long range penetration" tactics, "a man of genius who might well have become also a man of destiny." In the years that have elapsed since his death in 1944, he has certainly become a figure of controversy. Peter Mead's book is an attempt to set right the balance that he feels has been tilted against Wingate by the misunderstandings (or worse) of most of the historians, including myself, who have written about Wingate's policies, plans, and accomplishments in Burma in 1943–44.

Mead argues that published opinion on Wingate was favorable until the mid-1950s. Then *Defeat into Victory* by William Slim, whose reconquest of Burma in 1944–45 was the war's most brilliant feat of British generalship, was published in 1956, followed by the third volume of the official history, *The War against Japan* (1961). Mead contends that Slim and the principal author of the official history, S. W. Kirby, were biased against Wingate and that their prejudices and errors have misled virtually every subsequent writer. To buttress his case, Mead enters into a careful examination of controversial episodes in the planning and launching of Wingate's largest operation, Thursday, in March 1944, during whose early stages he perished in an air crash. Although Mead makes a number of good points, especially about the fallibility of participants' memories, the major issue remains: were the Chindit operations worth the heavy investment of high-class personnel and material in a theater chronically short of both? This has always been the heart of the controversy—not Wingate's undeniable charisma and leadership qualities (as well as equally blatant eccentricity) and certainly not the courage and endurance of the Chindits themselves. Slim and Kirby answered that question in the negative. Most post-1945 historians, assessing the evidence for themselves, have concurred.

Mead's essay should be read by every serious student of these events. The argument, however, is unlikely to be settled by this book. Perhaps, like that over Wingate's distant relative, T. E. Lawrence, it never will be, given the attraction colorful soldiers and special operations seem to have.

RAYMOND CALLAHAN
University of Delaware

PATRICIA W. ROMERO. *E. Sylvia Pankhurst: Portrait of a Radical.* New Haven: Yale University Press. 1987. Pp. xv, 334. $30.00.

This must have been a difficult book to write. Sylvia Pankhurst (1882–1960) was not thinking of provid-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ing subsequent biographers with an easy time as she lived her turbulent life as suffragette, community organizer, artist, feminist, socialist, communist, unmarried mother, anti-imperialist, and propagandist *par excellence*. That she died in Addis Ababa, buried with Ethiopian patriots involved in the war against fascism, her grave marked by an impressive marble monument, provides dramatic warning that hers will be a life not easily untangled and that no single-minded heroine of any sort awaits recognition.

Patricia W. Romero, Pankhurst's first full-length biographer, has written a book that clearly reveals the complexity of Pankhurst's motivations, enthusiasms, causes, and relationships. This is a woman who broke with her class, her family, her country, and, through all this, the conventions considered appropriate for her sex—from her dress through her manners to her sexual behavior. Yet she came by much of this in the time-honored way, for her parents were both radicals, albeit of different sorts. Richard Pankhurst, a middle-class lawyer, joined Keir Hardie's Independent Labour party, and when he died "the working class, the poor and trade unionists turned out in force to honour their dead champion" (p. 20). The political activities of her mother, Emmeline, the most famous of the militant suffragettes, also provide no simple knot to untie. She and another daughter, Christabel, changed the name of *The Suffragette* to *The Britannia* in the early days of World War I, abandoning not only the primacy of their feminist struggle but also the pacifism of their late father and husband, and of Sylvia, who maintained her pacifist politics until the rise of Nazism.

That Sylvia was a woman of many parts comes through clearly in Romero's biography. Yet a biographer can also err on the other side of the equation, becoming so bedeviled by the complexity of her subject that both author and reader can be more perplexed at the end than at the beginning. Perhaps with some lives there is no way to craft order from the endless stream of events. But in other cases so little sympathy exists between author and subject that the telling of the story can never be more than a description of one set of events replacing the last. Biography writing is a treacherous endeavor. If the author gets too much inside her subject's skin, the result might be little more than an apologia. On the other hand, to maintain rigid ego boundaries between self and subject, never to risk seeing the world as one's subject did, also has its costs.

In this case the cost is high. Romero remains Pankhurst's judge, never her sister, her therapist, her accomplice, or her supporter. In her concluding remarks she takes Pankhurst to task because it never occurred to her that she might have been "denied her goals because of her sex" (p. 287). Yet, with all the advantages of retrospection and another more sophisticated wave of feminist politics and theory, Romero herself never really explores this fruitful hypothesis.

Would it not help explain why, after years of identifying with the poor and dispossessed of East London, of embarking on many ingenuous schemes of local economic development, of writing thousands of protest letters and hundreds of newspaper editorials and stories, she accepted Haile Selassie as her patron? Her projects were always underfunded, and, finally, in her last years she raised the funds to build a hospital in Addis Ababa. Surely, it was not her personal characteristics ("self-centered, opinionated, immature, obsessive") that "often denied her the support she wanted" (p. xii) but, rather, the scope of her politics. The more germane question is not why Pankhurst was not more successful in changing the world but, given her sex and her radical politics, how she managed what she did. Romero lacks a deep understanding of radical politics, not just why its participants become engaged but also the resistance its practitioners rouse in others.

Romero's conclusion—that a rebel cannot make a good revolutionary—and that Pankhurst, unable to accept the discipline imposed by "democratic centralism," was merely the first, is unsatisfying. Revolutionaries—especially of the female persuasion—have not come in neat packages, for many good reasons. Romero's research is invaluable, but her account provides the basis for rather different conclusions about the woman who had her own case file in the British Foreign Office entitled: "How to Answer Letters from Miss Sylvia Pankhurst"!

ROBERTA HAMILTON
Queen's University
Kingston, Canada

ROBERT RHODES JAMES. *Anthony Eden*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1986. Pp. xiv, 665. £16.95.

By the time Anthony Eden became British prime minister in 1955, he had experienced a full apprenticeship. He had spent thirty years in Parliament and had served as foreign secretary in Neville Chamberlain's prewar government (from which he resigned over government policy toward Mussolini's Italy) and in Winston Churchill's wartime and 1951–55 governments. Soon after forming his government, he led his party in a successful election that perpetuated Conservative control of Parliament for the balance of the decade and beyond. His popularity rivaled Churchill's, yet by January 1957 he had resigned his office in the wake of one of the most

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

disastrous international escapades in British history, the Suez affair.

Following Eden's death in 1977, his second wife, Lady Avon, commissioned Robert Rhodes James to write a biography with complete access to her husband's papers. Rhodes James knew and admired Eden, and the work is testimony to the author's admiration and his Conservative bias. The biography depicts Eden as two men: one was selfless, confident, and good humored; the other was ill-tempered, vindictive, and stubborn. His political colleagues admitted that they never knew which personality might appear. It was the good Anthony, however, who earned a reputation for hard work and commitment to principle early in his career. His stand against Chamberlain in 1938 cast him with the right group when war was declared a year later. Returning in 1940 to the cabinet, now led by Churchill, he achieved successes in the Foreign Office through his own merits and diplomatic skill. His popularity within the Conservative party and with the public earned him the right to lead the government in 1955.

Soon after he took office, Eden turned to the unfinished business of Britain's position on Suez. Rhodes James devotes nearly one-quarter of the book to an explanation of the crisis. He explores why military planning difficulties arose, how cabinet members responded to the crisis (Harold Macmillan does not fare well), and the extent to which consultation took place among Western allies. Unfortunately, Eden's papers and government records do not improve the image of the prime minister. Attempting to atone in 1956 for the diplomatic failures of 1938, Eden misread international opinion. The resulting Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt in October 1956 was a military success but a diplomatic disaster. Condemnation from the United States and the United Nations not only cut short Britain's occupation of Egypt but also helped precipitate Eden's resignation in January 1957.

Although Rhodes James presents an engrossing and lively account of Eden's life, his book is flawed by a frequent disregard for fundamentals of historical research and writing. Eden's papers are quoted extensively but never cited. Other published primary sources and secondary writings appear in useful places, but the author has not consulted private papers from Eden's contemporaries. Thus, the author neglects the opportunity to understand Eden through the eyes of his contemporaries and through explanations of events from other points of view—those of friend and foe alike. The author makes too many generalizations that are either meaningless or careless or both. For example, "The entry of the United States into the [Second World] War caused, and continued to cause, as many difficulties as it brought benefits" (p. 264). Or take the way Rhodes James describes Eden's support following his resignation as Foreign Secretary in early 1938: "The cheering crowds outside Eden's house in Fitzhardinge Street were evidence that a significant number of people had had enough of humiliation at the hands of men who they realized to be brutal and evil . . . The British people sensed [in Eden] something much better, honourable and brave. In this they were right" (p. 196). The author asserts that public opinion on the Suez crisis was never accurately reported and offers as evidence his observation that those riding his number eleven bus from Chelsea to Westminster favored the government's actions (p. 555). Such conclusions, coupled with the lack of explanations and with unsupported arguments, ask for too much trust from skeptical readers.

And so, like the subject portrayed in the biography, this book has two characters. In its personal style, the author's ability to simplify complex issues, and the easy pacing throughout, the work is an absorbing account. Unfortunately, the author's apparent indifference to documentation and inattention to the conventions of historical scholarship depreciate the book's value.

STEPHEN R. WARD
University of South Dakota

JEAN DUNLOP. *The British Fisheries Society, 1786–1893*. Edinburgh: John Donald; distributed by Humanities, Atlantic Highlands, N.J. 1978. Pp. vii, 239. £12.00.

In the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Scottish Highlands were suffering from serious social and economic problems as a rapidly growing population pressed ever harder against the margins of subsistence in a region whose environment was difficult and whose resource base was slender. Highland landowners, as well as pundits from Lowland Scotland and south of the border, offered all manner of solutions to the problems of the area, most of them involving some universal panacea that would cure the ills of the entire region by introducing a single prosperity-generating activity.

After the end of the War for American Independence people began to turn to the Highlands as an underdeveloped area nearer home that was capable of improvement. New ideas and capital were being applied to the problems of Highland development. Some activities, such as kelp burning, brought temporary prosperity but eventually failed, exacerbating an already serious social problem.

Fishing seemed a likely source of prosperity. There was no doubt that the fish were there: the Dutch had long been exploiting the herring fisheries

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

around Scotland on a grand scale. Developing the fishing industry was not easy though; there was a lack of local skill and capital. The British Fisheries Society aimed to help by providing the infrastructure within which fishermen could establish themselves and prosper. They laid out fishing settlements, financing infrastructure such as piers, warehouses, curing facilities, custom houses, churches, schools, and inns. Plots of land for building houses were leased to fishermen, artisans, and merchants at low rents, including in most cases enough ground for a vegetable garden, some arable land, and rights to grazing and peat cutting. The society did not, however, become directly involved in the provision of boats and equipment or the actual business of fishing.

Jean Dunlop traces the history of the society from its foundation in 1786 until its demise in the later nineteenth century. Its most noteworthy achievements included the foundation in the later eighteenth century of the settlements of Ullapool and Tobermory in western Scotland as fishing stations and, in the early nineteenth century, of Pultneytown, a major planned extension to the burgh of Wick. The results of the society's activities were mixed, partly because of the uncertain nature of the herring fishery. The herring shoals were migratory and did not always appear at the same season or on the same parts of the coast. Sometimes they failed to arrive at all. The local fishermen, using small, open boats, were not able to pursue the shoals far if they shifted their location dramatically. As a result they seem generally to have retained a foothold in shore-based activities, particularly agriculture, and to have lost out to the more highly capitalized and fully professional fishermen from the east coast of Scotland and England. Neither Tobermory nor Ullapool was an unqualified success; the settlements had to diversify their activities away from fishing in order to develop, particularly when the herring shoals suddenly shifted to the east coast early in the nineteenth century. The projected settlement at Lochbay in Skye was a total failure.

The society was fortunate in securing the services of some able men such as the engineer Thomas Telford. Many of the men who acted as local agents were also capable, although other employees such as John Bain, who when commissioned to report on the state of the pier at Ullapool sent the directors of the company a treatise on local geology and folklore, were less of a success. A particularly endearing aspect of this detailed and scholarly study is the way in which it brings out the quirks and foibles of individual personalities and their effects on the society's development. For the general reader the principal shortcoming of the book is its failure to step back and gain sufficient perspective by setting the operations of the society within a broader context of economic development throughout the Highlands in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

IAN WHYTE
University of Lancaster

I. G. C. HUTCHISON. *A Political History of Scotland, 1832–1924: Parties, Elections, and Issues.* Edinburgh: John Donald. 1986. Pp. xi, 371. £20.00.

This very lengthy and detailed contribution to Scottish historiography is characterized by virtues and vices. Although it ought to be subtitled "The Rise and Fall of Liberalism in Scotland," the actual subtitle, "Parties, Elections, and Issues," is a very rough guide to what is chronicled in over three hundred pages of frequently tedious detail. Despite the virtues of the detailed picture of Scottish politics provided by I. G. C. Hutchison, his book suffers from a factographic approach. And, since historical facts do not speak for themselves, this is a serious weakness in a quite valuable study of Scottish political history.

In focusing on party and electoral politics between 1832 and 1924, Hutchison has produced a very detailed picture of nineteenth-century politics. He has consulted many individual manuscript collections and the reports and papers of political parties, trade unions, and religious and secular pressure groups. Under the impression that manuscript sources possess some special value, he has neglected much of the important secondary literature.

In spending almost two decades on the researching and writing of this book, Hutchison has displayed a certain industriousness. Also, he has confirmed the importance of religion and religious issues in nineteenth-century Scottish politics. However, although he chronicles the tangible weakening of religious influences around the turn of the century, he could have offered more analysis of the distinctive role of religion in nineteenth-century life and letters. In contrast to England and other European industrial nations, Scotland was most peculiar in this respect.

Certainly, Hutchison brings out the importance and distinctiveness of Scottish dissent—the centrality of the "voluntaries." What is new and valuable in the book is the examination of the high Victorian period in Scottish history between the Disruption of 1843 and William Gladstone's Midlothian campaign of 1879–80. Yet, in dealing with the advent of the Reform Act of 1832 and Scotland's emergence from dictatorial Toryism, when the electorate in the Athens of the North shot up from 4,500 to 64,447, Hutchison seems to lack any new insights into the political process in the decades after 1832. This is a direct consequence of his factographic approach.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Furthermore, when the ambitious scope and scale of the book are taken into account, Hutchison's contribution to Scottish historiography suffers from a surprisingly large number of significant omissions. Thus, he ignores Chartism, the Anti–Corn Law campaign, the extensive history of the Scottish National Reform League, the crofters' struggle in the 1880s, and the "Red Clyde" during and immediately after World War I. This would not have been so important in a less ambitious political history of Scotland. But in a book purporting to be a full-scale political history these serious omissions automatically produce a distorted account of what happened between 1832 and 1924.

A major weakness of Hutchison's study is that Scottish—and British—politics are very narrowly defined. Although Hutchison does not spell out his definition of politics, a very restrictive definition of politics as being solely about parties, elections, and issues is implicit from beginning to end. Further, there is no account of the process of historical change during the momentous turning points in Scottish history.

For example, there is no account of the role of pre-1832 Toryism in Scotland in engendering and shaping the Liberals' near-hegemony between 1832 and 1886. There is no real account of the role of the Scottish labor movement in pushing the Liberals to the Left at various crucial moments in the late 1860s and early 1870s and particularly in the 1880s. In arguing that "the more profound onslaught on the power structure of Liberalism in Scotland came not in 1868 but in 1874" (p. 134), Hutchison ignores the motor power of cumulative opposition and grievances among the middle-class radicals. Moreover, he ignores the role of the trades councils in forcing middle-class radicals such as Charles Cameron to make programmatic concessions to organized labor.

Throughout the book Hutchison displays a strong tendency to worship at the feet of the gods of political power in Scottish history. There is an obvious sympathy with the forces of power and privilege, but there is no empathy with the losers and victims of rapid industrialization. There is no hint of the material payoffs in high politics. The benefits of patronage are not recorded, and no criticisms of such powerful families as the Youngers or the Tennants grace the pages of Hutchison's book.

Hutchison is at his weakest in the treatment of the rise of Scottish labor after World War I. Because he has a visible soft spot for the mighty, he is unable to account for the radicalization of the Scottish working class. Hence the somewhat puzzling assertions that the Scottish working class developed a greater identity and "a strong and wide sense of working-class solidarity or consciousness" without evolving a "socialist consciousness" (p. 285).

Nevertheless, despite the underlying and awesome historical determinism in which right-wing political forces seem to possess an almost divine right to rule, Hutchison has recovered a great deal of lost material. But historical facts are never a substitute for interpretation.

JAMES D. YOUNG
University of Stirling

JAMES HUNTER. *The Making of the Crofting Community*. Reprint. Edinburgh: John Donald; distributed by Humanities, Atlantic Highlands, N.J. 1982. Pp. xi, 309. £12.00.

This book has established itself as something of a classic of Scottish history since its first publication in 1976. Eloquent, impassioned, scholarly, and provocative, it relates the fate of the Gaelic Highlands over the nineteenth century. Economic historians, James Hunter believes, failed in the task of historical explanation by concentrating so much on estate papers that "the people upon whom estate managements imposed their policies have been almost completely forgotten." Consequently, his book is an attempt to write history "from the crofting community's point of view" (pp. 4–5). The first half describes the background to the clearances through which so many thousands of Highland peasants made way for sheep as their landlords sought a higher return on their estates. The second half, the more original and the less assailable, explains how the "crofting community" attained a sense of its own identity and fought to obtain the privileges of security of tenure and arbitrated rents in the Crofters' Holding Act of 1886. He also explains how they failed to obtain, in time, provision for the return of land under sheep for crofting use: when this eventually came, in acts of 1911 and 1919, the old economy had decayed beyond redemption. The crofters' problems arose from a set of remarkably callous landlords and a state that moved too late to right the wrongs inflicted on the population.

This interpretation sees the crofters exclusively as victims. Hunter says little on demography but implies that the steep rise in population in the half-century before the potato famine of 1846–51 can be blamed on landlords who hindered emigration to America by the Passenger Vessels Act of 1803 and encouraged early marriage to provide labor for kelping and fishing. This, however, overlooks the facts that emigration south was never hampered, that landlords could not make peasants marry unwillingly, and that population went on rising long after the 1820s when landlords were trying desperately to move an impoverished and still-multiplying peasantry away. Similarly, nothing is said about the slow fall of Highland population in the second half

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the century when eviction was still legal or about the very rapid decline in the interwar years when land was at last available to those who wanted it. In short the demographic decisions of the population, and their variable choices about wishing to stay or to leave, do have bearing on their predicament. They were not just victims, and a work written since, Eric Richards's *The Highland Clearances* (2 vols., 1982–85), gives in most respects a better-balanced account than this of just what happened on the land itself.

Nevertheless, Hunter's conclusion remains powerful. "To landlords and economists, past and present, the Highland clearances, however regrettable, were and are explicable in the jargon of historic necessity and economic inevitability. To crofters, past and present, they are explicable only as a brutal betrayal of custom and belief, a reckless assertion of the interests of the few at the expense of the many" (p. 215). That is true because economic historians have taken landlorism itself for granted, and crofters never have. Had Scotland been an owner-occupier country like Norway, Highlanders would have had to make their own decisions and to blame themselves for their problems. In fact there are many similarities between Norwegian and Highland Scottish experience in the nineteenth century, including very rapid population growth, overdependence on potatoes, crisis, and extremely heavy emigration. But, because Norwegian peasants controlled their own farms, changes in land use came from within rather than being imposed from above. In the long run a more viable rural economy and a more confident, less paranoiac agrarian society were the more desirable results.

T. C. SMOUT
University of St. Andrews

JEAN BERENGER. *Turenne*. Paris: Fayard. 1987. Pp. 616. 150 fr.

There has been no new biography of Marshal Turenne, one of France's greatest generals, enshrined by Napoleon in the Invalides, since the work of General Maxime Weygand in 1929. A new examination of this seventeenth-century military leader has long been needed. A French scholar, Jean Bérenger, noted for his work on Austrian finances in this period, has authored this addition to Fayard's extensive biographical series. Designed for what the French call the "large public cultivé," these works of synthesis combine recent scholarship and primary sources.

Although Bérenger has not undertaken any intensive examination of the war archives at Vincennes, his work rests on the earlier efforts of scholars who have, such as Camille-Georges Picavet, whose study (1914) is still indispensable for Turenne's later career, 1660–75. Bérenger has also benefited from the recent publication of Turenne's letters edited by Suzanne d'Huart (1971). To this Bérenger has added notarial records from the Archives nationales as well as foreign correspondence from his own extensive research in Central European archives, such as the Fonds Piccolomini in Czechoslovakia. Because of Bérenger's detailed knowledge of foreign relations, a major part of his book is devoted to Turenne's role in the Thirty Years' War. Indeed, this detailed strategic narrative, as well as the work on Turenne's early years, is part of the strength of this book. Yet Bérenger seems unaware of the work by Louis André on Michel Le Tellier, the war secretary, except through the recent biography of Le Tellier's son, Louvois, by André Corvisier (1983). A closer reading of André would add greater nuance to his discussion of the relation of Turenne and Le Tellier.

In any such work of synthesis, especially one of 613 pages, a large amount of material, particularly dealing with military campaigns, is not new. Bérenger recognizes this and in fact gives only brief attention to the more well known later years of Turenne's life. Yet the author uses recent scholarship firmly to place the marshal within the context of the seventeenth century. Turenne was clearly a man of his time. He was a member of the clientage systems of Richelieu and Mazarin before creating one of his own. His "treason" in the Fronde is clearly placed within the context of rebellious *Grands* putting their own aggrandizement above the state. Moreover, Bérenger abolishes the old nineteenth-century myth of Turenne the French patriot. A grandson of William the Silent, he began his military career in Holland, spoke German, and maintained his family's Protestant ties to German princes. Also, he did not die a disinterested and thus poor man. Profiting from the contemporary system of court favor and linked to the world of high finance, he knew how to enrich himself. Fiercely proud of his family's rank, he strove to raise the house of Bouillon to a premier position in France. To this stimulating picture, Bérenger has appended a subtle psychological portrait of Turenne's relations with women and his conversion to Catholicism, as well as a historiographical essay depicting Turenne across the centuries. This book is a valuable work for understanding one of France's greatest military heroes.

DOUGLAS CLARK BAXTER
Ohio University

PRISCILLA PARKHURST CLARK. *Literary France: The Making of a Culture*. Berkeley and Los Angeles:

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

University of California Press. 1987. Pp. xvi, 273. $28.50.

For Edmond Rostand in *Cyrano de Bergerac* (1897), poetry is as essential to Ragueneau's cuisine as it is to Cyrano's swordplay and Roxane's love. One may read the play itself as a discourse on the centrality of literature to French culture. Priscilla Parkhurst Clark would no doubt agree. Her book examines the distinct national character of literature in France over the past three centuries, a character well-symbolized by the Panthéon in Paris where many of the grateful country's great writers are buried. Like Rostand's play, Clark's study illuminates the literary enterprise as an important source of public identity and pride despite many enduring political and social conflicts.

Clark sees one aspect of culture as "a vital link between literature and society, a mediator between the two poles that translates the literary into social terms and the social into a literary mode" (p. 8). This mediation is first examined in its French context, in sharp contrast to that of the United States, defined by several precise indicators. Titles published and sold, public and private support for writers, and the like are detailed in a useful appendix and reveal a distinct French ethic that makes a public figure of the writer, primarily because literature in France draws on and contributes to the country's profound sense of the past. Since the Old Regime this tradition has been embodied in important institutions, such as the Académie Française, and in equally important ideals, such as language itself. As the literary marketplace increasingly challenged these institutions and ideals, writers developed collective strategies to circumvent the market and still benefit by it. Accordingly, French authors' *esprit de géometrie* and *esprit de corps*, that is, their intellectual values and professional identities, have continued well into the twentieth century. Clark illustrates these developments with brief examinations of three careers—those of Voltaire the philosophe, Hugo the prophet, and Sartre the intellectual hero—that exemplify the persistent literary culture of France. The book then concludes with an assessment of the new role played by the *universitaires* in defining a more fragmented yet still traditional intellectual community, not unlike the vital cultural role that French cuisine continues to play today.

This intelligent essay is well worth the attention of social and intellectual historians. It provides historical information and insight but also raises important questions. For example, what place did cultural institutions and ideals actually have in the Old Regime when a minority of the population read, wrote, and spoke French? Clark assumes that the critical canon defines all French literary culture, despite the growing variety of reading matter over the centuries. With their bewildering displays of comic books, bestsellers, and scholarly monographs, the FNAC bookstores considerably complicate Clark's conception of a relatively homogeneous literary elite. Moreover, Clark focuses on continuity at the expense of change, on functionalism in lieu of conflict, and on Paris instead of the provinces in ways that many historians have considered inappropriate to France's remarkable cultural diversity, past and present. Clark's book clearly skirts the issues raised by Theodore Zeldin's two-volume revision (1973–77) of traditional ideas on a French national character.

These questions, however, do not undermine Clark's contribution so much as they heighten interest in it. Her book remains clearly organized, well-written, well-informed, and pleasurable to read. I recommend it to all historians of modern France for its sensitive and sensible consideration of one feature of French culture, a major feature in fact since the apostrophes of the real-life Cyrano de Bergerac in the seventeenth century.

JAMES SMITH ALLEN
Phillips University

JAMES C. RILEY. *The Seven Years War and the Old Regime in France: The Economic and Financial Toll.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1986. Pp. xxii, 256. $32.50.

Whatever premonitions Louis XV may have had about his own credit rating, he could hardly have envisaged the deluge of books that would chronicle his fisc, debts, and financial legacy to posterity. This ample bibliography now has an outstanding contribution from James C. Riley. It merits serious notice for the clarity of argument and the breadth of material brought under discussion. He deals with one particular conflict in Europe; unlike others in the eighteenth century with specific bones of contention—Spanish Succession, Polish Succession, Jenkins' Ear, Austrian Succession, American Independence, the revolution—this bout of feuding was so diffusely complex that it has been named after the time it lasted: the Seven Years' War.

Riley sets out the problem in logical sequence. First, the economy of France was underpinned by agriculture, and with high levels of poverty had limited consumption. The mid-eighteenth century nevertheless enjoyed the dual advantage of freedom from serious harvest failures (1741–70) and a vigorous expansion of foreign trade. By the early 1750s the royal debts had fallen to half those at the death of Louis XIV (1715). According to this analysis, the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–48) had cost some 90 to 100 million *livres* annually, but the budget for 1752 still entered roughly the same

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

amount for the army and navy in peacetime. As for the war itself, France managed to mobilize about 4 percent of its population to fight the campaigns. The country survived repeated interruptions in economic activity, which proved disastrous in the valuable colonial trade. With the return to peace, business soon revived. The real catastrophe, however, was not so much economic as political. France "could not afford in 1755 to fight the Seven Years War" for three-fifths to two-thirds of the additional expenditure came from borrowing (p. 159). In consequence France emerged from the struggle with debts doubled at 2,350 million *livres*.

Riley extends the discussion beyond the war and its financial implications to take issue with two important propositions in the history of France. He challenges the opinion of Ernest Labrousse that the Old Regime reached its apogee in the years following the war, that is in 1763–70. In place of this, he puts the turning point in the 1750s just before or early in the war. This chronology would effectively remove the relevance of Labrousse's classic *intercycle*, which preceded the revolution and precipitated the crisis of the French economy. Second, Riley discounts war as the major solvent of stability in France, arguing that the key issue was the way in which the monarchy managed to contain the increased indebtedness. At the same time, other countries saw their debts double in the war, not least Britain, which with one-quarter of the population appeared to carry commitments one-third greater than those of France. Such debates, however, are part and parcel of the lively presentation of the book. This stimulating, well-produced, and forthright study has a persuasive claim to be widely read.

FRANK SPOONER
University of Durham

FLORIN AFTALION. *L'économie de la Révolution française*. (Collection Pluriel.) Paris: Hachette. 1987. Pp. 393.

Imagine an analysis of the French revolution by a French monetary economist trained in the United States in the rational expectations school who disdains the Marxist interpretation, knows and thinks well of the views of Alfred Cobban and George Taylor, believes that the revolutionary crisis inside and outside France found its origins in monetary policy, and applies econometric analysis to test his hypotheses. The combination seems too improbable for reality. But that is the perspective of this book. It is a perspective that requires some explanation, for it seems unlikely that many readers, even of this journal, will be comfortable with both the historiography of the revolution and rational expectations monetarism. It is also a perspective that must surely occupy one of the narrowest windows of opportunity: how long a time can we suppose that even specialists will remember the full flavor of this combination?

Cobban and Taylor hold that the Marxist interpretation of the revolution failed because it could not withstand an assault of evidence about how wealth and influence were divided and pursued in Old Regime France. More than twenty years after their objections were first stated, it remains unclear that a coherent social interpretation can be given for the origins or development of the revolutionary crisis. Rational expectations theory assumes not only that humans identify and act on economic interests but that they arrive at informed expectations about the future and act on the basis of those expectations. Monetarists believe that the demand for money balances changes slowly and hence that the price level is chiefly a consequence of the quantity of money in circulation. This combination of economic assumptions and beliefs is not so much explosive as unique, but its explosive potential will be seen by anyone who, knowing the history and the historiography of the revolution, considers how each part of the combination might be enhanced by being applied to the events of 1789–94.

For all that, the historical narrative offered by Florin Aftalion is conventional in the extreme. It is not informed by economic theory, except in the case of monetarism, and shows no influence from the new economic history. Old studies by Marcel Marion and Ernest Labrousse provide both facts and interpretations of economic setting and events. Aftalion subscribes to the view that each act of the revolution, more especially each act concerning monetary matters, aggravated the crisis and holds that this view constitutes an economic model. Even the econometric test of the model, a standard linear regression analysis, is conventional. For the money supply Aftalion offers as proxy the issue of assignats; for the price level his proxy is the discount of the assignats. Neither proxy is adequate. Assignats were indeed discounted, implying that the money stock had other components; prices are not captured by the discount. Given passages from specie to paper money and from inflation to hyperinflation, it seems unwise to assume that cash balances (the inverse of velocity) remained stable. The only unconventional part of the narrative is the inconsistency of the argument. Rational expectations theory is said to be capable of assisting the analysis of decisions whose consequences were not foreseen.

It is true, as Aftalion remarks, that there is no adequate economic history of France during the revolution. This book does not fill the need. It offers a brief narrative of the revolution in which familiar economic and financial events, and views, are stressed but not an analysis of the performance of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the French economy during the revolution, much less the joint effect of material and revolutionary cultures in crisis.

JAMES C. RILEY
Indiana University

MICHAEL P. FITZSIMMONS. *The Parisian Order of Barristers and the French Revolution.* (Harvard Historical Monographs, number 74.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. xiv, 299. $29.95.

The barristers of eighteenth-century and revolutionary France, long neglected by historians, have now begun to come into their own. Lenard Berlanstein's *The Barristers of Toulouse in the Eighteenth Century, 1740–1793* (1975) heralded this tendency, and it continues with Michael P. Fitzsimmons's book.

Fitzsimmons examines the 605 barristers of the prerevolutionary Parisian *Ordre des avocats* and shows how they fared professionally in the revolutionary and Napoleonic epochs. The Parisian *avocats* of the Old Regime presented their clients' substantive legal arguments in oral and written testimony before the most powerful appellate court of the land, the Paris Parlement. These men of the law marked themselves off painstakingly from the *procureurs* or attornies who could only concern themselves with procedural matters in such lawsuits. Moreover, they secured from the government the right to determine the membership of and maintain discipline within their order. Indeed, although deeply imbued with the corporate mentality of the *ancien régime*, the Parisian barristers were so independent as to disclaim corporate status altogether.

As the author demonstrates, however, hard times awaited these proud practitioners of French law. The National Assembly, inspired "by an ideal of the sublimity of the nation diametrically opposed to the traditional privileged, corporate idiom that had bankrupted the state and paralyzed the Estates-General" (p. 196), abolished the *corps*, *états*, and *communautés* of the old society and endeavored to focus the loyalties of the citizenry on the regenerated French state. The Parisian *Ordre des avocats* went the way of all the other privileged entities of prerevolutionary France. Consequently, even though many of the prominent revolutionaries were themselves men of legal training, Fitzsimmons can argue convincingly that the majority of his 605 Parisian barristers—like their counterparts at Toulouse—opposed the revolution. Their sentiments had been profoundly molded by the corporate ethos of the *ancien régime*; as a result, although some of them continued to plead cases in the courts of the new era, they could never sanction the overthrow of their order and of the old society in general. Napoleon, it is true, reconstituted the Order of Barristers in 1810–11 but only in such a fashion as to subordinate the legal profession and its law to his postrevolutionary bureaucratized state. The barristers figured prominently in nineteenth-century France, but never again did their profession enjoy the autonomy and prestige of the prerevolutionary years.

This work is not without its flaws. As the author himself concedes, the prosopographical dimension of his study is attenuated by the loss of documentation in the fires of the Commune of 1871. Again, Fitzsimmons's refusal to call the emperor anything other than "Bonaparte" over a stretch of forty pages may lead some of his readers to feel that he has identified too closely with his barristers' royalist and antirevolutionary, anti-Bonapartist orientation. Finally, more careful proofreading would have improved a text occasionally marred by misspellings and awkward phraseology. Nevertheless, Fitzsimmons has contributed significantly to our knowledge in a neglected area of Old Regime and revolutionary history.

BAILEY STONE
University of Houston

PHILIP MANSEL. *The Eagle in Splendour: Napoleon I and His Court.* London: George Philip. 1987. Pp. 232. £16.95.

Philip Mansel's book explores the role of Napoleon I as head of the French court, the social heir of Francis I and Louis XIV, rather than of Napoleon the general or politician. Mansel examines specific aspects of this subject, including the revival of the court after the revolution, the role of the courts of Napoleon and his relatives, the courtiers who surrounded them, the etiquette and organization of these courts, their decline and failure, and the post-1815 legacy of the Napoleonic courts.

Several basic interpretations run through Mansel's work. Napoleon desired his court to equal and surpass those of his predecessors and contemporaries and to establish firmly his own dynasty and enhance its status. He used court appointments and titles to attract various groups ranging from commoners and former revolutionaries to Old Regime nobles, with a preference for the latter developing toward the end of the reign, a trend typical of other government appointments as well. Mansel describes the courtiers themselves as basically self-serving, concerned essentially with their own advancement, even to the point of giving Napoleon misleading advice. The courts of Napoleon's relatives were patterned largely on Napoleon's own court. Their accomplishments and success varied from the comparative success of Louis in Holland and Elisa in

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Lucca to the outright rejection of Joseph by the Spanish. The basic influence through all these developments was the whim of Napoleon himself.

Occasionally, Mansel digresses into politics and diplomacy, usually in such cursory, oversimplified fashion as to mislead an unknowing reader on developments such as the coup of 18 Brumaire, the expansion of Napoleon's power, and the causes of the Russian campaign of 1812. Likewise, Mansel's sweeping generalizations occasionally lead to misinformation, for example his assertion that the titles Napoleon granted to nobles of the Old Regime "were always different from those they had inherited" (p. 96). In some cases the Napoleonic titles were in fact the same as the pre-1789 rank.

Mansel discusses in detail many aspects of the Napoleonic courts. But he largely overlooks the considerable impact Napoleon had on music. Music played a major role in Napoleon's chapel and at various court reviews and ceremonies. Opera was regularly performed wherever Napoleon was in lengthy residence, especially at the Tuileries, St. Cloud, Malmaison, and Fontainebleau. Napoleon was knowledgeable enough to appreciate good singing and performing, and it was largely due to his influence that Italian-style music continued in favor in France. All this receives less than one-half page in Mansel's work.

Although Mansel provides some detail on Napoleon's court on St. Helena, including his relations with Charles Tristan de Montholon, no mention is made of the forensic work by Sten Forshuvid on the death of Napoleon and the resulting allegations that Montholon murdered Napoleon. It is strange that Mansel ignores these allegations, which certainly bear on his interpretation of Napoleon's courtiers.

The book is amply illustrated with examples of paintings of courtiers and ceremonies, of furniture, porcelain, and so on. It is based on archival research in Paris, Parma, and Vienna, including hitherto unexploited letters of some of the courtiers. Although this work contains little that is highly original, it makes a useful contribution to Napoleonic studies. But it must be used with care for it suffers from occasional overgeneralizations and from various omissions.

JAMES K. KIESWETTER
Eastern Washington University

JONATHAN BEECHER. *Charles Fourier: The Visionary and His World*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1986. Pp. xvii, 601. $49.50.

Jonathan Beecher, who, with Richard Bienvenu, gave us an invaluable anthology of the writings of Charles Fourier in 1971, *The Utopian Vision of Charles Fourier*, has now completed his long-awaited intellectual biography of Fourier. As anyone familiar with the earlier work could have foreseen, it is an authentic *chef d'oeuvre*: thorough, balanced, amply documented, warmly appreciative of Fourier's genius, but never sycophantic or naive.

Although the many years of work that Beecher invested in his biography were presumably—in Fourier's own phrase—"attractive labor" for its author, they could not always have been easy. Fourier was a private man, often cold and distant. The writings of his twenties, the decade of the French revolution, as well as his extensive correspondence with his first disciple, Just Muiron, have not survived. The copious published and unpublished materials he did leave behind were cast in a bizarre, idiosyncratic style teeming with neologisms, fables, digressions, and far-fetched speculations that by contrast render even the enciphered prose of Friedrich Nietzsche more or less transparent.

But Beecher rises to the challenge with obvious enjoyment. His goal, he writes, was to offer not a Fourier for our times but a Fourier situated in the worlds of discourse of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a Fourier responding to the collapse of the philosophy and society of the Enlightenment, not an isolated madman (as some have seen him) but a prophet of his age, a more romantic Bentham, a more systematic Saint-Simon, a more sociological Schelling.

The biography is divided into three large parts. In the first Beecher follows Fourier's life from his birth in Besançon in 1772 down to the publication of his greatest work, *Traité de l'association domestique-agricole*, in 1822. He then interrupts his narrative to analyze, in eight perceptive chapters, the structure of Fourier's theory, drawing on the *Traité* but other works as well. The last part of the volume resumes the story of Fourier's life, from 1822 to his death in Paris in 1837. These were years devoted chiefly to the public promotion of his ideas and the search for a benefactor who would underwrite the construction of a real-life phalansterian commune.

Along the way Beecher demolishes a variety of myths that have grown up about Fourier's life and work: the poignant myth of the drab, loveless, and threadbare recluse; the sentimental myth of the selfless saint; and the scholarly myth of Fourier the utopian socialist. Fourier (at least until old age) took his share of life's pleasures, treated rivals and disciples with egomaniacal contempt, and in his thought, as Beecher shows persuasively, incorporated not only a vision of the ideal society but also a pansophist science of nature and humankind as comprehensive in its way as the systems of G. W. F. Hegel, Auguste Comte, or Herbert Spencer.

Indeed, it was his ambition to found a new science modeled on Newton, with generous admixtures of *lyonnais* mysticism, Enlightenment moralism, Rous-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

seau, and Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, that most clearly separated Fourier from the swarm of self-styled Fourierists who imagined they were taking up his cause in the 1830s and 1840s. He had no organic ties to either the utopian or the egalitarian socialist traditions, and the "harmony" he preached was not so much a rejection of capitalism as a countercultural rejection of modern civilization itself.

By and large Beecher does the best job conceivable with his subject. He has consulted all the appropriate archives, mastered all the appropriate historical contexts, and written a vigorous, absorbing book. He forgoes the tempting opportunity to submit Fourier's gloriously fanciful texts to semiotic scrutiny in the manner of Roland Barthes (whose *Sade, Fourier, Loyola* he knows and cites). His few passages of psychohistorical interpretation are not especially provocative. The deconstructionist critique of struggles to reveal what authors "really" meant to say does not disturb or engage him, although he understands full well that Fourier's writings need much pondering and resist facile explanation. His book is, in this sense, a product of the context-oriented intellectual history of what has become, in the two decades Beecher took to write it, the "old" school. If so, so be it! Beecher shows that it is still quite possible to write contextualist history brimming with insight and life.

W. WARREN WAGAR
State University of New York, Binghamton

DAVID HIGGS. *Nobles in Nineteenth-Century France: The Practice of Inegalitarianism.* (Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science, 105th series, number 1.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1987. Pp. xvii, 287. $30.00.

David Higgs has given us the first comprehensive survey of the French nobility of the nineteenth century. Evocative, uncluttered, perceptive, the book treats the role of the noble in economics (especially landholding), politics, religion, and the family from 1800 to 1870. Higgs takes issue with historians who have assigned the nobility of the postrevolution the role of a social relic of the *ancien régime* or as an integral part of an evolving elite of notables. The noblesse maintained its separateness, its emphasis on family distinction and ancestral mythology, and offered French society a model of behavior that persisted as late as World War I. In 1790 Edmund Burke characterized the French nobility as "a graceful ornament to the civil order." Higgs convincingly demonstrates that almost a century later it was still able not only to preserve its cultural identity but also to persuade "the most influential part of the national elite" (p. 223) that the values of family, formalism, and hierarchy were more fundamental than egalitarianism and individualism.

Now, this did not mean that the nobility remained unchanged from the century before. The titled families were only too aware of the demographic hemorrhage that was making them a smaller and smaller proportion of the French population, no more than 0.5 percent by 1870. Moreover, the agrarian-peasant society that they understood and might continue to lead by local clientage and family networks was gradually eroding as urbanization and the new "dangerous classes" created an alien culture. Politically, each successive regime from the First Empire to the Third Republic posed a new challenge. Higgs shows that, despite the rhetoric and ritualism of legitimism, most noble families were opportunistic in their politics and accommodated to all four regimes by serving in the central administration, judiciary, municipal government, or legislative bodies. Although they did not enter the secular clergy except the episcopate, nobles continued to play a major role in the regular clergy. The "feminization" of the church in the 1850s and 1860s reflected a religious commitment of noblewomen beyond their numerical weight in the population. In general the nobility affirmed Catholic ritual in everyday life and a public attitude toward death that qualifies the broader theses of Michel Vovelle and Philippe Ariès. This religious affirmation fitted in well with the special role of the noble family, which is a central theme of the book. By a careful reading of wills and marriage contracts as well as of private correspondence and memoirs, Higgs demonstrates the special nature of noble kinship, its custody of ancestral prestige, and its rejection of individualism and even affection (as our generation understands it) within the family. In the family the nobility found its refuge. In its ability to inspire awe for the myths of the noble family outside its own ranks, the noblesse also found its longevity.

No rapid summary can do justice to the capacity of the author to select the telling example, to show how pale and misleading the aggregate numbers can be beside the actual cases, and to recapture a special milieu and mentality, not without a touch of irony. This is not an exhaustive quantitative study. It will not satisfy those who want to chart acreages and average incomes over the century. Instead, Higgs has given us a literate and perceptive analysis of the extraordinary staying power of a social group that refused to die.

ROBERT FORSTER
Johns Hopkins University

PATRICK FRIDENSON and ANDRÉ STRAUS, editors. *Le capitalisme français XIX^e–XX^e siècle: Blocages et*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dynamismes d'une croissance. Paris: Fayard. 1987. Pp. 427. 150 fr.

FRANÇOIS BLOCH-LAINE and JEAN BOUVIER. *La France restaurée 1944–1954: Dialogue sur les choix d'une modernisation*. Foreword by JEAN-PIERRE RIOUX. Paris: Fayard. 1986. Pp. 338. 98 fr.

Jean Bouvier began as a historian of French banking in the second half of the nineteenth century and gradually widened his sights to economic and social history more generally, covering the twentieth century as well. The first of these books is directed to the critical years following France's liberation before the economic miracle lasting to the mid-1970s; the second is a *livre d'hommage* to Bouvier, written by a battery of younger historians on French business, finance, and economy in portions of the last century and one-quarter, with an introduction by him extolling revisionism and a postscript, also by Bouvier, in praise of historical eclecticism.

The schema for *La France restaurée* was suggested by François Bloch-Lainé, an Inspecteur des Finances who served in the Treasury from 1947 to 1953 and was later president of the Crédit lyonnais. It consists of chapters starting with a historiographic and historical approach to a key topic by Bouvier, followed by the recollections and thought of Bloch-Lainé on the subject. Bouvier's contributions are copiously footnoted, relying to a considerable extent but not exclusively on the relevant theses of scholars contributing to *Le capitalisme français*; Bloch-Lainé writes without scholarly apparatus. Separate chapters deal with "modernization" and "restoration" (or "recuperation," a distinction that may be stronger in French than in English); with the decision in the spring of 1945 not to undertake monetary reform, advocated by Pierre Mendès-France in the Economics Ministry but opposed by René Pleven and Emmanuel Monick in the Ministry of Finance; the debate between the advocates of a closed economy and the neoliberals; nationalization of industry; economic planning; the great success of public investment, partly financed by French sources, partly from the counterpart of American aid; businesspeople and market forces; and the antipathy in 1953–54 between Mendès-France and Edgar Faure.

Bloch-Lainé writes with frankness. In pushing for monetary reform Mendès-France was a little wrong in the beginning, but in resisting it Pleven and Monick were completely wrong at the end; Americans were always interfering, though never upsetting, and their advice that the French found irritating actually accorded with French interests and desires. There was no gratuitous pushing of American business interests (but see the Marxist view of Annie Lacroix-Riz in *Le capitalisme français*). The public investment on which the success of French recovery rested would have been impossible without American aid. The Bank of France is like the general staff, busy fighting the last war. Nationalization made sense in electricity and gas, was inescapable in coal and for the Renault firm, but was absurd for the nationwide banks (a verdict in which Claire Andieu concurs in *Le capitalisme français*).

There is some personal confession, notably regret over a memorandum supporting Pleven over Mendès-France, that he now calls his "Bridge over the River Kwai," and especially expressing shame at the metaphor that it was not necessary to burn down the woods to drive out the wolves (the war profiteers with large cash profits). He mentions Jean Monnet's luncheons at the rue Martignac where the Commissariat au Plan was housed—the food mediocre, the cheese served with the salad in the Anglo-Saxon manner new in France, but not without its symbolism. Bouvier writes in a more limited personal vein but testifies to having served the Resistance as a student in a Communist cell in Lyons.

The format works well. Bouvier not only discusses the historical literature thoroughly but raises questions and helps answer them. It is slightly off-putting to an American that he and the authors of *Le capitalisme français* are largely unacquainted with the literature on their subject in English—Warren Baum, Robert Gilpin, Charles Maier, Alan Milward, and others—except that which has been translated into French. Of those that have been translated, Bouvier expresses agreement over a wide front with Richard F. Kuisel's *Capitalism and the State in Modern France* (1981) and refers with admiration to Henry W. Ehrman's older *Organized Business in France* (1957). Few of the issues, however, are discussed with anything but French sources and a French viewpoint.

In *Le capitalisme français* Patrick Fridenson and André Straus have assembled an outstanding group of younger scholars to honor Bouvier on his retirement. I do not know how many are his students, and I am ashamed to say that I know the work of only one or two in financial history: Alain Plessis who writes on French banking in the Second Empire and Jean-Claude deBeir. Plessis counts bank windows to make a case that is not quite persuasive that French banking in 1860 was fully modern. DeBeir contributes a fascinating piece on the internal foreign policy of the Bank of France in the 1920s; Charles Rist aligned with Benjamin Strong of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Pierre Quesnay with Montagu Norman and, especially, Harry Siepmann of the Bank of England.

With twenty-one essays it is evidently impossible to do more than single out a few, some for praise and some for criticism. On the second score, I am not convinced by Pierre Saly, who maintains that Raymond Poincaré was a Keynesian in 1926 as he

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

restored the franc because he permitted wages to rise, and despite a budget surplus. Lacroix-Riz claims that the European Coal and Steel Community was forced on France by the United States, in contrast to Gérard Boussat, whose essay on French modernization most closely follows *La France restaurée* and argues that it was a French reply to an American challenge. He makes the point of many, including Bloch-Lainé, that French interests were narrow, but that the pressure to enter worldwide competition, as Monnet wanted, proved useful in the end.

Both books emphasize French interest in power, getting into the ranks of the leading industrial countries, standing up to the Anglo-Saxons. Robert Frank notes that France produced a plan for world monetary reform—by Hervé Alphand and André Istel—but that at Bretton Woods Mendès-France spent his time fighting for a larger French quota, for prestige, rather than dealing with substance.

The theme of the book is revisionist, as Bouvier says in his introduction. France is not blocked. Its economy has dynamism. Saint-Simonianism and spurts of growth in the 1840s, 1860s, and 1920s were precursors of the glorious thirty years from 1944 to 1974.

Bouvier's seminar at the Sorbonne was of course diffuse for students followed their own interests. There is business history in *La capitalisme français*—two essays on steel, one on Saint-Gobain, another on Point-à-Mousson. Closely related to the substance of *La France restaurée* is Michel Margairaz's paper on the direction of the Treasury from 1930 to 1950, covering part of the regime of Bloch-Lainé. Fridenson deals with public enterprise from 1944 to 1986, a leading issue of *La France restaurée*. Straus's paper on the finance of public expenditure between the wars is largely methodological, a subject on which the historians' fears are perhaps better illustrated in a footnote in Jacques Marseille's essay on colonialism, calling for the abandonment by economists of their "theoretical terrorism."

Together, these works testify to the magisterial contribution of Bouvier to French economic history and furnish a profound, if occasionally ambiguous, understanding of French postwar recovery in its initial stages.

CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

FRIEDRICH LENGER. *Zwischen Kleinbürgertum und Proletariat: Studien zur Sozialgeschichte der Düsseldorfer Handwerker 1816–1878*. (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, number 71.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1986. Pp. 332.

Friedrich Lenger's monograph reflects many of the virtues we have come to associate with the best contemporary German historiography. Based on a thorough mastery of the relevant archival sources, informed by a wide reading in social theory and comparative history, and engaged with central questions of political development, the book is a carefully defined but broadly relevant case study. Its unpretentious cosmopolitanism will surely refresh those who share the ennui produced in this reviewer by the sterile insularity of the recent *Historikerstreit*.

After a brief methodological introduction and a survey of Düsseldorf's economic and demographic development, Lenger concentrates his attention on the social and political history of the city's artisans and workers from the beginning of Prussian rule to the late 1870s. He provides a nicely differentiated picture of the structural changes within the various crafts, confronts the vexed question of social and spatial mobility, considers family life and residential patterns, and then concludes with two long chapters on the revolution of 1848–49 and the emergence of political organizations in the 1860s and 1870s. Throughout the book Lenger connects his findings with other studies of social and political change. Thus, we are able to use the Düsseldorf experience to test and refine the work done by Hartmut Zwahr, Jürgen Kocka, Jürgen Bergmann, Charles Tilly, and many others.

Lenger's analysis is inevitably uneven. He can speak with some confidence about the economic condition of the crafts, but the data inhibit his efforts to be precise about patterns of mobility, housing, and family life. Moreover, because there is so little evidence directly linking individuals' political action and social circumstances, an unavoidable gap separates his accounts of socioeconomic and political developments. Indeed, Lenger is rightly skeptical about attempts to see political alignments as mere reflections of social conflicts: for example, he dismisses an explanation of the artisans' response to the revolution of 1848 in terms of the crisis of the 1840s as "overdrawn and crudely *ökonomistisch*" (p. 153). Throughout the revolutionary period in Düsseldorf, artisans supported a variety of political and social movements; what cohesion they had came not from their class consciousness but rather from their sense of being part of the *Volk*, whose collective ideals were best expressed by radical democrats. During the 1850s and 1860s, various political groups continued to compete for artisans' support: democrats, liberals, socialists, and Catholics. In the end the emotional appeal and organizational energy of political Catholicism mobilized the core of what Lenger calls the "petty-bourgeois-proletarian milieu" in defense of the church's interests. Nevertheless, some elements within this milieu supported

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

social democracy, which in Düsseldorf remained dominated by artisans until well into the 1880s.

As he tells us in his introduction, Lenger wants his book to respond to the demand that "the history of the labor movement be closely tied to the history of labor" (p. 13). This, he believes, can best be done by examining the process of class formation (*Klassenbildung*), which he conceives in a modified yet still explicitly Marxian mode. But Lenger recognizes that class formation is neither inevitable nor uniform. He presents it as a multidimensional process that involves economic, social, cultural, and political developments. Moreover, he agrees with Kocka that it "can and has occurred with different ideological results" (p. 14). At no point in his account does Lenger allow his concepts to obscure the complexity of his material, which often does not lend itself to class analysis. As a result, his research and conclusions clearly reveal both the strengths and the limitations of his conceptual apparatus and methodological assumptions.

JAMES J. SHEEHAN
Stanford University

GUSTAV SEEBER, editor. *Gestalten der Bismarckzeit*. Volume 2, Berlin, G.D.R.: Akademie. 1986. Pp. 469. 38 M.

This volume is the successor to an earlier publication of the same kind and the latest in a distinctive East German genre of collectively written handbooks that straddle the line between scholarly research and general history for a broader public. For many years the best example was *Die bürgerlichen Parteien in Deutschland* (2 vols., 1968–70), currently being superseded by an updated and larger multivolume version, which became a staple of the German political historian's preparatory diet. Other, more recent, additions include the *Geschichte der Produktivkräfte in Deutschland von 1800 bis 1945* (3 vols., 1985–88) and the valuable biographical guide to the revolution of 1848, *Männer der Revolution von 1848* (2 vols., 1987). The first of the two volumes on the personalities of the Bismarckian era appeared in 1978, and this second one, edited by Gustav Seeber, is a welcome elaboration of the coverage in the previous volume.

Like its predecessor, the second volume assembles an attractive mixture of detailed portraits, integrating not only the major personalities of state (such as Albrecht von Roon, Herbert von Bismarck, Lothar Bucher, Joseph von Radowitz, Friedrich III) and leading politicians (Eugen Richter, Friedrich Albert Lange) but also leading men of the economy (Bethel Henry Strousberg, Werner von Siemens, Hanns Jencke, Wilhelm Kollmann), socialists such as Carl Hirsch and Julius Motteler, and significant intellectuals such as Adolph Menzel, Friedrich Spielhagen, Curd Lasswitz, Fanny Lewald, and Heinrich von Treitschke. Correspondingly, the authors include specialists from a variety of disciplines, whose contributions are frequently condensed from larger biographical or associated studies. The individual contributions perhaps add little to our understanding of the Bismarckian period by way of major interpretation, but, by providing well-contextualized and detailed guides to the careers of individuals who are invariably without a full-scale biography, they add considerably to the available literature on this period. This is particularly useful for businessmen such as Jencke and Kollmann, who are familiar figures for German historians of the *Kaiserreich*, but who are notoriously difficult to track down via the published sources. Because the contributions are also generously footnoted with references to the archives and other primary documentation, the volume is a valuable research aid for graduate students first entering the period. In this sense there is no real equivalent of the genre in the historiography of the Federal Republic, whose handbooks (an equally characteristic feature of historical pedagogy there, one should say) remain aimed far more at an undergraduate audience.

The volume lacks an index. But otherwise it is well written and well produced and belongs in any library catering to research needs in German history.

GEOFF ELEY
University of Michigan

WILHELM HENNIS. *Max Webers Fragestellung: Studien zur Biographie des Werks*. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr. 1987. Pp. iv, 242. DM 34.

In Allan Bloom's best-selling *The Closing of the American Mind* (1987), Max Weber appears as a key link in the "German connection" that has brought the United States to the brink of moral and intellectual disaster. Resurrecting the old charge of the German refugee Leo Strauss that the United States won World War II militarily but lost it culturally to Germany, Bloom sees Weberian relativism as the great vice of the American academy and indeed of the American way of life: "Anything goes." Through Weber's presumed supremacy in American social science, Nietzschean nihilism has come to haunt American culture.

Well-known political theorist Wilhelm Hennis began his studies under Weber's spell, but, influenced by Strauss, deserted him in the late 1950s. Now, toward the end of his prominent career, Hennis has returned to Weber with a vengeance, claiming him for the Aristotelian moral and political tradition—the basis from which Strauss and Bloom have con-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

demned Weber's ethical antifoundationalism. A neoconservative critic of social science, Hennis takes the high grounds of philosophy and history. Never before, he observes disdainfully, has an orthodoxy triumphed with so little intellectual effort as has Americanized social science, and the vast literature on Weber is bereft of any spirit and is merely a routinized enterprise. Hennis resolutely takes Weber away from social science, although he concedes that without the ahistorical American interest in him after World War II, and especially without Talcott Parsons's naive adaptation, Weber would be a dead classic today. Hennis's perspective involves a rejection of the conventional view of Weber as a founding father of sociology—a position that can be argued seriously—and a disinterest in the theoretical and empirical uses made of Weber's opus. Hence he and the sociologists are bound to talk past one another.

Hennis is a first-rate polemicist and skillful pamphleteer. In contrast to Bloom, who never cites Weber, he combines forceful formulation with a close reading of passages from the whole work. The present volume contains five essays that were conceived as a series, beginning with "Max Weber's 'Central Question'" [1982] published in English in *Economy and Society*, vol. 12 [1983] pp. 135–80; a translation of the whole by Keith Tribe has appeared.) In Hennis's "radically historical" and "philosophically anthropological" reading, Weber's central question revolves not around the theory of social action or of modern society nor Western rationalization or the fate of the German empire but around the moral qualities of the individual now and in the future. Hence, Weber's dominant scholarly theme (chap. 2) concerns the relation between ethical personality and the "life orders." Investigating the existential conditions of virtue places Weber squarely in the tradition of the moral sciences from Machiavelli to Rousseau and Tocqueville. Therefore, chapter 3 interprets Weber as a true heir of the German Historical school in political economy, which was normatively rooted in Aristotelian moral philosophy. But Nietzsche's "ethical personalism" and "heroic pessimism" also loom large in Weber's *oeuvre* (chap. 4). That does not make Weber a Nietzschean, Hennis hastens to add. Weber did not take Nietzsche seriously as a scholar or a political man, but he let the philosopher's overriding concern with the condition of humanity inspire him. Nietzschean influence also helped turn him away from the older liberalism but in the direction of a liberal voluntarism that remained committed to political freedom (chap. 5).

In bringing Weber's *oeuvre* home to its forgotten German roots, so to speak, Hennis tries hard, with a good deal of erudition and verve, to change our perception of work and person at the very time that the first volumes of the *Max Weber Gesamtausgabe* have appeared and the ground is prepared for a new biography of Weber that can move beyond Marianne Weber's masterpiece. Hennis has been the most vociferous critic of the edition, which he sees as being controlled too much by professional sociologists. In my judgment, however, his case for Weber the moral philosopher is weakened by the fact that the writings contain almost nothing concrete about ethical conduct. If Weber had spelled out his notions of what he wanted Germans to be in the future—courageous citizens in a rising empire—he might well appear to us more time-bound. Instead, he poured his energies into the conceptual and substantive elaboration of his *Entwicklungsgeschichte* and sociology and thus provided take-off points for major developments in contemporary social science—for better or worse.

GUENTHER ROTH
Columbia University

MARKKU HYRKKÄNEN. *Sozialistische Kolonialpolitik: Eduard Bernsteins Stellung zur Kolonialpolitik und zum Imperialismus 1882–1914; Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Revisionismus.* (Studia Historica, number 21.) Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura. 1986. Pp. 382.

Eduard Bernstein's attempt to persuade the German Social Democratic party (SPD) to adopt a procolonial line before 1914 has attracted considerable attention from historians in recent years. In this thoughtful and important study, Markku Hyrkkänen, a Finnish scholar, interprets Bernstein's colonialism from a perspective somewhat different from those of others who have studied the subject. He argues that Bernstein's colonialism should be seen as an integral part of his revisionism and that both together are best understood as Bernstein's response to the problematical situation of the SPD between the 1880s and World War I. He rejects the tendency prevalent in the literature to analyze Bernstein's thought as a convergence of intellectual influences, claiming instead that the immediate context in which Bernstein worked largely determined the shape of his thinking. The focus of attention should be the questions arising from the conduct of politics that led Bernstein to construct answers by selecting among the array of contemporary ideas available to him.

Hyrkkänen argues, for example, that, although Bernstein's views on politics and colonialism resembled those of many of the Fabians and Radicals with whom Bernstein was in contact while in Britain, he should not be portrayed (as he often is) as a kind of German Fabian or Radical. Bernstein's ideological positions were specifically tailored to the circum-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

stances of the SPD in Germany. The SPD needed, according to Bernstein, to support "humane" and "nonaggressive" colonialism in order to promote democratization and the evolution of capitalism into a more socially benevolent form—objectives that had to some extent been achieved in Britain.

The author treats several other aspects of his subject in a similar way: Bernstein's avowal of the right of *Kulturvölker* to rule others, his advocacy of "internationalizing" colonial policy to avoid imperial conflicts, his idea of an international system of treaties to maintain peace. His analysis has the virtue of focusing attention on the relationship between practical politics and the formulation of ideology. He shows convincingly that Bernstein was concerned not so much with adjusting the theory of the SPD to its parliamentary practice as with adjusting both theory and practice to contemporary realities. Unfortunately, however, Hyrkkänen's avoidance of "influence analysis" seriously limits his interpretation. The context in which a politician such as Bernstein operates is not solely composed of "objective" social forces and practical political considerations. It also contains the ideas that other people have and that guide their behavior. Not only Bernstein's answers but also his questions—the *Problematik* that he derived from the SPD's relationship to its political surroundings—included ideas not Bernstein's own that were part of current political discourse. Bernstein's view of contracts as the key to social and international peace, for instance, came directly from one of the leading tendencies in liberal *Sozialpolitik*. It could be argued that the very nature of Bernstein's revisionism, which held that socialism should shape itself to the contours of an evolving capitalism, led him to form his thought along the lines of advanced liberalism in Germany and Britain—not as a mindless imitator but as one engaged in a dialogue with the most sympathetic bourgeois analysts of bourgeois society.

WOODRUFF D. SMITH
University of Texas, San Antonio

REINER POMMERIN. *Der Kaiser und Amerika: Die USA in der Politik der Reichsleitung 1890–1917*. Cologne: Böhlau. 1986. Pp. xii, 436. DM 108.

If the recent literature uniformly has treated this topic in a fragmentary manner, the most obvious characteristic of Reiner Pommerin's book is its comprehensive nature. This is perhaps its most important contribution to the literature on German-American relations during the Wilhelmine period and generally on international relations before World War I. In its scope, organization, context, and sources, it is clearly in a class by itself.

The book considers in detail the political, economic, military, and cultural relations between imperial Germany and the United States from Otto von Bismarck's ouster in 1890 to the American entry into World War I. Primarily about German policy and America's place in it, the book undertakes the complex task of comparing and contrasting the *Amerikapolitik* of the governments of Leo von Caprivi (1890–97), Bernhard von Bülow (1897–09), and Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg (1909–17) within the context of Germany's shifting interests and aims in the international arena throughout the period. Particular care is taken to demonstrate the relevance and significance of the other European great powers, their interests and rivalries, to the bilateral relationship between Germany and America. England's ever present shadow on that relationship is always apparent. The book's sources, particularly the many important and valuable collections of private papers housed in various libraries throughout the United States, are impressive and complete. Although concerned with the shifting attitudes and policies of the German leadership toward the United States, the book nevertheless relies very much on the important primary sources in the United States and England and the information and perspective they add to the German records.

Although the different foreign policy orientations of the Caprivi, Bülow, and Bethmann-Hollweg periods have often been defined elsewhere, the impact of those differences on the German-American relationship, as well as the reverse, has not. In an age of protectionist sentiment during the latter decades of the nineteenth century, Caprivi's Europe-centered, Mitteleuropa policy was motivated primarily by economic considerations and thus inclined to be anti-American. The obsession with a German-dominated economic bloc on the Continent was in part the result of growing German dependence on American raw materials and the onslaught of American goods on the German and other European markets. Germany's failure to convince the rest of the Continent of the "American danger," coupled with "the world-political reorientation of German foreign policy under the leadership of Bülow" (p. 381) placed America in a very different position in the eyes of the German leadership. A more aggressive colonial policy and the huge naval program, with negative consequences for Anglo-German relations, naturally made the United States a coveted friend and ally for Berlin. The author does a splendid job of detailing Bülow's futile attempts to accommodate American interests in the south Pacific islands, the Spanish-American War, trade relations, China, cultural relations, and the Western hemisphere and, in spite of this, America's continued strategic reliance on Great Britain.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This positive aspect of Pommerin's study falls off in the last section. With more than half of the book devoted to the Bülow years, there is an imbalance in coverage. Those years might also be considered the book, and the years 1909 to 1917 very much an epilogue. Although still a superb treatment of the shifting policy orientation of the German government and its relations with the United States after 1909, much of the context of international relations and great power rivalry, crisis, and war during those critical years is missing.

Pommerin rejects the notion that hostility and war were the inevitable outcome of the relationship between these two latecomers to the stage of global expansion and imperial rivalry. Although the author does not seek to assess blame, he leaves little doubt about his view that Berlin's efforts throughout were defensive and aimed at accommodation. This is a superb and much needed contribution to scholarship and will remain the standard work on German-American relations during the Second Reich for years to come.

FRANCIS R. NICOSIA
Saint Michael's College

TRUDE MAURER. *Ostjuden in Deutschland 1918–1933*. (Hamburger Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutschen Juden, number 12.) Hamburg: Hans Christians. 1986. Pp. 972. DM 88.

The *Ostjuden*, Jews from Russia and Russian Poland who moved to Germany during the closing decades of the nineteenth century and, mostly involuntarily, during World War I, aroused in the postwar era public controversy and rabid anti-Semitism quite disporportionate to their relatively small number. Trude Maurer's book is an extensive, well-documented study of their impact on the Weimar Republic's politics and on Germany's Jews. The *Ostjuden* had originally fled tsarist Russia to escape persecution, poor economic conditions, and military conscription. During the war, as German troops entered Russia's border regions where most eastern Jews traditionally lived, the German high command used them as forced labor and shipped thousands of them to Germany. Many of these men stayed on after the war had ended, followed by their families and an additional wave of fugitives from sporadic pogroms in the newly created Polish republic.

The study is nearly evenly divided between two themes. In the first half of the book the author discusses the effects of eastern Jewish immigration on the attitudes of public officials, political parties, and the media, stressing the often discriminating policies regarding *Ostjuden* that evolved once their presence was seen as a "problem." The balance of the book treats the ambivalent interrelations of the mostly assimilated German Jews, notably their major organizations, with their less-than-welcome coreligionists from the east. The story that emerges is sad. Over 70 percent of the immigrants settled in Prussia, notably Berlin, while the remainder went to other large cities outside Prussia such as Munich and Leipzig, living under poor and crowded conditions. They were overwhelmingly working-class people, religiously orthodox, culturally "alien." Some of them engaged in crimes—a few (the Barmats, Sklareks, and others) were involved in major financial scandals—which gave all *Ostjuden* a bad name. Not surprisingly, they were constantly vilified by agitators and the press of the political Right and were repeatedly attacked physically by anti-Semitic hoodlums, including Nazis. Particularly during the first five turbulent postwar years, they were also exposed to police brutality and harassment by public officials. A few successful attempts were made to expel entire families from Germany, and, although successive Prussian ministers of the interior leaned over backward to be fair in their treatment of *Ostjuden*, their subordinates often adopted a different stance. The author argues convincingly that the eastern Jewish immigration heightened the already virulent anti-Semitism in the republic. All segments of the political Right exploited it effectively not only to tar the assimilated German Jews with the brush of the despised "subhuman" *Ostjuden* but to attack the hated republic as well.

As to her second theme, the author modifies the standard charge that the German Jews rejected and abused their unloved coreligionists from the east. No doubt, such negative sentiments existed among German Jews privately and were occasionally voiced publicly. They were generally opposed to further immigration of *Ostjuden*, whose presence, they insisted, increased anti-Semitism in Germany. On the other hand, all but one of the major non-Zionist and Zionist organizations assisted the *Ostjuden* economically, advised them, and tried to integrate them into existing congregations. And, when in 1920 and 1923 racist activists attacked *Ostjuden* in Munich, Berlin, and elsewhere, the League of Jewish War Veterans and volunteers from other organizations rose to their defense and provided protection. In short the author has written a comprehensive, readable, and carefully researched book on a significant but long neglected topic.

WERNER T. ANGRESS
State University of New York, Stony Book

THOMAS CHILDERS, editor. *The Formation of the Nazi Constituency, 1919–1933*. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes and Noble. 1986. Pp. viii, 263. $32.50.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This book contains nine specialized essays on a range of topics related to the development of Nazism in the Weimar years. Thomas Childers has provided an introductory chapter laying out the main themes and directions.

Rudy Koshar's essay reviews developments in Marburg over the period from 1880 to 1933. His announced aim is to "evoke" the "mounting political crisis of the bourgeoisie." This attempt to draw larger lessons out of the experience of a small university town depends on one's willingness to accept his conclusion that, as with "a good microscope," Marburg "enlarged the texture and detail" of the wider political crisis. The effort is not successful; it loses the merits of a community study by attempting to serve that larger purpose. The question of typicality is merely assumed, never addressed: did "the bourgeoisie" of this small university town face the same problems and react in the same ways as "the bourgeoisie" of Berlin, Hamburg, Essen, and Leipzig?

Zdenek Zofka's essay deals with a rural Catholic *Landkreis* in Bavaria, showing voter disaffection leading first to the *Bauernbund* and then to the National Socialist party (NSDAP). Since most analyses of rural areas have focused on Protestant Germany, that being where the major shift occurred, it is useful to have a sensitive and detailed account of the developments in an equivalent Catholic region. It provides a very useful account of the party's appeals and the conditions for their success in that context.

Detlev Mühlberger provides an interesting study addressing the question of centralized control of party propaganda, based on the experience of Westphalia. The question of local autonomy versus direction from Munich has been an open one. His account, basically, indicates a gradual shift from autonomy to acceptance by the local units of Munich directives.

Michaela Richter's contribution borrows a theoretical orientation from sociology, the notion of resource mobilization, and applies it to the NSDAP, the specific context in this case being Franconia. There is much sweeping assertion here without commensurate support. We have, for example, the generalization that: "In each stage, the party's choice of tactics and its prospects for success were shaped by the character and structural logic of the Weimar party system" (p. 109). Some claims sound rather strained, for example, that the NSDAP "used activism" as a "resource" for mobilizing potential members. One could as easily say "they worked hard to gain new members."

Richard Bessel, drawing on his recent book, offers an interpretation of Storm Troop violence. It had a distinctive character, one designed to communicate the lesson of the NSDAP as defender of a nation threatened from the Left. The actions were not random or "pointless" such as would have alienated middle-class sensibilities. The chapter provides a useful counter to the frequent image of "nihilistic" violence.

Michael Kater provides a heavily documented essay on the National Socialist Physicians' League. Although the subtitle promises consideration of "causes and consequences," the essay is very thin in its discussion of import. Throughout the piece one has the sense of major gains being made. In the last lines, however, he reports that, as of January 1933, the party had "locked" only one medical professional in ten within its ranks. Without appropriate comparison, it is not clear whether that was a success or failure. Kater speaks of the organization as a "catalyst," as providing "bonding" to the upper bourgeoisie, but those claims come without serious support.

Jane Caplan takes up the party appeals to the civil servants, reviewing the situation of that segment and, rather loosely, claiming causal connections between the appeals and the subsequent voting. Her final conclusion has things both ways: it was, borrowing Childers's phrase, "a catch-all party of protest," but it was also "most durably located" among the old petite bourgeoisie of town and country.

Jürgen Falter's contribution is a sweeping, comprehensive statistical analysis of voter movements from 1928 to 1933. It shows the shifts from election to election over this period. It addresses the question of voter shifts versus new voters. Following up some clues from earlier studies, it provides convincing evidence of strong NSDAP support among the elderly. It is clear, too, that most of the simple summary formulas are hopelessly inadequate, for the characteristics of the supporters and the new voters changed rather dramatically from one election to the next. The centrality of the religious factor is made eminently clear here, something that is lost in several other essays in this volume (in the conclusion by Caplan, for example).

Childers's essay discusses the election of November 1932, in which the party lost some two million votes. It is based on the party's internal reports, indicating the general desolation that prevailed just before and immediately after that campaign.

In his introduction to the volume, Childers declares that the chapters "provide a representative cross-section of the new research on the formation of the National Socialist constituency" (p. 2). Some of those who have published "recent research" on the topic might be inclined to see the sampling as rather selective. Childers indicates that the National Socialists were able "to encompass" some support from among the ranks of "the affluent and educated bourgeoisie" but makes no reference to my *Who Voted for Hitler?* (1982). Nowhere in the volume are

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

my principle conclusions relative to the lower-middle-class thesis presented. One might think an essay devoted to "resource mobilization" would make use of the findings in Henry Turner's book, *German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler* (1985). Nowhere do the principal findings of that book appear in the Childers's volume. The work of Max Kele deserves attention at several points. I think David Hackett's dissertation could have been cited where appropriate.

Childers makes insistent use of his new catch phrase, that the National Socialist party was "a catch-all party of protest." It is difficult to see how this represents an advance over the previous catch phrase, that the party was a party of lower-middle-class protest. Given the diversity of the support in the various segments of the population, as indicated in several of the articles in the present volume, the expression "catch-all" gives us no serious clue as to the location or incidence of the infection. Childers's one-phrase summary, incidentally, is sharply challenged by the findings in Falter's essay.

The distinctive contribution of these essays, Childers writes, is that they "shift the focus" from some previously mistaken views. "Our analysis," he declares, focuses on "the complex social mechanisms of political mobilisation, dissecting the multifaceted appeal of National Socialism to its socially diverse constituency" (p. 8). In the process the sources of the National Socialist success are discovered "in the layered interactions between the party's propaganda, in all its profuse forms, and political traditions, social structures and networks of sociopolitical communication in a period of profound economic crisis" (p. 8).

RICHARD F. HAMILTON
Ohio State University

WILHELM DAMBERG. *Der Kampf um die Schulen in Westfalen 1933–1945*. (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte, series B, number 43.) Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald. 1986. Pp. xxiii, 270. DM 68.

Although the debate on the extent of the Catholic church's collaboration with or resistance to National Socialism, sparked by the publications of Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Guenter Lewy, and Hans Müller in the 1960s, has quieted in recent years, research on Catholics during the Third Reich has progressed innovatively by departing from the earlier fixation on the Vatican and the German episcopate. Since the mid-1970s studies of specific bishoprics and regions have deepened our knowledge of the attitudes and behavior of the people belonging to the church and the implementation of the government's antireligious measures on the local level. Unfortunately, a comprehensive history of the diocese of Münster, whose bishop belonged to that group in the episcopate prepared to resort to bold measures of opposition, cannot be written because of the destruction of the vicariate in Münster during an aerial attack in 1943. Wilhelm Damberg had to confine his study of the bishopric to the conflict over the schools. Nonetheless, he has produced a painstakingly researched and significant book that presents a compelling case for making regional distinctions in the history of the Third Reich.

Although the Nazis came to power with the goal of establishing their ideological dominance in the educational system, up to 1937 no conflict over the public schools broke out in Westphalia. Instead, a creeping process of encroachments eroded the confessional character of the elementary schools and the church's rights in respect to the instruction of religion. Whereas the Nazis carried out school reforms in Bavaria in 1935–37, state and party officials in Westphalia did not decide on a test of strength with the church until December 1938. Up to this time, as Damberg demonstrates with a wealth of archival evidence, the district governor in Münster behaved in a conciliatory manner toward the church, and the tactical course followed by the party's regional leadership was characterized by caution and restraint.

Damberg's explanation for the delayed confrontation with the church in Westphalia centers not so much on the charismatic personality of Bishop Clemens von Galen as on the Catholic subculture in the region. The Nazis had greater difficulties in penetrating Catholic strongholds here than elsewhere in the Reich. Party leaders regarded the Catholics here as a stubborn breed, who could be won over to National Socialism only over time. Moreover, the Nazi movement in Westphalia was not united ideologically. Many Catholics who joined the party and became local functionaries retained their old values and beliefs. Their moderating influence offset the radicalism of the anticlerical activists in the National Socialist Teachers' League.

The Nazi strategy for destroying the confessional schools through small, unsensational measures did not deceive Bishop von Galen. Beginning in 1935, he mobilized the faithful in his diocese to defend religious education in the schools. The protest movement of the parish clergy stirred up so much dissent that the *Gauleitung* in March 1937 stopped its own propaganda campaign for the secular "community school." Government officials renounced the use of plebiscites on the school question, a tactic employed earlier in Bavaria with success. When the state began to carry out the reform by administrative means in 1939, Galen and the parish clergy led an opposition movement that culminated in the school referendum held in all churches of the diocese.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The evidence documenting Damberg's analysis of Catholic opposition in Westphalia under the Nazi dictatorship adds up to an impressive testimony of self-assertion and courage. And yet some pertinent questions remain unanswered. Did Catholic opposition to the government's school policy have any repercussions on Catholic attitudes toward the Nazi state? Why did the alienation of Catholics over the totalitarian educational goals of the Nazis come to nothing in terms of wider political issues and pose no grave problem for the regime? Damberg seems to disagree (p. 257) with those historians who, like Ian Kershaw, contend that the narrower field of confessional issues consumed the potential energy of the parish clergy to oppose the regime, but he does not spell out his argument.

MARJORIE LAMBERTI
Middlebury College

KLAUS MAMMACH. *Widerstand 1939–1945: Geschichte der deutschen antifaschistischen Widerstandsbewegung im Inland und in der Emigration*. Berlin, G.D.R.: Akademie. 1987. Pp. 444.

The German Democratic Republic's postwar years have witnessed the appearance of a considerable body of historical literature devoted to German anti-Nazi Resistance. As a rule, despite the large volume of factual material, such publications were limited to presenting the Communist point of view and did not give the same weight to the non-Communist underground as to the Communist party of Germany (KPD). In breadth, reliability, and careful objectiveness these works proved to be far below the standard rules of historical scholarship. Their lack of respect for factual evidence and their use of sweeping generalizations and rhetoric unduly narrowed the historical perspective of many East German works. Some significant contributions have come, however, in the much explored field of Communist Resistance, and GDR historiography has helped illuminate many dark corners.

The present volume is a summary of the existing Communist Resistance literature. It is divided chronologically into four lengthy chapters: the German Resistance at home and abroad at the outbreak of the war, September 1939 up to the invasion of the Soviet Union, the turning point of the war at the battle of Kursk, and the period of July 1943 to May 1945. Each chapter examines in detail the so-called leading role of the KPD in the Resistance. A long description is followed by shorter accounts of the activities of Social Democratic, bourgeois, and Christian resisters. In every instance, the KPD and its associates emerge supreme.

Klaus Mammach's one-sided account contains considerable information on KPD activities, but it does not add anything new to what is already known. The volume is neither a general essay nor a scholarly work. It seldom moves beyond the confines of party politics. The author's method of scholarship is disturbing. Sometimes the author does not even consider it necessary to indicate his sources. His inability to use his vast factual evidence objectively makes him an ideological prisoner of the Communist party's premises. There is a marked tendency to accept uncritically the Soviet point of view and to downplay the contribution of the German democratic underground. The military underground is almost left out. The author holds great reservations and outright hostility toward the Social Democratic Resistance that opposed an alliance with the KPD, and he does not trouble to explore the available evidence. Some of his judgments lack fairness (for example, his note on Eugen Gerstenmaier, p. 357). Mammach takes Communist propaganda statements at face value and then bases his conclusions on them. He probes little beneath the Communist rhetoric. His wordy declarations about the leading political role of the KPD in the struggle against Hitler are couched in vague terms and unsubstantiated by sources, thus gravely weakening the whole work. The manipulated text abounds in oversimplifications and stresses the importance of every single Communist appeal. In places it presents an almost meaningless chronicle of declarations and events. To take only one concrete example, Mammach quotes as significant an exile German Communist pamphlet published in Argentina in 1941 that appealed to the German community of that country for support in the Soviet Union's struggle (pp. 116–17).

The biographical and geographic indexes are useful. The bibliography, largely based on secondary works, is relegated to the compressed notes. A number of pictures of leading resisters are featured.

This volume provides a good example of the defects of contemporary Communist historiography. On the one hand, the Communist activities are overemphasized and too finely detailed; on the other hand, the uncritical and unqualified application of the interpretative categories, such as Western imperialism, camp of capitalism, and popular front, does little to illuminate the actual historical development. Mammach has collected lots of material on a complex and important issue, but he has written about it without discrimination, fairness, or historical comprehension.

RADOMIR V. LUŽA
Tulane University

MARIE VASSILTCHIKOV. *Berlin Diaries, 1940–1945*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1987. Pp. xv, 324. $19.95.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marie ("Missie") Princess Vassiltchikov (1917–78) came from a family with a distinguished tradition in the service of the tsars of Russia. Her parents moved after the revolution with their three daughters and two sons to their properties in Lithuania; educated in Western countries, the children were at home in the capitals, palaces, and languages of Europe. Missie was a compulsive diarist and letter writer, and her younger brother George is the erudite editor and commentator of this volume of parts of her diaries, letters, and postwar recollections, covering the years 1940–45. A British edition under the same title appeared in 1985; for the present American edition the editor's linking comments were revised, and spelling and usage were unified.

The months from January 1940 to June 1941 are reflected in some fifty pages filled with social engagements among the international nobility in Berlin, against the background of German military victories. From the start of the German attack on Russia, almost two years of the diary, June 1941–July 1943, are missing (p. 55); some twenty pages of George's commentary and "random excerpts from Missie's diary discovered after her death" (p. 62) cover a few days of the interval, which includes a princely wedding with all the trimmings. There follow more than two-hundred pages of diary entries on the further course of the war and its aftermath, still laced with social notes but with political observations and comments decidedly in the foreground.

It is mildly intriguing to learn how a nobility carried on after the collapse of the political system of which it was a part, confidently keeping its form, only partially integrated into the contemporary political and social environment, be it in Spain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Lithuania, or Austria, yet bearing with traditional equanimity political upheavals, deaths in action, and other sacrifices demanded by war. Although the gap of information during the first months of the Barbarossa campaign is frustrating, a great wealth of information is available for the period after July 1943. For this later period the diary is a valuable source of detail on the anti-Hitler conspiracy that culminated on July 20, 1944. It is also a gripping account of life in wartime Germany, comparable to that of another inside view by an outsider, Christabel Bielenberg (*The Past Is Myself* [1968]). Missie worked in the German Foreign Office, and she was in frequent contact, both on duty and socially, with such figures as the former German ambassador in Moscow, Count Werner von der Schulenburg; the Potsdam governor, Gottfried Prince Bismarck; the Berlin president of police, Count Wolf Heinrich von Helldorf. She developed a friendship with Adam von Trott zu Solz, one of the chief anti-Hitler conspirators, who also worked in the Foreign Office.

From autumn 1943 Missie was informed about, if not entirely initiated into, the conspiracy against Hitler, as she confided to her sister Tatiana to warn her about her husband's (Paul Prince Metternich's) possible entanglement. References to the conspiracy increase in frequency and clarity in the spring of 1944, and so does Missie's torment over having to remain an inactive observer (pp. 179, 189) when she characterizes Trott, her own position, and the conspiracy as a whole. On Trott she writes: "He is a man completely out of the ordinary. All his thoughts and efforts focus on things and values of a higher order, to which neither the mood of this country, nor that of the Allies seem attuned. He belongs to a more civilised world—something, alas, neither side does" (p. 170). She got into a bitter dispute with Trott on July 10, 1944, over the conspirators' seemingly endless preparations "perfecting the details" (p. 186) when, to her mind, the job was to kill the monster. She elaborated on July 19: "The truth is that there is a fundamental difference in outlook between all of *them* and me: not being German, I have never attached much importance to what happens afterwards. Being patriots, *they* want to save their country from complete destruction by setting up some interim government. I have never believed that even such an interim government would be acceptable to the Allies, who refuse to distinguish between 'good' Germans and 'bad.' This, of course, is a fatal mistake on their part and we will probably all pay a heavy price for it" (pp. 189–90).

PETER HOFFMANN
McGill University

CHRISTOPHER R. BROWNING. *Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution*. New York: Holmes and Meier. 1985. Pp. ix, 111. $24.95.

EBERHARD KOLB. *Bergen-Belsen: From "Detention Camp" to Concentration Camp, 1943–1945*. 2d ed. rev. Translated by GREGORY CLAEYS and CHRISTINE LATTEK. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1986. Pp. 99.

A visitor to Bergen-Belsen today will find a place almost bucolic in appearance. Situated amid the plains of the Lüneburg heath, the former camp site resembles a trim, well-tended cemetery garden. That is not the way it looked on April 15, 1945, when British troops liberated it and found, to their horror and dismay, a scene so shocking in its display of human misery as to be beyond description or belief for most.

In his slim but informative volume Eberhard Kolb reconstructs the history of Bergen-Belsen in sufficient detail to clarify how, despite present appearances, its name has come to stand "as a symbol of the worst atrocities . . . of the Nazi system of concentra-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion camps" (p. 11). That was not the end for which it was originally constructed. Established relatively late, in the spring of 1943, Bergen-Belsen was meant to be an *Aufenthaltslager*, or "detention camp," but over its brief, two-year existence it devolved into a place of gross deprivation and mass death and came to warrant its ascription as a "horror camp." Its worst phase by far came at the end of 1944 when SS Captain Josef Kramer, a brutal, unscrupulous former commandant of Auschwitz-Birkenau, was transferred to Bergen-Belsen on the evacuation of the Auschwitz camp. Tens of thousands of former prisoners of Auschwitz and other camps were dumped into the overcrowded quarters at Bergen-Belsen, where the conditions necessary to sustain life were already seriously lacking. By December 1944 the camp worsened to the point where starvation and disease were commonplace and human suffering took on apocalyptic proportions: "In the spring of 1945 20,000 to 25,000 prisoners had just as many toilets and washing rooms available to them as 2,000 people one year earlier, or rather even less because the camp administration had not let the water taps and other installations which had become unusable be repaired . . . In the second Prisoners' camp 8,000 to 10,000 inmates did not have a single W.C. or water tap . . . Opportunities for washing and bathing did not exist here at all . . . In the last days there was no water in the entire camp . . . [and] the prisoners, who got practically nothing to eat at this time, now also had to suffer from a terrible thirst . . . In these last weeks cases of cannibalism were not rare" (pp. 43, 46). Under such conditions exhaustion, starvation, and typhus all took their toll. In the end fifty thousand people or more fell victim to the horrors of Bergen-Belsen.

Kolb's account, a condensation and translation of a much more comprehensive history of the camp the author published in German in 1962, is nonetheless full enough to allow the reader to grasp the character of Bergen-Belsen. To his credit Kolb moves beyond exposition to raise the inevitable question: "Who is responsible for the catastrophe of Bergen-Belsen?" (p. 49). His answer is that it was "the concentration camp system as such, and with it all those who made the functioning of such a terrorist apparatus and persecution possible by their respective individual contribution to the deed, in higher or in lower functions" (p. 49). Thus, although in its initial conception and operation Bergen-Belsen was not to have followed the prototype of the Nazi concentration camp, ultimately its fate was determined by the same "internal logic of the concentration camp system" that accounted for the larger death camps elsewhere in Nazi-occupied Europe. Furthermore, it is the author's contention that, integrated as it was into "a system of oppression," Bergen-Belsen shows "that an intentional policy of extermination was practiced by the SS officials active in the terror apparatus of the 'Third Reich'" (p. 11).

This question of "intention" is at the center of a major debate among German historians today, a debate that Christopher R. Browning enters in the opening essay of his *Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution*. Although this is not the place to develop the main lines of this debate, it should be stressed that it is substantial and ongoing and will shape the way we understand the role of Hitler and the whole decision-making process of the Nazi regime in the mass murder of the European Jews.

As Browning states his position in the introduction to his brief but highly well informed book, "One must shift away from an exclusively Hitlerocentric focus and look more carefully at what the middle- and lower-echelon Germans of the emerging 'machinery of destruction' were doing. Once the historian has a better understanding of what was happening in the field and when the future perpetrators of the Final Solution first knew what they were about, he can then draw certain conclusions or at least hazard more informed speculation about what had taken place at the center of the Nazi regime" (p. 7). Following this strategy of looking "both from the top down and from the bottom up," Browning devotes three of his four essays to extremely detailed and closely argued exposition of events at the local level in Nazi-occupied Serbia during late 1941 and early 1942.

His separate chapters "Wehrmacht Reprisal Policy and the Murder of the Male Jews in Serbia," "The Development and Production of the Nazi Gas Van," and "The Semlin Gas Van and the Final Solution in Serbia" point to a coalescence of interests between Wehrmacht and SS forces in the field and authorities in Berlin who were responsible for more centralized planning of the Final Solution. By looking at the activities of local-level soldiers, police, SS organizers, and technicians in conjunction with emerging plans for the wider Holocaust of European Jewry, Browning is able to develop a history of relatively small-scale atrocity that presaged the genocide to come.

The abiding question behind each of these chapters, as behind the larger scholarly debate, is one that inquires into just when the decision was made to destroy the Jews as a whole, who made the decision, and how it was transmitted to those who actually executed the Final Solution. In "The Decision Concerning the Final Solution," the author's opening and most speculative chapter, Browning declares himself to be a "moderate functionalist" and, as such, opposes the thesis, set forth most forcefully by Lucy Dawidowicz, that Hitler launched the war in order to implement the Final Solution. While not

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

denying the tenacity or passion of Hitler's anti-Semitic obsessions, he develops a thesis that sees an array of forces coming together in the summer of 1941 and leading to the mass killings that shortly were to follow in the east. He focuses in particular on the probable time when this plan of mass destruction was emerging and on what its actual impetus may have been and argues, contra Martin Broszat, that "the euphoria of victory in the summer of 1941 and the intoxicating vision of all Europe at their feet, not the dashed expectations and frustrations of the last months of the year, induced the Nazis to set the fateful process in motion" (p. 33). The thesis is supported by a line of historical argumentation that follows on the work of Raul Hilberg and will not be accepted by those favoring more "intentionalist" interpretations, but neither will it give full comfort to the "functionalists." The debate continues in Browning's work with the articulation of a middle position that other scholars will now need to examine with considerable care.

ALVIN H. ROSENFELD
Indiana University

KURT KOSZYK. *Pressepolitik für Deutsche 1945–1949.* (Geschichte der deutschen Presse, number 4; Abhandlungen und Materialen zur Publizistik, number 10.) Berlin, F.R.G.: Colloquium. 1986. Pp. 522. DM 79.

Kurt Koszyk's newest work is the fourth volume in the series dealing with the history of the German press, of which he has personally written three. The latest offering does not quite conform to its predecessors in that it is confined, for obvious reasons, almost entirely to West Germany alone.

Methodologically, Koszyk has bowed to the inevitable and devoted separate chapters to the rebirth of the German press after 1945 in each area of occupation. As he concedes, this leads to a certain imbalance in treatment; there are only thirty-nine pages on the Soviet Zone against eighty-three on the American and fifty-nine on the French Zones. Unusually, the British has been given the fullest examination, nearly as long as the other western areas combined. Thus, the material is not evenly distributed within West Germany. Moreover, the impressive amount of research that underpins the work has not been matched in all cases by a corresponding tightness of control over the organization, and the book is rather rambling in consequence.

This is not to deny its clear merits; Allied intentions are brought out well, as in the view of one British journalist with the occupation who "wanted to bring about nothing less than a 'journalistic revolution' in Germany" (p. 199). The German press was to be not merely democratized but changed in style and presentation. The author documents the differences in approach between the zones as to how this was to be achieved. Americans preferred to license editorial boards composed of journalists of varying political outlooks, each mixed group to run one newspaper. To the German complaint that such a structure prevented political parties from getting their viewpoint over to the public Lucius Clay retorted, "the foundation of our [that is, American] democracy is our independent press" (p. 99). The British were equally concerned to present their own version of freedom to the Germans; this was an independent radio system but party-oriented newspapers (as in Britain). Interestingly, the military government in the British Zone wanted the U.S. model but was apparently overruled by the U.K. cabinet.

Koszyk stresses the similarities between the western zones as well as the differences, including the problems they had in common. Central news-gathering agencies had to be set up afresh in each area, and there were grave shortages of almost everything required, especially paper. All the western powers equally faced the dilemma of reintroducing a free press at a time of military censorship. Not until October 1946 did the quadripartite Allied Control Authority permit the German papers to discuss domestic political problems freely and then only if such reports did not undermine Allied unity; in the west this meant no attacks on the Soviet Union. Overt criticism was first permitted in the U.S. Zone in 1947, followed by Clay's launching of "Operation Talkback," to answer Soviet propaganda; the British then joined in by May 1948. These dates are of interest to cold-war historians, suggesting that anti-Communism did not take precedence over denazification until much later than some have averred.

Some minor errors have crept into the book; Josef Müller is called a Christian Democratic politician (p. 379), perhaps a misprint. Clay's role in the Berlin airlift is overstated (p. 358); further, it was not particularly "an outstanding test for similar operations" (p. 442). The Allies had already carried out extensive airlifts in Burma in 1944–45. These do not really detract from the book's overall value to researchers in several fields of postwar German history.

J. FARQUHARSON
Oxford, United Kingdom

ANN G. CARMICHAEL. *Plague and the Poor in Renaissance Florence.* (Cambridge History of Medicine.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1986. Pp. xv, 180. $29.95.

This study concentrates on the period from the first outbreak of the Black Death in Florence in 1348

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through the mid-fifteenth century. Ann G. Carmichael asserts and tries to prove a thesis: "Fourteenth-century plague survivors could not have defended the conclusion that plague was a contagious disease of the poor. Too many prominent citizens died in outbreaks before the fifteenth century. But wealthy Florentines of the 1430s could be reasonably sure that flight from the city would protect them from the plague. When they returned the records would show clearly the heavy mortality in working class districts of the city and . . . prosperous districts were relatively spared. Florentine . . . leaders were certain by the 1450s that . . . this was a contagious disease . . . The next generation of leaders would articulate clearly the further 'experience' that plague and poverty were close companions . . . Novel plague legislation appeared throughout northern Italy during the second half of the fifteenth century . . . fifteenth-century legislators found the new measures attractive because the legislation successfully addressed social disruptions created by plagues. The eventual adoption of the contagion principle of plague defense served the need both to solve the problem of recurrent epidemic disease and to confront the growing burden of urban poverty" (pp. 1–2). The opening paragraph of chapter 4, "The Social Effects of Plague in Florence," most clearly states and drives home this thesis: "Florentine legislators by the mid-fifteenth century were convinced that plague was a contagious disease best controlled by segregating and isolating potential sources of infection. By the end of the century they were equally certain that poorer people, especially migrants and beggars, were carriers of the disease. There was a deepening conviction that poverty and plague were linked threats to the security of the state. The novel plague legislation formulated during this period helped to ensure that poverty and plague would be lasting companions" (p. 90).

The major sources on which Carmichael relies are the first four registers of the "Books of the Dead" of the communal Grain Office, now housed in the Florentine State Archives. "The series originally was little more than a register of all burials performed by communal gravediggers, but by 1424 included diagnoses [by the gravediggers] of causes of death during epidemic years" (p. 4). For the years 1450–58 Carmichael relies especially on the first volume of an "apparently independent, series of Florentine death registrations . . . kept by the physicians and apothecaries' guild," also based on information provided by the gravediggers (p. 32).

Given the dominant place of the gravediggers' records in this study, it is unfortunate that this book contains no transcriptions of representative entries from those records, particularly those that would indicate the major changes in the nature of record keeping. We also would have been better served if provided with a more precise account of the time periods included and omitted and the number of entries of each sort contained in each time period.

A key piece of evidence derives from "the minor 1430 plague year record," the sole one to include "the names of streets on which many victims died" (p. 73). Carmichael uses these to show that "it is clear that epidemic waves passing through Florence in the early fifteenth century hit populous working-class districts with disproportional severity" (p. 77). But who were the working classes, and how does one ascertain where they lived? For this the author relies on Samuel Kline Cohn, Jr.'s, *The Laboring Classes in Renaissance Florence* (1980). Cohn arrives at his conclusions on the basis of his statistical manipulation of archival data that he believes reveal endogamous and exogamous marriages (within and outside of various parishes and Florentine administrative districts), among those whom he ascribes to the working class according to varied criteria that include dowry size and the use of surnames. Cohn's findings are in serious dispute, but Carmichael's assertions depend on his being correct.

The author concentrates on trying to substantiate her thesis in the sections of chapter 4 that treat the legislative significance of minor plagues (here she deals with traditional sanitary legislation and crisis legislation during and after the Black Death) and the social significance of emerging plague legislation (pp. 96–107). Here, she quickly describes changes and legislation that encompass a full century and one-half, from about 1348 to 1498. I had hoped that the Florentine analysis would have been dealt with more thoroughly and at a deeper level in the next, and last, chapter, "Plague Controls Become Social Controls" (pp. 108–26). Although this chapter deals with plague controls in 1348 (especially in Pistoia and Venice), plague controls after 1348 (especially in Milan and Mantua), the evolution of plague controls (especially in Venice, Ferrara, and Milan), and plague legislation for the poor (especially in Siena and Venice), these pages contain no sustained analysis of the Florentine situation.

This study has done more, however, than pose an interesting thesis. The book includes useful medical as well as historical descriptions and explanations of the various minor plagues and epidemics that assaulted Western Europe during the late Middle Ages and early Renaissance, and it contains a substantial bibliographical essay focusing on the major secondary works.

WILLIAM M. BOWSKY
University of California, Davis

The assignment of this book review was made by the Board of Editors.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

GERARD DELILLE. *Famille et propriété dans le royaume de Naples (XV^e–XIX^e siècle)*. Rome: Ecole Française de Rome or l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris. 1985. Pp. 482.

"Family and Property in the Kingdom of Naples" is a very important book, not just for students of Neapolitan history but for anyone studying the history of the family. Because southern Italy appears to be the stronghold of a rather stereotypical notion of the traditional family, it provides the ideal ground to test the idea of the European family against a set of concrete material conditions.

Gérard Delille's analysis of social, political, and economic solidarity and the mechanisms for the exchange of women and goods grows out of a meticulous archival investigation over the long-term historical record. Family reconstitution from cadastral surveys, parish registers, and notarial acts such as wills, lists of goods, and marriage contracts provide the data base. Some 200 pages of paraphernalia (65 tables, 45 genealogical charts, and 18 diagrams in the text, 41 tables and 5 transcribed documents in the appendix, a 30–page bibliography, and a 17–page, 4–part index) make a wealth of detail readily available. From all this data, Delille attempts to derive rules for understanding the elementary structures of kinship in the Kingdom of Naples by demonstrating how property holding and inheritance strategies determined marriage alliances, dowry customs, and reproductive patterns for both the nobility and the rural classes, for both rich and poor.

Delille divides the argument about the relationship between property and family into four discrete parts: noble structures, village structures, kinship and alliances, and fluctuation and change from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Each of the first three sections explains how kinship alliances adopted themselves to demographic and economic crises in terms of the logic of property acquisition, strategies of inheritance, and the like. In other words, family and kinship were played out according to "rules in a game." For the nobility, transmission of feudal holdings dominated all considerations in family alliances. Transactions and strategies clustered into three periods: devolution of properties to royal authority, 1400–1550; increased sales between private parties, 1550–1650; and extinction of the two previous systems of property exchange by devolution and market, 1650–1800. For the village commoners, land and crops dominated all familial strategies. Three cultivation zones—one of the latifundias' extensive cultivation of wheat, one of small proprietors' intensive cultivation of fruits and vines, and one mixed—generated different demographic profiles for age at first marriage, family size, age structure, proportion of widows, importance of celibacy, and so on. For kinship alliances in general, a variety of political and economic reasons such as ensuring inheritance in case of death, providing avenues for remarriage, and avoiding or minimizing dowry payments explain the particular form of marriage partnerships. One strategy in particular, double marriages between two brothers and two sisters, pairs of cousins, and uncles or nephews and aunts or nieces, receives special attention because of its importance in cementing the bonds of reciprocity. Finally, part 4 looks at the dynamics and transformation of marriage and kinship systems from late medieval to modern Europe. In short the Neapolitan "family" is presented as an economically and legally determined entity. Arguments about the rise of sentiment or "romantic" love in the nineteenth century, for example, are meaningless unless they are presented in terms of property relations and the transfer of patrimonies.

I would make only two quibbles. First, the detail may be overwhelming for all but the most steadfast devotees of kinship complexities. *Famille et propiété* is, after all, a revised and condensed *thèse d'etat*. More seriously, at what point does structural analysis gloss over the conflict present in any system? Cadet branches of a family that may win out in the demographic endgame probably tell us more about internecine rivalry than clan victory. Rules were meant to be broken. Stasis and change resulted more from interaction and confrontation than from rational systemization.

Delille's third book, as a product of historical demography in the Annales school, joins the painstaking methodologies associated with that tradition to a mature and thought-provoking reflection on the relationship betweeen economy and society in early modern Italy. An anthropological sophistication in kinship terminology, marriage alliances, dowry practice, legal theory, and religious structures of inheritance, consanguinity, and livelihood systems informs a nuanced interpretation that is the essence of comparative history.

JOHN A. MARINO
University of California, San Diego

GARY TOMLINSON. *Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 280.

In a manner worthy of the comprehensive power of Claudio Monteverdi's own musical intelligence, musicologist Gary Tomlinson has united in this extraordinary and provocative interdisciplinary study the skills of an astute historian with those of a sensitive literary scholar and perceptive music critic.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The book is elegantly framed by two chapters of general historical interest, which provide the backdrop for Monteverdi's development as the foremost composer of his age. In addition the first of these chapters presents three "case studies"—the careers of Galileo Galilei, Giambattista Guarini, and Monteverdi himself—effectively summarizing the controversies engendered by their work and thereby illuminating the tensions between conservative and progressive (or scholastic and humanist) forces that dominated late Renaissance thought. The eight central chapters are a chronological review of Monteverdi's madrigals and operatic works, offering many new observations about the order of their composition, their relationship to the madrigal styles of Monteverdi's contemporaries, the ramifications of his text choices, and the influences on his musical development of Torquato Tasso, Guarini, Giambattista Marino, and other poets.

Because all Monteverdi's works are vocal works, the dual nature of the texts—poetic and musical—requires a particular kind of exegesis, and this is Tomlinson's forte. Although seventy-five musical excerpts are provided, the reader needs to have the complete musical scores in hand to appreciate fully the author's accomplishment in analyzing the preexistent poetry as well as Monteverdi's own musical response to it.

Despite the fact that Marino plays a crucial role in Tomlinson's chronicle of Monteverdi's stylistic development, the question of Mannerism (as opposed to Marinism) is never raised, presumably because the author gives little credence to it as a useful explanation for certain stylistic manifestations of the period. I fault him not for rejecting it merely for ignoring it. And this deliberate oversight is, I believe, symptomatic of a deeper flaw, for Tomlinson's own evaluation of Monteverdi's career at the "end of the Renaissance" is as idiosyncratic and single-minded as those who see Mannerist tendencies in every aspect of culture in the years spanned by Monteverdi's lifetime (1567–1643).

In Tomlinson's scheme of things, Marino and the "expressive impoverishment" (p. 164) of Marinist poetic tendencies are to blame for undermining the impassioned humanistic rhetoric that had characterized Monteverdi's youthful works. The latter belong to the introspective, Petrarchan tradition within which Monteverdi had forged music and poetry into a stylized language capable of expressing human passion, a language known as his Second Practice and best exemplified by his setting of Ariadne's lament. Furthermore, the polarity between Petrarchan and Marinist ideals of expression participates in the dichotomy between humanist and scholastic views of the universe outlined in the framing chapters; consequently, Monteverdi's struggle after 1610 to adapt to the fashionable and virtuosic, but ultimately "hollow," Marinist rhetoric of seventeenth-century Italian culture, a culture thwarted by the resurgence of scholastic values, constitutes a valiant but not wholly successful attempt to synthesize a Third Practice.

While this perspective is forcefully presented and developed over a series of chapters that include many original insights, it is finally disturbing because it oversimplifies the genesis of aspects of Monteverdi's late style and denigrates the aesthetic premises underlying the entire baroque era.

BARBARA R. HANNING
City College and Graduate School
City University of New York

JULIAN BUDDEN. *Verdi*. (Vintage Master Musicians.) 2d ed. New York: Random House. 1987. Pp. xi, 404. $9.95.

Julian Budden's studies of the Verdi operas are the most scholarly, detailed, and penetrating ever to have been written about the subject. His three-volume work *The Operas of Verdi* (1973–81) is now the most important study of the composer, and one doubts that it will be surpassed for decades to come. In the present book—a contribution to Vintage's Master Musicians series—Budden offers a reduced version of his earlier analyses, along with a biographical portrait and a discussion of Verdi's nonoperatic compositions. Measured in terms of sheer bulk, the reduction must be considered drastic: less than one hundred forty pages are devoted to the operas, whereas the three-volume study takes up more than fifteen hundred pages. Granted this radical constriction, the book can be recommended as an intelligent, state-of-the-art introduction to the most important figure in Italian cultural life since the Renaissance. Alas, the proofreading of the book's American edition is execrable.

Historians may be disappointed to find Budden arguing that "the Risorgimentale associations [of the operas] have been exaggerated" (p. 37). He denies not that the operas were quickly transformed into vehicles of Italian patriotism only that their inspiration was such. The most striking instance of this disjunction is provided by *Nabucco*, Verdi's first success. Although the oppression of the Jews by their Babylonian captors seemed a transparent metaphor for the circumstances of the Italians under the Habsburgs, no evidence suggests that Verdi himself embraced the analogy. True, he put up no resistance to its being drawn by his compatriots, but his own concerns, it appears, were primarily musical and dramatic.

There are no surprises in Budden's narrative. He tells the now familiar story of the slow but inexorable growth of Verdi's talent from the noisy and

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

hastily composed operas of the 1840s, through the famous domestic works of the midcentury, followed by the magnificent yet flawed experiments in grand opera that dominated the 1850s and 1860s, and culminating in the still not quite believable masterpieces of his ninth and tenth decades. No composer, unless it be Beethoven, underwent a more extravagant process of artistic development, although developmental careers seem to have been a characteristic of nineteenth-century composers. The artistic distance between his first opera, *Oberto* (1839), and *Falstaff* (1893) is staggering.

Beginning with the Weimar revival of the 1920s, Verdi has come into his own in the twentieth century. His greatness is now unambiguously acknowledged, whereas in his own lifetime musical seriousness was generally thought to be a monopoly of the Germans. Our forebears would have been surprised that we now find as much psychological depth and musical excellence in *Don Carlos* as they found in *Tristan and Isolde*. Budden is perhaps foremost among those who have persuaded us to think so.

PAUL ROBINSON
Stanford University

LUISA PASSERINI. *Fascism in Popular Memory: The Cultural Experience of the Turin Working Class*. Translated by ROBERT LUMLEY and JUDE BLOOMFIELD. (Studies in Modern Capitalism.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. x, 244. $39.50.

This book is based on the oral life histories of sixty-seven male and female workers in Turin, born between 1884 and 1922, which are combined with sources such as police reports, documentary films, and judicial documents. The interviewees recount their visions of life, of history, and of themselves; they call to memory the Fascist period and the ambivalent relationship between the Duce and the masses. The book originally was published as *Torino operaia e Fascismo*.

Luisa Passerini's introduction clarifies her methodology and the characteristics of her sample. Most of the interviewees were natives of Piedmont. The men were mostly skilled employees in engineering and metalworking. Many of them had participated in either World War I or the Resistance of 1943–45. The women were usually employed in the clothing industry; they had less schooling than the men and were more inclined to call themselves "rebels." Most of the interviewees were politically active, the majority being either communist, socialist, or "secular-progressive." Older people were the most radical and anticlerical.

Part 1, entitled "Oral Sources and the Analysis of Cultural Identities—Memories of Self," is written in plodding, social science style, despite the use of numerous quotations from interviewees. Part 2 is better: "Oral Sources and the History of Grassroots Cultural Forms—Fascism and the Symbolic Order in Everyday Life." It deals with such topics as the use of graffiti, songs, laughter, and the popular comic tradition to parody Fascism.

For me, part 3 ("Oral Sources and the History of the Events of Everyday Life") is the most interesting. Here the author explores, in turn, the degree to which workers expressed some social acceptance of Fascism, their widespread resistance to the regime's efforts to increase the birthrate in the 1930s (the description of birth-control practices is gripping), and their cold reception for Mussolini when he visited the new Fiat-Mirafiori factory on May 15, 1939. Of fifty thousand workers present, only a few hundred stationed in the front (mostly office workers) applauded him; the rest remained silent, with their arms folded.

The translators have worked hard to render the author's often turgid style into fairly readable English.

CHARLES F. DELZELL
Vanderbilt University

BERNARD MICHEL. *La mémoire de Prague: Conscience nationale et intelligentsia dans l'histoire tchèque et slovaque*. (Collection pour l'histoire.) Paris: Librarie Académique Perrin. 1986. Pp. 220.

Until 1939 Czech historians maintained close ties with French historians interested in the history of East Central Europe. Even as late as 1961 the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences published its retrospective bibliography of twenty-five years of Czech and Slovak historiography in French. Bernard Michel, a historian at the Sorbonne, attempts to restore those ties in this study of the historical memory of the Czechs (and, in one chapter, the Slovaks) over the last two centuries.

The book is divided into six chapters. The first argues Michel's case for the importance of history and language in framing Czech national identity. The second lists four characteristics that he argues constitute that identity, including a preference for evolutionary change, opposition to heroism, pacifism, and Slavic solidarity. The third chapter examines the role of the intelligentsia, especially František Palacký, in the birth of the Czech national movement in the nineteenth century. In the fourth chapter, Michel turns his attention to the interwar period, seeing Thomas G. Masaryk as its preeminent representative. The fifth chapter, an excellent essay on the Slovak point of view, sees the Slovak experience in its full historical context, one that was not tied to the Czech one to any great extent prior to

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1918. The final chapter, the least satisfactory one, recounts the experience of the intellectuals since 1939.

In reality the book is an extended essay. It is commentaries on Czech and Slovak history, not a study of that history. It is enriched by the inclusion of an abundance of apt remarks by Czech and Slovak writers and historians and occasional comparisons to the Polish experience. Michel also draws on his own experience in studying Czech and Slovak history and in interacting with Czech and Slovak historians.

In the end, however, Michel is trapped in the mindset of the ninteenth-century Czechs and Slovaks who originally determined the shape of their national identities. They rightly saw that the creation of those national identities had to be an intellectual process, one of education and culture. No other option was possible in a society so strongly influenced by persons speaking German and Hungarian. But twentieth-century society in Czechoslovakia is a mass society. It is more than a society of the mind. It is also one of material things. Even though Michel argues the existence of a "popular memory," there is very little in his book about the interests, needs, and outlook of Czech and Slovak workers and farmers. Czech and Slovak intellectuals have wanted from the earliest days to educate the masses and make them part of the Czech and Slovak nations. But the intelligentsia has rarely wanted to give the masses their own head because it has feared that they would be insufficiently concerned with matters of the nation's heart and mind. The fault may not be Michel's. Too few Czech and Slovak historians have looked at the social history of the modern Czech and Slovak nations. (Jan Havránek is a distinguished exception.) When historians know better this mass experience, they will be prepared to write a complete study of the national mindset.

OWEN V. JOHNSON
Indiana University

F. L. CARSTEN. *The First Austrian Republic, 1918–1938: A Study Based on British and Austrian Documents.* Broodfield, Vt.: Gower. 1986. Pp. 309.

F. L. Carsten has produced another illuminating documentary volume. This one, on Austria between the wars as seen through British eyes, follows closely on the heels of a similar book on Weimar Germany (*Britain and the Weimar Republic: The British Documents* [1984]). It is, of course, interesting to follow some of the leading British foreign policy experts in their running commentaries of the rocky history of the first Austrian republic. Britain had first-rate men in Austria, including F. O. Lindley, the high commissioner, Colonel Sir Thomas Cuninghame, the military representative, and, especially, Sir Eric Phipps, the envoy to Vienna between 1928 and 1933. No less interesting than their observations on the events in Austria are those, also included in this volume, of historians on official duty, such as Lewis Namier and E. H. Carr, and of the press corps. Furthermore, Carsten has tapped the records of the Society of Friends, whose relief mission, apart from its primarily humanitarian activities, sent reports to headquarters throwing important light on the first months in Vienna after the cessation of hostilities.

At first sight Namier's assessment of the struggling republic in a Foreign Office minute of August 2, 1919, seems rather surprising: "Austria in the days of her greatness has never had such a decent government and such able statesmen as she has got now" (p. 8). No less surprising, if not shocking, is the passage in a memorandum, "The Austrian Problem," of February 26, 1934, by the as usual unsentimental Carr in which he pointed out that in Austria the "Italian solution . . . supported only by the machine-guns of the mercenary Heimwehr" could not be expected to have the stability of the German solution. Regarding the latter, if it were recognized as eventually inevitable, "the sooner it comes the better" (p. 193).

No doubt the coalition government with which the first republic came on the scene was promising, as was the cooperation between the socialists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, to which Namier specifically referred. But the handicaps of the newly born state that almost *faute de mieux* came to call itself "Austria" were such that from the start it seemed, as the saying went, too small to live and too large to die. No doubt there was something inevitable about the last stages of the first republic's history, as Carr suggested. But serious mistakes were made, such as Engelbert Dollfuss's crushing the socialists in February 1934, without which, as the London *Times* observed, the outcome might have been different. On balance, however, the *via dolorosa* of Austria between the wars is traced in the reports of the officials with impressive understanding and expertise. One important fruit of Carsten's assiduous research is a memorandum, "The Aims of the Austrian Fascists" (pp. 134–36), of undetermined authorship, handed in 1929 by Otto Bauer to Herbert Morrison.

It must be added, though, that this book is disappointing. We should expect more from one of the leading authorities on Central Europe than a running commentary on archival sources. The pertinent question is: Did the British have any foreign policy in "far away" Central Europe? After all, Great Britain was a major power and not a mere observer of the play of diplomacy. And how did its role in Central Europe compare with that of France? Had Carsten also researched in the French archives, his conclusions would have carried more weight. More-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

over, the first Austrian republic was a pioneer in coping with the problem of postimperial policy. The study of Austria through British eyes has, Carsten might have indicated, a special, however melancholy, relevance for Britain after World War II.

KLEMENS VON KLEMPERER
Smith College

MARIAN MROCZKO. *Polska myśl zachodnia 1918–1939 (Kształtowanie i upowszechnienie)* [Polish West-Oriented Thought, 1918–1939: Formation and Dissemination]. (Dzieje polskiej granicy zachodniej, number 6.) Poznań: Instytut Zachodni. 1986. Pp. 429. 500 Zł.

This is the sixth volume in the series titled *Dzieje polskiej granicy zachodniej* (The History of Poland's Western Boundary). Marian Mroczko, its author, focuses primarily on the formation, evolution, dissemination, and implications of Polish ideas concerning the western territories that Poland acquired either in the period between the two world wars or since 1944.

These west-oriented ideas encompassed culture, economics, and politics. Mroczko briefly traces their origins to various political and ideological movements of the late nineteenth century. He devotes most of his attention, however, to the interwar period (1918–39) when they developed most fully. Polish west-oriented ideas, he suggests, were reactions to a real German threat, evidenced by Germany's push east and revisionist policies, the latter most consistently reflected by Germany's dissatisfaction with its post–World War I boundary with revived Poland.

From these basic premises, the author proceeds, in six well-organized and carefully documented chapters, to develop his study. Chapter 1 provides the requisite prewar background. Polish political and ideological positions regarding the western territories, then part of the German empire, and efforts to internationalize the Polish Question are discussed. The succeeding five chapters, each divided chronologically and set in the context of international politics in the interwar period, provide appropriate settings for the intensification of Polish interest in and response to the issue of the western territories in light of uprisings (for example, in Great Poland and Silesia), plebiscites (for example, in the lower Vistula region), an enhanced German position on the international stage after Locarno (1925), and Nazi revanchism between 1933 and the outbreak of war in 1939.

These intensified responses, according to Mroczko, led to the institutionalization and popularization of Polish west-oriented ideas. Early defense organizations, for example, the *Związek obrony kresów zachodnich* (1921) were soon joined by numerous newly created institutions (for example, the Instytut Bałtycki in Toruń and the Instytut Śląski in Katowice) and new and established universities, especially the University of Poznań (established in 1919). These engaged in numerous research projects relating to a complex of issues regarding the Polish position in the newly acquired western territories and the Polish minority in Germany. Centers created to disseminate information joined with newspapers of all political persuasions to popularize the new information generated by institutional research. As a result, the author concludes, in the twenty years between 1918 and 1939, an impressive west-oriented consciousness arose in Polish society—a marked shift away from the east. This, in effect, helped prepare the way for the acceptance of Poland's western boundaries at the end of World War II.

Mroczko's clearly written, copiously documented monograph is judiciously objective, despite its guarded political conclusions. It provides the reader with new insights about a kaleidoscopic variety of individuals, associations, organizations, and institutions in the interwar period—all preoccupied, if not obsessed, with the issue of Poland's fate in the west. It also enhances the reader's sensitivity to the offensive nature of German policies, especially as perceived by the Poles. The comprehensive bibliography, although based almost entirely on Polish archival and printed materials, is impressive in its scope and variety. The three indexes and the English and German summaries are useful. This original, thoughtful, and balanced study is a pleasure to review.

JOAN S. SKURNOWICZ
Loras College

JOHN COUTOUVIDIS and JAIME REYNOLDS. *Poland, 1939–1947*. (Politics of Liberation Series.) New York: Holmes and Meier. 1986. Pp. xxi, 393. $59.50.

This is the second volume in a series "The Politics of Liberation," published originally in Great Britain. In their preface John Coutouvidis and Jaime Reynolds promise a good deal to their readers. Thus, on the one hand, they want to explore the impact of otherwise undefined "great external events" on Poland's internal politics during and after World War II, yet, on the other hand, they also argue that Poland's "own political forces and culture" had a far greater influence on the country's recent history than even the Poles themselves dared to imagine. With these two basic, albeit somewhat contradictory, premises in mind, the authors express hope that their study "will go some way to fill what has hitherto

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

been a gap in the literature on modern Polish history."

I hate to disappoint the authors, but, in my experience at least, seldom have anyone's hopes been less fulfilled than in this particular case. Let me state it up front: this is a highly disappointing book, and a question ought be raised why such a volume could be published in England and the United States some forty years after the events described in the book.

In a brief review it is impossible to offer a detailed critique of the authors' main conclusions. Rather than doing that, I will try to answer my own question posed earlier regarding the purpose of the volume and the need to have it published. To begin with, despite the authors' claims about filling gaps in our knowledge, I did not find in their study any new information, original insights, or new interpretations. Part of the problem here is that the study is shockingly dated for the very simple reason that the volume glues together two doctoral dissertations completed in England in 1974 and 1984. Not surprisingly, the authors' data base essentially ends about ten years ago, in the second half of the 1970s, even though the volume itself was published in 1986.

I do not want to belabor the obvious, but, in my opinion at least, there is no excuse for this kind of scholarship and for the authors' failure to consult many new sources that appeared in both Poland and the West in the last decade. The incomplete data base raises some serious questions about some of the authors' major conclusions and interpretations, not to mention their terminology, which I find rather strange.

Finally, let me raise another question. It is a well-known fact that as a rule it is not so easy these days to have a doctoral dissertation published in the United States. Apparently, this is not the case in England. The question is, even though it was published in England, why should the volume have been published in the United States and why should the publishers have the chutzpa to charge $59.50 for it?

ANDRZEJ KORBOŃSKI
University of California, Los Angeles

KARL HEINZ SCHLARP. *Wirtschaft und Besatzung in Serbien 1941–1944: Ein Beitrag zur nationalsozialistischen Wirtschaftspolitik in Südosteuropa.* (Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte des östlichen Europa, number 25.) Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. 1986. Pp. viii, 443.

Western historians initially neglected the economic consequences of Nazi occupation policy throughout wartime Europe, concentrating instead on military repercussions and the human cost. The repair of this neglect began with the pioneering work by British economic historian Alan S. Milward on the occupation of France and Norway. The present volume, together with its bibliography, reveals the leading role that younger West German historians have now assumed in examining Nazi economic policy in Southeastern Europe. Karl Heinz Schlarp's book is subtitled as a contribution to that subject. Like the recent work by Holm Sundhausen, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte Kroatiens in nationalsozialistischen Grossraum 1941–1945* (1983), it grew out of the German equivalent to an American doctoral dissertation. Like Sundhausen, Schlarp performs an invaluable service by assembling comprehensive detail within boundaries somewhat narrower than Milward's original framework.

The fall of France in 1940 opened up the prospect of direct Nazi exploitation of Southeast European sources of raw materials, principally mines, now freed from any control by West European capital. The author's first chapter emphasizes how this "new order" went beyond the commercial concept of *Grossraumwirtschaft* during the 1930s. Thus, the Bor copper mines in Serbia passed from French into German hands even before Hitler's invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941. Subsequent chapters set out the framework for the German occupation of Serbia proper and the neighboring Banat, the economic contribution of these two areas to the German war effort, and the agricultural and financial consequences of these "occupation costs" for the local economy. Extensive evidence from Foreign and Finance Ministry archives in Bonn and Koblenz and from military archives in Freiburg and Belgrade supports the inquiry at virtually every turn.

Schlarp's conclusions will not surprise students of German occupation policy elsewhere in Europe. We see the Nazis' lack of a comprehensive economic plan at the start of the occupation. They expected only a short-lived war of further conquest in Europe. As the need for long-term support for the German war economy became apparent, the same division of authority and confusion of purpose between Nazi authorities appeared that we have come to regard as hallmarks of the regime, outside of the terror apparatus. How the struggle between these various offices, individuals, and ideas affected the extraction of resources and the dynamics of the domestic economy over the next two years is not, however, traced out.

The economic results of that extraction, rather than its inner workings, are the author's major concern. What the "new order" assumed would be the major Serbian contribution to the German war effort, nonferrous ores in general and copper from the Bor mines in particular, turned out to be disap-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pointing—less than half of prewar levels of production. German measures to extract, principally by agricultural deliveries, some 40 percent of rising occupation costs from the local population fed inflation and popular resistance. This added still further to the cost of occupation and pushed its total, according to Schlarp, past German gains from Serbia proper. Only the forced labor extracted from Serbian civilians (and prisoners of war) in the Reich and from grain production under the control of the *Volksdeutsche* minority in the neighboring Banat provided clear "positive" contributions and then not enough, again by the author's rough reckoning, to outweigh Serbian costs.

Missing from the final two chapters is a recognition of the continuing racial contempt for an inferior Slavic people that lurked, in Milward's apt phrase, behind all of Nazi occupation policy in Eastern Europe. This, plus a terror apparatus unchecked by local authorities, probably placed Serbia closer to wartime Poland in comparative perspective than the author seems to suggest, so did the initial Nazi decision, barely mentioned by Schlarp, to destroy or remove to the Reich all Serbian manufacturing facilities.

JOHN R. LAMPE
Wilson Center
Washington, D.C.

HANS KNOLL. *Jugoslawien in Strategie und Politik der Alliierten 1940–1943*. (Südosteuropäische Arbeiten, number 82.) Munich: R. Oldenbourg. 1986. Pp. 671.

Yugoslavia's role in World War II has been written about from many angles and by many authors: by Yugoslav participants in the political and military struggles of that time, by those sent in from outside to find out or influence what was going on (virtually every British agent deposited in the country by parachute or submarine seems to have written about his experience with the Chetniks or the partisans), by high officials concerned with the grand strategy or diplomacy of the war, and by a host of historians who over the subsequent forty years have tried to sift truth from fiction or to prove one thesis or another in this most complex story. One of the major contributions of the volume under review is an introduction that includes a critical essay on these sources and historical works. On the events within Yugoslavia during the dark years of occupation, resistance, and civil war, we probably shall never have a full and uncontroverted record. On the policies and actions of the interested outside powers, however, the availability of previously closed archival material in London and Washington has now made possible a much closer approach to such a record.

In this study Hans Knoll goes a long way in that direction. He limits himself—if one can talk of limiting when the result is a work of some six hundred fifty closely packed pages—to the policies, conduct, and interaction of the three major Allied powers with respect to Yugoslavia in the period from the fall of France to mid-1943. Primarily, it is a study of British policy, solidly based on the records of the Foreign Office and other official papers including those of the Special Operations Executive and intelligence agencies and also on the valiant work done in recent years by Elisabeth Barker, F. W. Deakin, and others in trying to bring together first-hand testimony and other pertinent evidence on British policy and operations in wartime Yugoslavia.

The book is well balanced and carefully done, exhaustive and exhausting. It covers in great detail the various phases of British policy: the failed diplomatic endeavors to keep Yugoslavia out of the Axis camp during the period of neutrality (1940–41) and to create a Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish barrier to Germany's advance southeastward; the British role in the coup d'état of March 27, 1941 (less decisive than some have argued); vexing problems in dealing with the ineffectual and ever more irrelevant government-in-exile; the attempts to use Yugoslav resistance movements in the framework of British strategy in the Mediterranean; and, finally, all the issues, present and future, raised by the struggle between Dragoljub Mihajlović and Tito. The author is at times critical of British policy: for example, the pursuit of Balkan coalitions and the aim of Balkan federation without even the minimum means of success. But what is important is not his critique but his honesty and thoroughness in recounting what happened: how British officials debated these matters among themselves and why they reached the conclusions they did. One particular point of interest is how clearly the Foreign Office professionals, very early in the game, perceived the dangers of Soviet domination of the Balkans and, in Britain's interest, tried to prevent it.

The book does not have the same success in describing American and Soviet policies, and those two powers were, after all, the major actors on the scene by the end of the war. It is true that the United States, especially in the early years, tended to defer to the British in the Balkan and Mediterranean area; even so, there is more to the American side of the story than is told here. Soviet policy at that time, necessarily, remains more or less obscure. The author has had the benefit of the reports of Sir Stafford Cripps and others from the Soviet Union, and he is ready to give logical explanations of Stalin's course, but, as even the most accomplished

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Western scholars of the period concede, there is much that we do not and may never know. The strange affair of the treaty with Yugoslavia signed on the very day of the German attack, April 6, 1941, is a case in point.

On the whole the author has carried out his task with a diligence that is extraordinary, even intimidating. We may hope that he will in time complete it, bringing the narrative down to the end of the war.

JOHN C. CAMPBELL
Cohasset, Massachusetts

PATRICIA HERLIHY. *Odessa: A History, 1794–1914.* Cambridge: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute; distributed by Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1987. Pp. xiv, 411. $19.95.

The distinctive regionalism of the Russian empire was reflected in the radically different character of its leading cities: Moscow, St. Petersburg, Warsaw, and Odessa. In her lively history of Russia's fourth city, Patricia Herlihy defines Odessa's uniqueness in terms of its newness, rapid growth, polyglot population, political liberalism, and booming commercial activity. Ironically, by the end of the nineteenth century, most of these attributes offended the imperial government and its local administrators. Odessa was ethnically non-Russian and politically too radical. Officials discriminated against it. They favored other Black Sea ports and endowed them with better railroad connections. They permitted pogroms that drove out many of Odessa's most productive citizens. Their indifference to Odessa's urban and economic problems in the face of foreign competition led to the decline of this brilliant and dynamic city, which was almost as rapid as its rise. Herlihy attributes Odessa's early growth to its natural geographic advantages and the farsighted administration of the Duc de Richelieu, who tripled its exports and founded its main cultural institutions during his eleven-year administration of the city and the region of Novorossiia. In his spirit his successors continued to promote "a free and open social atmosphere" (p. 122). The central government at its best encouraged migration into the region; at the very least it let things alone. At the core of the book are two exceptional chapters on Odessa's economy after the emancipation. Herlihy displays a masterly grasp of the grain trade around which the life of the city revolved—its fatal connections with a declining agriculture and stagnant industry. Here in particular she weaves together a wealth of Russian statistical data with vivid impressions drawn from consular reports in American, British, French, and Italian archives.

The landed economy of Novorossiia was highly volatile. Peasants on their small, uneconomic holdings were too poor and the big landowners were too cautious to introduce modern methods. Only the German colonists adapted well to shifting markets and demand. The government did not help matters with its vacillating tax policies. Still, agricultural production increased, and so did the quantity of Odessa's grain exports, at least up to 1911, with the exception of the revolutionary years. But the value of its exports declined. Moreover, Odessa, like the rest of Russia, was losing its share of the world wheat market. Herlihy locates the decline in a triad of factors: poor quality control, inadequate marketing prodedures, and inefficient transportation facilities. For all three, foreign observers blamed the proliferation of intermediaries and the lack of a railroad network. Here one wishes for more analysis. Herlihy alludes to favoritism in railroad construction but does not explore railroad politics beyond this point. She has very little to say about the values and business practices of the merchants.

Herlihy's description of the city as a physical presence is evocative, especially in the chapter "The Uses of Space." She has a fine feel for its streets and squares based on her own residence there. It was a planned city with a "fine blend of business and pleasure" (p. 265). Despite its ethnic mix and class differences, there were no socially segregated areas. Unfortunately, the author does less justice to cultural life. Odessa's most famous export besides grain was violinists, but she never mentions them.

Herlihy concludes with a poignant chapter on the decade of disturbances, 1904–14, when the city was wracked by revolution and pogroms. The physical damage was repaired, but the spirit withered; "for Jews, Odessa was not, as it had been, a comfortable home" (p. 308). Moreover, a series of international crises disrupted its maritime commerce even before the Turkish entry into World War I sealed the Straits. At the end it was badly governed, and it failed to surmount the problems of economic modernization and integration that sapped the strength of other regions as well. As the first history in English of a Russian city, this is a pioneering work that should inspire similar studies of the varied urban life of the old empire.

ALFRED J. RIEBER
University of Pennsylvania

MARTIN A. MILLER. *The Russian Revolutionary Emigres, 1825–1870.* (Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 104th series, number 2.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1986. Pp. xii, 292. $32.50.

Martin A. Miller, known to historians primarily for his superb study of Peter Kropotkin, in this book turns his skills as a biographer to a dozen or so

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Russian revolutionary émigrés of the mid-nineteenth century. This group of radicals includes relatively well known figures, such as N. I. Turgenev, A. A. Serno-Solov'evich, and N. I. Utin, as well as more obscure émigré activists, such as N. V. Sokolov (the first Russian disciple of Pierre Proudhon) and V. I. Kel'siev (the first revolutionary "apostate"). Miller brings these and other characters in the emigration out of the immense shadow of Alexander Herzen and capably assesses their contributions to the development of Russian revolutionary thinking.

The book examines the emigration between Turgenev's exile in 1825 and Herzen's death in 1870 as the formative stage in the development of its social, political, and ideological character. Miller divides this stage again into two. The first lasts roughly until the emancipation of 1861 and includes diverse and informally linked groups of émigrés, dominated by Herzen, but contributing each in its own way to the development of strategies for liberating the homeland. In addition to Herzen and Turgenev, Miller includes in this period the careers of I. G. Golovin, N. I. Sazonov, and P. V. Dolgorukov. In the second period, from 1861 until 1870, the "sons" turn against the "fathers," formulating more concrete ideological and collective solutions to the problem of revolution. To one extent or another, the formation of a revolutionary party becomes the central issue for radicals such as Sokolov, Utin, the Kel'siev brothers, Serno-Solov'evich, as well as I. A. Khudiakov, L. I. Mechnikov, N. I. Zhukovskii, and V. A. Zaitsev. Miller argues that the situation of emigration contributed in major ways to the more comprehensive approaches of the 1860s. Struggles in the International, in particular, absorbed the energies of the Russian émigrés and influenced the development of their views.

Miller's attention to émigré radicalism in this period is not entirely new, nor are his conclusions. The Russian historian M. K. Lemke and, more recently, the Polish scholar W. Sliwowska have written about the "Herzen generation" of Russian revolutionaries. Miller does take advantage of some well-chosen material from French and Soviet archives, such as the reports of Iakov Tolstoi, an educated and particularly well informed agent of the Third Section in Paris. But the primary contribution of the book lies in the author's interesting reflections on the psychological and social situation of the emigration as part of the Russian historical dilemma: the love of homeland combined with attempts to overthrow (or reform) autocracy; the hatred of the "authorities" interlaced with a desire for their attention; the simultaneous attractions to and disdain for their adopted European homes; and the problematic attitude—guilt-ridden yet superior—toward radicals at home in the underground.

The struggle of Russian émigré radicals to act collectively clashed with their delicate egos forged by the act of emigration itself. Their shared belief in the need for liberation was not enough to tame their inherent factionalism. Alliances were forged and broken; friendships were constantly tested by the strains of competing radical strategies. Miller describes, for instance, Serno-Solov'evich's vituperative denunciations of Herzen's liberalism and individualism; the young radical called Herzen "a dead man from whom nothing more could be expected" (p. 141). Yet, when Serno suffered repeated mental breakdowns and required expensive hospitalization, Herzen touchingly responded by providing the financial means.

The limitations of Miller's study derive from the genre, as he describes it, "a series of analytical biographical sketches of the first émigrés" (p. 31). Material is included on the number of émigrés, their relation to the growing colony of emigrants and expatriates, and their juridical status in their new countries (and at home). There are also separate chapters on revolutionary journalism and "the world of emigration." But a picture of the life of the "society-in-exile" (versus that of its leading publicists)—perhaps necessarily—remains hazy. Still, this is an interesting and well-written book that illuminates the careers of a group of significant, yet previously little known, Russian radicals.

NORMAN M. NAIMARK
Boston University

CHRISTINE JOHANSON. *Women's Struggle for Higher Education in Russia, 1855–1900*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1987. Pp. x, 149. $22.00.

This too concise, but mildly revisionist study traces the fortunes of women's advanced education in Russia, primarily during the reign of Alexander II (1855–81). Christine Johanson knows the pertinent secondary literature but apparently had only limited access to archives and made sparing use of the periodical press. Yet the work is cogently organized and argued and establishes a perspective others will have to take into account.

Johanson believes that a concern for women's involvement in revolutionary activity has led to a misunderstanding of the impulses underlying women's drive for higher education. In the decade following the Crimean War, Russia established a network of secondary schools with unrestricted access for girls, which put the country well ahead of France and England at the time and also stimulated demand for access to the next rung of the educational ladder. She argues that a remarkable expan-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sion of higher education courses ensued, the result of an alliance of determined women (prodded by the decline of gentry economic status, a search for gainful employment, and the emancipatory spirit of the thaw under Alexander II), supportive male professors, and sympathizers at high levels in the government. A combination of ministerial infighting (notably between War Minister Dmitry Milyutin and Education Minister Dmitry Tolstoy) and the tsar's lack of strong convictions on the issue, as well as the loosening of state controls, helped open the university gates to women. The author observes that a dramatic expansion of women's education occurred under Alexander II, but without substantial advances in women's careers.

Johanson's heroes and heroines in this story are the many women of high society who used their influence to promote education, the thousands of female students who suffered extreme material privation, ridicule, and opprobrium (it was rumored that female medical students "cut up corpses at night, walk around with bones in their hands, and carry intestines in their pockets" [p. 83]) to pursue their goals, and scholars such as I. I. Paulson, V. O. Kliuchevskii, I. M. Sechenov, and K. D. Kavelin, and Milyutin. Her villains are a familiar cast of characters, including K. Pobedonostsev, police chief P. Shuvalov, the journalist M. Katkov, and, to a lesser degree, Dmitry Tolstoy. She accepts A. Sinel's nuanced interpretation of Tolstoy: although supporting repression, he recognized Russia's need for more education. She notes that Tolstoy made no attempt to impose social criteria to restrict access to higher courses, but she rejects Cynthia Whittaker's suggestion that Tolstoy was a friend of women's education. Instead, she feels, he "viewed higher courses primarily as a safety valve, a mechanism to control women's educational pursuits" (p. 67).

Other villains were in the radical movement; Johanson resurrects the old claim that it was fear prompted by revolutionary activities that caused the government to veer to the right and to clamp down on women's education, despite the fact that few female students were revolutionaries or even concerned with a larger social transformation. In particular she dismisses Soviet claims that the graduates of the *Bestiuzhevskie* courses were contributors to the "glorious revolutionary-democratic tradition." Johanson's argument here is plausible but neither new nor conclusive.

In a weak concluding chapter, she races through the counterreforms of Alexander III and the stunning turnabout under Nicholas II, when women gained full access to a university degree, to the bar, to the medical profession, and to many teaching opportunities at the secondary level. Because the author's treatment of this period is so truncated, she abandons all attempt at explanation of the events or forces that produced such a striking collapse of resistance to women's education and careers after 1894. One regrets the author did not expand this brief book to do justice to the later period.

BEN EKLOF
Indiana University

P. G. RYNDZIUNSKII. *Krest'iane i gorod v kapitalisticheskoi Rossii vtoroi poloviny XIX veka: Vzaimootnoshenie goroda i derevni v sotsial'no-ekonomicheskom stroe Rossii* [Peasants and the City in Capitalist Russia in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Mutual Relationship of the City and the Countryside in the Socioeconomic System of Russia]. Moscow: Nauka. 1983. Pp. 267. 2 r. 80 k.

P. G. Ryndziunskii's central theme is the transformative power of capitalism in the Russian countryside and its influence on the migration of peasants to cities. He says surprisingly little about the past debates that these topics have evoked or about the extent (and ambiguity) of evidence previously analyzed by other authors, Soviet and non-Soviet. Instead, he offers a series of hypotheses and case studies, applying relatively complex mathematical methods such as multiple regression analysis to published data from nineteenth-century sources.

He begins by reviewing inequalities in landholding throughout European Russia and comparing grain harvests to nonagricultural wages (taking the latter as a measure of minimum subsistence requirements for reproducing a worker's labor). In almost all regions of European Russia, one factory worker's annual earnings were equivalent to more food than an average peasant household produced. The author takes this as evidence of both pauperization and proletarianization in the countryside (the differences between the two are not pursued) and goes on to suggest that impoverished peasants were eager to give up their land and move to the cities.

Russian law permitted short-term departures in search of wages (*otkhodnichestvo*) but strongly discouraged peasants from settling permanently in towns. Chapter 2 examines peasants' nonagricultural earnings in relation to their landholding and livestock. It presents such labor as a response to poverty, part of a step-by-step process of proletarianization, but acknowledges that prosperous households also participated. (*Otkhodnichestvo* may in fact have given larger families a convenient outlet for surplus labor.)

Chapter 3 surveys the economic structure of towns in relation to size of settlement and regional variations. Ryndziunskii pays particular attention to smaller settlements that the tsarist government did not classify as urban and to the occupational composition of urban and rural populations. Not sur-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

prisingly, larger towns show a distinctive occupational profile, including greater diversity and commercial influence. The author concludes that the growth of capitalist industry was in fact the "fundamental principle" behind urbanization.

Anyone born of peasant parents was legally classified as a peasant for life, but some "peasants" spent their entire lives in cities. Chapter 4 compares the employment patterns of city-born peasants and rural migrants, finding that the city-born group's involvement in urban occupations was in some ways weaker than that of its country cousins.

Ryndziunskii's presentation of findings is flawed by erratic and sloppy treatment of numerical data and by omission of important statistical details; correlation and regression coefficients are given, for example, without indicating the number of cases from which they were computed or their levels of significance. His calculations, though ingenious, raise more questions than they answer: about the possible shortcomings of his sources, about the assumptions underlying his computations, and about the author's unilinear view of historical change. The apparent anomalies that he encounters (for example, the use of outside earnings to bolster traditional agriculture or the involvement of city dwellers in agricultural pursuits) deserve closer attention than his schema permits. His evidence is challenging, his methods are original, but his conclusions are unconvincing.

R. E. JOHNSON
Erindale College
University of Toronto

L. S. BESKROVNYI. *Armiia i flot Rossii v nachale XX v.: Ocherki voenno-ekonomicheskogo potentsiala* [The Russian Army and Navy in the Early Twentieth Century: A Survey of Military-Economic Capacity]. Moscow: Nauka. 1986. Pp. 237. 1 r. 50 k.

This posthumously published volume completes a series of three that L. S. Beskrovnyi devoted to the organization, administration, and equipping of the Russian army from the reign of Peter the Great to the October revolution. It is by far the weakest of the three, and not—if the editors are to be believed—because it was in any substantial way incomplete at the time of the author's death. Its shortcomings will be familiar to readers of Beskrovnyi, but this book is even shorter on analysis than his other writings, even more an undigested compendium of data. Much of the text is a weapons-class by weapons-class survey of the production and delivery of armaments to the army, particularly during World War I. That and the prewar naval construction program are the author's major preoccupations, but he has nothing novel to say about either, and it is very difficult to draw any conclusions from the raw data he provides. Were the four thousand machine guns in the army as of 1914 few or many? They were too few for the war, of course, but how did Russia compare with other countries? Beskrovnyi observes in passing that the Russo-Japanese War changed Russian thinking about machine guns but does not say what that thinking was. He indicates, also in passing, various ways in which the Russo-Japanese War impinged on troop training, field organization, and armaments, but he attempts no general assessment. To be blunt, Beskrovnyi treats no issue adequately. Because much of the space is taken up by eighty-four tables, and much of the text by lists, the book is both slighter and more tedious than its relatively short length would indicate. Still, there is raw material here for others to mine.

The chief interest of the book lies in Beskrovnyi's attitudes, which combine patriotism and military parochialism. When during World War I Russia had to order armaments abroad, its allies shamelessly failed to deliver what they were supposed to. But then Russians produced better weapons than did foreigners; Russians improved the Vickers machine gun, and a Russian produced a design for what would have been the first aircraft carrier, if only it had been built. The patriotic blessing awarded to Russians who contributed to weapons development extends even to the chemist Vladimir Ipatiev, who, as Beskrovnyi neglects to mention, emigrated at the end of the 1920s. When Beskrovnyi admits shortcomings in Russian military preparation or performance, he generally blames civilians. Some of that blame may be deserved, but whether the Ministry of Finance rendered Russia a disservice by restraining military expenditures in the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War is open to doubt. More strained still is Beskrovnyi's attribution of Russian defeat in the Japanese war to civilian failure to develop the Siberian railway adequately; if only Russia could have transported more troops to the Far East, he says, Japan might have been overwhelmed. In fact Russia consistently enjoyed a numerical advantage during the war, an overwhelming advantage toward the end. But Russia's poor generalship and the reasons for it remain outside Beskrovnyi's field of vision. A thoroughly orthodox Soviet historian, he seems to have been unaware that his loyalty to the prerevolutionary military establishment transgressed Soviet political-historical orthodoxy.

JOHN BUSHNELL
Northwestern University

ROBERT SERVICE. *The Russian Revolution, 1900–1927.* (Studies in European History.) Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities. 1986. Pp. x, 99.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This slender volume is part of the new Macmillan Studies in European History presenting "the state of the debate" on important themes and episodes. It offers "a concise and integrated account" of the Russian revolution running, through continuities and disruptions, from 1900 to 1927—an account designed to offset the increasing compartmentalization of research. Robert Service also attempts to compare Russia's transformation with events elsewhere in the world, a laudable effort yet perhaps applied here rather superficially. He wants to show, moreover, how contemporary life in the Soviet Union is related to the Soviet historical experience—a promise minimally kept.

This is a well-organized survey. Key themes are indicated in the subheadings within each of the three chapters. At the beginning of each chapter we read a summary of the popular Western views of the events subsequently more accurately analyzed with the help of carefully researched historical evidence. Making no claim to originality, the author tries to weave factual data drawn from monographs into a coherent story. He also aims at carefully balanced judgment, pointing out accomplishments and shortfalls at every stage from tsarist rule to the end of the New Economic Policy (NEP).

There emerges a familiar story. The tsar's empire was on the wane; under the strains of World War I "the point of political explosion moved nearer" (p. 25). In February 1917 "no civilian or military group wanted autocracy preserved" (p. 31). By November "the February revolution was in the final stages of decay, and some kind of socialist government would very likely have emerged from the chaos"; Lenin's initiative gave it its Bolshevik form (p. 49). Overall, "the Bolsheviks . . . were much more effective [than the tsars] in . . . obtaining popular acceptance of their monopoly of state authority" (p. 81). The author leaves open the question whether a continuation of NEP would have allowed Russia's survival in World War II but alludes to the flaws in Joseph Stalin's revolution, warning of imitation by other countries.

As a survey of the Russian revolution viewed from the academically sterilized operating room of historical science, this volume will benefit graduate students and beginning scholars searching for the broader contexts of their specialized research; they will appreciate the 143 items listed in the select bibliography. Yet can this work enlighten them about "the state of the debate" on the Russian revolution? Or is it merely, in the author's words, "the tossing of another stone onto the cairn of writings" about that crucial event (p. ix)?

THEODORE H. VON LAUE
Clark University

ROBERT C. WILLIAMS. *The Other Bolsheviks: Lenin and His Critics, 1904–1914*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1986. Pp. 233. $27.50.

The reconstruction of prerevolutionary Russian history on its own terms, without the lessons and directions imposed on it since 1917, is a difficult task. In this book Robert C. Williams examines the activities and conceptions of Bolshevik intellectuals in the decade before the war and recaptures a fractious, precarious, and ideologically rambunctious period in the history of what turned out to be a party. This is a wide-ranging excursion into the ideas, finances, ramshackle institutions, conspiratorial escapades, and, mostly, quarrels of Lenin, A. A. Bogdanov, Maxim Gorky, L. B. Krasin, A. V. Lunacharskii, V. Bonch-Bruevich, and other would-be leaders of the Bolshevik fraction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor party (RSDRP). Williams's main concern is with the wildly divergent ideologies of the Bolshevik *intelligenty*, in particular the gulf between the cultural, religious, and technocratic ideas of neo-Marxists such as Bogdanov and Lunacharskii and Lenin's more traditional nineteenth-century materialism. At the same time, Williams sorts through a lot of dirty linen from these scrappy years: the struggles over money from the "expropriation" of the Tiflis State Bank in 1907, the maneuvers, some marital, to gain the large inheritance of N. P. Schmidt, head of the Morozov furniture factory in Moscow, Lenin's extensive efforts to wrest RSDRP funds from the trustees of the German Social Democratic party after the German party intervened to arbitrate the Russians' disputes, the intrigues of the Bolshevik schools at Capri, Bologna, and Longjumeau.

The book is a convincing demonstration of diversity within bolshevism before 1917 and, more specifically, of Lenin's lonely rejection of the major philosophical initiatives of his times. As Williams shows, Bogdanov, Gorky, Lunacharskii, and other "other Bolsheviks" were far more innovative and current in their theoretical work, reaching out to Georges Sorel and syndicalism, Ernst Mach's monism and relativism, technological developments, physics, and even the study of religion in their efforts to expand and modernize socialist theory. From the perspective of many Bolshevik intellectuals after the revolution of 1905, it was Bogdanov, with his *Empiriomonism* (1904–07) and his utopian novel *Red Star* (1908), who was the most interesting Marxist theorist of the day. Lenin's refusal to go along with the new ideas and his insistence on reading them out of "orthodox" Marxism was an anomalous position that isolated him from his former allies.

Of course, Lenin won in 1917, and, despite Williams's commitment to telling prerevolutionary bolshevism the way it really was, he cannot avoid reading Lenin's later victory back into his early

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

battles. The entire book is structured around the notion of Lenin and the "others," a much too rigid dichotomy given the fluidity of alliances and theories at the time. This structuring is reinforced repeatedly by Williams's analysis of Bolshevik theory. This he also sees as sharply divided, from 1904 into the 1920s, between Lenin's "authoritarian individualism" and the "self-sacrificing collectivism" (p. 4) of the rest. These classifications are clearly overstated and quite unfair to the various, shifting camps. For one thing, there is nothing that suggests that Bogdanov, Lunacharskii, Gorky, *et al.*, were one whit more self-sacrificing than Lenin nor that they, with their own captiousness and dramatic schemes, were any less "authoritarian" in their behavior. More critically, the contrast between "collectivism" and "individualism" does not work. All of these socialist intellectuals, including Lenin, were collectivists, a common cause that heightened their quarrels over the theoretical basis of collectivism as well as its practical construction.

This overgeneralized approach to the analysis of ideas—which too often take on an agency of their own ("a world where mass collectivism craved individual authority" [p. 172])—extends to the treatment of the relationship between theory and more practical matters. Williams draws an untenable analogy between the Bolsheviks' use of conspiratorial techniques, such as "Aesopian language" and code, and the alleged duplicity of their theories, ignoring the fact that codes and Aesopian language were designed to get a real message through. His treatment of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1909) as an attack on political rivals "in the guise of a philosophical monograph" (p. 141) misrepresents the seriousness of the philosophical debates of the times and, in particular, the strong and threatening draw of neoidealist ideas on Bolshevik intellectuals. Lenin did not spend weeks in the British Museum reading the works of David Hume, George Berkeley, Mach, and Richard Avenarius in order to disguise his thoughts; he, typically, had to study these ideas in order to counter them effectively.

Although *The Other Bolsheviks* represents an effort to examine ideas in their social context, Williams has drawn oversimplified connections between the conditions of political activity and political thought. Moreover, the hypothesis of a fundamental division between Leninist authoritarianism and syndicalist collectivism sets an oversimplified agenda for interpretation of a complex period in the history of socialist theory. Despite Williams's stated intentions, this study is still centered on Lenin and Leninism; the other Bolsheviks' ideas deserve a more developed and nuanced explication.

JANE BURBANK
University of Michigan

MICHAL REIMAN. *The Birth of Stalinism: The USSR on the Eve of the "Second Revolution."* (Indiana-Michigan Series in Russian and East European Studies.) Translated by GEORGE SAUNDERS. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 188. $24.50.

Michal Reiman is a Czech historian, forced into exile after the events of 1968. This book was first published in German in 1979, and the translation is welcomed.

Reiman's theme is a familiar one: that terrible moment when Stalin's political supremacy within the Russian Communist party was consummated by the decisions that led to the breakneck mobilization of the whole of Soviet society. Much of what Reiman discusses is already familiar, but the discussion is illuminating and provocative for a number of reasons.

Reiman's most important contribution is the use he makes of documents found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry, which shed considerable light on the innermost workings of the Soviet leadership. Stalin is quoted as complaining that "all secret reports and original documents in all fields of internal and foreign policy, including military and economic questions, are being passed along to foreign governments" (p. 128), and on the face of it Stalin was justified, even though he attributed the leak to sabotage by the opposition. The secrets, however, were well kept by the German Foreign Ministry. It is news now that Stalin was convinced as late as 1927 that the monopoly on foreign trade would have to be modified, if not abandoned, so that foreign capital might help bail the Soviet Union out of its economic difficulties.

What is missing, however, is any discussion of the provenance of the documents, where they came from and how reliable they are. To be sure, they are entirely plausible, and often there is corroborative evidence, but still one misses some evaluation of their sources. The problem is compounded by their sole existence in German translations (now even further removed from the originals by English rendering). The mind whirls at the spectacle of information about the opposition being gathered by the GPU in Berlin, passed on to headquarters in Moscow, and now becoming a primary source in the German archives.

One of the more surprising aspects of this new data is the active role played by the GPU, not only in political matters such as the suppression of the opposition but also in economic matters. V. R. Menzhinskii was assertive in most areas, and Reiman is certainly correct to stress the point that the turn to coercive economics immediately involved the police. Almost as surprising, although it should not be, is that the supposedly secret memoranda of Stalin, A. I. Rykov, G. V. Chicherin, and Maxim Litvinov paid

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

lip service to the notion that the opposition was the prime source of the economic difficulties of 1927–28, not only by undermining foreigners' confidence in the stability of the regime but by inciting peasant reluctance to sell their grain. Thereby, the fury of the repressive machinery could be directed against the hapless peasant as if against a deliberate foe. Reiman also presents evidence that the left opposition was a significant political factor until it was eliminated during the course of 1928. Perhaps the new Stalinist machine had genuine reason to fear it.

Reiman's discussion of the political maneuvers at the top is well attuned to the social crisis to which it responded and which was precipitated by the economic difficulties. Especially enlightening is his discussion of the Shakhty affair in the spring of 1928. It was not only a demagogic attempt to placate the industrial workers. It also signified the abandonment by the Stalinist school of any further hope to resolve Soviet problems by an appeal to the self-interests of capitalism. Any hopes that German financial resources could be tapped were lost forever.

The West's favorite Bolshevik, N. I. Bukharin, is properly presented as the most implacable antagonist of the opposition, until he found himself the object of Stalin's attentions. Besides, Bukharin was an easy target for Stalin's wrath because he lacked any real authority and because of the prominence he had as a polemicist. People such as Rykov and M. P. Tomskii were considerably more substantial obstacles to Stalin's supremacy.

Altogether, Reiman is persuasive about the provisional, hesitant nature of the way in which Stalinism came to crystallize at the end of the 1920s and about the contingent quality, the crisis atmosphere, of the steps that led to it. It was, as Reiman puts it, primarily a system of "social terror," and the political repression that made it possible was more a supplement than the essence of what was involved. The Indiana-Michigan consortium has made an important book more accessible.

DANIEL MULHOLLAND
Tufts University

NEAR EAST

AHMAD ANANI and KEN WHITTINGHAM. *The Early History of the Gulf Arabs*. White Plains, N.Y.: Longman. 1986. Pp. vi, 170. $19.95.

By "the early history of the Gulf Arabs" Ahmad Anani and Ken Whittingham refer to the activities of Arab tribes from southern Iraq and northeastern Arabia during the period from the establishment of the "kingdom" of Hira (ca. third century) to the beginning of the Abbasid caliphate (749–50). Topics covered include the wars of the Lakhmids and Sassanids, the spread of Islam, the Wars of Apostasy, the conquests and strife of the early caliphate, and the fall of the Umayyad dynasty. As a result, this book resembles a survey of early Islamic history rather than a distinct history of the Gulf Arabs. Moreover, the role attributed to the Gulf Arabs tends to be exaggerated and distorted, as reflected in the overstated assertions that "the conversion or assimilation of the Gulf Arabs to the Islamic cause was critical to the defence of the new faith" (p. 93) or that 'Ali at the Battle of Ṣiffin was "backed by a huge army of Gulf Arabs and Persians" (p. 103).

The authors frequently invoke the supposed animosity of "North" and "South" Arab tribes to explain complex historical events. They repeat the old myth that Shi'ism was Persian in character and conclude, incredibly, that it was used by "those seeking to sabotage the new Islamic state, not those seeking to build it" (p. 110). They dismiss economic motivation as a factor in the Ridda Wars on the grounds that zakat taxation was "irrelevant to the wandering tribes" and "is not a concept which can be applied to a society where wealth is livestock" (p. 84) despite the explicit provisions of zakat law pertaining to pastoralists. They treat the important phenomenon of Kharijism as an anarchical "hurricane of violence" devoid of any genuine religious content (p. 125).

Self-contradictions are rampant; the most striking is that the authors set out to "lift the veil of obscurity from a region which has always played a prominent role in the history of mankind" (p. 3) but conclude that the region "slipped back into misery and poverty" and for a thousand years remained "in the shadows until the rise of European powers, who sought to revive Alexander's dream of east-west trade" (pp. 138–39). They thus perpetuate rather than discredit the idea that the region has no significant history apart from the first decades of Islam and the contemporary era of petroleum prosperity.

Despite the authors' claim that "the sources used in this study are many and varied," the book is largely based on secondary works with occasional references to well-known Arabic material. The system of transliteration is unscientific and arbitrary. Documentation is sparse and vague. How many readers will decipher a footnote such as "this account is taken from al-Shashani, *Al-mallal wal-amal*" (p. 150) as actually referring to Shahrastani's *al-Milal wa'l-nihal*?

The authors disclaim any intent "to produce a meticulously annotated historical record for the academic reader alone." Unfortunately, they fall short of their goal of using "the sources to provide readers from many backgrounds with a basis on

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which to understand the modern society of the Gulf Arabs" (p. 3).

ELTON L. DANIEL
University of Hawaii

GERD WINKELHANE and KLAUS SCHWARTZ. *Der osmanische Statthalter Iskender Pascha (gest. 1571) und seine Stiftungen in Ägypten und am Bosporus.* (Islamwissenschaftliche Quellen und Texte aus deutschen Bibliotheken, number 1.) Bamberg: aku; distributed by Klaus Schwartz, Berlin. 1985. Pp. 361.

This book by Gerd Winkelhane and Klaus Schwartz is the first in a new series devoted to the publication of texts, with extensive introductory commentaries and studies, from manuscripts in German collections. Not only are such publications of great use to scholars in many areas of Near Eastern research but the facsimiles can also help students who need practice in reading and analyzing manuscripts before traveling to area collections. In this case the manuscript in question is the foundation document of a major pious foundation, the waqf of Iskender Pasha, Ottoman governor of Egypt from 1556 to 1559. Included as a bonus is a study of his foundation document for religious and educational institutions in the Istanbul suburb of Kanlica.

Iskender Pasha, probably born to a Christian family but conscripted into Ottoman service as a child, rose in prescribed fashion within the administration, amassing considerable wealth (as his foundation inventory reveals), even before his relatively brief tour of duty in Egypt. After his return to Istanbul, he served both in Anatolia and as administrator of Buda and was in charge of Istanbul when Süleyman the Magnificent died on campaign in Hungary. At his death in 1571 he was governor of Aleppo. His career, not without setbacks, was nonetheless very successful and rewarding.

The publication of his waqfiyya, or foundation document, along with the authors' careful analysis of its contents, allows the reader considerable insight into any number of topics in Ottoman social and economic, as well as religious, history. There is suggestive information about prices, commodities, salaries, architecture and patronage, library holdings (and therefore reading tastes and traditions), rents, and the fashion in which an influential man built up an inventory of landed holdings.

A collection of such works as this book will allow any number of interesting comparative studies, and it is not the least of its virtues that readers are informed and reminded of the magnificent riches of medieval waqf documents and of the research procedures with which talented researchers may mine valuable ore from them. Although sharply focusing on one document, Winkelhane and Schwartz have produced a model study, in terms both of method and of results.

RUDI PAUL LINDNER
University of Michigan

ZEYNEP ÇELIK. *The Remaking of Istanbul: Portrait of an Ottoman City in the Nineteenth Century.* (Publications on the Near East, number 2.) Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1986. Pp. xviii, 183. $25.00.

"All the distinctive peculiarities of a Turkish town . . . will soon merge into the uniformity of European things, and, if the innovation proceed as rapidly as it has hitherto done, leave scarce a trace behind them," wrote Robert Walsh, a resident of the Ottoman metropolis, in 1838 (*Constantinople and the Scenery of the Seven Churches of Asia Minor* [1839]). Zeynep Çelik, starting at that date, studies one aspect of this continuing Westernization, "the transformations in the urban form of the Ottoman capital," during the Tanzimat and Abdülhamid II's reign, to 1908 (p. xv). As an architect, her primary concerns are city layout, urban transportation, and building styles.

Two introductory chapters sketch the history of the Byzantine city and its Ottoman successor and then outline the nineteenth-century city's population, spread, incipient industry, and administration. Çelik deals equally with Istanbul and its Europeanized suburb, Galata-Pera; here, and throughout, Üsküdar and Eyüb are left on the margins. A chapter on "regularization" describes the intermittent planning for opening up congested areas and for building in brick and stone instead of the customary wood, the introduction of orthogonal streets in quarters devastated by fire (Aksaray 1856, Hocapaşa 1865, Pera 1870), and the creation of suburban streets and broad quays. A chapter on transportation presents, after the traditional oar-powered caïques, the innovations: two Golden Horn bridges, 1836 and 1845; steamer ferries, 1851; horse-drawn tramways, 1872; the railway along the Marmara shore, 1874; and the Tünel (subway), 1875. "Grand Schemes" proposed, but never implemented, included Helmuth von Moltke's plan of 1839 for major arteries in Istanbul, F. Arnodin's scheme of 1900 for a railway bridge across the Bosporus and a second bridge at Rumeli Hisari bearing a circumferential highway, and Joseph Antoine Bouvard's unrealistic Parisian designs of 1902 for Beyazit, Eminönü, and Sultanahmet square. "Architectural Pluralism" examines the Western influences on building styles, principally neoclassicism, but also considerable European-designed Islamic revival styling and Art Nouveau.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This account of the piecemeal Westernization of Istanbul's fabric whets the appetite for more that could be said about schemes, buildings, drainage, water supply, lighting, and the fire department. There are occasional historical misstatements and errors in dates, even in geography: Maçka is northeast of Pera, not west, and the eastern part of the Istanbul peninsula got the most modernization, not the western (pp. 138, 140). Von Moltke is identified as a German engineer rather than as the famous soldier who advised Mahmud II's new army. None of the errors affects the heart of the study, which is a delightful survey in brief compass of significant urban change. Çelik has exploited pertinent documents in the Istanbul archives. Her work will be valuable to historians of all sorts, not only to architectural specialists. The volume, beautifully produced, contains 120 maps, plans, drawings, and photographs.

RODERIC H. DAVISON
George Washington University

HAIM GERBER. *The Social Origins of the Modern Middle East.* Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner or Mansell, London. 1987. Pp. vii, 221. $30.00.

This ambitious book is to be praised for its efforts to establish connections between the economic, social, and political structures of the Middle East today and those of the late Ottoman empire, ca. 1830–1914. Haim Gerber's book thus is a welcome antidote to the all-too-frequent studies of the contemporary Middle East that are written innocent of historical context. Applying Barrington Moore's paradigm to a Middle Eastern setting, Gerber argues that the origins of the radical differences between the present political structure of Turkey and of the Arab states are to be found in the Ottoman Land Law of 1858 and its interactions with preexisting patterns of human geography.

The book will appeal primarily to Middle East specialists, since it is devoted mostly to a series of challenges to various sacred cows of regional economic history. Indeed, the author's frequent assaults on prevailing conventions make a worthy contribution. Most of the book is based on secondary works, but several chapters reflect the author's own primary research that, for example, forces us to reconsider a long-cherished cliché regarding the law of 1858. Most small holders did not fear the law and therefore avoid the land registry offices of the state. Instead, as Gerber persuasively shows in several regionally focused case studies, they understood that the law gave them firmer legal claims to the land and so flocked to register it in their own names. Similarly, he gives proof that both small and estate-like large holdings often consisted of widely scattered parcels of land held by a single individual.

The value of the book is sharply reduced by a number of flaws. To support his arguments, the author sometimes offers sweeping generalizations that simply are wrong. For example it is not true that the Ottoman Middle East possessed "few rural industries" (p. 126), nor is it correct to state that pre-twentieth-century tribal social structures were "entirely unexploitative" in nature (p. 164). In the premature rush to judgment on the social origins of the modern Middle East, the author sometimes is too quick to close discussion on matters that are still open for debate. Although he might well be correct in his statements about the nature of landholding patterns in the various states, I am not fully persuaded by the evidence he presents. We need more research and, particularly, more analysis of the data. And, finally, there is the business of the Land Law of 1858 and its relationship to the changes that occurred in Middle Eastern landholding in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The author sees the law (mistakenly in my view) as the very pivot on which modern Middle East history turns, and this overemphasis causes him to misunderstand that history. To say that there was no real Ottoman agrarian problem until 1858 is wrong (p. 141); for example, it sweeps under the rug the momentous peasant risings in the Bulgarian provinces during the 1830s and 1840s. The author unquestioningly assumes and states that the law was the cause of the landholding changes and of the subsequent growth of large estates in many areas. Here, I would submit, he confuses cause with effect. Instead, important changes in agriculture already were occurring, triggered by a rising population in the area and a booming Western demand, that rendered commercial agriculture and large estates more profitable than before. The law did not cause these changes, but, rather, the changes themselves were part of a process that gave birth to the Land Law. Also, in arguing for the proliferation of large estates, Gerber seems to assume that large estates were more effective mechanisms for commercial agriculture than small holdings. This needs to be proved and not simply asserted. And, finally, in discussing large estate formation in Syria and Iraq, he does not give due weight to British and French policies of anachronistically supporting tribal chiefs. These policies rather than the Land Law and any supposed superiority of large estates over small were the primary promoters of land agglomeration during the mandatory era.

DONALD QUATAERT
State University of New York, Binghamton

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AFRICA

SHARON STICHTER. *Migrant Laborers.* (African Society Today.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1985. Pp. v, 225. Cloth $29.95, paper $10.95.

Sharon Stichter's book, together with Ken Swindel's *Farm Labour* (1985) and Richard Sandbrook's (with Judith Barker) *Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation* (1985), opens the new Cambridge University Press series African Societies Today. The series addresses a wide readership, including university students, and is an updated product of radical scholarship. In its best tradition, Stichter deals with one of the most important problems of the contemporary history of Africa: wage labor formation during the twentieth century. Every student of the industrial societies should be grateful for this comprehensive treatment of labor history in African societies south of the Sahara. The study is a long-needed and very useful addition to the historiography of labor.

The first impression is very favorable and confirms this book's utility for teaching. The analysis, however, raises some doubts. I am bothered by Stichter's use of labor migration as a means of understanding the historical specificity of industrial wage labor formation in Africa, her irritating habit of adding some structural-Marxist wording that does not really affect her analysis, and her mainly static use of historical data. Political economy without social history is unable to explain the making of a working class in Africa.

"Labour migrants shuttle between . . . capitalist wage employment . . . and some form of pre- or partially capitalist subsistence or peasant production" (p. 1). Stichter adds that the "turnover between wage and non-wage work . . . is the key factor" (p. 4). This is hardly the most distinctive feature of African development. Belgian industrialization was for a long time based on Flemish peasant-workers' labor. Peasant-workers' contribution was fundamental to Polish "socialist" industrialization, and European peasant-workers also moved "between wage work and some other mode of production, over some spatial distance." Stichter argues very convincingly that labor migration in Africa was mainly a transitional phase resulting from the conjunction of short-term interests of both the colonial administration and local African authorities (unfortunately, she did not use William Beinart's article in the *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 19 [1985]: 91–98). Labor migrations were rather costly for external investors. She correctly points out that the South African system of migrant labor results from political, not economic, considerations. Can we isolate migrant laborers from other industrial wage workers? Administrative measures before independence and economic pressures of unemployment after independence could at any time push them back to the countryside. Do they then become migrant laborers?

The author's use of mode of production terminology leads to such fancy formulations as the "family as mode of production" (p. 81) or, already quoted, wage labor as a mode of production. This prevents her from realizing that the rural versus urban distinction comes straight from the dualist ideology.

Struggling to extend the distinction between migrant and permanent wage labor to the sphere of consciousness and workers' protest, she goes on to consider that "the struggle *not* to become a worker became the central dynamic of labor protest" (p. 192). Should we understand that consciouness was born before the actual social being? Consciousness, announced as the central concern of the book, is, unfortunately, its weakest aspect. Given the state of our knowledge, this is unavoidable and Stichter cannot be blamed.

The consideration of women's participation in wage labor and of the household situation in rural areas is an excellent point, but I am convinced that Stichter would do better to stress women's participation and reactions in every chapter instead of singling out women as migrants and workers in a separate chapter.

The book is well documented, and the author's critical discussion of various approaches to the issues that she analyzes is very well done. The only weak point of the documentation is her almost complete omission of French-language literature and of work on Zaire, except Charles Perring's. This is important for comparison with South Africa, if only to remind us that it is not "the only [country that has] successfully industrialized on the basis of enforced migrancy" (p. 2).

The addition of a bibliography would also be very helpful for the reader.

B. JEWSIEWICKI
Université Laval

PAUL PASCON. *Capitalism and Agriculture in the Haouz of Marrakesh.* Translated by C. EDWIN VAUGHAN and VERONIQUE INGMAN. Edited by JOHN R. HALL. London: KPI. 1986. Pp. xiv, 248.

Paul Pascon's accidental death in 1985 was a great blow to scholarship. The two volumes of his doctoral thesis on the Haouz, or region, of Marrakesh established him as a leading authority, not only on rural society and economy in Morocco but also on the whole question of rural change in the Third World. It is excellent that we now have the second volume of that thesis translated into English, a major addi-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion to the English-language literature on North Africa.

The book covers the development of the agricultural economy and peasant society in the district around Marrakesh from the late precolonial period at the beginning of the twentieth century down to the early 1970s, showing on the one hand the growth of capitalist agriculture but on the other the tenacious survival of a peasant economy and society. The land grabbing of "feudal" barons, followed by that of French settlers, and the repartition of what had been acquired in this way among state enterprises, private purchasers, and the peasants themselves appear to have done comparatively little to alter a society of peasant cultivators who in their own eyes were, and are, the hereditary proprietors of their plots, regardless of who claims to own the land and on what terms. The result, says Pascon, talking in the language of modes of production, is "composite." "If we are obliged to summarize the social situation of the Haouz today," he observes, "we arrive at a formulation of the following complexity: the social formation in the Haouz is caïdal-Makhzenian. Tribalism is being eliminated and patriarchal domination is being controlled . . . But caïdalism itself is dominated by international capitalism in the sphere of production and trade" (p. 209–10). This conclusion, says Pascon at the very end, "lacks vigor and conviction"; while rejecting "linear simplifications" as wholly inadequate, he feels himself unable to define the precise relationship between the different elements of the agrarian structure, to make of "composite" a positive term and a useful tool. But he is much too modest. Having valiantly abjured his first avowed attempt to be a Marxist, he has replaced the notion of a society "of transition," one in which a single new order is coming into existence at the expense of all rivals, with that of a society in which the balance of forces is much more even, the outcome less certain, depending on factors many of which are peculiar to the region and the society in question. "To expose that configuration, to take it apart, to prove it—this is the task of another work" (p. 216). But here at least is the beginning of wisdom, and we can only regret that there will be no sequel, at least not by him.

All that said, the reader should be aware that this is not the easiest book to read. "No doubt," says the author, "I could have improved it considerably at the cost of a fairly substantial recasting." As it stands, the text tends to the staccato and notational; the argument is naturally there, but it does not flow. It may even be that, if Pascon had had the time or inclination to revise it, he might have solved some of his own problems of definition of his composite society and produced the study he declared to be a task for the future.

MICHAEL BRETT
University of London

M. W. DALY. *Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898–1934*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1986. Pp. xv, 542. $65.00.

This book by M. W. Daly is a carefully researched and well-written history of the Sudan during the first half of the period of British imperial control. The book expands on Daly's previous work and includes a glossary, index, map, and tables of revenues and financial data. It is the first of a projected two-volume history on the Condominium.

Using a wide range of primary sources from public and private collections in Great Britain and from the Sudan Government Archives in Khartoum, Daly skillfully interweaves these varied materials in a spritely historical account of a fascinating era. Without sacrificing meticulous scholarship, Daly even manages, in the opening section, "Blood and Champagne," to breathe life into those old war-horses, the Fashoda Crisis and the fall of Khartoum.

While debunking many of the British imperial accounts regarding the excesses and weaknesses of the Mahdist regime, Daly provides a careful but not tedious description of the Condominium. Daly is at his best, however, in capturing the personalities and policies of the individual governors-general from Lord Kitchener and Reginald Wingate to John Maffey. Almost all aspects of the administration, including education (which was a particular weak spot), agriculture, the military, and health care, are described and evaluated. The various economic motivations and ramifications of British control, particularly with regard to the Gezira project, might merit more analysis. In this regard Daly does not delve extensively into the debate over the relative merits of increasing cash crops at the expense of food production.

Daly does not shirk from detailing areas in which the British administration and policies fell far short of the mark. For example, the continued existence of slavery in Sudan under the British is substantiated. Daly also emphasizes that the British limited educational opportunities, particularly in the arts and sciences, in order to prevent rising nationalist sentiments. Not incidentally, fewer educational institutions also meant fewer budgetary demands. Similarly, the British, in order to maintain more direct control, sought to curb the spread of both Islam and Arabic into the southern provinces. As a consequence, "education was left to missionaries as a

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bone to a dog" (p. 397). The British also encouraged a policy of tribalization in the south.

Daly leaves the reader to deduce that herein were planted the seeds of the civil crisis in contemporary Sudan. In conclusion Daly argues that the establishment of security was the greatest achievement of the Condominium. Given the numerous administrative failures or shortcomings documented in the study, however, one cannot help but wonder whether "security" was worth the price.

Additional materials from Sudanese nationalist sources will presumably be included in the second volume, which will undoubtedly address the ultimate failure or success of the Condominium. In the meantime, historians are fortunate to have—at long last—an account of the Condominium, based on the latest available sources, that is both scholarly and readable. This book will be a valuable addition to public and private libraries and is must reading for anyone interested in Middle Eastern, African, or British imperial history.

JANICE J. TERRY
Eastern Michigan University

GEOFFREY HODGES. *The Carrier Corps: Military Labor in the East African Campaign, 1914–1918*. Foreword by ELSPETH HUXLEY. (Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies, number 18.) New York: Greenwood. 1986. Pp. xxiii, 244. $39.95.

No war has more firmly captured our collective imagination than World War I. In addition to the shelves of scholarly studies, the Great War for Civilization has given us *All Quiet on the Western Front, A Farewell to Arms*, and many other works that delight the reading public as much as the historian. The campaign in East Africa was a sideshow—even its participants recognized that. It was fought in contravention of the Berlin Agreements of 1885, which proscribed the involvement of "natives" in a European conflict, and its outcome had no effect on the final settlement that the antagonists eventually negotiated in Paris. Still, this sideshow has produced more than its share of popular interest. *The African Queen* long ago brought the war in East Africa vividly to life. More recently, the settler mobilization for war in *Out of Africa* rekindled the interest of moviegoers. The East African campaign has also produced four or five full-length popular histories over the last twenty years—all of them descendants of Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen's somewhat self-serving diaries. The exotic setting and the romantic appeal of the principal combatants (including the German commander, Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck) contribute to the continuing popular interest. There has not, however, been a corresponding concern on the part of historians.

Geoffrey Hodges has spent much of the last twenty years assembling his history of the Carrier Corps. It is clearly a work of warm affection if not love. He points out at the beginning that the choice of human power for transport during the protracted campaign that stretched from what is now Kenya through Tanzania into Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia was the product of the recognition that the abundant tsetse population prohibited the successful employment of animal traction. In all, approximately one hundred eighty thousand carriers were recruited in Kenya alone (of whom some forty thousand died). This number far exceeds the fifty thousand *askari* (soldiers) who were enlisted from the same territory. And, as might be expected, the conditions under which the carriers served were far more severe than the already harsh ones facing the men of the King's African Rifles. Hodges considers a number of issues facing the members of the Carrier Corps, including their rations, their rate and frequency of pay, disease factors, the incidence of desertion, and length of service. Much of what he tells us is, of necessity, generalized from a few interviews and the scanty archival materials available in London and Nairobi. The names of a few individual carriers reappear frequently as sources without any convincing evidence that they are representative. Nonetheless, the picture that emerges is compelling in evoking both the importance of the Carrier Corps to the conduct of the war and the hardships endured by the men who filled its ranks.

Where the reader wishes that Hodges had gone further is in investigating the process of recruitment—or was it impressment? Although there is a chapter that discusses recruitment and repatriation, it does not adequately deal with the question of whether compulsion was the principal mode of recruitment, nor does it specifically treat the subject of how it was exercised.

Hodges's most important contribution is in further debunking the tacit assumption of many historians that military service, combatant or noncombatant, was an impetus for individuals to seek entry into the modern sector of the economy in the postwar era and to become active in the early opposition to colonial rule. It turns out that service in the Carrier Corps, as has already been demonstrated for the men of the King's African Rifles, was essentially a conservative experience. The major figures in the Kenyan struggle for independence were all old enough to have served in World War I, but few of them had.

LEWIS J. GREENSTEIN
United States Peace Corps
Washington, D.C.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

KENNETH P. VICKERY. *Black and White in Southern Zambia: The Tonga Plateau Economy and British Imperialism, 1890–1939*. (Contributions in Comparative Colonial Studies, number 21.) New York: Greenwood. 1986. Pp. 248. $35.00.

This study of the Tonga Plateau of Zambia succeeds in telling a good local story but falters at the level of generalization. The Tonga people from 1890 to 1939 experienced momentous changes, starting as a society preyed on by powerful African neighbors who coveted their cattle and then contending with radical early colonialism, with its railway construction and alienation of adjacent lands to white settlers. The hinge of this economic history is the emergence of a pace-setting African elite bent on expanding maize production and using plows, a process that became popularized. By the end of the interwar period, as Kenneth P. Vickery demonstrates, the Tonga had become victors in the struggle to participate in the new economy and were thus exceptions to the rule enunciated by Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons in their influential *Roots of Rural Poverty* (1977) that African cultivators were "structurally determined losers."

The work is solidly grounded in colonial administrative archives, missionary collections and private papers, oral data gathered in three selected areas, and abundant secondary literature. Because the enterprising Tonga attracted the attention of anthropologists attached to the nearby Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, social scientists began to record economic and social details very shortly after the close of the period under discussion. Elizabeth Colson in particular proved to be not only a sensitive ethnographer but also an unusually keen observer of historical processes. Vickery's contribution is to look at the plateau economy from both the African and the settler perspective, with a consequent stress on dualism that is reminiscent of older colonial studies, which also juxtaposed "indigenous" and "imperial" economic spheres, although they were less Afrocentric or concerned to see how the two impinged on one another.

Had the more mature reflections on African agricultural systems been available when this inquiry was shaped, we might have been spared the defensive and unproductive comments on the shortcomings of underdevelopment theory. John Tosh's article, "The Cash Crop Revolution" (*Journal of African History* 1980), is cited in the introduction but has not influenced the argument. The conceptualization of economic forces remains weak, and it is misleading to substitute a composite "imperial" for "cash" and "market" in reference to the economy. Surely cash and market dependence must be considered both separately and in association with legislation and administrative interventions. This book, nevertheless, provides a substantial case study in the history of the modern African economy.

MARCIA WRIGHT
Columbia University

ASIA AND THE EAST

SUSAN MANN. *Local Merchants and the Chinese Bureaucracy, 1750–1950*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 1987. Pp. viii, 278. $35.00.

Relying heavily on case studies, Susan Mann explores a dialectic between the interests of the state and the response of local merchants. In a larger perspective, Mann also examines the way in which China's stable agrarian society accommodated centuries of dynamic commercial expansion.

Chapters 2 through 5 discuss the traditional relationship between the bureaucracy and local commercial elites. They show that the policies of the high Qing supported an unprecedented trade growth by holding the bureaucracy in check, keeping market taxes low, and farming those taxes to local merchants. After 1853, however, new taxes and an expanding bureauracy disturbed the old order of the marketplace, giving rise to conflicts and negotiations. Chapters 6 through 10 examine this new, conflict-ridden government-merchant relationship throughout the late Qing and the republican periods. Mann suggests that these historical conflicts and compromises have resurfaced in the 1980s, as the Communist government attempts once again to pull the bureaucracy back out of local markets.

Using tax collection as a socioeconomic institution, the author examines the transformation of China's old agrarian bureaucracy into a modern state bureaucracy. She identifies three models of tax collection (liturgical tax management, contract tax farming, and bureaucratic tax collection) in China and sheds light on similar transformation in such other historical agrarian societies as France, England, Mogul India, and the Ottoman empire.

The book has minor shortcomings. Several terms are not included in the character list (p. 230), and many names are misspelled, such as "Juijiang" (p. 37), "zifu yinggui" (p. 213), "Wellington K. K. Ch'an" (p. 256), and "Frances L. K. Hsu" (p. 259). Stylistic inconsistencies abound: both the Pinyin ("Beijing") and the Wade-Giles ("Canton") systems of romanization are used, and one finds in the character list both the simplified and the complicated forms of writing. The absence of Chinese and Japanese languages in the bibliography will disappoint many Sinologists. Other weaknesses are more serious. There is no conclusion to recapitulate the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

major themes and findings of the book. Moreover, Mann tries to use fragmentary historical materials to support general arguments about China as a whole. It is interesting to note that this book, strongly influenced by a regional systems approach, is explicitly reluctant to accept spatial differentiation, regarding the division of China into two broad cultural zones (coastal and interior) as "an artificial dichotomy" (p. 27).

Nevertheless, this is an important book. It continues a recent trend in Chinese historiography because it is a "China-centered history of China," dealing with Chinese issues set in a Chinese context without emphasizing the modern West. Focused on the market towns, it sheds new light on local commercial interests and informal governance often neglected in studies of Chinese history. And it provides a comparative perspective about historical agrarian societies and contemporary socialist states. On balance this is a welcome addition to the growing literature of Chinese socioeconomic history based on local studies. Both Sinologists and comparative historians will find it interesting and stimulating.

YEN-P'ING HAO
University of Tennessee

HAO CHANG. *Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Search for Order and Meaning, 1890–1911*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1987. Pp. x, 223. $37.00.

The major Chinese intellectuals of the end of the Qing dynasty have been endlessly studied, but the present book leads the reader into engrossing and new territory through a brilliant, uncompromising study of the philosophies of Kang Youwei, Tan Sitoung, Zhang Binglin, and Liu Shipei. Hao Chang does not pretend to offer a complete interpretation of early twentieth-century thought or to provide much description of its contemporary context. This book starts where its eminent predecessors, Joseph Levenson's *Confucian China and Its Modern Fate* (1958), Benjamin Schwartz's study of Yen Fu, and the author's earlier work on Liang Quichao, stop. It changes the focus from the familiar sociopolitical themes of nationalism, reform, revolution, modernization, and the search for wealth and power to universalistic spiritual and moral quests. The thought of its four subjects has been hard to categorize. By changing the terms of analysis, Chang illustrates thematic similarities that open new perspectives on the modern intellectual evolution of China.

The complexity and richness of the book cannot be summarized in a brief review. Chang sees all four men responding to a "crisis of orientational order" brought about by Western intrusion into China. Kang and Liu sought moral perfection of individuals and of society in a future utopia. Tan and Zhang sought spiritual immersion in a primordial selfless whole, defined by the one from the Confucian concept of *ren* (humanity) and by the other from Mahayana Buddhism. All were responding to the twin disruptions of existential meaning and of the sociopolitical order. They tried to restore cognitive and moral coherence through new world views.

The author argues that this search primarily drew on traditions of Chinese thought, and he shows in impressively specific and convincing detail which Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist ideas and texts each of his subjects drew on, when and how these ideas originated in Chinese history, and which thinkers perpetuated or mediated these concepts before the twentieth century. The reader is not left with hazy references to Chinese tradition, and one cannot finish this book believing that Chinese thought was bankrupt by the end of the Qing dynasty.

The author's second major contribution is to stress that these tradition-based world views were discontinuous responses to newly perceived dilemmas. The specifics of how Western incursion produced discontinuity are not fully developed. However, Chang convincingly argues that the broad attacks on the three hierarchical Confucian bonds (ruler-subject, father-son, and husband-wife) by Kang, Tan, Liu, and Zhang meant rejection of the pervasive Confucian myth embedding kingship and family in the core of a China-centered cosmological order. Such dissolution of the past attracted iconoclastic contemporaries, but there is little evidence that these writers' visions of the future had much effect on succeeding generations of intellectuals during the republic. As Chinese continue to grapple with continuing crises of order at the end of the twentieth century, however, the ideas this book extracts from the beginning of the century may appear relevant.

MARY BACKUS RANKIN
Washington, D.C.

THOMAS R. H. HAVENS. *Fire across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan, 1965–1975*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 329.

Thomas R. N. Havens's fifth monograph in the last seventeen years (the five are on distinctly different topics) surveys "the impact the war had on Japanese politics, foreign relations, trade, society, and culture" (p. vii). Havens paints a picture of popular opposition and ruling elite support for the war, of the development of "the biggest antiwar movement in Japanese history" (p. 6), and of a "process that gradually diminished America as a model for na-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tional emulation in Japan" (p. 264). He concedes that there were many factors involved: the trade balance, Okinawa, America's race riots and assassinations, the Nixon shocks, and Satō Eisaku's deftness. In eleven chapters Havens gives us background to 1965 and a narrative account interspersed with essays on major figures (Satō, Oda Makoto), institutions (the Japanese press, Beheiren), and issues (the economic impact, public opinion). Havens has used some twenty interviews (most notably with Oda Makoto and Royama Michio) to supplement the written record. There are 35 pages of notes, 18 pages of sources (in both English and Japanese), 10 pages of index, and 12 photographs. Although occasionally marred by run-on sentences, improper choice of words, and misspellings, Havens's style is largely smooth. This book can be assigned to undergraduates.

Narrative history often allows authors to camouflage their biases and assumptions. We need to ask Havens a few questions. What is his view of the Vietnam War? In his concluding chapter he writes: "Both leftists and rightists in Japan had difficulty in seeing the war as a series of revolutionary power struggles between indigenous groups for control" (p. 261). Earlier Havens had written: "It is easy to understand . . . why so many antiwar intellectuals thought American imperialism was thwarting self-determination by the Vietnamese" (p. 33). Havens does not analyze the war itself more fully.

What is his view of American policy? He writes without irony that the purpose of the U.S. defense outlays after 1945 "was not to impose imperial dominion over other states" (p. 9) and that the U.S. goal under the Guam Doctrine was "continuing the security treaty so as to protect East and Southeast Asia" (p. 199). He writes: "One of the chief aims of this book is to explain how the war in distant Indochina forced people in Japan to come to grips with the United States as a pragmatic participant in world politics rather than the genial model of democracy and fairness [the Japanese] remembered from the American occupation" (p. 5).

What is his view of Japan? He finds "elitist leadership, ambivalent views of the United States, clubby social cohesion, and basic cultural insularity" (p. 6). Article Nine of the constitution "ruled out sending troops abroad" (p. 5).

Why did he choose 1965–75? Did the war begin in 1965? No, that is when "America intervened in Vietnam with major military force" (p. 13) and when Rolling Thunder "created the first real [Japanese] public interest in the war" (p. 28). Did it last ten years? At one point Havens writes of "America's eight-year war in Indochina" (p. 84).

Havens's narrative is open to challenge on these issues of framework; within the context of his choices on these issues, Havens has written a useful and informative account.

RICHARD H. MINEAR
University of Massachusetts

SUGATA BOSE. *Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure, and Politics, 1919–1947*. (Cambridge South Asian Studies, number 36.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1986. Pp. xii, 306. $42.50.

In recapitulating three critical decades in the fate of one of the world's most battered peasantries, Sugata Bose moves skillfully between economic and general history. The subtitle suggests the book's purpose: to sort out the mutual determinations of global economic forces, regional social structures, and peasant mobilization from the end of World War I to Indian independence. These elements of economy, society, and politics have, in one form or another, already engaged dozens of scholars. Bose has profited from this literature, yet, taking the lead from C. J. Baker's *An Indian Rural Economy: The Tamilnad Countryside, 1880–1955* (1984), he adds considerably to it by demonstrating how fluxes in international trade and currency movements in and out of Bengal affected peasant debt and consumption and how these in turn determined shifts in class relations, rural violence, and party alignment. These determinist arguments, based on a close study of Bengal revenue records, are new. Nonetheless, Bose exhibits an essential modesty, not claiming too much and backing away from comparisons with agrarian societies elsewhere.

The book, which contains nine maps, eighteen tables, and a glossary, is divided into two parts: "Agrarian Economy and Society" and "Peasants and Politics." Chapter 1 offers a typology of social structures in Bengal's subregions around 1920. It distinguishes between the village landlord–rich farmer-sharecropper system in the newly settled northern and coastal areas, the peasant smallholding system common in most of the east, and the peasant smallholding–demesne labor complex found in central and western Bengal. Each subregion exhibited a characteristic mix of means—rents, labor dues, or interest—by which the exploiting stratum engrossed the agricultural surplus. Static though this typology is, it greatly clarifies the discussion of rural Bengal's social and economic system, which has suffered heretofore from a contradictory terminology and endless assertions about an all-purpose oppressor (the *jotdar*) who lorded it over a proletarianized field worker.

In chapters 2 and 3, Bose describes factors that created tension in village economic relations. Notably, there was a demographically driven shift in the ratio between land and inhabitants and a deepening

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dependence on cash cropping for food, rent, and other expenses. Jute was the preferred cash crop and covered 10–22 percent of the land areas in east Bengal (p. 55). However, jute's costly inputs (as compared to paddy) forced cultivators into the arms of a thin stratum of mostly Hindu trader-usurers and landlord-moneylenders, who in turn drew their capital from urban sources. Bose is persuasive in showing that by 1920 there was a decisive shift in east Bengal from rent to usury as the principal method of surplus appropriation and that the annual import from Europe of vast sums for jute advances had become a necessity for peasant survival. These insights are stated as a revisionist thesis: "A study of the network of agrarian credit relationships is more relevant in the late colonial period than a focus on ties of revenue and rent. It not only provides the critical linkage along which fluctuations in the world economy were transmitted to the region's agrarian economy, but also forms the most important element in the complex of agrarian relations in the region" (p. 5). By elevating credit as an explanatory variable above rent, revenue, and landholding (see chapter 5), Bose overturns a century of historiographic assumptions.

Chapters 4 and 5 are the heart of the book. They explore in detail the impact of the depression of the 1930s followed by the disruptive war economy on the subregional class structures. The cessation of large European capital flows, along with the collapse of the global market for jute, plunged rural east Bengal into a crisis. New loans could not be made, interest on existing loans could not be collected, and land-collateral could not be sold in a depressed market. At the same time bureaucrats fiddled with the exchange value of Indian currency, and politicians legislated debt reduction, all of which convinced landlord- and trader-usurers to get out of moneylending. As a result, they rendered themselves otiose, and their political and social isolation became complete. Bose also shows, however, that in northern and western Bengal peasants had never become so habituated to credit, moneylending was correspondingly less significant, and surplus appropriation relied on the more traditional means of rents, crop sharing, and attached labor. Thus, the links of dependency in these latter subregions became more pronounced after 1929, because landlords continued to give share tenancies and grain loans.

Chapters 6 through 8 map Bengal's political history in light of the shuffling of class relations that occurred after 1929. The last fifty pages examine several famous rural conflicts between 1936 and 1947 in more detail than can be summarized here. These chapters become increasingly narrative as Bose shows how politicians maneuvered for advantage, but the explanatory line closely follows the contours of the new class antagonisms or the old class symbioses. He takes a clear position on the powerful communalism that ranged itself against the landlord and trader elite in the east: "From 1930 onwards, the east Bengal countryside increasingly became the scene of a violent conflict between a predominantly Muslim peasantry and a mostly Hindu rural elite. This conflict was interpreted and used by self-serving politicians for their own ends . . . [they] unflinchingly used religion to mask an essentially economic conflict" (p. 277). Predictably, in the north and west, where class divisions were not so pronounced nor marked by religious difference, communal politics were irrelevant.

In sum this is a key work—well-written and well-researched, marshaling new sources and sophisticated arguments—in the study of Bengal's modern history. Bose is not entirely alone in the study of this period, and this book can be profitably read alongside Partha Chatterjee's *Bengal, 1920–1947*, Volume 1, *The Land Question* (1984).

PAUL GREENOUGH
University of Iowa

RAVI KALIA. *Chandigarh: In Search of an Identity*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 1987. Pp. xiii, 201.

The *AHR* places this review with books on Asia, but its proper place is with the international history of architecture. Although Chandigarh is modern India's most exciting new state capital, designed and built from scratch in the 1950s and 1960s, its creation engaged architects and city planners from around the world.

In this well-crafted presentation, Ravi Kalia presents the evolution of an urban planning concept through the interpersonal relations of its principal protagonists. For Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India's first prime minister and Chandigarh's strongest champion, the building of a new capital for the Punjab was to help heal the wounds of partition, introduce a beacon of modernity to newly independent India, and provide opportunities for young Indian architects to apprentice under outstanding (Western) practitioners. The American planner Albert Mayer, who drew up Chandigarh's first master plan, and his Siberian-born, Warsaw-trained architect, Matthew Nowicki, intended to introduce and sustain the democratic, neighborhood-based values of the garden city movement.

The Swiss-French architectural team of Le Corbusier and his cousin Pierre Jeanneret was selected to supervise the planning after Nowicki died in a plane crash in 1950. They modified Mayer's design into a kind of horizontal *ville radieuse* emphasizing order and monumentality. Though uncom-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fortable with its formality, the British husband and wife team of Maxwell Fry and Jane Drew accepted Le Corbusier's overall design as they prepared architectural segments. In a modern Babel of collaboration among the various Europeans and Indians, Le Corbusier's architectural contributions, driving personality, and rapport with Nehru stamped his name indelibly on the project.

The planners, however, especially Le Corbusier, did not adequately consider local conditions and life styles. (After all the real client was the Western-educated, intellectual Nehru.) Socioeconomic data were very limited, and the foreign planners had little insight into Punjabi society. Le Corbusier contracted to spend on site only two months per year for three years.

After Nehru died in 1964 and Le Corbusier and Jeanneret died in 1965, the forces of local living patterns, politics, economics, interest groups, and bureaucracies inevitably altered the ways in which the city was used, especially by its poorer inhabitants. Industry penetrated its surrounding green belt. In 1966 the Punjab split into two separate states, each claiming Chandigarh as its capital.

Parts of Chandigarh's story have been told elsewhere, and for technical detail, especially on the urban design and the architecture, other accounts must be consulted. Here we have a sweeping synthesis with the historical-biographical narrative as its unifying thread.

HOWARD SPODEK
Temple University

UNITED STATES

MICHAEL H. HUNT. *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy.* New Haven: Yale University Press. 1987. Pp. xiv, 237. $22.50.

In this sweeping survey, Michael H. Hunt argues that there has been "an ideological continuity in [U.S.] foreign policy with few if any equals among great powers in modern times" (p. 13). What he calls "core foreign-policy ideas" (p. 14) consist of visions of national greatness defined in terms of liberty, Anglo-Saxon racial supremacy, and political moderation (as against revolutionary radicalism). These core ideas were generated in the late eighteenth century and further developed in the nineteenth and were validated by "a remarkable string of successes" in U.S. foreign affairs (p. 125). In the twentieth century, however, the weight of the inherited ideology proved to be an obstacle in the way of formulating a mature, restrained approach to rapidly changing world conditions. Thus, Hunt argues, the disastrous Vietnam War was "the culmination . . . of an old impulse to impose on the world the patterns of an ideological foreign policy" (p. 170).

Others have made similar points; Norman Graebner, among others, has long noted the importance of deciphering ideological underpinnings of U.S. foreign policy that often interfere with a rational perception of world realities and national interests. Hunt's plea for a new "republicanism," according to which the nation should play its role as a "model, not a molder" of the world (p. 194), replicates the thinking of some anti-imperialists of the 1890s or of anti-interventionists such as Walter Lippmann in the 1930s. The book's anti-ideological, almost neoisolationist, critique reflects the profound unhappiness felt by many historians of the author's generation with the course of U.S. foreign policy since the 1960s. (Hunt has better things to say about Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration, which, according to him, showed an awareness of the limits of power.)

This book is unique, however, in tracing twentieth-century dilemmas and frustrations to earlier ideological origins. Particularly valuable is Hunt's analysis of the racial connotations of the idea of national greatness. He presents detailed descriptions of American images of blacks, Latins, and Asians and argues that the "pursuit of greatness" may have served as a device "to hold an ethnically, racially, regionally, and religiously diverse country together" (p. 189). This is quite plausible, but the United States is not the only country that is so diverse. Does internal diversity necessarily conduce to an interventionist foreign policy? If not, what other conditions are required to produce one? On the other hand, countries that are far less diverse, such as France and Japan, have also developed visions of national grandeur and often defined foreign policy in ideological terms. What is so exceptional about U.S. foreign policy?

The book does not answer these questions, but it does suggest that the idea of uniqueness may itself be a uniquely American characteristic. The only way to escape from this rut, Hunt writes toward the end of the book, is to reform education so as to encourage a more cosmopolitan outlook. One could hardly disagree. But, to borrow the author's own conceptualization, is not cosmopolitanism itself an ideology? What determines whether internationalism or nationalism will shape foreign policy?

AKIRA IRIYE
University of Chicago

CHRISTINE BOLT. *American Indian Policy and American Reform: Case Studies of the Campaign to Assimilate the American Indians.* London: Allen and Unwin. 1987. Pp. x, 437. $37.95.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Christine Bolt's earlier publications have generally reflected her interest in slavery and race. That interest is manifested also in the chronological survey of Indian-white relations that constitutes the first part of this book and in the choice of topics for the case studies in the second part.

The research for the survey is principally, as it must be, in the secondary literature. It is thorough, and the familiar authorities appear: Francis Paul Prucha on government policy, Henry F. Dobyns on aboriginal population estimates, and Henry E. Fritz on the Board of Indian Commissioners, to cite only three of the many names appearing in the text. For her case studies she has relied more on primary sources, although again she shows an enviable grasp of the secondary literature.

The larger allocations of space to slavery and race than occur in most surveys are at the expense of other subjects such as land, which I believe to have been the most important factor in shaping the character of Indian-white relations. Overall, however, Bolt has provided a survey that is well worth recommending as an introduction to the history of Indian-white relations.

Bolt's case studies also are valuable. The first compares slaveholding among the Five Civilized Tribes and demonstrates that the differences between the tribes were at least as great as differences between white and Indian practices. A second essay deals with Indian-black relations in Oklahoma after the Civil War and seems to conclude, unconvincingly, that whites somehow were responsible for the perpetuation of animosity between the Indians and the blacks. Another case study centers on the relations between anthropologists and Indians, which she sees improving as anthropologists become more concerned with the Indian people and their problems than with academic theory.

Government education programs are the subjects of two studies, and one is devoted to Indian women. Bolt provides a survey of the government's education efforts while criticizing them for failing to better prepare Indians to compete in the larger society. At the same time, however, she acknowledges the growing interest in cultural pluralism and the very real difficulty in reconciling these educational goals. In the case of Indian women, Bolt believes that white observers failed to appreciate the importance of the status accorded them. She does note the considerable variations among the many cultures, yet concludes that women in general have been more successful than their men in adapting to white culture.

The last two case studies, dealing with urban Indians and political protest groups, are two of Bolt's best. They are characterized by the same thorough research and objective tone as the earlier chapters. It is provocative to find such familiar subjects presented from a somewhat different perspective, even though one may not always agree with the result.

WILLIAM T. HAGAN
State University College of New York, Fredonia

DAVID TYACK *et al. Law and the Shaping of Public Education, 1785–1954*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 259. $25.00.

Increasingly, scholars are exploring the broader context in which historical events occur. This is particularly true of recent studies that see law and the legal system as important factors in shaping how individuals and institutions change over time. Along these lines, David Tyack, Thomas James, and Aaron Benavot have written an interesting and provocative book on the role of law in the development of public education from 1785 to 1954. Although earlier versions of a large portion of this book have appeared as articles elsewhere, the volume brings these materials together in a more accessible and coherent form.

The book is divided into two parts. The first examines how constitutional and statutory law was used to build common schools in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The authors analyze the role of the federal government and state constitutions in the establishment of common schools and examine in detail educational developments in California and Michigan. They document the gradual increase in litigation about education in the nineteenth century and discuss the growing bureaucratization and centralization of schools in the early twentieth century.

In the second half of the book, the tension between majority rule and minority rights in school law is considered. The struggle of former slaves in the South to educate themselves after the Civil War is traced as well as the effort of majorities elsewhere to impose their values on other minorities through mandatory school instruction. The successful referendum to compel attendance in public school and to abolish all private schools in Oregon in 1922 and its subsequent defeat in the courts are analyzed. Finally, in a brief but fascinating epilogue, the authors consider the recent changes in the uses of law in education from the perspective of the past. They find that what is new in the post–*Brown v. Board of Education* era is not the use of law by advocates of educational change but rather the increased volume of cases, the kinds of issues raised, the constitutional doctrines employed, and the types of activists involved.

The authors focus on the state as their unit of analysis and pay very little attention to the role of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

local school districts in fostering common schools. Although this approach makes their analysis more manageable, it does not allow them to explore exactly how changes in state constitutions and laws may have affected the growth and development of common schools. As a result, much of the interplay between legal changes and educational development in nineteenth-century America awaits further study. Nevertheless, the authors of this pioneering and thoughtful volume have not only set the framework for such an analysis but have also directed our attention to this hitherto neglected area of social history.

MARIS A. VINOVSKIS
University of Michigan

ELIZABETH PLECK. *Domestic Tyranny: The Making of Social Policy against Family Violence from Colonial Times to the Present.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. vi, 273. $24.95.

Elizabeth Pleck has written the first book-length historical analysis of American family violence. By family violence, a term coined in the 1970s, Pleck means "sexual coercion or threats of or the use of intentional physical force with the aim of causing injury" (p. 4). The book gives us a history of abused children and battered wives and the periodic attempts to ameliorate their plight.

Crisis and drift lie at the heart of Pleck's analysis. Family violence has been and is an ever-present reality of American households. Public attention, however, waxes and wanes. Her central contention is that changing social and political conditions, not worsening conditions in homes, drag the issue out into the public arena. As interest flags, public knowledge fades.

Pleck chronicles the major eras of change in family violence policy. These stretch from efforts in the seventeenth century by Puritan magistrates to those in the late twentieth century by feminists. She tries to place each period in an explanatory context that suggests its origins, character, decline, and legacy. Throughout, she raises a set of central themes that constitute the major lessons of the history of family violence. Foremost, she argues, coherent responses to family violence have been stymied by popular belief in the "family ideal," a persistent faith in household autonomy, parental rights, and family preservation that fosters an aversion to public intervention in the home. Periodic change occurred only because a conducive environment led to action that revised the family ideal. The founding of anti-child-cruelty societies in the 1870s by an urban elite fearful of social disorder and willing to sanction limited removals of children typifies her argument. In any era success came more easily to reformers who conformed to the family ideal than to radicals who challenged its conventions. Pleck pursues these themes by drawing on an array of primary sources and the work of historians such as Linda Gordon. Of particular importance are two major studies she conducted on patterns of childhood punishment and changes in the incidence of family murder. To these she adds judicious assessments of controversies such as the longstanding debate over the implications of Freudian analysis for the treatment of battered women.

Obviously, the history of American family violence is far too enormous and complex to be assessed thoroughly in such a slim volume. The critique is predictable: too many contentions left undeveloped; too many issues raised but not pursued. For example, from the opening quotation by John Stuart Mill insisting that the law must interfere with domestic tyrants to her concluding call for a more comprehensive American welfare state, Pleck champions concerted state action as the most effective means of reducing family violence and aiding its victims. Yet her argument is merely suggestive because she does not fully explore the interconnections of familialism and antistatism nor fully answer the arguments of those who oppose state intervention.

Such caveats ought not to diminish Pleck's achievement. She has insightfully opened up a new historical domain and provided an invaluable starting point for reexamining family violence policies. Most important, as a historian she documents the constant interconnections of the past and present. Her book makes it clear that family violence has a history that must be understood to realize a different future.

MICHAEL GROSSBERG
Case Western Reserve University

ELLEN K. ROTHMAN. *Hands and Hearts: A History of Courtship in America.* Reprint. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 370. $8.95.

Starting with a famous study by Willard Waller in the 1930s, sociologists have documented such modes of the match game as rating and dating, going steady, and shacking up. But few studies have illuminated the pre-1930 era, which Waller and others have portrayed as a time of "traditional courtship." This phrase suggests a configuration of static and stolid relationships between young people intent on marriage, but Ellen K. Rothman's fine study demonstrates the complexity and variety of courting experiences in the pretelephone era.

Basing her conclusions on a sensitive analysis of some three hundred fifty diaries and autobiographies of middle-class Americans from the late eigh-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

teenth to the early twentieth centuries, Rothman shows that courtship was never so general or formal a system as Waller supposed. Courting—that is, socializing without coitus or a clear intent to marry but with privacy and physical intimacy—has been far more widespread than courtship (where the intent to marry is clear). Indeed, she writes of an "invention of petting" during the early 1800s (p. 54) and maintains that during the nineteenth century the sharpening of gender roles after marriage intensified the quest of young people for physical intimacy without coitus before marriage. As married women became more isolated from their husbands' spheres of activity, the need to establish a mutuality of tastes before marriage increased. Far from being the passionless creatures portrayed by sex manuals of the Victorian era, unmarried women hungered for physical and emotional contact with their lovers.

Although this quest for intimacy has endured, several disjunctions have marked the history of courting. Rothman portrays early nineteenth-century married couples (especially women) as gripped by idealistic expectations of marriage. Because marriage involved a drastic alteration of a woman's life (removal from parents and female friends into the exclusive and monopolistic sphere of the home), girls trembled at its approach and often shied at the gate. Later in the century, in contrast, widespread knowledge of birth control and wealth to pay for servants made middle-class marriage a less daunting prospect and stirred impatience to tie the knot. Paradoxically, as marriage became more inviting and as urban life gave courting couples more privacy, adult fears for the morals of youth led to the institution of chaperonage late in the nineteenth century. The result was a tug between the older generation's demand for supervision and the younger generation's continual quest for autonomy. Often challenged, the latter persisted.

Rothman's examination of personal documents enables her to illuminate the relationship between prescription and experience. She contends neither that young people merely absorbed prescriptive advice about marriage nor that they regularly flaunted it. Victorian women sought physical intimacy but feared coitus. They accepted the stereotype of men as oversexed but expressed their own longings and felt guilty only when they led their lovers over the edge. In sum this book takes us on a rewarding excursion into the innermost recesses of our ancestors' private world.

JOSEPH F. KETT
University of Virginia

PHILIP ABBOTT. *Seeking Many Inventions: The Idea of Community in America*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 1987. Pp. x, 214. $19.95.

In this slim, ambitious volume, political scientist Philip Abbott offers an imaginative reading of the history of an improbable grouping of American phenomena: the telephone, the camp meeting, the patchwork quilt, the prison, and the motel. His argument is that all can be understood as inventions and that a correspondingly broad definition of the invention process leads to a new appreciation of the centrality of community in American culture. Very much in the tradition of Robert Nisbet, he sees this idea as historically and theoretically focused on social interaction and institutions, ground eroding fast under pressure from liberalism's twin forces of atomistic individualism and corporate-state collectivism, in both the economic and political spheres. Abbott believes that Americans have always actively sought to protect and extend that social middle ground, although he sees deracinated modern efforts as needing the reinforcement and encouragement that history can provide.

Although his reading of each of the five "inventions" is not particularly original as such, the idiosyncratic juxtaposition makes compelling sense, especially as a demonstration of the first proposition: that it is worth broadening our concept of invention beyond the narrowly individual and technological in order to appreciate the socially grounded human agency from which a variety of changes have arisen. Abbott's point is so convincing, in fact, that perhaps he need not have labored through an elaborate invention typology and an even more cumbersome "invention matrix" that leads to the unsurprising discovery that institutions are historical in socially complex ways.

More problematic is the attempt to stitch the patches together into a quilt of explicit community. Here, the argument stumbles repeatedly over a failure to distinguish clearly intent from effect. And, having treated the concept so broadly that every change with social implications (the Lordstown factory, for instance) is seen as rooted in an "inventive community," Abbott not surprisingly finds that modern efforts lack genuine social content and meaning, many (like the motel) coming down to the ersatz community of a shared isolation, which Abbott calls "intimate anonymity." This is perhaps his most acute insight but not one that really requires or supports the book's elaborate theory.

For the most part, the book rests on an adequate if not extensive coverage of the secondary literature. But some sections, notably that on prisons, are out of touch with contemporary reality and scholarship. Abbott speculates vaguely about the possible "deinvention" of prisons in America, seemingly unaware that our per capita rate of incarceration, one of the highest in the world, has been accelerating ominously in recent decades. Further, curious political labeling does not help the analysis engage the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

real world, unless one thinks that George Gilder, Irving Kristol, and Michael Novak are the exemplary voices of American liberalism. Finally, a series of embarrassing errors mars the book, such as the claim (dubious as to both word usage and literary history) that Hamlin Garland was a writer "not at all adverse to constructing a frontier romance" (p. 97). And it is not encouraging when a book about community begins, in its very first paragraph, by hailing the "historical testament" of "the *shetls*" [*sic*] (p. ix).

MICHAEL FRISCH
State University of New York, Buffalo

GARY LAND, editor. *Adventism in America: A History*. (Studies in Adventist History.) Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans. 1986. Pp. ix, 301.

The last ten years have witnessed a surge in studies of American millenarianism, particularly the Millerites and the Adventist movement. Past accounts, produced mainly by Adventists, often were apologias with little critical analysis. Recent studies, by both Adventists and non-Adventists, have tried to free the movement's history from hagiography. Non-Adventists have had an easier time of it, for they were writing for a broad academic and not a denominational audience. Perhaps more interesting is the approach of historians who are Adventists addressing an essentially Adventist audience. In the face of professional scholarship that has at times been critical of such leading figures as William Miller and Ellen G. White, the temptation in the Adventist community is to strengthen the fortress of faith, as Mormons seem to be doing. The test of a history of Adventism by an Adventist is the extent to which he or she can avoid this trap.

In this sense the present book goes far but not far enough to please a non-Adventist, professional audience. This series of articles on Seventh-day Adventist history is a one-volume summary of a principal indigenous American denomination. Everett Dick, pioneer in the study of the Millerite movement, the church's theological forebear, discusses Millerism broadly and objectively; Godfrey Anderson traces the Seventh-day Adventist church's founding from 1846 to 1864; articles by Richard Schwarz, Gary Land, and Keld J. Reynolds bring the story to the present emphasizing particularly the church's energetic, world-wide mission movement. Intended for a Seventh-day Adventist audience, the book provides a history refreshingly free from overt apologetics, probably the most objective survey we have seen coming from historians who are Seventh-day Adventists.

But, although the book avoids hagiography, it is not sufficiently objective either. For one thing, although the title suggests the book will discuss Adventism, that term is narrowly defined to include only the Seventh-day Adventist church. The Adventist movement is much broader than that, including the Advent Christians and many other denominations. This reflects Seventh-day Adventists' view of their denomination as the major, perhaps even only, legitimate proponent of Adventism. But an objective observer must rebel against the appropriation of the label in the title of a book that wishes to be scholarly.

Also, the book is ambivalent in its treatment of important issues in the history of Seventh-day Adventism, particularly the character and role of Ellen White. Anderson's chapter on the organization of the church from 1846 to 1864 leads one to believe that James White was the principal founder, and he gives relatively scant consideration to the role of James's wife. She was a principal, if not the principal, founder of both Seventh-day Adventist theology and organization. In a later chapter, though, Reynolds neatly summarizes the debate within the church over the source of Ellen White's revelations, her propensity to change her mind, and the affinity between her supposedly original witness and late-nineteenth-century cultural life. He also discusses the church's frenzied response to the new critical scholarship, which is coming largely from historians who are members of the church. Reynolds's willingness to discuss these important questions is a sign of the denomination's growth in its sense of security, but the unwillingness of the writers to reach a conclusion about some of these points illustrates continuing nervousness about treating controversial issues.

As an institutional, single-volume history of the Seventh-day Adventist church this volume serves adequately. But anyone wishing for a full historical interpretation of the church's significance or of Adventism as an important cultural and religious theme in American life will be disappointed.

DAVID L. ROWE
Middle Tennessee State University

PHINIZY SPALDING. *The History of the Medical College of Georgia*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1987. Pp. xiv, 290. $35.00.

A commemorative production initiated by the sesquicentennial of the founding of the Medical College of Georgia in 1828, this book traces how one proprietary school with a tiny, part-time faculty was transformed into a massive medical center with a university ethos. The faculty members of the antebellum college drew national attention by ambitious, though largely bootless, efforts to uplift formal standards of medical education. They gained regional prominence through their ardent attempts to

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

energize the intellectual life of southern medicine and in 1836 founded the *Southern Medical and Surgical Journal* partly as a vehicle for their proselytism. When the college reopened after the Civil War, however, the ideals of professional mission and reform were gone. Through the early twentieth century, the college was blatantly ruled by nepotism and run for profit. Its standards and facilities were greatly improved in the 1910s, and, although lack of state commitment to public education brought the college near to collapse during the 1930s, it endured to enjoy the support of a nation preoccupied with medical excellence in the decades after World War II.

This is not a volume that represents the historiographic sophistication of recent work in medical history on such topics as the pedagogical allegiances of medical educators or the shifting place of the profession in American society. It is, instead, at its best in situating events at the college within their local Augusta, Georgia, context. One of the most compelling sections describes the school's revitalization in response to Abraham Flexner's report on American medical schools in 1910. Flexner judged the Medical College of Georgia to be beyond redemption and urged the state university to sever all ties with it. What accounts for the college's survival during a period when so many institutions condemned by Flexner folded, Phinizy Spalding convincingly shows, was less internal reorganization than the determination of alumni and civic leaders. The college was perceived as an important civic asset, and it was largely community support, rallied by the Augusta City Council, that gave the school the new building, financial resources, and new city hospital needed to win approval from the American Association of Medical Colleges. Still, the meaning of the school to the local community might have been pursued even further. The relationship between Augusta's black community and the school is little mentioned, for example, although attention to it might have helped flesh out a fuller story from the unelaborated statement that the first black medical student was accepted "without fanfare" in 1967 (p. 209).

Spalding has ably served the alumni for whom the volume is largely intended and has provided historians with a well-researched account of how patterns that are generally familiar were expressed in one institution.

JOHN HARLEY WARNER
Yale University

JOHN F. STOVER. *History of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.* West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press. 1987. Pp. xiv, 419. $29.50.

If one railroad can be said to have mirrored the rise, decline, and apparent rebirth of the American railroad industry, it is the Baltimore and Ohio. Chartered in 1827, the B&O was the nation's first common carrier railway. Its corporate existence, blurred in recent years as the railroad was folded into the Chessie System, finally came to an end in 1986 amid the megamergers that marked railroading's deregulated revitalization.

John F. Stover offers a portrait of a railroad that was founded to help the city of Baltimore compete more effectively with rivals Philadelphia and New York City for inland trade. The B&O subsequently spurred national industrialization by tapping the coal fields of West Virginia and the steel centers of Pennsylvania and Ohio. Pushing its steel tentacles farther west to Chicago and St. Louis, it linked the agricultural heartland with the Atlantic seaboard.

Stover notes that the railroad never forgot its genteel origins. It traditionally ranked comfort higher than speed in marketing its passenger service and—emblematic of its physical and political connections—used the Capitol dome as its corporate trademark. Its most well known chief executive, Daniel Willard, was the confidant of presidents from Woodrow Wilson to Franklin D. Roosevelt. Willard was highly respected by both organized labor and his fellow managers, and under his leadership (1910–41) the B&O reached its peak in size and operating efficiency.

The Baltimore and Ohio nonetheless operated for most of its history in the shadow of the mighty Pennsylvania Railroad, whose east-west mainlines served essentially the same markets as those of the B&O. The Pennsylvania Railroad even controlled the B&O for a few years at the turn of the century, during which time it helped the smaller road escape a receivership brought on by excessive borrowing.

Stover's book cannot be considered the definitive history of the B&O. It is only a survey and for the most part is not based on extensive use of corporate archives. Stover's research did not take him far beyond annual reports and employee magazines. But even this brief survey could have had greater value had it not been compromised by weaknesses that are serious—and surprising, given the author's well-deserved reputation as a scholar of railroad history.

Stover is either uninterested in or unfamiliar with the technical and operating sides of railroading since World War I, as illustrated by the scantiness of his discussions of such topics as electrification, rail diesel cars, and the B&O's philosophy of steam locomotive design. He seems not to appreciate certain corporate milestones. The acquisition in 1932 of the Buffalo, Rochester and Pittsburgh Railway—then one of the most traffic-rich railroads in the East—is casually treated in less than two paragraphs.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Furthermore, heavy reliance on annual reports causes the book itself to read like one. It merely chronicles people and events and does not analyze or interpret them. Stover does not address, for example, the fundamental issue of managerial leadership. Were the B&O's succession of lawyers, civic leaders, and traffic men effective as presidents? Did their backgrounds influence the shape of the B&O in the same way that, say, the Pennsylvania Railroad was largely a product of its engineer-presidents?

Even in a survey such as this, Stover had an opportunity to break new ground by emphasizing the B&O's modern era and exploiting oral history sources. Instead, the road's early years claim most of his attention, and a chance for original scholarship was lost. Contrary to the blurb on the dust jacket, this book offers few insights to scholars or rail buffs.

MICHAEL BEZILLA
Pennsylvania State University

JOHN NIVEN. *The American President Lines and Its Forebears, 1848–1984: From Paddlewheelers to Containerships*. Newark: University of Delaware Press or Associated University Presses, Cranbury, N.J. 1987. Pp. 327. $39.50.

John Niven's previous writings have centered on mid-nineteenth-century America. Following his authoritative account of Connecticut during the Civil War, he focused on political history, producing the definitive biography of Gideon Welles and then a well-regarded examination of Martin Van Buren and his era. Now, with his study of a major American shipping enterprise, Niven has lengthened his historical span while maintaining the meticulous scholarship, rigorous analysis, and effective exposition that characterize his earlier works.

The best kind of institutional history—and Niven's book is a fine example—deftly interweaves the organization under examination with the individuals who created and sustained it, to the extent that in considerable measure the account of an institution's development becomes an account of major individuals as they managed that development. Thus, Niven assesses the impact of William Aspinwall and Jay Gould on a business firm that began during the years of troubled first experiments with federal government subsidy of steamship enterprise and survived the wholesale collapse of maritime industries in the later decades of the nineteenth century to become a major presence in both Pacific coast and trans-Pacific shipping of the modern period. Just as the Pacific Mail Steamship Company was shaped by its nineteenth-century managers, so its successor, the Dollar Steamship Company, displayed in its early twentieth-century growth the leadership of Robert Dollar and his son, R. Stanley Dollar.

From the business tribulations of the depression of the 1930s—catastrophic to shipping firms—emerged American President Lines as a successor to the Dollars' organization. Operated by the U.S. government from 1938 until 1952, the company subsequently encountered a variety of organizational changes that witnessed the managerial influence of such as Ralph Davies, George Killion, Chandler Ide, Worth Fowler, and Bruce Seaton. And, whether part of a larger organization or operating on its own (since 1983), American President Lines has contended with labor issues, changing market conditions, and, above all, revolutionary developments in the design and use of container ships, those intermodal carriers so technologically remote from their paddlewheel progenitors.

Out of this long and remarkably complicated corporate experience, Niven has produced a history that clearly establishes both the firm and its major executives in their commercial, political, and technological contexts. Drawing on a wealth of materials, including extensive interviews with executives of American President Lines, U.S. government documents, manuscript collections, contemporary newspapers and periodicals, and published reports, Niven also has benefited from the scholarship of his longtime colleague, John H. Kemble, a Pacific maritime historian of distinction. The resulting book is maritime and business history of substance, sweep, precision, and clarity.

EDWARD W. SLOAN
Trinity College

ANN KIBBEY. *The Interpretation of Material Shapes in Puritanism: A Study of Rhetoric, Prejudice, and Violence*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1986. Pp. xi, 203. $27.95.

Ann Kibbey places the philosophical concerns of poststructuralism with the meaning of "figures" in the context of seventeenth-century New England in order to reveal relationships between rhetorical and visual theories and practices and particular historical instances of prejudice. Whether she analyzes "figures" as "acoustic" shapes, metaphors, visual images, or living bodies, her conclusions remain the same. First, far from eliminating the use of images, Puritans needed the sensational world of "material shapes" to apprehend the abstract spiritual world. To justify their own actions, they distinguished between "appropriate" figures (their own) and "inappropriate" figures (those of everybody else). This differentiation helps explain their attacks not only on the rhetoric but also on the bodies of those who differed from them. Second, when the Puritan use

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of figures is closely examined, however, the assumption of "clear" differences disappears. Metonymy and hyperbole—figures that blur the relationship between sign and referent, between figural and literal "meaning"—are central to Puritan discourse. A key example is the "bread" of the Lord's Supper. "Bread" can refer to "common" bread; to a state—being "living" or "dead" bread; or to an action—the destruction of "false" bread. The true believer must "read" what bread "means" in a given situation; the problem is that this meaning continually changes. The referent of "Pequots," "Catholics," "Antinomian women," and "women" also shifts: at one point external, attackable threats; at the next, subversive enemies within the self and community. Third, Kibbey concludes that the Puritan ministerial elite defined a social system (grounded in threat, prejudice, and violence) and maintained its own power (as elect, male interpreters of a Word-centered religion) by purposefully confusing the relation of literal to figural meaning.

The poststructuralist approach is especially illuminating when applied to rhetoric and actions leveled at Pequots and Antinomian women. Figural analysis can clearly contribute to an understanding of Puritanism's violent side. But problems arise when its findings are overgeneralized and other forms of evidence ignored. One notes, for instance, that John Cotton, never viewed as normative by historians, provides Kibbey's central example of Puritan rhetoric. Also problematic is Kibbey's own rhetoric of Puritan uniqueness: many of the "prejudicial" beliefs and scriptural images she highlights were equally shared by Catholics and Protestants of the period. Her stylistic analyses also beg larger questions. Must complex images invariably "constrict" hearers? Does not the Antinomian controversy itself suggest that Cotton's preaching "freed" certain listeners? Is religious rhetoric in all cases simply a superstructure imposed on passive hearers in order to maintain patriarchal authority? Kibbey's method is of major interest, but its larger claims must be tempered.

TERESA TOULOUSE
Tulane University

MILTON J COALTER, JR. *Gilbert Tennent, Son of Thunder: A Case Study of Continental Pietism's Impact on the First Great Awakening in the Middle Colonies.* (Contributions to the Study of Religion, number 18.) New York: Greenwood. 1986. Pp. xx, 227. $35.00.

Gilbert Tennent was once credited with having delivered the most vitriolic sermon ever preached in America. His *The Danger of an Unconverted Ministry* (1740) brought this otherwise obscure Presbyterian divine to the attention of the entire American people and did more than any other single act to arouse public animosity to the eighteenth-century revival movement known as the Great Awakening. Until now, that emotional outburst was just about the only event of Tennent's life considered worthy of notice by historians. Unfortunately, this brief biographical study does little to raise its subject to a higher level of importance.

In fact, this eldest, Irish-born son of William Tennent, Sr., was a relatively ordinary clergyman in the religiously heterogeneous Middle Colonies. Educated at his father's famous Log College in Neshaminy, Pennsylvania, Tennent became thoroughly indoctrinated in the pietist teachings flourishing among the followers of Theodorus Frelinghuysen and Nikolaus von Zinzendorf. Throughout his life he sought to carry these traditions into the Scots-Irish Calvinism of his father's Presbyterian church. In the process he played a major role in virtually every major dispute of theology and polity plaguing that troubled denomination. By his participation in such obscure quarrels as the subscription debate, the Adoption Act compromise, the question of itinerancy and George Whitefield, the Old Light–New Light schism, the necessity of conversion, congregational autonomy, ministerial education, and emotional preaching, Tennent becomes the vehicle by which the author seeks to illuminate these facets of the revival.

This is the real purpose of the book. Milton J Coalter, Jr., naturally sees the evangelical fervor of the Great Awakening as one of the most important characteristics of American religion in the eighteenth century. But the revival was never a monolithic movement even among the Presbyterians of the Middle Colonies. Evangelicals such as Tennent faced a host of learned, vigorous opponents who hoped to move their denomination in entirely different directions. The Great Awakening was thus the first important public debate over religious questions to occur in our national experience, foreshadowing debates that even now generate newspaper headlines and television specials.

As biography, this work suffers from a subject whose life was neither particularly interesting nor significant. As an analysis of the Great Awakening, it explores in some detail the workings of that movement in one particular area of the colonies. As a study of many of the theological and political niceties within American Protestantism and especially important to its growing evangelical sector, it addresses the issues with clarity and economy. In this last quality lies the author's greatest contribution to our understanding of the American past in general and American religion in particular.

GEORGE WILLIAM PILCHER
Ball State University

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

N. E. H. HULL. *Female Felons: Women and Serious Crime in Colonial Massachusetts*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1987. Pp. x, 171. $21.95.

A study of female criminals can be illuminating, N. E. H. Hull affirms, for it can tell us important things about the extent to which patriarchal bias is reflected in the legal system. From an examination of women's trials, verdicts, sentences, and punishments in colonial Massachusetts, Hull concludes that, even though "women were a subordinate class in early American law and society," in court fairness was the order of the day (p. 140). Her tabulation of 144 females and 249 males indicted in the Massachusetts Superior Court between 1673 and 1774 yields "no significant difference between the treatment of men and women" (p. 88).

Hull also provides her readers with a succinct history of English felony law, enumerates some differences between English and New English practices, compares male and female criminality (for example, women kill alone, men kill in groups), and statistically links crimes against property with fluctuating economic conditions (a poignant argument, which is unfortunately buried in an appendix).

Hull's effort to "partially exonerate the Puritans and their descendants from charges of sexism in their laws and courts" is, however, not convincingly accomplished (p. 142). It is reasonable to expect that equality in treatment would exist at the level of the most serious crimes but not necessarily at the misdemeanor level, yet Hull chooses not to consider misdemeanors, which were far more common and, in the seventeenth century at least, reflected larger differences in sentencing. The actual numbers of felons are very low—less than two women and three men per year—and thus general conclusions about the level of sexism over the span of an entire century hardly seem judicious. In fairness to Hull, she does indicate that the eighteenth century was characterized by a decline in infanticide, adultery, and witchcraft proceedings, as well as by the emergence of the affectionate family, but she does not really separate the eighteenth-century Puritans from their earlier counterparts in her statistics. She therefore takes issue with those scholars who have defined sexual bias in the seventeenth-century courts by using her largely eighteenth-century evidence against them. Her desire to vindicate the Puritans from charges of sexism sometimes takes leaps of fancy: for example, she contends that "generalized misogyny" was not a factor in witchcraft, a conclusion that ignores the fact that 90 percent of the accused were female. Moreover, Hull's statistics do not totally bear her out. If there was no "significant" difference in treatment by sex, why does her chart of capital offenses (p. 89) reveal that women were more likely to be found not guilty, to be whipped, and to be executed, while men were more likely to be assessed a fine? Hull's study is useful, in certain respects, but its conclusions about the deliberations of angelic justices—"men of learning, sense, and respect for the law"—are not to be taken seriously.

LYLE KOEHLER
New Mexico State University

MARY ANN JIMENEZ. *Changing Faces of Madness: Early American Attitudes and Treatment of the Insane*. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, for Brandeis University Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 219.

This study surveys the history of mental health care in Massachusetts between 1700 and 1840. During this period, Mary Ann Jimenez contends, two distinct social orders evolved, the colonial and the postrevolutionary, and each produced a unique view of madness and how the insane should be treated. Colonial Massachusetts was an intensely religious society with Puritanism dominating every area of life. Accordingly, madness had, in the author's words, a "supernatural face"; God or the devil had the power to drive a person insane, and, invariably, a wayward, immoral life style also caused mental derangement. Mad people roamed about freely and were tolerated, or viewed with indifference, as long as they were neither a violent threat nor a financial burden to the community. The mad lived with their families, and insane paupers were boarded in the homes of town residents. Unless incapacitated, a mad individual could remain on the job; Jimenez cites examples of schoolmasters and ministers who suffered mental distress yet kept their positions. Prayer and fasting rather than medical treatment were the chief modes of therapy. Presumably, a matrix of warm, intimate community and family relationships reduced individual stress and contained insane behavior.

After the revolution a new social order emerged, a secular and impersonal society that produced a new kind of response to insanity and the care of the insane. Now, the author claims, madness had a "medical face," and the insane required incarceration. Several factors contributed to these changes: religious authority faded, medical knowledge and practice became more structured and professional, and European and English ideas about insanity and the care of the mad gained attention and an influential following. There were dramatic changes in the structure of society such as population increase, more urbanization, the appearance of large numbers of the transient poor, and a competitive, market-oriented economy. The end result was a new world, a society of stress and strain, a world far removed from the harmonious communal order of colonial Massachusetts. The individual, Jimenez ar-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

gues, was caught in a web of ever changing relationships and pressures without traditional support groups and faced increasing demands for self-control. Madness could not be tolerated; it became a threat to social order, and its victims had to be contained in an institutional setting. Public officials took the lead, making confinement, in jails and almshouses, an acceptable solution to this new social problem.

The author provides extended notes and a selected bibliography.

LELAND V. BELL
Central State University

THOMAS L. PURVIS. *Proprietors, Patronage, and Paper Money: Legislative Politics in New Jersey, 1703–1776.* New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press. 1986. Pp. xii, 348. $38.00.

This very intelligent and well-written monograph upsets many of our current notions about colonial American politics. The first truly analytical study of colonial New Jersey's legislature in action, the book takes sophisticated advantage of hundreds of surviving roll calls to buttress key points in the author's argument about the nature of legislative politics and representative government in a royal colony.

Thomas L. Purvis's findings prove surprisingly similar to those of his mentor, Jack P. Greene, for colonial Virginia. New Jersey society in the eighteenth century was ruled by a native-born, cohesive gentry class that governed without serious challenge and proved highly responsible and capable in fulfilling its public tasks. What is surprising about this is that New Jersey's was not a homogeneous society but one characterized by religious and ethnic diversity and geographically divided between east and west. Like Virginia, it was rural and agricultural and lacked a dominant city. Unlike Virginia, New Jersey had diversified agriculture, and there was no established church present to oppress Nonconformists. Whereas Virginians used their tobacco as money and secured credit from British merchants and Scottish storekeepers, all classes of freemen in New Jersey faced continuing scarcities of both money and credit. Finally, New Jersey was unusual because it was plagued by overlapping land claims dating back to Stuart times. Continual suits and countersuits by rival groups of proprietors in the eighteenth century threatened the titles of poor farmers unable to afford the court and attorney fees to defend themselves.

Although proprietors dominated the upper house and controlled appointments to prestigious local offices, representatives in eighteenth-century New Jersey steered clear of the land battles. Instead, legislative politics centered on two related issues: minimizing the burden and power of the provincial government by twisting its purse strings and mobilizing the government's credit to create a money supply through financing mortgages on land. Interest on these mortgages provided enough income to finance all normal expenses of the central government and eliminated any need for taxes in peacetime.

This happy situation benefited white property holders of all ranks yet worked to the advantage of the gentry by perpetuating popular disinterest in politics. Neither the Board of Trade nor Parliament, however, was prepared to tolerate local autonomy in the colonies or paper money as legal tender, and thus a perpetual tug-of-war ensued, which was interrupted only by the overriding call of patriotism during the Seven Years' War.

The resistance of the governor and council, as agents of the crown, to the wishes of the members of the lower house served to unify the latter into an opposition party based fundamentally on class interest, although their arguments were frequently cast in the idealistic language of constitutional principle. On the other hand, sufficient numbers among them proved susceptible to the corrupting promise of councillor patronage so that the outcomes of the annual battles over paper money and the budget were never preordained.

Although the study lacks a fully developed economic context for its narrative about the rise of the gentry or the role of money and credit in a colonial economy, the author has used his sources brilliantly to extract an entirely new and persuasive interpretation of New Jersey's legislators: they were neither factious nor oppressive. The book's importance, however, carries well beyond the bounds of one small colony because it shows, as no other study has succeeded in doing, how representative politics in British North America actually worked.

GLORIA L. MAIN
University of Colorado

MICHAEL C. BATINSKI. *The New Jersey Assembly, 1738–1775: The Making of a Legislative Community.* Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. 1987. Pp. xxii, 310. $27.50.

Michael C. Batinski's study of the New Jersey assembly, 1738–75, is an effort to break through the traditional legislative history of earlier scholarship. His purpose is to apply and clarify a "new conception of the colonial American legislature," which focuses on the membership rather than the institution.

The first part of the book explores the reasons for the plurality of interests and divisions among New Jersey lawmakers. According to Batinski, the values

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of a landowning society guided an economic and social elite that sat in the assembly, values that were both traditional (rural and emphasizing a moral economy) and liberal (urban and drawn from the marketplace) and that served as the foundation for a legislative "community." Within that community, divisions and conflict did not reflect polarized alignments so much as the free play of interests as assemblymen pursued their vision of a "commercial arcadia."

More than half of the book focuses on the assembly as an institution, its leadership, committee assignments, voting blocs, and the political ideology that shaped the roles and voting behavior of its members. Based on an analysis of 544 roll-call votes, Batinski concludes that New Jersey politics was an unstable form of pluralism, derived from the colony's demographic, economic, and religious diversity. Thus, the assembly oscillated between the extremes of consensus and polarity, with bloc voting more common than either, as members confronted such issues as the governor's prerogative, paper money, debts, export regulations, war, and imperial authority. Disagreements among the assemblymen took place within a "country" ideological tradition, with positions taken or sides changed more because of individual "temperament," conditioned by localism, than because of clashing interests or political principles. According to Batinski, this characterization of New Jersey's assembly politics continued well into the next century.

The most persuasive part of Batinski's work is his analysis of assembly roll-call voting. Although he finds occasional evidence of an east-west division, the conventional explanation of New Jersey's politics, a kaleidoscope of bloc voting more accurately reflects the processes of decision making in the New Jersey assembly. Less convincing is Batinski's effort to explain the meaning of New Jersey's "milling interests" within a framework of an "arcadic ideal" and a "country ideology" that were "complementary elements of a single vision of the moral society" (p. 110). What that might mean is obscured by an analysis and writing style that rely on a heavy repetition of terms and labels. The book lacks a bibliography and an adequate index; an appendix provides a short biographic sketch of each assemblyman.

ROGER J. CHAMPAGNE
Illinois State University

E. MERTON COULTER. *Abraham Baldwin: Patriot, Educator, and Founding Father*. Foreword by ALBERT B. SAYE. Arlington, Va.: Vandamere of AB Associates. 1987. Pp. xvi, 304. $24.95.

E. Merton Coulter, professor of history at the University of Georgia from 1919 to 1958, author of twenty-two books, and coauthor or editor of eleven others, is best known for his two volumes dealing with the period 1861–77 in the "History of the South," a series of which he was coeditor. The book under review was found in manuscript at the time of his death in 1981 and is now published posthumously, edited by his lifelong friend and colleague, Albert B. Saye. Coulter completed the work in 1981 as he approached his ninety-first birthday. The volume does a serious disservice to Coulter's reputation.

Abraham Baldwin grew up in Connecticut, where he was born in 1754. He excelled at Yale College and stayed on for three years as a much admired tutor and was subsequently strenuously importuned by President Ezra Stiles to accept the prestigious position of professor of divinity there, which he refused. Instead, he studied law and moved to Georgia, where he entered politics. He was elected to the state legislature and served in the Confederation Congress, the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787, the U.S. House for ten years, and the Senate for seven as a rabid Jeffersonian. He died in 1807.

The only previous book-length biography is that done by Henry C. White in 1926, still a serviceable work. The need for a new appraisal of Baldwin has long been apparent. The need remains. Coulter's work is in the tradition of late nineteenth-century genteel biography. The book evinces an utter lack of historiographic sophistication, virtually no analysis, and very little apparent probing in the many relevant manuscript collections. It tells us nothing of significance not already in print and illuminates neither the politics of Baldwin's era nor the character of a man of intriguing complexity.

As far as can be inferred from this biography—for we are never told—Baldwin never worked as a lawyer and had no other visible means of support. Yet he died a very wealthy man. Coulter tells us that Baldwin disparaged land speculation (p. 191) but also tells us he died holding vast acreage in Ohio Scioto lands—of which his brother-in-law and closest friend, Joel Barlow, was the agent—and land in Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, as well. Yet we are provided with no new information or insight about the Yazoo land frauds in which Baldwin was a principal antagonist of the speculators.

Baldwin represents the prime archetype of Connecticut's antiestablishment minority who chose to leave the state rather than to bang heads against the Federalist stone wall. Yet Coulter tells us nothing at all of Connecticut politics in the Confederation era despite four doctoral dissertations on the subject, none of which are included in his bibliography, which lists only three works published after 1968. These are but two examples of the many missed opportunities to present findings of interest to

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scholars and to enliven a plodding and pedestrian narrative.

In short the book is a colossal disappointment, will detract considerably from Coulter's high reputation, and, to the extent that it discourages publication of a useful biography of Baldwin, does historical scholarship a major disservice.

CHRISTOPHER COLLIER
University of Connecticut

KENT A. BOWMAN. *Voices of Combat: A Century of Liberty and War Songs, 1765–1865*. (Contributions to the Study of Music and Dance, number 10.) New York: Greenwood. 1987. Pp. xii, 172. $39.95.

Kent A. Bowman's book offers an introduction to the popular music of the battlefield and the home front from the revolution through the Civil War. Although his argument that "the first signs of an American popular music appeared in the form of liberty and war songs of colonial protest and rebellion" (p. ix) puts him at odds with at least one of his important musical sources, Gilbert Chase, who finds the earliest flowering of an American popular music more than one hundred years prior to the revolution, Bowman does provide evidence of considerable derivative and original musical creativity in wartime.

Conceptual problems arise in distinguishing between liberty songs, whose texts focused on the issues that led to conflict, and war songs inspired by the realities of battle. Once he introduces these categories, Bowman tends to blur rather than sharpen them. This is appropriate, given the tendency of many war song texts to straddle the fence between the ideological and the bellicose, but it calls into question the distinction in the first place. Bowman hopes to connect the songs of war to the political and social climate of the United States as well as the everyday experiences of the military men who sang in their camps and the citizens who played and sang about war at home. This effort would have been stronger with more reference to recent scholarship, especially for the pre-1776 and revolutionary periods, by such historians as John Shy, Charles Royster, and Fred Anderson.

There are some interesting discussions of song texts, although some composers and songs deserve more thorough treatment. From Bowman's account it is unclear what made Nathaniel Niles and Andrew Law, composers in 1776 of "The American Hero," "the first important team of American war song composers" (p. 23). Bowman notes the religious imagery in this song, subtitled "Bunker Hill," and mentions the allusions to Greek mythology's god of war, but he misses the reference to popular lines from Shakespeare's "Julius Caesar," in the American version: "While all their hearts quick palpitate for havock, let slip your blood hounds nam'd the British Lyons." Louis Moreau Gottschalk is mentioned only for his favorable remarks on George F. Root's "Battle Cry of Freedom" (p. 131) and not for "The Union," his own contribution to the war effort and to bringing popular music into the concert hall. The dissemination of liberty and war songs receives limited attention, especially in the Civil War period, when publishing houses such as Root's made songs by Henry Clay Work and others readily accessible to middle-class households with a piano.

Bowman provides careful descriptions of songs, reprints many song texts, and compares the war songs to their antecedents in the English ballad and other musical traditions. A deeper probing into the context in which these songs served their wartime purpose would have provided a richer analysis.

BARBARA L. TISCHLER
Barnard College

FREDERICK F. SIEGEL. *The Roots of Southern Distinctiveness: Tobacco and Society in Danville, Virginia, 1780–1865*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 205. $22.00.

Born in 1822, the son of a straight-laced Methodist yeoman of modest means, William Sutherlin joined the discipline of his upbringing with the advantages of his education to become the most successful tobacco manufacturer in antebellum Danville, Virginia. Frugal, diligent, a teetotaler and a Mason, Sutherlin was also an avid promoter of industrial development and expanded economic opportunity. The greatness of America, he believed, was that it rewarded the hard working and made its aristocracy out of its mechanics.

Frederick F. Siegel sees a paradigm in the Sutherlin case and therein lies the central thesis of this book, a study of tobacco and society in Danville, Virginia, from 1780 to 1865. From this small place he derives a big idea. Turning Barrington Moore on his head, Siegel proposes that the South was bourgeois but not capitalist, for, while men like Sutherlin plumped hard for banks and roads and factories, they were doomed to frustration by the limited possibilities for development in the tobacco economy. This is an excellent thesis, but it would be even better if we simply replaced "tobacco economy" with "slave economy" in the last sentence. In that case Siegel's argument would be even stronger, but, as we shall see, it would not be Siegel's argument.

Although the volume is slim, the evidence is compelling. Danville's tobacco planters and manufacturers were forever concocting plans and investing in schemes to make their town and region a hotbed of economic growth. They always failed, but

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

their zeal never waned. And as time passed they picked up all the right ideas. They stood for active government in behalf of monetary stability and economic growth, for public schools, for temperance. They bought clocks and watches to keep track of precious time.

But Siegel explains all of this by resorting to the ecological determinism that once distorted U. B. Phillips's work and that now dominates studies of the colonial Chesapeake in a form called "staple theory." Phillips began with the weather; Siegel begins with the weed. But the pattern Siegel finds was common to the slave South, whether the crop was rice, cotton, or wheat. And, even in Virginia, as Alison Goodyear Freehling's recent book (not cited by Siegel) demonstrates, slavery was the guiding light of politics and ideology.

Fortunately, the strength of Siegel's analysis does not depend on its explanatory framework but on its quiet common sense. This is a good book.

JAMES OAKES
Northwestern University

RICHARD G. LOWE and RANDOLPH B. CAMPBELL. *Planters and Plain Folk: Agriculture in Antebellum Texas.* Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press. 1987. Pp. xvi, 216. $22.50.

This study is the latest of a series of books and articles by Randolph B. Campbell and Richard G. Lowe on the economic and social history of nineteenth-century Texas. Like Campbell and Lowe's earlier work, it is based primarily on quantitative sources, in this case samples from the 1850 and 1860 U.S. censuses and from Texas probate records.

After an introduction the authors provide a statistical survey of farm population and products, examine the distribution of resources and production among planters and farmers, and analyze the economics of antebellum Texas agriculture. In much of the analysis four geographical regions in Texas are compared. In addition they offer portraits of six farmers based on census and probate records in an effort to add some flesh and blood to their generalizations (slaves do not figure in the book except as agricultural property).

This book shares the virtues of its authors' earlier work. The data base is large, with some five thousand cases each from the 1850 and 1860 censuses; the sampling method is exemplary; the organization is logical and well thought out; the writing is clear. In addition Campbell and Lowe display their usual command of the literature on the economy of the antebellum South. The book is certainly the most thorough quantitative portrait of agriculture in a single southern state, and it stands alone as a comprehensive study of agriculture in antebellum Texas.

Still, the yield from this impressive research seems somewhat disappointing. Perhaps because the authors have rarely ventured beyond what are by now standard methods and questions, their results are not surprising. Thus, they find that agricultural wealth and production were very unequally distributed and that cotton growing was quite profitable. (In one revision of generally accepted data, they argue that slave prices, as determined from probate assessments and sales, were generally lower, especially in 1860, than previous researchers have found.)

Although there can be little argument with most of Campbell and Lowe's work here, there can be argument with the authors' failure to address in depth some important questions for which their data are well suited. For example, although their data indicate that between 20 and 30 percent of Texas farmers were tenants, they pay only slight attention to tenancy as an issue. Further, they do not address the debate about whether "yeoman" farmers in the antebellum South oriented themselves primarily toward market or household production. Here the book's tables offer contradictory evidence: a majority of nonslaveholders did not grow cotton before the Civil War, but the proportion who did grow cotton increased dramatically from 1850 to 1860. (Interestingly, a substantial number of slaveholding farmers also did not grow cotton.) Perhaps Campbell and Lowe will use their data to explore such questions in the future.

In sum this book is a solid, if not exciting, contribution to southern studies. It will be of interest primarily to specialists in the history of Texas and southern agriculture.

J. WILLIAM HARRIS
University of New Hampshire

JOHN ASHWORTH. *"Agrarians" and "Aristocrats": Party Political Ideology in the United States, 1837–1846.* (Royal Historical Society Studies in History Series, number 37.) Paperback edition. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. x, 325. $11.95.

The appearance of this 1983 volume in paper is one measure of its significance. It virtually completes the process of overthrowing the entrepreneurial interpretation of Jacksonian Democracy. Beneath the puffery of party rhetoric, in the older view, lay the real world of democratic capitalism—a world given over to material pursuits, interest-group politics, and a belief in the unplanned good of the whole. Taking party debate very seriously, by contrast, John Ashworth argues that "the basic nature of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American government and society" was at stake (p. 126). The confrontation of "agrarians" and "aristocrats" was at last "a clash of democracy and capitalism" (p. 131).

At the core of Democratic ideology was an "agrarian" belief in social equality for (white) men and the predilection for a relatively simple economy, the "natural" operations of which would forever sustain the relative equality of condition among citizens. Projected into the political arena, this equality armed the great mass with a defensive power against the designs of interested minorities to create "artificial" inequalities in society through such acts of partial legislation as banks, tariffs, and chartered privileges. Democratic equality opened the door to immigrants but, in league with the pervasive racism of the day, closed the door on Indians and blacks. The Whigs were "aristocrats." They supposed a natural inequality among human beings and embraced the elitist corollary of rule by the best. Policies for promoting economic enterprise constituted a valuable means for diversifying pursuits and drawing out more fully the range of talents and abilities. To the democratic appeal for equality of opportunity they joined a meritocratic vision of the good society. Their sense of hierarchy made the Whigs more sympathetic to blacks and Indians while it blunted the equalitarian appeal to immigrants.

While ascribing substance to Democratic and Whig differences, Ashworth also isolates elements within each party tending toward a reconciliation. In the wake of the Panic of 1837 conservative Democrats broke with Martin Van Buren's administration over its "agrarian" hard money policy; Whigs in the mold of William H. Seward, Thurlow Weed, and Horace Greeley explicitly linked support for enterprise to a more equalitarian view of society. Both groups clearly pointed toward the world of democratic capitalism, which the entrepreneurial school wrongly thought had arrived during the Jackonsian era.

Two things might have added to this very fine study. First, Ashworth could have brought the concept of republicanism more explicitly to bear on his analysis. Its language—virtue and self-interest, liberty and power, corruption and restoration—pervaded the rhetoric of party debate, yet his primary focus is on the way each party conceived of interests in the good society. Liberalism and republicanism mingled in the party ideologies, and more needs to be done with this mix of elements. Second, one can question the chronological limits of the study. Although the dialogue of parties did not mature until after the Panic of 1837, the lines of debate had assumed basic form during the tumultuous bank war. Extending the study to the end of the second party system in the 1850s might also have yielded more clues about the triumph of liberalism.

Despite these reservations, the present volume constitutes a new point of departure for further scholarship. Based on an extensive reading of political speeches, platforms, and the party presses, it follows the rather conventional approach of intellectual history, yet it reflects a broad command of relevant studies. Compact and well written, it will also appeal to the general reader.

MAJOR L. WILSON
Memphis State University

DAVID RAY PAPKE. *Framing the Criminal: Crime, Cultural Work, and the Loss of Critical Perspective, 1830–1900.* (Archon.) Hamden, Conn.: Shoestring. 1987. Pp. xviii, 255. $27.50.

Historians of American criminal justice have tended to approach the subject from too narrow and static a perspective, argues David Ray Papke in this original and intriguing study. Crime, he insists, is not a discrete social fact but the product of political labeling. In support of this thesis, he examines three forms of cultural conditioning—"reporting," "imagining," and "remembering"—that shaped public perceptions of criminality in the urban and industrial areas of the country during the nineteenth century. Conceptualizations that defined, or "framed," the antebellum criminal differed markedly, he suggests, from the criminal frames of the Gilded Age.

Modern crime reporting began in the 1830s, with the advent of the penny press. New York's leading newspapers—*The Sun* and *The Herald*—appealed to a working-class audience by developing a politicized journalism that was sharply critical of the police and the courts. Reporters regularly attended the city's police court, provided sympathetic profiles of accused laborers and clerks, and charged that a corrupt elite manipulated the institutions of criminal justice for its own purposes. George Lippard, Joseph Holt Ingraham, and other popular antebellum novelists likewise attacked the class bias that influenced the definition and punishment of criminal behavior. Even midcentury police officers, such as Edward Hartwell Savage and George Washington Walling, left memoirs that reflected an uneasy awareness of the link between social dislocation and the growth of crime.

As a mature industrial society arose after the Civil War, however, criminal frames became standardized commercial products that increasingly mirrored the values of the political establishment. The newspapers of the 1890s looked to police departments, rather than trial courts, as the primary sources of crime news and came to share police perspectives on crime control. Although the mass journals of Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hearst resembled their antebellum counterparts to some extent, they offered their readers only melodramatic accounts of violent crimes, with no accompanying political commentary. Popular detective novels and cheap crime thrillers reinforced the norms of the new industrial state by featuring professional crime solvers who worked within the system. A comparable emphasis on professionalism and "scientific" techniques of crime control dominated the later reminiscences of policemen and private detectives. By the turn of the century, Papke concludes, a depoliticized perspective on crime had been permanently planted in the public mind.

Although this monograph makes a valuable contribution to American studies, it raises far more questions than it answers. Papke's fictional analysis, in particular, is highly restrictive and thin, and his argument stops just prior to an era of muckracking journalism and criminal law reform that arguably reaffirmed the critical perspective of the antebellum years. To his credit, however, he has opened up some important new lines of research that imperatively call for further investigation.

MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD
Catholic University of America

LOUIS S. GERTEIS. *Morality and Utility in American Antislavery Reform.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1987. Pp. xvi, 263. $27.50.

This serious and difficult book narrows a gap. For many years studies of British antislavery have debated the relation of humanitarianism to capitalism. Until now studies of American antislavery have, for the most part, shunned this theme. Charles Beard and Mary Beard sixty years ago linked American abolitionism to the hegemony of northeastern commercial and industrial interests, but that viewpoint disappeared with the downfall of Progressive history. No new account of the relation between antislavery reform and economic change has arisen in its place.

Louis S. Gerteis discovers in antislavery writings a world view that he calls "utilitarian." The term may be confusing, since many antislavery leaders rejected Benthamite doctrines in ethics and psychology. This is not a study of philosophical influence, however, and Gerteis is able to show the importance to many antislavery leaders of "denationalizing" slavery and replacing it with a gospel of individual striving, family sentiment, economic growth, and moral progress.

There is complexity at every twist and turn of his exposition. Antislavery reformers appealed to the authority of the revolution, but in their commitment to "middle-class" entrepreneurial values they "transformed the meaning of the past they embraced" (p. 3). In discussing attitudes toward law, Gerteis stresses the reformers' early acceptance of common law and chancery decisions as instruments for "the promotion of entrepreneurial and manufacturing interests" (p. 11). When the consolidation of economic gains required a different legal outlook, a new goal—"the final subordination of equity jurisprudence to legal formalism"—assumed prominence in "the wider liberal agenda of which abolitionism was an essential part" (p. 50). Antislavery reformers never completely reconciled their recognition that democracy was correct in principle with their aversion to mass electoral politics. Although they believed the state should assume new responsibilities for economic progress, as well as for education and philanthropy, they feared the consolidation of executive power, which they associated with corruption and tyranny. "Contradictions" in the reformers' thought limited sympathy for freed slaves and hastened reconciliation with the erstwhile master class, although Gerteis seems uncertain in the end whether to emphasize the achievements or shortcomings of antislavery reform.

This is one of the most challenging studies of American antislavery thought to appear in a long time. But its argument is terse and cramped; evidence is highly selective. The discussion of some individual reformers is brilliant, but the reasons for focusing on these individuals are undisclosed. It is not even clear who is properly included in the key term "antislavery reform." The issues raised are always important, but the interpretations offered are sometimes questionable. To be more convincing, this book would need more examples, more discussion, more extensive consideration of the secondary literature, more leisurely exposition of its own categories. This is that rare book that really ought to be much longer.

LEWIS PERRY
Vanderbilt University

ROBERT L. MCCAUL. *The Black Struggle for Public Schooling in Nineteenth-Century Illinois.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. 1987. Pp. x, 193. $24.95.

Nineteenth-century Illinois was no racial haven. The white inhabitants of the territory came primarily from slave states, settling the southern portion of Illinois and then spreading to the northern region of the state. Southerners comprised two-thirds of the Illinois population prior to 1850. Only by the slimmest margins did the "land of Lincoln" remain free of slavery and loyal to the Union during the Civil War. In such an environment, blacks were scorned and despised. Starting from this sound premise, Robert L. McCaul examines the struggle of

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

blacks to attain one essential ingredient for the progress of their children and their race: a decent education.

Illinois whites of the nineteenth century generally opposed blacks' quest for public schooling, fearing that access to public education would bring white and black children together in the classroom and on the playground and lead to racial amalgamation. A more fundamental question for whites was whether or not blacks should be provided any education, even a segregated one. Illinoisans were in agreement with the arguments of Horace Mann, Henry Barnard, and others that common public-school education, supported by common public-school taxation, was necessary for the common good of the community, the state, and the nation. Blacks in Illinois, and throughout most of the nation, were seen as outside of this postulate. They were required to pay taxes that helped support public education, but they were not viewed as members of the community, entitled to public schooling, and whose progress, or lack thereof, affected the well-being of the whole.

McCaul gives a perceptive analysis of the tactics Illinois blacks employed to change this. Because they were isolated and excluded, Illinois blacks were not in a position to draw on arguments directed to the self-interest of the community. As McCaul shows, the arguments that they and their few white supporters made for their schooling were primarily philosophical, attempting moral suasion directed at the opposition's sense of piety and fair play and acclaimed reverence for the religious and patriotic precepts of the Bible and the Declaration of Independence. It was not until 1870, however, with the power of the suffrage, that black Illinoisans could garner and guarantee their right to public education, albeit largely segregated.

Further, McCaul discusses Illinois court cases and legislative enactments that had an impact on and were reflective of the prevailing color line in the state. He gives detailed attention to the Illinois Supreme Court case of *Chase v. Stephenson* (1874), a major precursor of *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896) and the national sanctioning of the infamous doctrine of "separate but equal."

This is a valuable study that students and scholars interested in the history of American education and the African-American experience will want to read.

DONALD SPIVEY
University of Connecticut

REGINALD HORSMAN. *Josiah Nott of Mobile: Southerner, Physician, and Racial Theorist.* (Southern Biography Series.) Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1987. Pp. 348. $35.00.

Reginald Horsman's latest book might be considered a sequel to his excellent study, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (1981). As that book considerably expanded our knowledge and understanding of its subject, so this absorbing and skillfully executed biography adds much to our knowledge and understanding of this important southern doctor, scientist, public figure, and key member of the antebellum "American school" of anthropology.

As William Stanton and John S. Haller argued in their respective valuable studies of science and race years ago, there were several schools of scientists in the nineteenth century whose members insisted that there was abundant evidence for the scientific "inferiority" of nonwhites to whites. Inevitably, these theorists of race emphasized white over black, as it were, far more than white "superiority" over all "other" races. And, as Stanton and Haller have suggested, the study of racial differences, compromised or not by racial bigotry, was related to other issues, such as separate versus single creation, the precise meaning of race or type, the relationships between hybridization and "racial" inheritance, the age of the earth, and so on. The views of Josiah Nott and fellow "scientific racists" were rooted in assumptions of ideas and activities that were endemic to the age.

Nott (1804–69) was born in Columbia, South Carolina, into a prosperous, well-educated family. After a presumably normal childhood he graduated from South Carolina College, a center of unorthodox views, at age twenty. He became a doctor after studying medicine at several locations, including Philadelphia and Paris. He established himself as a rising member of the Mobile medical community. A man openly atheistic, with a combative personality and supreme confidence in his ability to think and to debate, he became a noted member of Mobile society. In the 1840s his fame for his contributions to medical science made him into a noted medical scholar, especially on that dread disease, yellow fever. Horsman insists that Nott's work on yellow fever was probably the best any American doctor offered then and that his other work in medicine was also well regarded. In the 1840s he began to make public statements about race. Blacks, he argued, were inferior to whites. Initially, Nott knew relatively little about then-current scientific notions of race, but he was deeply racially prejudiced. That taint, Horsman insists, lasted with him until the end of his life. Eventually, Nott joined with members of the American school of anthropology, whose leader was Samuel G. Morton, a prominent Philadelphia physician who had just published the school's first book, *Crania Americana* (1839). Nott educated himself in this new field and became a major spokesman for it, especially after Morton's death in 1851. His

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

work was crucial to the American school's argument that whites and blacks had been created separately as distinct races, that whites were superior to blacks, that there was no possibility of intermingling (that is, hybridization and thus by biological means uplifting blacks to the status and worth of whites). Thus, Nott thoroughly approved of slavery and segregation. He argued they were congruent with the dictates of science. Nott was at least as interested in the scientific aspects as in the social policy parts of the new science, Horsman implies, for Nott was enthusiastically antireligious as well as profoundly convinced of the inferiority of blacks to whites. In the later 1850s Nott underwent some reversals of luck but also continued to practice medicine as expertly as before. He lived through the Civil War in Mobile, a loyal supporter of the Confederacy; the war essentially destroyed everything in which he believed. He moved north to New York, where he practiced medicine and witnessed, probably to his acute distaste, the growing support among scientists for Darwin's notions of evolution, which undercut his notions of separate creation. Horsman believes that Nott had contradictory values—those of humanitarianism in medicine and "scientific bigotry" in race relations. Yet Nott would appear conflictual only from a modern, not a contemporary, perspective.

Overall, this is an eminently worthwhile and useful book. Horsman has exhausted the available source materials and digested them well. He has an eye for detail that lends a great air of authority to the book. Horsman has written the book he intended to with great success and has made a useful scholarly contribution. He has added to our knowledge of the American school and the practice of medicine in nineteenth-century America and has given valuable clues as to the relations between science, medicine, and society in the first two-thirds of the nineteenth century. He has also written a keen and perceptive analysis of Nott as a person.

HAMILTON CRAVENS
Iowa State University

JAMES I. ROBERTSON, JR. *General A. P. Hill: The Story of a Confederate Warrior*. New York: Random House. 1987. Pp. xv, 382. $24.95.

Biographies of second-, third-, and even fourth-rank Civil War military figures have poured from the pens (and now the word processors) of historians ever since the conflict ended almost one and one-quarter century ago. Despite the flood of books, however, there are Civil War leaders whose stories have not yet been fully told. Until the publication of this fine study, Ambrose Powell Hill was a second-rank Confederate general whose role in the war had not been adequately covered.

Hill was born in Virginia in 1825 and graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1847. When his native state seceded in 1861, he resigned from the U.S. Army and was commissioned colonel of the Thirteenth Virginia Infantry Regiment. By the summer of 1862 he was a major general commanding a division in the Army of Northern Virginia. He was, in the words of James I. Robertson, Jr., that army's "best division commander" (p. 175). He played an especially conspicuous part in the fighting at Second Manassas and Antietam.

In the spring of 1863 Hill was promoted to lieutenant general and assigned to command the newly created Third Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. He held that position until April 2, 1865, when he was killed in the last fighting near Petersburg, Virginia. Like many Southern generals, Hill found it difficult to perform effectively above the level of command where he could exercise personal leadership, and his record as a corps commander was a mixed one.

Robertson's belief that Hill's health problems resulted from prostatitis—itself the result of a bout with gonorrhea in 1844—will provoke debate with those who believe that the gallant men in gray had no interest in sex. (Ironically, many of these people are members of the Sons of Confederate Veterans or the United Daughters of the Confederacy.) Other readers will applaud or denounce Robertson's treatment of Hill's role in this or that battle or his running dispute with "Stonewall" Jackson. Robertson, however, makes his points with fairness and sound scholarship.

Robertson's work is the second biography of Hill (the first, by William W. Hassler, was published in 1957). Robertson has used the vast amount of new material about the war that has become available since 1960, and he has uncovered some previously untapped letters, photographs, and other records. The maps in this book are especially useful and should serve as models for other biographies.

There are some minor problems with the book. Robertson's occasional use of exclamation points detracts from what is generally a very well written work. Sometimes Hill is lost in battle details and the actions of units far below his level of command. At such times it is not always clear whether Robertson is offering us a biography of Hill or a history of the corps that Hill commanded. (This is a problem that bedevils all biographers of Civil War military leaders.)

Overall, this is the best and fullest account of A. P. Hill that we are ever likely to have.

RICHARD M. MCMURRY
North Carolina State University

JOHN HALEY. *Charles N. Hunter and Race Relations in North Carolina*. (James Sprunt Studies in History and

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Political Science, number 60.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 352. $17.95.

The dual purpose of John Haley's study is to analyze the career of Charles N. Hunter and to refute the "myth that alleged that North Carolina was the best place in the world for blacks" (p. x). Born a slave about 1851, Hunter started out as an assistant cashier at the Raleigh Freedmen's Savings and Trust Bank in 1869, and from then until his death in 1931 he worked as a postman, internal revenue clerk, author, newspaper editor, waiter, labor recruiter, Navy Yard foreman (in Norfolk), teacher, and school principal. He was also a founder and lifelong supporter of the North Carolina Industrial Association, a frequent speaker at Emancipation Day celebrations, an amateur historian who hoped someday to write a history of blacks in the state, and a member of a black business league. Throughout his life he took an active interest in politics (although he ran only once for public office) and sought to maintain amicable relations with prominent whites, including Governor Charles Brantly Aycock and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels. Hunter hoped that whites would assist him and other blacks in improving their condition. Despite Hunter's efforts, the author argues, race relations in North Carolina were as oppressive and violently antiblack as anywhere in the South.

The study is at its best when it focuses on Hunter, who struggled with his own identity throughout his life: a spokesman for temperance who was fired from a teaching position for alcoholism; an accommodationist who, late in his life became increasingly strident; a community leader who became destitute; a Republican who supported Democrats; a propagandist for the state who emigrated to New Jersey (later to return). There are several sections that discuss at some length Hunter's inconsistencies and character flaws. The book also contains new material about black political leaders in North Carolina, the divisions within their ranks, and the efforts of some (including Hunter) to placate powerful white Democrats. But perhaps the study tries to do too much in arguing that race relations in North Carolina were the same as elsewhere. In fact, "race relations," as viewed in this study, are almost entirely confined to politics. The effort to survey racial politics over a period of more than six decades creates problems in organization and balance. In the book's strict chronological framework, some chapters contain very little information about Hunter, whereas others focus almost entirely on his activities. The result is a blurred picture of Hunter and a one-dimensional analysis of race relations. In addition, the author has relied almost exclusively on the Charles N. Hunter papers at Duke University and a scattering of newspapers and other writings. He would have probably profited greatly from investigations into the collections at the Library of Congress and National Archives, especially considering Hunter's federal positions, his efforts at the Jamestown Exposition in 1907, and his close ties with patronage appointees and political leaders.

LOREN SCHWENINGER
University of North Carolina, Greensboro

PETER WALLENSTEIN. *From Slave South to New South: Public Policy in Nineteenth-Century Georgia.* (Fred W. Morrison Series in Southern Studies) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 284. $27.50.

Over the course of its history, Georgia has searched everywhere for revenue. At various times the legislature has levied taxes against property, polls, sales, and corporations. Fortune tellers, lightning rod salesmen, Gypsies, and owners of dog and pony shows also have not escaped the clutches of the tax collector. Margaret Mitchell's *Gone with the Wind* tells us that even Scarlett O'Hara was almost bankrupted by the property tax of 1866 and was reduced to turning her curtains into a dress.

Such indignities have not endeared the tax collector to Georgians, and, perhaps for similar reasons, historians have paid little attention to the history of taxation in the state. Peter Wallenstein's book examines this neglected topic. But it does much more. It explores, in the author's words, "the intersection of social and political history" (p. 2)—the point where the government turns popular desires and mores into public programs, services, and reforms. Confining himself to the nineteenth century, Wallenstein also compares Georgia fiscal and public policy with those of nearby states and New York.

In 1800 Georgia offered its citizens little more than low taxes and a crude system of law and order. Not a cent of state money was spent on education or transportation; schools and passable roads were matters left to the whim of the counties. By 1860, however, there had been considerable change; the legislature was making periodic donations to elementary and higher education and had built a state railroad, a prison, an insane asylum, and academies for the deaf and the blind. Such reforms came not from tax increases but from the profits of the state railroad, from the sale of public land, and from federal grants to compensate for the cession of Georgia's western land claims. The Civil War shattered this system of tax-free public finance. When the struggle was over, the debt had doubled and the tax base had shrunk by two-thirds. The legislature drove up the property tax—hence, Scarlett O'Hara's

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

distress—and cut expenses. Even so, by the 1880s most social spending had been restored or expanded and included blacks on a segregated basis.

What is to be made of this? Wallenstein argues persuasively that, before the Civil War, Georgians were hardly wedded to the doctrine of laissez faire; on the contrary, they eagerly desired spending for social improvement as long as such expenditures did not involve higher taxes. He also maintains that by the 1880s social programs existed that presaged those of the Progressive era. Finally, Wallenstein sees little continuity between the periods before and after the Civil War. During Reconstruction the most significant break with the past came just after the conflict and not during the later Republican administration.

This is an insightful book. It is well argued and well researched, and it squeezes considerable sense from the arcanum of Georgia's tax records. Best of all, the book is written in clear and often felicitous English. It will serve as a model for similar studies of other states.

BARTON C. SHAW
Cedar Crest College

EDWARD LEO LYMAN. *Political Deliverance: The Mormon Quest for Utah Statehood.* Foreword by LEONARD J. ARRINGTON. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1986. Pp. x, 327. $22.95.

Shortly after the Mormons arrived in the Great Basin in 1847, they organized the state of Deseret and petitioned for its admission to the union—an attempt thwarted by the Compromise of 1850, which relegated the Mormon settlement to the lesser status of a territory named Utah. Thereafter, Mormon attempts to obtain statehood were foiled again and again, not to be realized until 1896.

Edward Leo Lyman sees polygamy as the main stumbling block to Mormon participation in the American political process and, by demonstrating how intricately and inextricably the Mormon question was tied to partisan politics, shows that acceptance could be accomplished only through political means. Both Democrats and Republicans, he argues, interpreted Mormon interference in politics selectively. As long as such interference was detrimental to the interests of one party, its outraged denunciations of Mormon theocracy reverberated in the halls of Congress and filled the pages of the daily press. Yet the beneficiary of such meddling was capable of casting a blind eye on some of the most flagrant acts of church interference in politics. Traditionally, Mormon leaders (and therefore the membership at large) had favored the Democrats in national politics, while at home a Mormon People's party faced an anti-Mormon Liberal party. Yet by the early 1890s it had become apparent that Mormons could achieve their goals only through the breakup of the local parties in favor of participation in the national parties—a transformation achieved with surprising speed in 1891. This new alignment worked to the clear advantage of the Republicans, who gained considerable Mormon support at the expense of the Democrats. It was a shift that enabled the Republicans to exert the necessary pressure to force the Mormons to make major concessions on polygamy, leading to Wilford Woodruff's "Manifesto" in 1890, which, although not initially intended as such, resulted in the ultimate demise of Mormon plural marriage and paved the way for Utah statehood in 1896. In order to get favorable publicity for their side, the Mormons established a sophisticated public relations apparatus, whose effectiveness was proved when the enabling act passed both houses of Congress with virtually no opposition—suggesting that most constituents had abandoned their apprehensions regarding Mormonism by 1896. At the same time, most Mormons accepted the propaganda of their leaders at face value, making it impossible for the church to retreat from a position that had been intended primarily for public consumption. Neither polygamy nor the political kingdom could be revived as politics in the state of Utah became secularized and Mormons joined the modern world of a pluralistic America.

Lyman sees his work as "offering a depth and breadth of detail . . . which allow a clearer view of the entire Mormon struggle for statehood than was previously possible," an assessment with which I fully agree (p. 306). The author has effectively used the wealth of new information that became available in the Mormon archives in the 1970s for an account that is nothing less than stunning. This book promises to remain a standard work for years to come and deserves the prizes it has garnered.

KLAUS J. HANSEN
Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario

ELLEN WEISS. *City in the Woods: The Life and Design of an American Camp Meeting on Martha's Vineyard.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. xv, 167. $22.50.

This is a delightful history of the design of Cottage City, a community composed of Wesleyan Grove and Oak Bluffs, a Methodist camp meeting ground and an adjoining resort on Martha's Vineyard in Massachusetts. Ellen Weiss's book stands as a fine study of one way idealistic Americans attempted to imbue built environments (such as urban parks, suburban single-family houses, or utopian communities) with large political and religious meanings.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The author expands our knowledge of the strong connections between enthusiastic religion and environmental design in the United States in the second half of the nineteenth century. Weiss also adds a detailed architectural history of the camp meeting cottage to the literature on American vernacular building.

Weiss introduces the campground's founders through the history of Methodism, showing how a small and persecuted sect became the largest denomination on the island of Martha's Vineyard by 1850. She explains the attraction the controversial camp meeting format held for many members of the Methodist Church and traces the physical design of camp meetings from the start of the nineteenth century in Kentucky. The special effects of evening illumination through fire altars, flickering candles, and moonlight are explored as a source of emotional energy, as well as the attractions of meeting sites approached by water. She probes the metaphor of tents as shelter in a religious encampment.

Wesleyan Grove, from 1835 on, was the camp meeting where Methodists cultivated all these spiritual enhancements to their greatest extent. By 1858 twelve thousand faithful were crowding into the grove for the Sabbath. They enjoyed the "sweet disorder" of "fanciful curves and mazy circles" in the radial-concentric plan (pp. 37–38). Between 1859 and 1864 the white tents were replaced with painted wooden cottages created by local carpenters. In 1880, with five hundred cottages in place, a major American monument had been created, a place that retains its charm to this day. Adjacent to the camp meeting site, commercial resort developers began the construction of Oak Bluffs in 1866. Many of S. F. Pratt's designs for larger houses incorporated ornament similar to that developed for the tiny camp meeting cottages. The two communities shared Circuit Avenue's commercial space, beginning in the 1870s, and together began to be called Cottage City, or the "city in the woods."

The author shows how visitors came to the campground to see ideal family life on display in the tiny wooden cottages. (More first-person accounts of life at Wesleyan Grove by ordinary inhabitants would have filled out the social history Weiss only suggests.) Visitors also admired the peaceful coexistence of economic classes, although eventually a jail and a police station became necessary. Weiss explores all aspects of building construction, but the book lacks the visual analysis she could have provided with architectural plans. Town plans and historic photographs, however, convey the sense of place quite well. One colored photograph might have represented the community's pastel seaside charms more effectively than some of the black-and-white photographs included. Some are excellent, but others are too dark to be of publishable quality. (This reinforces the book designer's unfortunate preference for a nostalgic rather than a crisp treatment.) But these are minor criticisms.

Weiss is adept at both high-style architectural history and the history of vernacular architecture. She has given us a loving account of a remarkable American place and of the religious ideals that inspired its wonderful design.

DOLORES HAYDEN
University of California, Los Angeles

DORIS WEATHERFORD. *Foreign and Female: Immigrant Women in America, 1840–1930*. Foreword by LILLIAN SCHLISSEL. New York: Schocken. 1986. Pp. xvi, 288. $19.95.

Doris Weatherford, a nonprofessional historian, has attempted to do in this volume what numerous scholars have also tried: namely, to write a synthetic history of the experience of immigrant women in the United States. Weatherford's work, based on an eclectic mix of sources, hopes to draw a composite portrait of immigrant women and the process of adaptation to American life. She has consulted some memoirs, some government reports, and a handful of letter collections, oral histories, novels, and sociological studies, and, through them, she considers the work and family experiences of these women. She clearly hopes that these particular sources offer her and her readers a glimpse of some of the more personal aspects of women's lives and allow her to generalize about the particular patterns of marriage, childbearing, and aging among the millions of women who migrated to the United States in the century under consideration here.

Weatherford, unfortunately, has been even less successful than the other writers, both professional historians and popular writers, who have tried their hand at this enormous topic. First, Weatherford seems to have absolutely no knowledge or awareness of the scholarly literature on immigrant women in general and, more important, on specific groups of immigrant women. Although no scholar has yet written a definitive analytic history of immigrant women, numerous studies of individual groups—Irish, Italian, East European Jewish—do exist and could have been exploited here. The rich literature produced by social historians of the last twenty years never informs this book, and its absence is reflected in the lack of any conceptual or analytic framework. Thus, the author fails to justify the selection of topics or sources and does not develop any overarching hypothesis or question to pull the multitude of details together. Furthermore, Weatherford falls into the trap of writing about some nonexistent generic group called "immigrant

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

women." She barely recognizes the vast cultural diversity within that amorphous body, nor does she take into account differences in economic patterns or variations in the structure of the various migrations. Weatherford, clearly enthusiastic about her subject, has tackled something beyond her and therefore produced a volume that will be of little use to general readers, let alone to scholars.

HASIA R. DINER
University of Maryland

GLORIA MOLDOW. *Women Doctors in Gilded Age Washington: Race, Gender, and Professionalization*. (Women in American History.) Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1987. Pp. xiii, 246. $24.95.

Focusing on Washington, D.C., between 1870 and 1900, this book is a thoughtful contribution to the history of female physicians in the United States. Gloria Moldow's story is one of "promise" and "disillusionment," as the several hundred women who came to the city seeking professional advancement experienced the opening of and then, by the end of the century, a decline in medical opportunities. The author's meticulous research into female professional networks allows her to paint a vivid picture of individual careers and various success strategies.

Although some of her findings confirm those of other recent historians, there is also some important new material. The presence in Washington of Howard University, which offered a coeducational medical course to both blacks and whites, allows Moldow to offer something no other history of female physicians has yet provided: an account of the social origins, professional training, and subsequent practice patterns of the city's black female physicians. She uses this material to good effect, fleshing out the consequences of black female physicians' double burden. She illustrates how white male physicians, in barring blacks and women from their medical societies, at first lumped issues of race and sex together but, when push came to shove, eventually allowed the "bonds of race and class" to prevail "over distinctions of sex" (p. 104). Sadly, racism also tarnished the efforts of white female physicians. They, too, excluded black women from their societies, while black medical organizations, no strangers to nineteenth-century theories of woman's place, shunned qualified female practitioners of their own race.

Following in the tradition of Mary Roth Walsh's *"Doctor's Wanted, No Women Need Apply"* (1977), Moldow concentrates primarily on the struggle of her subjects against sexism, racism, and discrimination. She is less articulate in depicting the complexities of ideology, self-image, and beliefs—factors that also motivated her women. Indeed, in this book "motive" usually means "ambition." Yet her study of the intricacies of professionalization is extremely suggestive, especially in light of other works, all of which have concentrated primarily on Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. Washington, D.C., where barriers were annoyingly successful, appears less congenial than elsewhere.

Perhaps one clue to the contrast lies in the fact that these other cities boasted at least one strong female-run medical institution (some had several)—be it hospital or medical school. Such an institutional base for young medical graduates may have spared them the vagaries of male whim in a fashion not possible for female practitioners in the nation's capital. Although Moldow herself is less sanguine about the positive results of female separatism, her book provides an important case study for further comparison.

REGINA MORANTZ-SANCHEZ
University of California, Los Angeles

MARTHA BANTA. *Imaging American Women: Idea and Ideals in Cultural History*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1987. Pp. xliii, 844. $50.00.

Martha Banta ends her fascinating, if overly lengthy, study of the types and signs that dominated American culture at the turn of the century with the question, "Can women who have been *looked at* for too long ever master the art of *looking back?*" (p. 688). As defined by the desires of men (especially artists and writers), ideas and ideals of woman represented the nation itself during a period that witnessed bourgeois anxiety over the growing diversification of American life. Thus, Daniel Chester French's *Republic* towered over the World Columbian Exposition as a symbol of majestic greatness. "The American Girl," whether in the prints of Charles Dana Gibson or the fiction of Henry James, portrayed innocence, while her racial type and class background excluded new immigrants and Afro-Americans from being "American." During the Spanish-American War, "The American Girl Battleship March" linked purity with nationalism; posters and statues of women embodied imperialism itself. Whether the Beautiful Charmer, the Outdoor Pal, the New Woman, the Hovering Angel, or the New England Woman, the American Girl defined American civilization. But rarely did actual women do the defining.

More cultural criticism than cultural history, the present book offers historians a new angle of vision and provides a concrete introduction to the semiotic techniques much in favor among literary critics. This is a history of iconographic forms, an interpre-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tation of the acts of creating and reading signs, that illustrates how sophisticated the analysis of images has become. Arguing that, "image-making and image-reading had become a major cultural activity, as well as the means for interpreting the nation's achievements and gauging its weaknesses" (p. xxviii), Banta draws on both high and popular culture and turn-of-the-century philosophy to analyze how culture makers associated images of types with the conduct of life and the inner soul. Prang drawing lessons, physiognomy books, Delsartian manuals of gesture, costumed tableaux, sheet music, poster art, and advertisements reveal the pervasiveness of images of women as types of the ideal.

Just when it appears that Banta has imposed categories on documents joined together only by the critic's eye, just when her loose treatment of chronology and the interventions of her own voice overwhelm the historical thrust of this cultural commentary, she grounds type in actual experiences. We view photographs from housekeeping magazines that show feminists posed as womanly women with "roses at the breast" (p. 71), thus reassuring their audience that suffrage was compatible with domesticity. Snapshots of Irma Purman (Banta), the author's mother, and her friends in a small Indiana town from 1897 to 1916 show the living out of types, even if their photographer posed his sitters and the sitters merely played at being the ideal head, kneeling angel, woman in trousers, consumers on display, or the New Woman. They acted out the formulaic gender switches of popular novels and the historical characters of tableaux.

While conventional signs locked women into images of male desire, Irma Purman and her friends could represent both threatening New Women and just fun-loving girls. Types, Banta sensibly reminds us, can be ambiguous. Thus, still lifes of women represent the ideal, but they also record women in the act of thinking. Types limited self-expression, but they allowed experimentation into one's "bottom-nature." The book's final image captures the ambiguity that adheres to signs, even when placed in their social context. Posing "going on vacation," Irma Purman looks ahead, ready to snap her own camera, and thus prefigures the image making of a new generation of women, to which her daughter belongs.

EILEEN BORIS
Howard University

JOYCE S. GOLDBERG. *The* Baltimore *Affair*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1986. Pp. xiii, 207. $19.95.

This is a modest but model monograph that closely examines the famous riot involving American sailors from the USS *Baltimore* outside the True Blue Saloon in Valparaiso, Chile, in October 1891—an episode that led to Chilean-American confrontation and a short but first-rate war scare. Although the incident, at least by twentieth-century standards, was and remains trivial, Joyce S. Goldberg convincingly demonstrates that it illuminates many significant dimensions of late nineteenth-century American foreign policy: among the more important, the influence of the press, the role of the new and burgeoning U.S. Navy, and the impact of the state of Anglo-American relations on other diplomatic questions. More important, she interprets the brawl in the streets of Valparaiso as evidence that the imperialist outburst of 1898 was not an abrupt departure from previous American practice but rather part of a continuum of aggressive, moralistic diplomacy. "In view of the *Baltimore* affair," she concludes, "that conflict [the Spanish-American War], emerges as considerably less a cause of the United States' new world status than an expression or affirmation of a power and role that the United States had achieved earlier" (p. 142).

The great strength of this monograph derives from the meticulous research that Goldberg has done in Chilean archives. It is abundantly clear, for example, that the United States and, in particular, its minister in Chile, Patrick Egan—a naturalized Irishman and certified Anglophobe who had fled Britain under threat of arrest for alleged crimes committed in behalf of Irish independence—had alienated the new revolutionary regime in Chile by their apparent support for the recently ousted government of José Balmaceda. To the Chileans, American policy seemed the result of the anti-British bias of Egan and Secretary of State James G. Blaine, who, so the Chileans thought, wanted to take control of Chilean commerce from Great Britain. Her research suggests that the incident flared to crisis when President Benjamin Harrison became personally involved (in part because of the illness of Blaine) and pressed the case against Chile because he accepted the intemperate charges that the U.S. Navy brought against Chilean justice and also because he saw an opportunity to improve his reelection possibilities in 1892. The navy, moreover, may well have regarded the short-lived crisis if not as an opportunity to test the new fleet in action at least as a chance to secure larger naval appropriations. But Goldberg's research in Chilean archives also demonstrates that miscalculations and procrastination by Chilean officials, the writing of a note that seemed a deliberate provocation, and the misguided temptation to stand up to the Colossus of the North were equally responsible for turning a street brawl into a Chilean-American confrontation. Its eventual resolution, it might be added, came when a new Chilean foreign minister "acquiesced so quickly that Har-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rison's ultimatum soon appeared anticlimactic" (p. 124).

But much of the evidence Goldberg presents does not totally support her continuum thesis. When Harrison, angered at the Chilean delay, turned the matter over to Congress in a message that amounted to an ultimatum, he received what was at best moderate support from the press. Democratic papers argued that Chile should not be humiliated, while their Republican counterparts "demonstrated little energy in supporting the action of the party's president" (p. 108). Congress, in turn, opted to postpone immediate action with requests for additional information, and the Foreign Relations Committee suggested careful deliberation and the need to avoid confusion by an instantaneous response. This suggests that there still remains some virtue in regarding 1898 as a significant point of departure and continuing to raise questions about the explanatory power of the concept of a seamless web of American expansionism in the late nineteenth century.

RICHARD D. CHALLENER
Princeton University

NORMAN POLLACK. *The Just Polity: Populism, Law, and Human Welfare*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 376. $29.95.

I once ended a preface to a study of Populism, without intending to be patronizing, by registering an "indirect debt" to Richard Hofstadter and Norman Pollack. These two intellectual historians had revived the subject, almost single-handedly, setting in motion an inquiry that would, it was believed, ultimately "culminate in a more meaningful understanding of Populism." Clearly Hofstadter's contribution, albeit a mountain at the time, was far less positive than that of the then much beleaguered Pollack. What goes around comes around. With this eloquent and important study, Pollack once again places himself at the center of scholarly discourse; in fact, he has given us a work (coupled apparently with yet another to come) that effectively closes a cycle of debate and reexamination that was set in motion nearly four decades ago.

The approach is familiar. Perhaps we might call it Hofstadterian, although Pollack describes it as "textual exegesis." Hofstadterian or exegetic, the critical analysis of selected Populist scriptures is brilliantly done and with a substantial difference: Pollack has effectively armed himself with more than two decades of additional thought and study. The end product should secure his preeminence on the list of Populism's interpreters.

The study's primary focus relates to the meaning of Populism in its own right and in the larger sweep of time: in particular, the movement's relationship to capitalism, socialism, and modernization. This of course has been at the heart of the debate since the 1950s. We have, in the last decade, made significant progress in our search for answers. It is this aspect that Pollack especially addresses and further develops. The terms he uses are quite illustrative: "two-tiered economic structure," "framework of democratic capitalism," "competitive capitalism," "antimonopolist capitalism," "nonprivileged capitalism," "transformative antimonopolism," to note just a few. Concisely stated, the main thesis is, "Populists intended . . . to construct an economy and a supportive culture of democratic capitalism, which would reject alternatively, monopolism and socialism" (p. 5).

Some may be disappointed that Pollack is reluctant to tie the movement firmly to any particular overarching tradition. Noting the voguish "republicanism" theme, in particular, he recognizes similarities, but his recognition is properly tempered by awareness of variety, crosscurrents, and an "ascending curve of radicalization." He does not mention but perhaps senses a descending curve, on the part of some Populists, representing deconversion. Others, southern historians especially, will likely not be pleased with his admitted "apparent severity" with southern Populism. His disagreement with C. Vann Woodward's thesis about two Tom Watsons, as well as his quarrel with the old assertion that southern Populism represented the more radical wing of Populism, will encounter resistance. He is probably on solid ground. Pollack concedes, incidentally, that he has not made the complete case. It is truly ironic, however, that Watson emerges from Pollack's study more closely resembling Hofstadter's portrait.

If Pollack was ever gone, he is indeed back. This book is our gain, and, with his forthcoming sequel, it would appear that, for now at least, we have just about reached the outer limits of clear insight. We now need to turn our attention to corporate-industrial America's response to Populism. Can anyone think of a scholar better suited for that vital study than Pollack?

GENE CLANTON
Washington State University

PAUL KLEPPNER. *Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics, 1893–1928*. (Contributions in American History, number 120.) New York: Greenwood. 1987. Pp. xv, 263. $35.00.

The Progressive era is among the most enigmatic American governmental periods. Not only are the wellsprings of policy change in the early twentieth century perplexing but also the character of voter behavior remains obscure. Paul Kleppner's book

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tackles the latter question with a general reconnaissance of the electoral realignment of the 1890s and its settling out process during the "fourth electoral system." But Progressive era voters were an elusive lot. They have resisted even Kleppner's practiced ability to ferret out the sociopolitical scent of popular politics.

Most of the author's conclusions are familiar. The depression of the 1890s triggered a reversal of Democratic fortunes, and the election of 1896 applied the *coup de grâce*. Thereafter (through the 1920s), partisan competitiveness and voter turnout declined in an electoral regime in which the ethnocultural mooring of partisan combat unraveled. Voting in the new era was more "secular" and more atuned to candidate personality, circumstances that contributed to short-term "electoral volatility." In some respects the book is an extended essay devoted to the proposition that a "critical realignment" did occur in the 1890s. Kleppner argues that a durable change in party election successes, not the mechanisms of coalition reconstitution, serves as the test of a genuine "realignment." The author has processed innumerable election returns and complementary indicators to corroborate this and other observations. This is his fourth extended pass over the battle of 1896 by my count.

The work explores understudied terrain but is doubly flawed, first on the intrinsic merits of the research design and second by its external validity. Kleppner's empirical case rests on state, regional, and national aggregations of presidential and congressional county-level election returns. He justifies his additive approach to this restricted sample on grounds that state "electoral and governmental systems are integral parts of [a] national system of action" (p. 29). The proposition misconstrues the American polity, which has never been a unified politicolegal entity, despite commonalities in some election outcomes. Kleppner summarizes the broad partisan directions of these victories but merely surmises the dynamics that produced them. Absent from the study is the microanalytic design needed to tease out how politicians reached out to touch voters and how the electorate reacted to these cues and governance in the new era.

Kleppner's likely rejoinder is that voter motivation is an issue separate from the empirical structure of voter coalitions and that partisan outcomes affect "future policy." Elections, in short, are guides to governance. The argument is specious and unsubstantiated. One studies policy by studying policy, not elections, which may have (and often had) little to do with the way public decisions are made and implemented. Even the contention that the few bona fide voter realignments provoked abrupt shifts in policy direction rests on an unconvincing evidentiary base focused on party voting in Congress. And, whatever the determinants of national policy, most law was not made, now or historically, by federal legislators. The electoral school of American history needs to rethink its subject. Just what are the functions of elections in America?

BALLARD C. CAMPBELL
Northeastern University

MARY KLACHKO. *Admiral William Shepherd Benson: First Chief of Naval Operations*. Foreword by ARLEIGH A. BURKE. Assisted by DAVID F. TRASK. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute. 1987. Pp. xviii, 268. $24.95.

William Shepherd Benson is often remembered as the man Josephus Daniels chose to be the first chief of naval operations because he had opposed the formation of the office and did not want a strong leader such as Bradley Fiske, to many the natural choice, to occupy it. This reputation is unfortunate, and historians' neglect of Benson unjustified. Mary Klachko corrects this oversight with a well-balanced biography based on extensive research in both family and official records.

After briefly tracing Benson's early career, the author describes his role in preparing the navy for World War I, his participation in various naval conferences and the Paris Peace Conference, and his attempt to create a strong American merchant marine during the 1920s. As chief of naval operations, Benson was caught between a hostile Daniels, who feared a diminution of civilian control over the military, and strident reformers, who believed that he did not strongly press the needs of the navy for increased appropriations and a more centralized administrative structure. Wilsonians generally opposed preparedness before American entry into the war because they feared that belligerents would view any American build-up as unneutral.

During the war Benson had to balance demands by William S. Sims, U.S. naval representative in London, for closer adherence to British naval desires against what Benson believed to be American self-interest. Benson, like his counterparts in the British navy, rejected Sims's belief that American and British interests were identical or even complementary during the war and the subsequent peace conference. As a student of Alfred Thayer Mahan, Benson understood the close connection between naval and mercantile power, insisted that the United States must have a balanced fleet equal in strength to Britain's, and viewed with alarm British moves, even before the war was won, to reassert its commercial dominance in Latin America.

The author's focus is on policy issues rather than administration, and, except for a brief chapter on the reforms of the office of the chief of naval operations in 1919, there is little on the establish-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ment or operation of the office. Benson emerges from this study as a quiet, unassuming, but extremely competent administrator, whose forceful views on naval policy stemmed not from Anglophobia but from a deep sense of nationalism and a clear grasp of the needs and responsibilities of the U.S. Navy. Fiske may have overshadowed Benson as an agitator for reform, and Sims have gained more publicity during the war, but the author shows clearly that it was Benson's ability to work within the difficult political setting that made the office of chief of naval operations a success.

JAMES C. BRADFORD
Texas A&M University

MICHAEL M. SOKAL, editor. *Psychological Testing and American Society, 1890–1930*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 205. $28.00.

This collection of essays is more about psychological testers than psychological testing and does not do enough to link the testers to the broader society. But it is a very useful starting point for a fuller history of the testing phenomenon in American culture in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Essays on James McKeen Cattell (by Michael M. Sokal), Henry Herbert Goddard (Leila Zenderland), Robert M. Yerkes (James Reed), and Lewis M. Terman (Henry L. Minton) are supplemented by discussions of the rise of the multiple-choice concept (Franz Samelson), the clash between Yerkes and Walter Dill Scott over how to test servicemen during World War I (Richard T. von Mayrhauser), and the Ohio Bureau of Juvenile Research, where Goddard played the key role (Hamilton Cravens). Sokal adds a brief introduction that tries to place the volume in the context of the contemporary debate over the character and legitimacy of testing.

The essays are almost uniformly of great interest to students of the history of medicine, psychology, and education. They tell us a great deal about the key figures in the growth of mental testing and frequently suggest avenues for further research. At the 1893 World's Fair, for instance, Joseph Jastrow, with support from Franz Boas, Frederic Ward Putnam (curator of Harvard's Peabody Museum), and an army of graduate student volunteers, gave mental tests to thousands of visitors (he singled out foreigners) and to the Indians who had been brought in for display. It would be fascinating to know what he asked and what he thought his results established.

But, like many collections, this one suffers from a repetition of information and a meandering analytical line. For example several of the essays address the place of World War I in the careers of the testers and the spread of testing, but none—not even von Mayrhauser's—gives a full account of this pivotal question. We want to know how significant the testers were to the war effort and how important the war effort was to the development of testing. Several of the authors give us vital remarks about these big questions—including Reed's report that the testers refused to throw out thousands of tests by GI's who got zeroes by not trying. Putting those results into the final tally produced a skewed finding, which of course still sounded like music to eugenicists, nativists, and other preachers of racial doom. And von Mayrhauser gives us a fine treatment of the conflict between Scott's psychological, group-oriented approach to efficient mobilization and Yerkes's psychiatric, individual-oriented fixation on the diagnosis of mental deficiency. But no one synthesizes the whole issue of testing and the war.

One collection cannot do everying, but noting what the volume does not do is a useful way of highlighting what it does do. Like the World War I testers themselves, the authors do not inquire into the cultures of the test takers; this is supply-side cultural history. Nor do they trace the spread of testing from the army to public schools. Samelson does inform us that by 1921 a dozen group intelligence tests had measured the intelligence of almost two million soldiers and over three million children, but we need to know what proportion of children was tested by whom under what conditions in which states for what purposes. It seems possible that, while the idea of testing may have had a significant place in public debate, the practice of testing may not have had a comparable place in the lives of schoolchildren. Perhaps Reed is right that "mental testing flourished because it helped the American school to be both a comprehensive and a differentiated institution: the tests squared American ideals of equality of opportunity with a social structure that resembled a pyramid" (p. 77). But that promising speculation needs to be rooted in evidence of institutional enactment.

The collection might also have given more systematic attention to the critics of testing, some of whom—Hugo Münsterberg, Clark Wissler, Walter Lippmann, and John Dewey—are mentioned in passing. Lippmann and Dewey made especially effective responses to the hereditarian assumptions of the testers, Terman in particular. One of the best essays in the book is Henry Minton's piece on Terman, who as a child in Indiana in the 1890s was himself tested by a vagabond book peddler who doubled as a phrenologist. After surveying the impressive bumps on Terman's head, he predicted a great future for him. Minton notes that mental testing enabled a liberal progressive such as Terman to try to reconcile inherited notions of equality with hierarchical and hereditarian assumptions. Equality meant providing each individual with the resources

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to develop his or her native endowment, and that endowment could be measured by the intelligence test. Dewey was right to insist that Terman's viewpoint was reductionist in its equation of intelligence with "abstract thinking." The further question, as Samelson notes, is whether mutliple-choice testing could even give an accurate index of abstract reasoning.

In a few passing sentences Samelson also makes the vital point that grasping the role of testing in American society demands a comparative viewpoint that the volume in fact avoids. Samelson claims that multiple-choice testing was not an inevitable product of bureaucratic growth, since "European systems have not utilized such methods at all, at least not until long after the culture of Camels and Coke had conquered the world" (p. 123). That assertion leaves much to be desired in its chronological ambiguity, but it does suggest that comparative analysis is essential. This collection makes an impressive start by elucidating the careers of the main actors in American testing and by pointing to the many crucial questions that remain.

RICHARD WIGHTMAN FOX
Reed College

ERIC HOMBERGER. *American Writers and Radical Politics, 1900–39: Equivocal Commitments.* New York: St. Martin's. 1986. Pp. xiii, 268. $25.00.

Eric Homberger's new book is a work whose imaginative reach far exceeds its grasp. The book purports to examine three generations of literary radicals—those reaching maturity in 1900 and shaped by the struggle to create a Socialist party, the generation that came of age with *The Masses* and was increasingly attracted to left-wing political commitments, and the writers shaped by the period of Communist predominance in the 1930s—and to analyze the experience of representative writers in each. Homberger simultaneously locates the impulse for literary radicalism in the political and ideological environment of each generation, clearly a social phenomenon, and, in the realm of feeling and human sympathies, more aptly an individual one. Homberger fails to present a vision of the literary Left substantially different from that of Daniel Aaron, Walter B. Rideout, or James B. Gilbert. And the absence of an introductory chapter and a conclusion and the tangential nature of much of the appendix material to the book's arguments reveal the rudderless nature of Homberger's critical enterprise.

Homberger devotes most of his attention to analyzing his subjects' literary work and often neglects the political and cultural forces that shaped their generations. Thus, his selection of subjects seems arbitrary, and their representative nature questionable. Jack London is chosen to represent the first generation, which appealed to a "larger community of moral and ethical values which transcended class division" (p. 5). But Homberger himself distinguishes London from his generational cohorts Jacob Riis and Upton Sinclair by his decision to live among the slums and admits that London was far more skeptical and nihilistic regarding socialism than his peers. No other leading contemporary literary radical shared London's passion for simultaneous commitments to Social Darwinism and socialism. And John Reed is atypical of *The Masses* generation in his active participation in the Bolshevik revolution and his subsequent efforts to organize an American Communist party. Although both he and Edmund Wilson are selected to represent their generations, both are distinguished by their advocacy of American exceptionalism, the heretical belief that unique historical conditions exempted America from inevitable class conflict and revolution. And the Objectivists, who are the focus of the final chapter, were a slender minority without much audience or literary influence. Although Homberger's book has moments of originality and insight, as in his comparison of the urban imagination of Reed and Ezra Pound, it lacks thematic coherence. It is an example of the case study method run amok, of symbols without referents, and of an author unwilling to impose intellectual order on his material.

LESLIE FISHBEIN
Rutgers University

EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ. *Disabled Policy: America's Programs for the Handicapped.* (A Twentieth Century Fund Report.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. xiii, 280. $24.95.

The double entendre of Edward D. Berkowitz's title is soberly intended; he aims to trace the history of America's programs for the handicapped while rendering severe judgment on their nature. Berkowitz has an even broader goal: believing that history "can help to guide reform" in policy making (p. 226), he offers suggestions for the improvement of disability policy.

In a lean and lucid narrative, Berkowitz traces from the Progressive period to the present the laws culminating in the current pattern of over one hundred "anachronistic and uncoordinated programs" (p. 227). The legislative and administrative burdens have been enormous and complex, because the category of the handicapped—unlike the decisive determinant of age—includes such a broad range of permanent and temporary, severe and moderate, disabilities. Public understanding of the place of the handicapped in society has evolved

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from an earlier sense of separation, both sympathetic and suspicious, to a recent acceptance of the civil rights of the handicapped minority, which deserve respect and helpful adjustments. State-federal tensions, conflicts between administrators of varying educational specialties, contrary decisions by bureaucrats and judges, and pressures of social need balanced against costs all play a role in the complicated determination of disability policy.

The ameliorative response to disability, Berkowitz states, came in two generations of programs to maintain income, workmens' compensation through state laws beginning in the Progressive period, and federal disability insurance, a 1956 addition to the New Deal Social Security structure. Two generations of corrective responses have aimed at improving the ability of the disabled to work, a modest vocational rehabilitation program in the 1920s, and more vigorous recent efforts, supported by federal laws of the 1970s and 1980s, lobbied for by the organized handicapped using arguments of earlier minority groups seeking improvement of their civil rights. Recent laws have also decreed removal of architectural barriers hampering access by the handicapped. Mainly in this realm lie Berkowitz's policy recommendations: support for the disabled in their efforts to create independent living programs and to work productively. He also urges greater emphasis on prevention of workplace accidents and a joint effort by legislative and executive branches to "consider disability policy as a whole, not little pieces of it" (p. 234).

The research for this excellent book is extensive, including documents from the personal records of congressmen and from the private archives of congressional committees and oral history interviews with members of Congress, members of their staffs, officials administering the assorted laws, and many citizens from the ranks of the disabled. Vivid case histories illumine and enliven the book. Perhaps more quotations from debates in Congress and from committee hearings might have added greater flavor to the narrative.

JAMES HARVEY YOUNG
Emory University

ELIZABETH FEE. *Disease and Discovery: A History of the Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health, 1916–1939*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 286. $30.00.

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times. So could it be said of American public health in the first decade of the twentieth century. Advances in sanitary engineering and the advent of bacteriology were making it possible for public health workers to prevent or greatly reduce the toll from some of the nation's worst scourges, including typhoid fever, diphtheria, and tuberculosis. But, at the same time, in most cities the public health department was a part of the political spoils system, and appointments were made on the basis of whom one knew rather than what one knew.

The challenges confronting the nascent profession of public health were examined by a small group of public health representatives and philanthropic executives at a conference held in 1914 in the offices of the General Education Board of the Rockefeller Foundation. In this and subsequent discussions, the nation's public health leaders raised basic questions that remain unresolved today. What should be the relationship between public health and medicine? Should schools of public health concentrate on producing new knowledge, or should they provide practical training for administrators and laboratory and field workers? Should public health take a biomedical approach to disease, or should it give equal weight to the economic, environmental, and social determinants of illness?

In practical terms the most important question to be considered was which university would house the nation's first degree-granting school of public health. "By far the most developed and successful model for public health training at that time was the School for Health Officers run jointly by Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology" (p. 31). However, the Rockefeller Foundation was persuaded by Abraham Flexner, whose recent report on American medical education was having an enormous impact, and William Henry Welch, the leading "statesman" of scientific medicine, to select Johns Hopkins, whose medical school Flexner and Welch regarded as the archetype of scientific medical education.

The schools' supporters have argued ever since about the wisdom of this decision, and Elizabeth Fee contends that there is little to be gained in continuing the old academic battle between Harvard and Hopkins. But, in light of the fact that Greer Williams has forcefully argued that the Harvard-MIT school offered a superior model of public health education and has asserted that the adoption of an elitist, bioscientific model was a grievous error that led to the undoing of schools of public health, Fee's reticence to enter the fray is disappointing. More is involved here than whether or not Harvard was ill treated, and the reader would like to know Fee's thoughts on the matter.

Fee follows the school's development through the beginning of World War II. She describes the faculty's many important research contributions but fully acknowledges the school's failure to realize all of its educational goals. A changing social environment led to the adoption of some innovative programs, a theme Fee plans to explore more fully in a

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

subsequent volume dealing with the post–World War II period. Fee has written a highly readable and informative book based on extensive archival research.

STUART GALISHOFF
Georgia State University

SUSAN MCINTOSH LLOYD. *The Putney School: A Progressive Experiment.* New Haven: Yale University Press. 1987. Pp. xiii, 276. $27.50.

Susan McIntosh Lloyd's fascinating story of the Putney School's first thirty years underscores the dedication and perseverance of Carmelita Hinton, a remarkable social reformer in the history of American education. Hinton's enthusiasm and vision of a utopian community were part of a great Progressive experiment in the United States. She knew some of the major figures of the Progressive movement—for example, John Dewey and Jane Addams. The Putney School was, in Dewey's words, "child-centered," a school where progressive ideas were not merely debated but translated into reality. The school program tried to erase the lines between schooling, education, and life. "The main thing was learning how to learn" (p. 79). Hinton's enthusiasm and vision helped build the foundation of a unique school.

Her unconventional ideas deviated from the historic rules of school administration and often sparked controversies among teachers and staff. She often consulted with favorites around her and sometimes abruptly stopped conferring with others whose expertise and efforts were essential to the success of the school. Until 1949 the Putney School was successful under Hinton's leadership. Then, during the 1948–49 school year, some experienced teachers raised questions concerning school governance and pointed to problems in personnel practices that had been increasing for a decade (issues, for instance, over appointments, salary structure, and tenure). When Hinton refused to relinquish her authority and control over school matters and to change her administrative policies, the teachers organized and formed the Putney Faculty Association, a labor union. Bitter confrontations between Hinton and the association led to a teachers' strike, and the school community gradually drifted further apart.

The institution that emerged after the strike of 1949 was stronger and sustained an extraordinary variety of teachers and staff, which had been the main strength of the school from the beginning. Benson Rockwell replaced Hinton in 1955, and, bolstered by a new corporate structure, Hinton's utopian experiment became a noteworthy institution. The primary purpose of the school did not change significantly under Rockwell's leadership, which encouraged innovation and individuality. The school maintained its original goal of a progressive education.

Lloyd's "biography" of the Putney School and of Hinton adds an important chapter to the history of American education. Established in 1935 in rural Vermont, the Putney School became an influential preparatory school and a powerful example of Progressivism in secondary education.

S. ALEXANDER RIPPA
University of Vermont

ROBERT C. WILLIAMS. *Fordson, Farmall, and Poppin' Johnny: A History of the Farm Tractor and Its Impact on America.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 232. $24.95.

With the farm equipment industry in the doldrums, victim once again of yet another farm crisis, there has been renewed interest about whether this highly cyclical industry can continue to survive in its existing form. This book provides insight into the historical roots of this problem. After a brief introduction on the antecedents of agricultural technology, Robert C. Williams provides a chronological description of the growth of the tractor over its twentieth-century evolution. There is an excellent section on the development and significant impact of the Fordson tractor, perhaps even overemphasized in its relationship to International Harvester and Deere. The latter two companies were the exemplars of the "row crop" tractor, the general-purpose machine that revolutionized the farmers' use of this equipment; the book's coverage here is excellent. In this section Williams also develops the critical link between the tractor and its tillage tools. Discussion of the recent period is somewhat sketchy, and there is only brief mention of the traumatic shake out in the industry in the past decade (International Harvester is no longer even a name in the tractor world!).

The last three chapters turn to the role of the tractor in society, and Williams's linking of social and economic consequences is provocative. The section on tractor safety is helpful, for this subject is often skirted. Williams views with some alarm the dominance of high-technology mechanization; this argument is overly truncated and not as persuasive. Nevertheless, this is an important piece, well documented and deserving its place as a serious source book for one of the most important segments of American agriculture.

WAYNE G. BROEHL, JR.
Dartmouth College

JOHN F. BAUMAN. *Public Housing, Race, and Renewal: Urban Planning in Philadelphia, 1920–1974.* Philadel-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

phia: Temple University Press. 1987. Pp. xvi, 278. $34.95.

Philadelphia, like Chicago and New York City, has become an exemplar of urban development, thanks to the work of such scholars as Sam Bass Warner, Mark Haller, Allen F. Davis, and Theodore Hershberg. John F. Bauman has added to the accumulated store of knowledge with this account of the reasons for the sad state of public housing in the City of Brotherly Love. The book does more, however. Although resembling Arnold R. Hirsch's *Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940–1960* (1983), it takes a broader and longer view of the development of a rigidly segregated northern city. Although both Chicago and Philadelphia arrived at the same destination, they took different routes.

Bauman traces the changes in public housing using a typology based on differing ideological positions on the purposes of such housing. One group, professional "housers," so-called by Gwendolyn Wright in her *Moralism and the Modern Home* (1980), had the primary goal of eliminating slums, while communitarians, although wishing to improve housing, had as their main aim to restore moral order. The history of public housing in Philadelphia was one of a struggle between these two positions, a struggle finally won by the housers.

The book is a chronological account of the development of public housing in Philadelphia, viewed from ideological, political, economic, and design perspectives. It begins with the ideas of Ebenezer Howard and Clarence Perry as well as the establishment of the Philadelphia Housing Association in 1909. After a quick survey of this foundation, the book describes the impact of the New Deal on the city's public housing. At that time the prevailing assumption was that public housing would be a temporary refuge for worthy tenants, white or black. Despite that assumption, political opposition and white resistance presaged a trend for greater black participation. World War II saw a retreat from public commitment as national and local policy opted for privatism, austerity, and poorly built temporary facilities.

By 1950 blacks in Philadelphia, attracted by wartime industries from the South, constituted the third largest such community in any American city, although they did not yet live in a rigidly segregated ghetto. A ghetto did emerge in the 1950s because of postwar economic development and federal policy in the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954, which emphasized destroying slums and revitalizing the central city through rebuilding. These emphases, along with white resistance and federal foot dragging on racial integration, meant public housing increasingly consisted of high-rise buildings occupied by poor blacks displaced by urban renewal. The trend was not changed in the 1960s when public housing grafted more social services onto its original mission and took in "problem families." By the 1970s public housing had become a warehouse for poor, black, often female-headed families sustained by public assistance.

Bauman's book paints a dismal picture of the consequences of timid leadership, political manipulation, racism, and short-sighted economy for public housing. Though well-researched and informative, it is, unfortunately, not an exciting book to read, since its pages are cluttered with a large number of unfamiliar alphabet agencies and names. For the persistent reader, however, it is rewarding.

DWIGHT W. HOOVER
Ball State University

WAYNE F. COOPER. *Claude McKay, Rebel Sojourner in the Harlem Renaissance: A Biography*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 441. $29.95.

This thoughtful, probing, and clearly written work is a superb addition to biographical studies of major black intellectuals of the twentieth century. Wayne F. Cooper's dynamic study of Claude McKay (1890–1948) offers a convincing picture of his subject in both public and private dimensions and places a complex life in the context of the times, ideas, and issues that shaped it.

From the moment of McKay's birth in Jamaica, his life was filled with complexities and inconsistencies. His proud, contentious, dark-skinned peasant family had high hopes for his generation's economic and social mobility, hopes that ran counter to the country's economic stagnation and rigid color and class system. Although McKay's years as a boy and young man left him with a lifelong love for rural Jamaica and its black peasantry, they also bequeathed an education that caused him, for a time, to regard himself as a "little black Briton." He repudiated this definition early in adulthood, but his poetry always reflected the heroic sentimentalism of Victorian England. A man of intense sexual passion who was briefly married and throughout his life attracted to women, he also had numerous male lovers. A restless quester for adventure, new experiences, and personal freedom, McKay was continuously dependent, practically and psychologically, on a succession of patrons.

After McKay left Jamaica in 1912 for the United States, he never returned to his native land. Through his early poetry and the later writings that reflected on his youth, however, he earned a place as a pioneer in the establishment of an indigenous West Indian literary tradition. Following brief, un-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

happy stints as a student at Tuskegee Institute and Kansas State College, he settled in New York City, where, between 1914 and 1922, he emerged as one of the major contributors to the Harlem Renaissance.

Because McKay's poems and political essays appeared in radical journals such as the *Liberator*, the *Negro World*, and the *Workers' Dreadnought* and because he collaborated in the journalistic and political activities of leading black and white leftists, he was also identified as a significant voice of the American Left. The appearance in 1919 of McKay's poem, "If We Must Die," signaled his solidarity with American radicals "who looked to Communism as the answer to the quest for true freedom." Although he spent a lifetime trying to understand and challenge race and class oppression, he ultimately repudiated Soviet Communism. The most significant and consistent aspect of McKay's radicalism was the "fierce, unswerving loyalty he demonstrated toward the 'common people' of his race, a loyalty that amounted to an incipient black nationalism and that seemed to contradict other aspects of his thought" (p. 101).

McKay's position as a major spokesperson for the "New Negro" was consolidated by the appearance of his two major novels, *Home to Harlem* (1928) and *Banjo* (1929). These works, richly informed by his emotional and intellectual experiences with international Communism and socialism (McKay lived in the Soviet Union for a year) and in the interracial bohemian communities of Great Britain, France, Spain, and North Africa, had a "profound, catalytic effect" on young French West Indian and West African writers and intellectuals.

In 1934 lack of money and the indifference of the reading public to McKay's writings forced a return to the United States, where he was compelled to accept a series of poorly paid, demeaning, and uncongenial jobs. In 1944 he joined the Roman Catholic Church, attracted by its hostility to Communism and the courtesies and kindnesses he had received from the Catholic laity he met through the Friendship House movement. McKay's conversion redirected rather than softened or eliminated his assaults on racism and class oppression. As a Catholic poet and writer, he was often a contentious and bitter critic of his new religious community, while continuing to offer trenchant analysis and biting commentary on American politics, culture, and race relations.

Cooper's impressive integration of fresh information, thoughtful interpretation, and informed speculation makes this book the definitive biography of McKay. One of the work's greatest strengths is the sensitive balance and insight the author brings to his discussion of the psychological dimensions of McKay's public and private behavior.

ALFRED MOSS
University of Maryland

SARA ALPERN. *Freda Kirchwey: A Woman of the Nation.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 319. $27.50.

Freda Kirchwey was a leading participant in the intellectual discourse that characterized the liberal-left in America from the 1920s through the McCarthy era. Kirchwey joined the staff of *The Nation* in 1918. She wrote on a range of social issues that reflected the emergence of a modern ethos, including sexual freedom, birth control, and the right of women to both family and career. In 1937 Kirchwey purchased *The Nation*, and, as owner, editor, and publisher through 1955, she addressed the far-reaching political issues that were reshaping the modern world.

Sara Alpern's biography attempts to combine two major themes: the interrelationship between Kirchwey's public and private life and her involvement in the political causes of the liberal-left. It is not an entirely successful undertaking, perhaps because the two themes seem to correspond to entirely different periods in Kirchwey's life. The result is that Alpern's account reads like two different stories: one of a "New Woman" of the 1920s and 1930s, struggling to make a career for herself in the midst of family responsibilities; the other of a beleaguered journalist, shaping public opinion and courageously challenging conventional wisdom.

The first several chapters of Alpern's book focus on the "women's issue" both as it emerged in Kirchwey's own life and as she expressed it in her work. Kirchwey's marriage was less than satisfactory, according to Alpern, and her parenthood was tragic. She had three sons, but one child died in infancy, and her second son, Jeffrey, died after a long bout with tuberculosis. Alpern makes the connection between these personal trials and Kirchwey's efforts to find herself intellectually and professionally. A series in *The Nation*, "These Modern Women," which was published in 1926–27 under Kirchwey's editorship, tried to provide answers to the New Woman of the 1920s. As Alpern points out, the writers represented in the series downplayed their domestic lives—"Marriage was either dismissed cavalierly or praised briefly" (p. 62)—and, indeed, although Kirchway did not contribute to the series herself, she too did not place family at the center of her concerns, especially after the death of her second son.

The tone of the book changes when Alpern focuses on Kirchwey's career from the mid-1930s

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

through her leave taking from *The Nation* in 1955. Alpern takes us step-by-step through the ideological struggles and moral dilemmas of the liberal-left during these years. Kirchwey had the courage to take unpopular stands—sometimes even in opposition to her colleagues. For instance she lost the support of her former editor, Oswald Garrison Villard, when she favored Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing plan. Her most difficult period came after the war, when she defended the policies of the Soviet Union, lost the support of many contributors, and eventually resigned her position at *The Nation* in the midst of a financial crisis. The remainder of Kirchwey's life was anticlimactic as she struggled with ill health and emotional depression that brought an end to her intellectual productivity.

Kirchwey's last years with *The Nation* are well documented, but the narrative is uneven, fragmented by the number of often unrelated issues that Alpern describes. Nonetheless, the author has rescued from obscurity a woman who once cut a wide swath across the cultural landscape of twentieth-century America.

WINIFRED WANDERSEE
Hartwick College

MAURINE H. BEASLEY. *Eleanor Roosevelt and the Media: A Public Quest for Self-Fulfillment*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 240. $24.95.

This work is a sensitive and thoughtful analysis of several issues connected with the career of Eleanor Roosevelt, ranging beyond those suggested in the title. Maurine H. Beasley demonstrates that Roosevelt used the media in a struggle to find a role for herself that offered more personal fulfillment than the traditional performance as wife, mother, and hostess expected of formal first ladies. Beasley traces in detail the evolution of the special women-only press conferences conducted by Roosevelt, her published writings, her "My Day" newspaper column, her involvement in social causes, and, briefly, her career in the United Nations.

Roosevelt challenged traditional feminine roles, but her challenge itself was based on tradition. Her life was "revolutionary," yet she was neither radical nor aggressive. She was regarded as the greatest American woman of her time, yet her writings were full of platitudes and ordinary observations of life, her speeches were flawed by awkward style and a speaking manner at once high-pitched, nervous, and simplistic in content. The author explores these apparent paradoxes and develops several intriguing insights and questions out of them. Beasley raises the notion that Roosevelt's life, publicized and dramatized through her own efforts from the 1930s through the 1960s, may have been itself a causal factor in a later generation's definition of women's liberation. Although this thesis is implicit in the work, and the evidence for it is quite substantial, the author leaves the question open. Whether Roosevelt's life was a precursor of later liberation styles, was a cause of those styles, or was some intentional or unintended blend of both is left for the reader to ponder.

The author's richest contribution, beyond raising such thought-provoking questions, lies in detailing Roosevelt's adept use of both the print and radio media. Beasley draws on some excellent sources, including not only the Hyde Park collections but also correspondence and memoirs by female journalists in several repositories and private collections, the Eleanor Roosevelt FBI file (which Beasley obtained under the Freedom of Information Act), oral history interviews, and a wide range of difficult-to-track newspaper and magazine items. The product reflects the breadth and depth of research. The author assumes the reader is unfamiliar with the major legislation of the 1930s and with the social values of the era, perhaps in keeping with the publisher's desire to bring out a work of value in undergraduate courses, as well as a serious monograph. The book would certainly be a good reading in twentieth-century U.S. history courses, as well as standing as a solid contribution to the growing literature on both the Roosevelt era and the history of women in America.

RODNEY CARLISLE
Rutgers University

HOWARD DICKMAN. *Industrial Democracy in America: Ideological Origins of National Labor Relations Policy*. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court. 1987. Pp. xiii, 445.

This book is predominantly a review and critique of the ideas and values underlying the public policy purportedly favoring the determination of wages, hours, and working conditions through collective bargaining between labor organizations and management. At a time when popular and scholarly literature is filled with obituaries for the American labor movement and unions are blaming their impotence on the Taft-Hartley Act and threatening to boycott the Reagan National Labor Relations Board, the author's preoccupation with the sources of big labor's power, exclusive representation, compulsory unionism, and the overriding of the individual's contractual preferences seems anachronistic—as if he were writing twenty or thirty years ago.

The stated purpose of the book, for example, is to explain how American society came to support a national labor policy that Howard Dickman claims is a "commitment to compulsion—to compulsory unionism" (p. 4), and that theme is built around

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"four major principles": the right to organize, the duty to bargain, the enforceability of collective bargaining agreements, and exclusive representation by majority rule. Although Dickman acknowledges that the term "industrial democracy" has many different meanings, it is difficult to determine what the term means to him beyond "using the power of government to vest in unions the power to establish the terms and conditions of employment" (p. 218).

Dickman traces the evolution of this government-union alliance from the breakdown in the guild system and the rise of individualistic economic policy (Sir Edward Coke, the Physiocrats, and Adam Smith) through theories of syndicalism (Robert Owen, Thomas Skidmore), socialism (Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, Edward Bellamy, Daniel De Leon), and collective bargaining (Lujo Brentano, Richard Ely, John R. Commons, Lester Frank Ward) and models of industrial reform (Emile Durkheim, Harold Laski, G. D. H. Cole) to the current system of collective bargaining. In each chapter the ideas leading to the government-union alliance are set forth fairly, with reasonable thoroughness and with detailed documentation. Dickman, who expresses his intellectual debt to Ayn Rand and others such as Sylvester Petro, Fritz Machlup, and F. A. Hayek (n. 35, p. 351), also attempts in each chapter to demonstrate errors in the theories that support the union-government alliance.

Dickman, however, presents no alternative theory concerning his notions of a just industrial relations system. Like his mentor, Rand, Dickman deplores the replacement of the natural rights of the human being with the utilitarian happiness of most people as the basis for the defense of free markets and a free society. Yet he does not acknowledge that, even using the natural rights approach, some body with power and influence has to define what those natural rights are. History shows that certain conceptions of natural rights have been used to justify not only John Locke's theory of private property but also Social Darwinism and white human beings' ownership of black human beings.

Since some body also has to define the greatest good for the greatest number, Dickman is also seriously remiss in ignoring the well-known body of research pointing out that the state could use the legislation ostensibly protecting various rights of labor to strip labor of some of its most powerful weapons. Thus, the right to organize is diminished by tolerance of employer union-busting campaigns, judicial exclusion from bargaining of subjects related to the "core" of entrepreneurial control lightens the employer's duty to bargain, collective bargaining agreements are enforced by a corps of management-rights oriented arbitrators to whom the National Labor Relations Board defers, the power of exclusive representation is limited by a judicially fashioned duty of fair representation and union democracy legislation, and labor's freedom to strike, boycott, and picket is in important ways subordinated to other rights.

Despite these limitations, this book would be good supplementary reading and an excellent source for discussion in many industrial relations courses.

JAMES A. GROSS
New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations Cornell University

DAVID P. PEELER. *Hope among Us Yet: Social Criticism and Social Solace in Depression America*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1987. Pp. xiv, 340. $35.00.

David P. Peeler maintains that a mixture of social criticism—social realism, in the parlance of the cultural historian—and a fuzzily nonideological hopefulness (what he calls "social solace") defines a dominant artistic strain in America of the 1930s. And he sets out to find his diagnostic combination in a number of media that enjoyed unique popularity during the Great Depression: accounts of domestic travels; documentary photographs; the gritty novels of John Steinbeck, Jack Conroy, James T. Farrell, and their comrades; and some of those relatively few paintings depicting the various privations, anxieties, and labor actions of the period.

The thesis of the book is unremarkable and unarguable. Like New Deal functionaries and most ordinary citizens, American artists were distressed by the suffering they saw around them, blamed "the system" (an entity susceptible to a broad range of possible definitions), but, in the end, were at a loss as to what to do about it. Nonetheless, they remained at heart optimistic about the future. In 1939, in fact, Americans built a tribute to tomorrow in the form of the spaceship architecture of the New York World's Fair, and it was not for its magnolia-scented charm alone that Margaret Mitchell's *Gone with the Wind* was the publishing success of the decade: the last line in that great, transparently metaphoric chronicle of life in contemporary America reads, "After all, tomorrow is another day."

Peeler is not interested in architectural symbols, Tara included. Architecture, he thinks, is not didactic, and Mitchell has nothing to do with the American scene of her own day. Indeed, the content of works of art—the tomorrowness evident in cultural products ranging from Tara and Walt Disney's *Fantasia* to the powerful Rose of Sharon finale of *The Grapes of Wrath*—has been excluded from Peeler's book in favor of exceedingly dubious readings of the artists' intentions. In the case of Steinbeck, for example, Peeler tells us that he "managed to obscure

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

his own meaning" (p. 157): Peeler, and not Steinbeck's text, serves as the final authority for what the novelist is saying. Similarly, in the absence of a respectful inventory of their pictorial content and the style through which it is made manifest, paintings and photographs are reduced to mere illustrations of the author's thesis.

This is by no means the first book to resort to such means when the cultural product proves disappointing to the historian whose real interest is not in objects, symbols, and form but in the personality of the maker and in what artists tried to do or hoped to do in their work (the mystery and glory of the creative act lies in the difference between intention and result, of course). But what is truly distressing in this book is Peeler's conviction that these artists failed as artists because they offered hope in lieu of sound political alternatives to the decadent capitalism of the American 1930s. Although he readily concedes that paintings and the like are clumsy tools with which to construct meaningful alternatives to "the system," he is nonetheless chagrined all over again when each of his artists comes to the same laudable conclusion. Peeler wishes Americans had been interested in ideologies: alas, they were not, and, in the main, they still are not!

KARAL ANN MARLING
University of Minnesota

FORREST C. POGUE. *George C. Marshall: Statesman.* Foreword by DREW MIDDLETON. New York: Viking. 1987. Pp. xix, 603. $29.95.

The fourth and final volume of Forrest C. Pogue's biography of George C. Marshall covers his service first as Harry S. Truman's emissary to China (1946), then as secretary of state (1947–48), and, finally, as secretary of defense (1950–51). Anyone familiar with the earlier volumes will appreciate the meticulous scholarship and wonderful familiarity with which Pogue presents Marshall's contribution to U.S. history and foreign policy.

To say of Marshall that he was "a military man with a civilian mind" or that he was a truly authentic American in his respect for and devotion to the American system of government is to understate the qualities of greatness that Marshall manifested. First and foremost, as Pogue's delineation of the record so clearly shows, Marshall was a person who put his superb judgment and masterly political skills at the service of peace and survival as well as security. In doing so, he worked within the American constitutional system free of vanity or ambition for power, secure enough to be completely honest with himself and others, and strong enough to defend the positions to which his judgment led him—not in spite of his critics but because common sense told him where the intelligent course of action lay.

However much we are in debt to Pogue for a study that provides us, as teachers, with a model of a leader whose character and achievement we can take pride in recounting to our students, Pogue's biography also brings to life the history of the events and decisions of the early cold war that have been the subject of revisionist scholarship. The extent to which Pogue has immersed himself in the documentary record and the information with which he has buttressed his analysis of Marshall's diplomacy present us with a most authoritative history of the early cold war as well as a splendid account of Marshall's contribution. Whatever role economic interests or anti-Communism played in shaping U.S. policy, it pales in comparison with the adamacy with which Joseph Stalin, whether out of fear or miscalculation, persisted in his hostility toward Europe's economic and political recovery. Inevitably, anti-Sovietism played a part in public and congressional views, but Pogue's account shows that Marshall, like Goerge F. Kennan, Charles S. Bohlen, and others, sought to avoid an irreparable schism. Instead, whether out of ideological perversity or miscalculation, the Kremlin produced precisely the result that it had aimed to defeat—a revived Europe looking to America for its security. The real lesson that Pogue's account conveys is how often in the decades since American leaders have failed to make a similar effort to explore the possibilities for avoiding confrontation and reducing tension under far less desperate and pressing circumstances than Marshall faced.

There are other lessons in Marshall's statecraft and leadership from which Americans might have benefited. Marshall's (and Truman's) respect for the role of Congress in the development of foreign policy stands as a model of what the Constitution calls for and of what it takes to win the support of Congress.

A third lesson—Marshall's refusal to let the United States be sucked into a hopeless civil war in China and made subservient to Chiang Kai-shek's corrupt regime—stands as a model that subsequent administrations might have followed in relations with Third World dictatorships. Marshall also opposed sending U.S. combat forces to Greece in 1948 for the same reason. His military judgment as opposed to spurious geopolitical theories told him not to spread American forces too thin. Unfortunately, it was not within his power to exercise the same restraining influence on General Douglas MacArthur.

Marshall paid the price in attacks by right-wing demagogues for his courage in opposing intervention in the Chinese civil war, but the present state of U.S. relations with the People's Republic has vindi-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cated his judgment of America's national interest. Things might have gone better for us in the 1960s and 1970s had we had leaders of Marshall's character, prudence, and judgment. Pogue has written a great biography about a great man. Let us make its lessons a part of our students' learning.

DAVID S. MCLELLAN
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio

ROGER DANIELS *et al.*, editors. *Japanese Americans: From Relocation to Redress*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. 1986. Pp. xxi, 216. $24.95.

In her prefatory note, Sandra C. Taylor explains that the idea for the spring 1983 conference underpinning this collection of essays (the International Conference on Relocation and Redress sponsored by the Center for Population Studies at the University of Utah) is attributable to one of the other two editors, Roger Daniels. Daniels also deserves credit, says Taylor, for suggesting that Salt Lake City "would be a natural site for such a gathering [because] it was an important crossroads in the history of relocation." It was not only "the wartime home of the Japanese American Citizens League [JACL]," declared Daniels, but also "the site of a small community of Japanese Americans, and a point of transition for many who were held at the concentration camps [in the states of Utah, Idaho, and Wyoming] at Topaz, Minidoka, and Heart Mountain" (p. vii). Published at a time when Congress has reached a crossroads regarding the appropriate remedies due an ethnic community that the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) in 1982 deemed victims of race prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership, this volume represents both a valuable repository of significant scholarship and a strategic stepping stone in the systematic development of Japanese American historiography.

Although the book is grounded in the presentations made at the Salt Lake City conference of 1983, it has been enriched by contributions that the editors subsequently commissioned to facilitate their intent: "to present a look at less well known aspects of relocation, to emphasize its impact on the Intermountain West, and to give a preliminary assessment of the movement for redress" (p. viii). The ultimate mix of material, drawn from multidisciplinary scholars and players in the "relocation and redress" drama, is more comprehensive (and, arguably, more consequential) than any extant volume covering the Japanese American experience in World War II.

The volume has eight parts. The first consists solely of Daniels's keynote address at the Salt Lake City conference. Particularly cheering to Daniels was the just released CWRIC report, *Personal Justice Denied*, although he took exception to the commission's sidestepping of the term "concentration camp" (a term, ironically, that the editors of this book themselves have sacrificed to achieve an alliterated subtitle). Finally, Daniels speculated on the prospects for—and propriety of—securing meaningful monetary redress for evacuation survivors via the political process.

Part 2, "Prewar Japanese America," comprises essays by two Nisei, Barry Saiki and Bill Hosokawa. Although providing insight into Saiki's two communities (Stockton, California, and the University of California, Berkeley) and that of Hosokawa (Seattle, Washington), these essays portray a pre–World War II Japanese America that is monochromatic and unrepresentative as to both generational and gender experience.

Life in the camps is the subject of part 3. Five of the eight pieces in this section are superb assessments of important aspects of the concentration camp story heretofore relatively unexplored. Two focus on education, one from the perspective of a humanistic teacher at the Topaz camp, Eleanor Gerard Sekerak, and the other from that of a revisionist sociocultural anthropologist, Lane Ryo Hirabayashi. Two other studies, by Tetsuden Kashima and John J. Culley, are centered on the mistreatment of enemy alien Japanese. The final item, "The Forced Migrations of West Coast Japanese Americans, 1942–1946: A Quantitative Note" by Daniels, clarifies many issues that scholars customarily have dealt with impressionistically.

All eight selections in part 4, "Reactions to the Camps," are beneficial. But the best are those by Geoffrey S. Smith, Leonard J. Arrington, Robert C. Sims, and Taylor. Smith demonstrates that "the decision to relocate the Japanese Americans was consistent with the administration's prewar attitudes and policies toward objectionable minorities" (p. 84). Whereas Arrington explores the "ambiguous response" of Utah's largely Mormon population to a "latter-day" persecuted ethnic group, the Japanese Americans, Sims surveys the attitudes and actions of Idahoans to the existence in their state of some nine thousand Japanese Americans at the Minidoka camp. Last, Taylor maintains that, although the churches were not very active in their assistance to the Japanese Americans at the time of their roundup and removal, they deserve commendation for the support given the evacuees in camp and during their subsequent resettlement into mainstream America.

Part 5, "Incarceration Elsewhere," contains three excellent analyses of the wartime treatment of people of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii (by Dennis M. Ogawa and Evarts C. Fox, Jr.), Canada (Gordon K.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hirabayashi), and Latin America (C. Harvey Gardiner). Although much of this material has been presented before, its inclusion in this collection allows readers to comprehend the situation in this country within a comparative, hemispheric perspective.

Clearly, the volume's richest analytical lode is part 6. United by the common theme of the effects of the Japanese Americans' wartime incarceration, the essays, by Harry H. L. Kitano, Amy Iwasaki Mass, Taylor, Gary Y. Okihiro and David Drummond, and Howard Ball, represent the intellectual core of the anthology and, taken alone, justify its publication and purchase. Editor Kitano, a participant in the evacuation (as a Topaz internee) and a longtime student of it, employs a sociohistorical model of governance to compare and evaluate the behavior of Japanese Americans under concentration camp conditions. Mass, a psychologist, argues from clinical evidence and from CWRIC testimony that the evacuation had a tremendous impact on Japanese Americans and that "one way to resolve our feelings is to have the government admit its wrongdoings" (p. 161). The two articles by Taylor and Okihiro and Drummond address economic issues: the first is concerned with establishing an accurate accounting of the loss suffered by Japanese Americans as a result of the evacuation, while the second, using the case of California agriculture, goes beyond the losses sustained to demonstrate precisely who profited from the wartime removal of Japanese Americans. The remaining essay by Ball reevaluates the actions of the Supreme Court relative to the *Korematsu*, *Hirabayashi*, and *Endo* cases and concludes that they "diminish the luster of the tribunal" (p. 184).

The rest of the book is devoted to the contemporary redress movement. Whereas part 7 comprises three essays by Japanese American redress leaders (John Tateishi, William Hohri, and Dale Minami), plus another by a political scientist (Shirley Castelnuovo), that are supportive of redress, part 8 is constituted of recent letters from two surviving architects of the evacuation, John J. McCloy and Karl R. Bendetsen, which justify the government's wartime policy and deplore the conduct and findings of the CWRIC hearings.

In criticism of this book, a case can be made, less on the grounds of commission than omission, that the "generous assistance in funding this volume" provided by the JACL's Japanese American Research Project (p. iv) predisposed its editors to muffle—although certainly not muzzle—criticism of the league's controversial role during the war and in the redress movement. Although the volume includes contributions by notable JACL critics such as Hohri, chair of the National Council for Japanese American Redress, and historians Okihiro and Daniels, conspicuous by their absence from the volume are the strident anti-JACL voices of Frank Chin, Richard Drinnon, James Omura, and Raymond Okamura. Surely, as Daniels himself suggested in his keynote address at the Salt Lake City conference (p. 6), Clio is a muse who must not be managed—even when the motive for doing so, as it seems to have been in this instance, is to promote community solidarity during a time of critical public policy formation.

Still, it is the achievement, not the shortcomings, of this attractive book that warrants emphasis. In addition to the fruitful questions raised by most of the contributions, readers are rewarded with introductory essays that illuminate each section and suggest sources for further topical exploration, a useful chronology of Japanese American history, and an array of riveting historical photographs.

ARTHUR A. HANSEN
California State University, Fullerton

GARY R. HESS. *The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940–1950*. New York: Columbia University Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 448. $45.00.

Americans "discovered" Southeast Asia relatively late. Not until the Japanese threatened to overrun the area in 1940–41 did Washington perceive a vital stake in the region. Gary R. Hess has written a regional analysis of policy toward Southeast Asia for the crucial decade of 1940–50. Before then, Americans had interests in the Philippine Islands (which they mistakenly saw as a regional model) and some modest investments in the raw material industries of the area's British, Dutch, and French colonies.

Germany's conquest of Western Europe raised the real possibility of Japan establishing military-political hegemony over this resource-rich area. Washington's hope of "containing" Tokyo, before the Pearl Harbor attack, hinged on the defense of China and colonial Southeast Asia. Japan's unexpectedly easy advance early in 1942 revealed the erosion of European power and convinced American planners that the only way to ensure future stability was to ease the colonial powers out and transfer authority to moderate Asian nationalists—as the Americans intended to do in the Philippines.

Hess builds on the contributions of Christopher Thorne and William Rogers Louis in analyzing the twists and turns of Allied planning for Southeast Asia. Just as the United States tried to prepare the way for planned decolonization, the British, Dutch, and French tried to cajole, stall, and resist these pressures. Franklin D. Roosevelt's particular dislike for Charles de Gaulle and the French colonial

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

record made Indochina a special target for the American decolonizers.

Despite elaborate discussions about postwar "trusteeships," concerted European resistance and bureaucratic disputes in Washington limited American—essentially Roosevelt's—determination to impose timetables. Moreover, military imperatives forced the United States to pull its punches and refrain from issuing any ultimatums to its allies. The president's death and succession by the largely indifferent Harry S. Truman halted the momentum of the anticolonialist movement. The emerging cold war practically buried it. Shortly before Japan's surrender, the Office of Strategic Services sent an intelligence evaluation to the White House that seems an epigram for postwar U.S. policy. It declared, "We should encourage liberalization of the colonial regimes in order the better to maintain them, and to check Soviet influence in the stimulation of colonial revolt" (p. 125).

From 1945 to 1950, Hess demonstrates, American policy makers subjected Southeast Asian nationalism to a political litmus test. Washington supported native political movements that appeared moderate, pro-Western, and anti-Communist. The ability of these movements to govern effectively, receive popular support, or meet the needs of backward economies was a secondary concern. Washington backed nationalists and pressed the colonial powers to give in when it saw viable non-Communist movements, such as the Indonesian republic or its own proxies in the Philippines. By contrast, the Viet Minh in Indochina were completely unacceptable, despite the movement's early professed friendship for America and Washington's continued disgust with French policy. The triumph of the Chinese Communists in 1949 convinced Washington that the real issue in Southeast Asia was safeguarding the region's economic resources from Communist domination and using that same wealth to ensure Japanese and European industrial recovery.

Hess has written a judicious, professional, and extremely useful study. Researched largely in American sources, it focuses on Washington's perceptions and actions rather than on the internal Southeast Asian situation. It contains no startling revelations, and most of the material on Indochina, Indonesia, the Philippines, and regional economic integration will be familiar to specialists. Still, it makes a real contribution by describing how American diplomacy functioned regionally and tried to steer emerging nations around the shoals of revolution.

MICHAEL SCHALLER
University of Arizona

SAMUEL Z. KLAUSNER and VICTOR M. LIDZ, editors. *The Nationalization of the Social Sciences*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1986. Pp. xiv, 296. $34.95.

In the fall of 1946, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) commissioned Talcott Parsons to prepare a brief for the inclusion of the social sciences in the proposed National Science Foundation (NSF)—a kind of social science counterpart to Vanevar Bush's *Science, the Endless Frontier* (1945). The resulting document, "Social Science: A Basic National Resource," failed to have the impact of the Bush manifesto for reasons of timing, style, and content. Parsons's draft was not ready until the summer of 1948. By that time President Harry S. Truman had vetoed the first NSF legislation, and the issue had become ensnarled in partisan politics. At that point the inclusion of the social sciences was a divisive issue of secondary importance, which would ultimately be deferred. In style Parson's report was far more readable than the gelatinous prose of his theoretical works, but it was doctoral-level thought and exposition, hardly likely to impress the average member of Congress. In the end, perhaps inevitably, the social scientists themselves fell out over Parson's characterization of the social sciences. The draft report was sent out for review to no less than sixty-nine readers. Their criticisms ranged from matters of basic strategy to theoretical perspective to the alleged slighting of individual disciplines. In retrospect Parsons' achievement appears far more creditable. By way of comparison, a recent NSF report of similar size and scope (*Behavioral and Social Science Research: A National Resource* [1982]) required a blue-ribbon committee, a full-time staff, and a budget of 350,000 dollars (pp. 251–52). Nevertheless, by 1949 Parsons had "had a bellyful" (p. 27), and he left the report to molder in the SSRC files for more than one-quarter century. Now it has been published for the first time and retrospectively appraised in this misleadingly titled volume.

The authors are to be commended for putting Parsons's draft into presentable form and for providing essays from social scientists with firsthand experience of the relevant developments to explicate its context and significance. As a historical document, the Parsons report has a bearing on three related themes: the place of social science in the NSF, Parsons as a figure in social science history, and the impact of federal patronage on the development of American social science. The three main sections of the volume roughly correspond to these questions, and the concluding essay contemplates the ramifications of current social science dependence on federal research funds.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

For the first theme, the big question is of small moment: no arguments were likely to have been persuasive enough to win the acceptance of social science in the original NSF, nor did it matter. Although social science was denied a seat in the NSF rowboat of the early 1950s, it found a commodious place (if not first class) in the luxury liner of the 1960s. Dael Wolfle estimates that initial inclusion might have been expected to raise the cumulative federal funding for the social sciences by one-quarter of one percent (p. 193). More indirectly, it is alleged that being forced to enter the NSF through the back door, so to speak, caused social science slavishly to imitate the positivistic methods of the natural sciences. This is unconvincing, however. The foundations (Rockefeller and Ford), which were the actual patrons of social science research in the pre-Sputnik period, were similarly eager to promote methodological rigor. In fact the failure to recognize this major influence on the development of the social sciences casts doubt at other points on the assumed consequences of government patronage.

The middle section focuses on Parsons and, specifically, his relationships with empirical social science. With his all-encompassing view of social science, Parsons clearly perceived the need for empirical studies and on several occasions actually participated in them. Yet, all these efforts resulted in theoretical or interpretive writings. Parsons never completed an empirical study. Bernard Barber offers a not-very-complicated explanation for this: Parsons lacked the skills and the temperament for such work, his true talent being theorizing (pp. 128–29). These essays illuminate an important and neglected facet of this complex figure, but we are unlikely to progress further in understanding the historical Parsons until the history of the Harvard Department of Social Relations has been seriously studied.

The final group of papers addresses aspects of the relationship between the federal government and social science. As history, Dael Wolfle's account of the failure of social science to be included in the NSF legislation of 1950 and Henry Riecken's description of how the social sciences eventually were brought into NSF are of greatest interest. The ultimate focus of all these essays, however, is the "now" rather than the "then." In this respect Riecken's explication of the dilemma of attaining public support for an enterprise that affects public interests but transcends public understanding is both penetrating and apt to Parsons's assignment of 1946.

In a concluding "editorial" Samuel Z. Klausner and Victor M. Lidz take up the topic of nationalization and the social sciences. Nationalization here does not mean the temporal process of increasing federal presence—that subject falls between "then" and "now"—but rather the current consequences of government support of social science research. It is somewhat ironic that a work concerned implicitly, through Parsons, with what social science ought to be should conclude with an example of what it ought not to be. Without recourse to evidence or prior scholarship, the authors discern and deplore an assumed gap between "Big Social Science," heavily quantitative in character, and departmentally based qualitative work. This and other ills are ascribed to government influence, even though Big Social Science emerged in the first postwar decade as a result of private, not federal, support. Their paradoxical remedy calls for greater institutional separation (removing Big Social Science from the university) combined with more theoretical integration (pp. 285–86).

In the end the editors, like Parsons, envision a larger role for social science in running our society, but they part company with Parsons over the means. Parsons, concerned about the danger to the reputation of social science posed by certain "utopian-minded intellectual elements" (p. 110), urged his colleagues to confine their applied efforts to tasks that they possessed the technical competence to accomplish successfully. The editors, however, find this too constricting a role. They would use "broad social scientific perspectives and interpretations of social science knowledge to provide the intellectual public with a deeper understanding of problems in society" (p. 285). Their muddled discussion of nationalization, however, does not inspire confidence in this aspiration.

ROGER L. GEIGER
Yale University
Pennsylvania State University

ELLEN W. SCHRECKER. *No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1986. Pp. viii, 437. $20.95.

We have long needed a careful and extensive study of the impact of McCarthyism on higher education. Ellen W. Schrecker has made the first effort in the field. Her book is impressively researched, well written, highly controversial, and important. It is required reading for specialists and is recommended for all serious students of postwar America.

Some six hundred professors and teachers lost their jobs during the second Red Scare. Schrecker is concerned with the approximately one hundred professors who were fired because of their membership in the Communist party, their refusal to sign a loyalty oath, or their unwillingness to testify before an investigative body. At the heart of her research are some one hundred forty oral interviews, nearly one hundred manuscript collections, and Federal

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Bureau of Investigation materials obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. Her command of secondary materials, although she seems to know or care little about Senator Joseph McCarthy himself, is generally solid.

The problem is that Schrecker's left-wing inclinations color virtually every page. She sees members of the Communist party as mere idealists and radicals who were persecuted outrageously by lethargic, cowardly, and wicked liberals. She denies that the Communists in question tried to proselytize in class or subvert their universities. She believes in the existence of an "academic blacklist" and describes in detail the often shattered lives of those driven from academica. She argues that McCarthyism seriously damaged higher education in America, paved the way for a generation of somnolent students, and led to misleading "consensus" interpretations of the nation's history.

Much of the author's case remains to be proved. Evidence for the blacklist, for example, is hard to find. Communist purity in the classroom needs documentation. (Why did she not interview some students?) The alleged damage to academia from the purge seems highly doubtful. Moreover, few objective scholars will be pleased by Schrecker's interpretation of Communists as innocents or by her highly predictable explanation of the cold war and the Red Scare. Still, this study is formidable and sophisticated and deserves widespread attention.

THOMAS C. REEVES
University of Wisconsin, Parkside

MARK LANDIS. *Joseph McCarthy: The Politics of Chaos.* Cranbury, N.J.: Associated University Press or Susquehanna University Press, Cranbury. 1987. Pp. 171. $26.50.

In order to place Joseph McCarthy in a meaningful psychopolitical framework, Mark Landis scrutinizes his "political style." This book arose from a broader effort by Landis to test James David Barber's typology of presidential character. A frenetic self-advertiser, McCarthy resembled Barber's "active-negative" type, but the fit was poor. Guilty about their methods of pursuing grand moral ends, active-negatives expend vast psychic energy in rationalization and invest their causes with great seriousness. But the Wisconsin senator did not.

Better to classify McCarthy, Landis offers a Cook's tour of various efforts to analyze moral and political development and political leadership. We encounter, among others, Harold Lasswell on the nature of politicians' motivational systems, Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg on intellectual and moral development in childhood, Abraham Maslow's ever popular "hierarchy of needs," and James MacGregor Burns on the types of political leadership. Each of these interpretive constructs teaches us something, but none fully encompasses McCarthy.

Borrowing from developmental psychology, Landis finds McCarthy's "impulsive style" his most telling trait. It comprehends his tactical flexibility and lack of sincerely held or constructive long-term goals. This McCarthy looks a lot like the one etched by Richard Rovere. Indeed, the book leans heavily on Rovere, whose work points conveniently in the direction Landis seeks to travel. Like Rovere's, Landis's McCarthy is a cynic, in contrast to Thomas Reeves's portrait of an anti-Communist true believer.

This thesis, however, is debatable. In arguing it, Landis stresses that McCarthy's behavior caused him little psychic friction. Yet how then can one explain his long-standing alcohol problem and other ailments? Similarly, if McCarthy did not sustain grudges (and thus was an imperfect active-negative), what do we make of his punitive behavior toward Senators Millard Tydings and William Benton and journalists William T. Evjue and Drew Pearson? The author is more convincing in addressing McCarthy's ideological underdevelopment and the facets of his background that may have been responsible for it.

Landis relies wholly, as he concedes, on others' work for the details of McCarthy's life. Thus, no new biographical facts emerge here. What is innovative is the application of various models of personality development and structure to the known data. At times the going is tedious—like watching the trying on of a series of hats, none of which fits well. Although it is probably apt to term McCarthy an "impulsive," this label does not uncloud the mystery about his personality. Nonetheless, for students of the Wisconsin senator, this attempt to comprehend his personality, if not always compelling, does offer considerable food for thought.

RICHARD FRIED
University of Illinois, Chicago

MAURICE ISSERMAN. *If I Had a Hammer . . . : The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left.* New York: Basic Books. 1987. Pp. xx, 259. $18.95.

Although the anti-ideological, ahistorical, and moralistic fervor of the New Left early in the 1960s provoked some observers to stress its divergence from previous eruptions of American radicalism, historians tend to be suspicious of claims about clean breaks from the past. Maurice Isserman is one of these skeptics, and, even though *If I Had a Ham-*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mer . . . contains a rather slack argument for the continuity of political protest, the book makes legible some fascinating features of radicalism during a decade in which it seemed almost as dead as chivalry.

The author's first book, *Which Side Were You On?* (1982), traced the fortunes of the Communist party through World War II; this one picks up the story about a decade later, after the revelations of the Twentieth Party Congress in the Soviet Union had ignited a crisis among the American comrades. In seeking an egalitarian society, some of the disillusioned searched for a less authoritarian and manipulative organization. Next, Isserman records the peculiar odyssey of Max Shachtman, former Communist, former Trotskyist, former Socialist, father of the Independent Socialist League, who, after seeking to influence whatever dissident stirrings could be identified on campuses in the 1950s, later backed American military intervention in Vietnam. One of his erstwhile disciples, Irving Howe, founded *Dissent* in 1954 to keep evergreen the tradition of democratic socialist values but—like Shachtman—failed to shape in any decisive fashion the attitudes of the next generation of radicals. Such frustrations among the legatees of the Marxist Old Left were not shared by pacifists, whose desire to bear witness to the dangers of nuclear war helped some campus idealists conclude that fears of Communism need not produce paralysis. A final chapter recounts the birth of Students for a Democratic Society. The most populous and influential conglomeration of young radicals in American history confronted—if it had not entirely exorcised—the ghosts of the Old Left and had learned from Gandhian pacifism the salience of activism, even at the risk of life, limb, and liberty.

Isserman draws on an impressive range of sources, from newspapers, leaflets, and magazines through the shelves of secondary accounts (including unpublished theses), as well as interviews. But extensive research has not impeded the author's skill in retracing the sometimes hairpin ideological and organizational turns that the radicals of the 1950s executed; this account is clearly and cogently presented. Although it is sympathetic, the book also underscores why the larger social and political context alone cannot explain the feeble rabbit punches of radicalism in the 1950s. The membership lists of these groups were sometimes no bigger than a paper route, yet Isserman's analysis avoids getting sucked into the sectarianism that bedeviled so many of his dramatis personae. The cameo portraits of individual figures are intriguing. Their ideas, however, count for less in this book than their political tactics and maneuvering, which are not studied in terms of historical causality. Had the author attempted to demonstrate how X helped lead to Y instead of Z, an absorbing story might have been a persuasive one as well.

STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD
Brandeis University

SAMUEL P. HAYS. *Beauty, Health, and Permanence: Environmental Politics in the United States, 1955–1985.* Assisted by BARBARA D. HAYS. (Studies in Environment and History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. xv, 630. $29.95.

Americans' concern for their natural environment underwent a supernova-like explosion shortly after the middle decades of the twentieth century. An earlier generation's interests—saving forests and parks, protecting some wildlife species, reclaiming specific soil sites and water courses—were sporadic, disconnected, and of limited impact on the general population. When conservationism gave way to environmentalism, Samuel P. Hays demonstrates, the new movement was comprehensive, intricately and inextricably organized, and focused on sustaining not just desirable exceptions to material progress but essential economic and social health, indeed the very survival of the entire American population.

Thirty years ago Hays asserted that the conservation movement was a primary force in bringing scientific management to government. Subsequently, however, few educational institutions chose to elevate resource-use studies to stand beside economic, diplomatic, or military history in their curricula. He now presents us with a history of the early environmental era, an offer we dare not refuse. No matter how well we may be educated, we are all students in desperate need of his knowledge and evaluations. Fortunately, Hays is a most helpful guide for Everyman. His narrative is written in the past tense, but this is a primer for all participants in the problems and solutions of environmental use. Some activists may be impatient with his often maddeningly bland review of these most passionate issues. But he warns us against the old clichés of categories and villains. Although he shows us the sorry behavior of the biggest polluters and their tribunes, especially in the years of Ronald Reagan's administration, he emphasizes that the true enemies of the people are old ways of thinking and inertias produced by weaknesses in the system's procedural machinery.

Drawing on—and, thankfully, translating into nontechnical language—hundreds of technological and organizational reports and journals, Hays perceptively reviews the plethora of problems and the ways in which business, farmer, and labor organizations have realigned their traditional views to support federal and state legislation. But the issues involved have become increasingly complex. Proce-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dures for resolving contentions preliminary to voter, legislator, or administrator decision making, Hays most significantly emphasizes, often founder with the task of redefining and rethinking assumptions about the scope, depth, and impacts of any decision on population needs. The American trust in mediation has not worked in this realm. Bargaining is ultimately resolved by politicians, so activists on both sides must master political processes as much as technological data. Moreover, technicians have weakened their own influence with contentions arising not only from subsidies by special interests but from their inclination to defend professional assumptions against "outsiders." Similarly, economists have been reluctant to adopt new definitions of cost-benefit, and computer model designers insist that environmental factors are only one of many components to be included in the model. Project managers, agency heads, and citizens' groups may have no alternative but to rely on these myopic technologies. The most chilling conclusion in Hays's analysis of ideas and procedures used in the early environmental era is his belief that the efforts of all entities have been outpaced and overwhelmed by the increasing problems they are trying to solve.

In spite of his comprehensive coverage, Hays's history does not include three important late-breaking topics: nuclear waste disposal, the Supreme Court's recent support of compensation as part of private compliance with environmental prevention and protection regulations, and the emergence of what some would call the terrorism of the "Earth First" movement. But we have his well-organized analyses of similar issues as a key to study the potential impact of those and future environmental crises.

ELMO RICHARDSON
Seattle, Washington

CANADA

J. M. BUMSTED. *Land, Settlement, and Politics on Eighteenth-Century Prince Edward Island*. Kingston, Ont.: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 238. $27.50.

This book is the work of a master historian. From his early work on the Great Awakening among the Cape Cod churches to his important study of Scottish Highland emigration to North America, J. M. Bumsted's scholarship has been characterized by thorough archival research and careful attention to telling detail, attributes that enable him to delineate local circumstances with clarity as he disentangles complex personal and factional conflicts. These strengths are deployed to their fullest extent in this account of Prince Edward Island, that fifty-six hundred square kilometer island in the Gulf of St. Lawrence that is now Canada's smallest province and that was in the late eighteenth century a tiny and odd British colony. Ceded to Britain in the Treaty of Paris of 1763, the island was sold in 1767 in 20,000–acre townships to proprietors, most of whom were to remain absentee landlords in Britain. Bumsted describes and assesses the subsequent intricate interaction between the proprietors, the British imperial authorities, colonial officials on the island, and the settlers, whose composition was a complicated mix of poverty-stricken early arrivals of the 1760s, loyalists of the 1780s, and Highland Catholic Scots of the late 1780s and 1790s.

It was a confusing period even for contemporaries. When he assumed the governorship in 1805, J. F. W. Desbarres observed that matters "seem more and more to have been in a strange and incompatible state from the beginning, and the different points of which in the progress of above thirty years induced such further confusion and intricacy, pervading the whole, as to render them extremely difficult to be unravelled" (p. 200). Bumsted has not managed to unravel every thread from this skein, but it is difficult to think of anyone doing a better job. He proceeds in a skillful, chronological manner, sorting out issues from evidence in British and Canadian archives. For readers interested in regional history, the detail unearthed will be of considerable interest, but, for a more general audience, even of colonial historians, the study will not contain enough material of general significance. As Bumsted himself ruefully confesses, "unusual local conditions produced results not always easy to integrate into larger historical patterns" (p. 98).

Still, there are analytical points that deserve the attention of colonial historians. Bumsted convincingly shows that the British plan in 1767 to try the proprietory system was an element in the general imperial policy of the mid-1760s to encourage eastern settlement as a counterattraction to the trans-Appalachian west. His account of the long governorship of the Yale-educated Edmund Fanning, who had achieved notoriety as the focus of Regulator anger in North Carolina in 1770, will be of interest to historians of the southern colonies. And just as the economic history of British North America has benefited recently from an approach that considers all the colonies from the Caribbean to Canada so too will our understanding of emigration and settlement improve markedly not only from the grand project of Bernard Bailyn but also from this kind of reliable local study that never loses sight of the imperial context.

GORDON T. STEWART
Michigan State University

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A. B. MCKILLOP. *Contours of Canadian Thought*. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 163. Cloth $25.00, paper $12.95.

This book consists of eight essays by the author, most, though not all, of which have been published before. Together they fairly reflect A. B. McKillop's interests in and views on Canadian intellectual history.

These views and interests fall into two areas. First, as McKillop correctly notes, "few practitioners of [Canadian] intellectual history have felt compelled to speak or write about the nature of their subdiscipline" (p. 24). McKillop is the exception to this rule, however, and he, more than any other, has been concerned with the theoretical side of the field. The questions of the place of intellectual history and of its future are a central concern in the early essays of this collection.

Canadian intellectual history, he notes, is still a new field. Inspired by intellectual history writings in the United States and the United Kingdom, it developed in the 1960s and matured in the 1970s. Though new, its prospects seem uncertain given the crisis that has recently hit the field in other countries. Only a close connection between ideas and social events can, he suggests at one point, maintain the force of the subdiscipline. Materialists should not be so quick to dismiss the force of ideas even if those ideas have their roots in the environment.

Given McKillop's second major interest, this conclusion is a little surprising. For McKillop, more than any other major Canadian intellectual historian, has been concerned with the relationship of ideas to each other rather than with the direct impact of ideas on society, economy, or government. His major focus of research to date has been on the questioning of Victorian values, particularly religious values, brought about by modern methods of critical inquiry. Darwinism, as he makes clear, was but one of a string of challenges that transformed the nature of religion, the role of the university, and the values on which society rested in the sixty years preceding World War I. Many of these essays would be familiar to anyone who has read his major work, *A Disciplined Intelligence* (1979), but some take the concerns of that work into new areas.

Two themes dominate the second group of essays. First, the struggle of those years was not between specific beliefs but between whole ways of organizing thought, of viewing the universe. Second, McKillop stresses the particularly Canadian evolution of this debate—Canadian, that is, in that it was distinct from the American. The hegemony of Scottish idealism around the turn of the century, he argues, had an aftereffect that has shaped the Canadian intellectual imagination to the present day.

These are good, often brilliant, essays by a thoughtful historian. In them all there is, as there should be, a sense that the exploration is still continuing. That point, however, also hints at the weakness of the collection. All but one of the pieces (the shortest) is at least five years old, and some are closer to ten. There is, thus, a sense that this collection is incomplete and may indeed already be dated. A strong conclusion, drawing together some of the threads contained in the papers and giving the author's current thoughts both on the "critical mind" and on the state of Canadian intellectual history, would have done much to advance the field and to give the collection a sense of completeness.

DOUG OWRAM
University of Alberta

THOMAS P. SOCKNAT. *Witness against War: Pacifism in Canada, 1900–1945*. (Social History of Canada, number 40.) Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1987. Pp. x, 370. Cloth $35.00, paper $16.95.

The pacifists' lot has not been a happy one in this century. The hysteria produced by war is an extraordinarily powerful emotion, and those who, for reasons of conscience, refuse to bear arms for their country are very often labeled as cowards and tormented or tortured until, frequently, they accept military service as an end to harassment. Those who can resist the pressures and follow their conscience are strong indeed.

Canadians are not usually thought to be a very militaristic people, but Canadian pacifists, as Thomas P. Socknat shows clearly in this superbly researched study, have suffered just as much as their comrades elsewhere.

The small pacifist movement in Canada before World War I was concentrated in the churches and to some extent in the labor movement. But when Canada went to war in August 1914 pacifism instantly became a German plot, and conscientious objectors were seen as "slackers." Canada was then still a political and intellectual part of the empire, more fervid in its loyalty than the British, and there was little tolerance for those in English Canada who refused to volunteer to fight or, even worse, who urged men to resist military service. (French Canadians were beyond the pale, of course.) The mainstream churches instantly abandoned their principles and turned themselves into recruiting organizations, and the government in Ottawa gave conscientious objectors scant consideration. Somewhat better treatment was accorded the historic peace sects, including Mennonites and Tunkers, but these groups too had a difficult time persuading the government that they were entitled to "privileges." Socknat calls this "the collapse of liberal pacifism,"

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

which it certainly was, and, after conscription was imposed in 1917, matters became worse yet.

The reaction in the interwar period to the Great War in Canada was, though not as pronounced as in the United States, still very sharp. Pacifists organized, the churched repented their sins of enthusiasm, and the Communists became involved, trying to take over youth groups and to muster support for Joseph Stalin's policies. Despite this, pacifists were better organized by 1939, and the state more tolerant. Even so, when more than one hundred United Church ministers in Toronto and Montreal produced a pacifist statement, "Witness against War," in the fall of 1939, the attorney general of Ontario tried to bring charges against them for discouraging recruiting. Cooler heads prevailed, something that would not have happened in 1914. Moreover, the government permitted alternative service for pacifists.

Socknat's book is chockfull of the names of those who participated and the long-forgotten organizations they founded with such faith. His story, however, is too long by half, and his prose, though serviceable, never rises to gracefulness. Nonetheless, Canada's pacifists now have their war memorial, and textbook writers who omit this saga of conscience will no longer have any excuses.

J. L. GRANATSTEIN
York University

MELISSA CLARK-JONES. *A Staple State: Canadian Industrial Resources in Cold War.* (The State and Economic Life, number 10.) Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 260. Cloth $35.00, paper $14.95.

According to sociologist Melissa Clark-Jones, Canadian federal officials played a negative role in their country's economic development after World War II because they rejected a nationalist strategy of independent, industrial development. They chose to reinforce the country's traditional reliance on natural resources instead of promoting secondary manufacturing for industrial growth and export earnings. Worse, they looked increasingly to the United States for markets and reaffirmed the country's customary habits of dependent development. The author makes ideology the chief causal variable and finds a continental mind-set among Canadian policy makers reinforced by representatives of large-scale American and Canadian corporate capital who successfully squeezed out smaller, independent Canadian firms in the search for influence with bureaucrats in both Ottawa and Washington. Particularly important among Washington officials, in her view, were U.S. stockpile managers who in a dangerous and insecure cold-war world had their own good reasons for having Canadian base metals developed and flowing southward. The result, according to the author, was, and still is, the unfortunate rejection by Ottawa officialdom of nationalist industrial development in favor of "continental resource capitalism" (p. vii).

Since the book lies in that zone where ideology and history meet, it cannot be recommended as a neutral, historical introduction to the developments it explores. On the other hand, it does offer excerpts from documents that the author found in the files of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, her chief primary source, that could interest specialists in Canadian-American relations and Canadian political economy. The book's first three chapters—case studies of the oil, forest, and nickel industries from roughly 1947 to 1965—also contain some interesting references to the role of U.S. stockpiles in the postwar evolution of Canadian newsprint and nickel industries and to persistent efforts by spokesmen from Imperial Oil to shape Ottawa's oil policy.

The study is also not without interest as historical polemic. It reflects an upsurge of interest in political economy among Canadian academics and a continuing fascination with the writings of Canadian economist Harold Innis, who pioneered in analysis of the role of staple commodities in economic development. The series "The State and Economic Life" in which this book appears as the tenth volume represents both these developments. Of these ten volumes, *A Staple State* is perhaps the most ideologically committed. As a result, its chief contribution lies more in speculative discussion about the role of the Canadian state in theory than in providing a reliable guide to the complexity of its conduct in fact.

ROBERT D. CUFF
York University

LATIN AMERICA

RICHARD W. SLATTA, editor. *Bandidos: The Varieties of Latin American Banditry.* (Contributions in Criminology and Penology, number 14.) New York: Greenwood. 1987. Pp. viii, 218. $37.50.

In 1959 in *Primitive Rebels*, Eric Hobsbawm first suggested that banditry can be a form of prepolitical peasant protest, a notion he elaborated in *Bandits* (1969). Hobsbawm's work on social banditry has spawned investigations of the phenomenon throughout the world, many critical of his original formulation.

This collection of case studies centers on the question of whether social bandits, as portrayed by Hobsbawm, existed in nineteenth- and twentieth-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

century Latin America. Contributors include Paul Vanderwood on Mexico, Richard W. Slatta and Miguel Izard on the Argentine pampa and the Venezuelan llano, Linda Lewin and Billy Jaynes Chandler on northeastern Brazil, Erick Langer on Bolivia, Louis Pérez, Jr., on Cuba, Gonzalo Sánchez and Donny Meertens on Colombia, Allen Woll on images of Latin American bandits in Hollywood films, and Dretha Phillips on criminological theory and Latin American banditry.

Together these essays suggest that social bandits did not exist in Latin America, although some outlaws were idealized in stories and myths. According to the editor, Hobsbawm's confusion of myth and reality stemmed from his overreliance on folk and literary sources. Police and judicial records reveal a different picture.

Banditry in Latin America almost never occurred where there were strong peasant communities but rather existed on the frontier or in areas that combined haciendas with small private holdings. Many bandits were not peasants themselves, and they rarely relied on peasant support but tended instead to establish close ties with landlords and merchants. Many bandits were individualists who sought economic mobility; they aimed not so much to defend a traditional communal way of life against the inroads of capitalism as to take personal advantage of new opportunities opening with the spread of commerce.

Thus, this book questions the supposed ties between peasants and social bandits. It also questions Hobsbawm's "prepolitical" label, for bandit gangs frequently emerged during elite political struggles, many were tied into the local power structure, and endemic banditry sometimes succeeded more organized rural protest. Finally, these essays challenge Hobsbawm's portrayal of the countryside. What comes through is not an isolated rural sector of enduring peasant communities and distant landlords but a conglomeration of varied and extremely complex landholding structures and social relations, responding to the political and economic transformations affecting the whole society.

The editor's decision to focus on the social banditry debate is a useful centering device, but in the end it becomes constricting. Rather than simply accepting or rejecting Hobsbawm's thesis (which is more nuanced than some contributors would admit), it is time to get on with exploring some of the broader issues in the social history of rural crime.

These essays raise a number of provocative questions for further research. One is the relation between banditry and the law—how social groups define what criminality is and which groups have judicial recourse. Another is the question of how bandit strategies and organization reflect the social environment and how they change over time. A third question has to do with the popular images of bandits. Hobsbawm argued that Robin Hood myths were of peasant origin and signified resistance to outside authorities. Slatta and others question Hobsbawm's assertion by suggesting that such myths often originate in the upper or middle classes. Why this should be and why idealized images of bandits emerge only in certain times and places merit further investigation. One final question relates to popular culture. In documenting bandit-elite ties, this volume tends to dismiss altogether the peasant connection. What is missing is the rural population's attitudes toward the bandits. This is difficult to determine, but one way, these essays obliquely suggest, is by attending to the cultural and ethical dimensions of bandit interaction with the rural poor. Behavior may help us infer popular values and attitudes by studying, for example, bandit treatment of women or the cultural context of violence. We need to integrate the lower sectors back into bandit studies by going beyond the simplistic dichotomy between elite collaboration and peasant rebellion that some students of banditry, intent on demolishing Hobsbawm, are posing.

As is typical of edited volumes, some articles are stronger than others. The essays by Langer, Lewin, Pérez, and Sánchez and Meertens are impressively researched and analytically complex. Read as a whole, this is a useful book. It provides fascinating descriptions of a variety of origins, forms, and effects of banditry throughout Latin America. For those interested in social banditry, this volume offers a good sampling of the literature on Latin America; for those studying crime, it provides insight into one Latin American variant; and for rural historians, it offers a new slant on rural life and the possibilities and limits of change. Finally, the book is interesting historiographically, for it sheds light on the evolution of sources and interpretations in the field of bandit studies over the past twenty years.

CATHERINE LEGRAND
Queen's University
Kingston, Canada

MANUEL CABALLERO. *Latin America and the Comintern, 1919–1943*. (Cambridge Latin American Studies, number 60.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1986. Pp. ix, 213. $39.50.

This concise book on the Communist Third International in Latin America is likely to become a definitive work, unless new sources are discovered. Manuel Caballero struggles to overcome formidable research obstacles surrounding an organization cloaked in secrecy and legend. Skillfully assessing and blending difficult materials, he produces a thoughtful and judicious study. This Venezuelan

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

scholar prudently admits doubts and speculation on many points of fact as well as interpretation. The author is also to be commended for sustaining objectivity toward a subject that often arouses passions.

Caballero argues that the Comintern failed in its task of exporting the Russian revolution around the globe because of its institutional and ideological rigidity. That agency was particularly ill-equipped for activities in what is now called the Third World, about which it knew and cared little. Instead, that organization mainly focused its ideas and actions on Europe. Of all world areas, Latin America assumed the least importance in the eyes of the Comintern.

To foment revolution in Latin America, the leaders of the Comintern debated who was the main enemy, who would be the chief protagonist, and when and how that eruption would come about. They were torn as to whether it would be an anticolonial style upheaval against the United States or an Americanist movement in support of a socialist takeover in the United States. Because the essential proletariat was small and the denigrated peasantry large, the Comintern believed that Communist revolutions in Latin America would be a long time coming. The International also vacillated over the means to seize power. In Brazil it supported a rare insurrection in 1935, while in most of the hemisphere it favored gradual infiltration through reformist coalitions. That latter National Union approach became increasingly dominant, reflecting the moderate strategy of U.S. party head Earl Browder.

Regardless of these propositions, the Comintern had little concrete impact in the Americas. Orders or finances from Moscow seldom determined specific Communist party behavior within the Latin American republics. In the long run, far more important was the intellectual legacy of Leninist theories about semicolonial Latin America's need for uprisings against large landowners and Yankee imperialists. While those concepts continued to influence Latin American revolutionaries, the official Communist parties became insignificant instruments of class collaboration. By the beginning of the 1940s, they were no more committed to or capable of revolution in Latin America than was the Comintern.

Caballero effectively shows the Comintern's ignorance, ineptitude, and irrelevance in Latin America in the interwar years. Because reliable documentation is thin, it remains difficult to distinguish between the achievements of the Comintern and the individual acts of local Communist parties. The history of Comintern ideas is also slender, mainly because its leaders thought little about Latin America. As a result, the author runs the risk of exhausting a small topic. Nevertheless, he makes a solid contribution by deflating myths about the power of international Communism and by pointing out differences among its parties in Latin America.

PAUL W. DRAKE
University of California, San Diego

CHRISTOPHER ABEL and NISSA TORRENTS, editors. *José Martí: Revolutionary Democrat.* Durham: Duke University Press. 1986. Pp. xviii, 238. $29.95.

José Martí helped organize and launch Cuba's struggle for independence from Spain, and he shaped the thinking of modern Cuba with brilliant social and political ideas that fill twenty-five volumes. This collection of interdisciplinary articles, edited by Christopher Abel and Nissa Torrents and the result of a seminar at London's Institute of Latin American Studies, contains new interpretations of Martí's thoughts and political accomplishments. Unlike many studies of Martí, it avoids hagiography.

Cuban literary critic Roberto Fernández Retamar depicts Martí as a man of the future as well as the past, one whose political and social philosophies remain valid. He views Martí as a political creature, a humanist whom Marxists respect because he, before Lenin, analyzed and denounced the imperialist stages of capitalism. Fernández Retamar also marvels at Martí's knack of uniting Cuba's tobacco workers and their employers in revolutionary harmony.

Gerald Poyo examines how Martí related his ideology of independence to the socioeconomic realities of the Cuban émigré community in the United States during the late nineteenth century. Poyo explains how Martí overcame the exiles' diverse political beliefs and forged political cohesion and how he rejected class struggle and still won the confidence of Cuba's anarchosyndicalists. Poyo also points out that Martí defended workers' rights, had no quarrel with their bosses who paid fair wages, but condemned excessive accumulation of wealth.

In a superior article on twentieth-century radical and populist thought in Cuba, Antoni Kapacia chronicles how groups have used Martí's ideas for political gain. Intellectuals paid scant attention to Martí's thought before 1923. Then, for approximately a decade, the radical student movement used it to stress elements of rebellion, democracy, class collaboration, racial equality, economic and social justice, and socialism. Between 1934 and 1942 Cuba's ruling class used Martí to legitimize its control by turning him from an anti-imperialist hero into their national apostle. In 1952 opponents of Fulgencio Batista's dictatorship resurrected Martí as a revolutionary anti-interventionist.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

During the 1880s and 1890s, Martí lived in and wrote about the United States. Jacqueline Kaye notes that Martí saw the United States as devoid of restraint, a nation of conflict based on reconciliation. Cuban historian Jorge Ibarra finds ambivalence in Martí's attitudes toward the United States. For instance, Martí trusted the efficacy of the popular vote there, opposed the Yankee profit motive, and found merit in Henry George's proposal to preserve U.S. capitalism by shifting emphasis from greedy industry to the more egalitarian agrarian sector. Ibarra categorizes Martí as an advanced democratic thinker who understood the possibility of a more utopian society in the distant future, an advocate of ideological pluralism who believed that reality could be comprehended from different theoretical positions as long as they had a historical base.

According to John Kirk, Martí felt that intellectuals were obligated to teach, to seek truth and create consciousness, and Martí viewed his praxis as far more important than his poetry or literature. Abel adds that Martí's optimistic view of mass political participation set him apart from other Cuban thinkers. Abel also characterizes Martí as concerned more with the spirit of rulers than with the strength of institutions and as having a sense of living in a period of irreversible movement toward liberation. To literature specialist Ivan Schulman, Martí epitomizes modernism, with its sensitivity to change, critical attitude, and defiance of norms.

Every research library should have this splendid collection, which provides original analyses of Martí by Cuban, English, and American scholars and demonstrates why intellectuals throughout Latin American revere Cuba's universal man who pursued knowledge, culture, and politics to elevate humanity.

SHELDON B. LISS
University of Akron

S. L. CLINE. *Colonial Culhuacan, 1580–1600: A Social History of an Aztec Town.* Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1986. Pp. xvii, 258. $29.95.

This is a social history of a sixteenth-century Mexican town, a difficult subject given the usual lack of data for native society and especially for commoners. Although it is supported by additional archival data, S. L. Cline's analysis is based primarily on an exceptionally rich collection of Nahuatl documents, which she and Miguel León-Portilla have published separately as *The Testaments of Culhuacan* (1984). These consist of sixty-five wills (fifty-two complete and thirteen fragments) spanning 1572 to 1606, but clustered around 1580–81, and thirty-six related documents.

Although Cline is interested in a wide range of social practices, gender is a consistent focus, and she shows the considerable complexity of sex roles in colonial life. Among the patterns discerned are that women bequeathed their land more widely than their houses, more women disinherited potential claimants than did men, and more women than men ordered goods given to the church or sold for masses. However, the reasons for some of these patterns are unclear. For instance, is the fact that women's ties are stronger to their sisters than to their brothers an emotive matter, or is this a function of women's economic dependency or poverty? Cline's patterns are more easily discerned than explained, even when she presents suggestive social contexts.

The problem is not one of interpretation or of imagination but of data. Although these wills provide access into the lives of ordinary Indians, they also impose limitations. By focusing on the ends of people's lives, wills obscure significant social issues, such as occupational and generational changes, marital patterns, residential mobility, household composition, family cycles, and infant mortality. Moreover, it is difficult to know how skewed the sample is: although they cover a broad social spectrum, this does not mean that the wills are a representative sample. With only twenty-nine complete and eight fragmentary wills for men and only twenty-three complete and four fragmentary wills for women (plus one fragment of undetermined authorship), many of the analyses necessarily rest on very few examples. This is particularly worrisome when the patterns only differ by degree rather than consisting of totally distinct practices. The wills also lack the temporal depth to analyze long-term changes and trends. Cline attempts to redress this by contrasting the wills with accounts of pre-Hispanic life, which highlights differences. And the complexity of actual behavior warns against simple-minded acceptance of idealized pre-Hispanic behavior, but this pre-Hispanic-colonial contrast largely reflects differences in types of data rather than in actual behavior.

Cline's data are both the book's strength and its weakness. They offer especially interesting details of ordinary life that help flesh out the larger picture. The book's focus, however, is not on an integrated set of questions about social life but rather on the somewhat eclectic mix of questions that the wills themselves address. Yet, despite limitations imposed by the data, this is a good book and a significant contribution to colonial Latin American history.

ROSS HASSIG
Columbia University

JOHN S. LEIBY. *Colonial Bureaucrats and the Mexican Economy: Growth of a Patrimonial State, 1763–1821.*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(American University Studies, ninth series, History, number 13.) New York: Peter Lang. 1986. Pp. xvii, 252. $32.00.

The received wisdom for many years in the study of Mexican colonial history was that the Bourbon reforms of the latter half of the eighteenth century had a substantially positive effect on the colonial economy. John S. Leiby's book supports this view, although the work falls rather short of achieving its own analytic and comparative goals.

In chapters on reformist trends in European and Spanish political economy, the various sectors in the economy of eighteenth-century Mexico, and the Bourbon colonial bureaucracy, Leiby attempts to portray what he calls the growth of a patrimonial state in Mexico, directly related to the defensive and modernizing posture of the Spanish metropolis; in all this there is nothing new. In superimposing on his rich, if uneven, empirical data the theoretical grid of the autonomous patrimonial state, Leiby seeks to add the sheen of comparative social science. Unfortunately, although the work gives evidence of substantial archival research, its bibliography is a good two or three decades out of date at some key points, and research of the last ten years or so that seriously questions the conventional wisdom about the Bourbon reforms is totally neglected. The result of this peculiar disjunction is to produce a sort of vertigo in the reader, putting the entire effort in the category of uninformed revisionism. Furthermore, the considerable original research has produced a hodgepodge of data, from single years of fiscal statistics to long lists of the names of colonial grist mills, apparently without any consistent criteria of selectivity or criticism.

The work is deeply flawed theoretically and methodologically, and these problems amplify each other. For example, looking almost entirely at government-generated reports and statistics produces the impression that the Bourbon reforms were, in fact, effective in rationalizing and centralizing colonial economic activity, to the point that Mexico's economy in Leiby's pages looks cut almost in a Stalinist pattern. Similarly, the use of the concept of a patrimonial state, without sufficient theoretical development, refinement, or attention to empirical fit, is largely meaningless. In one of his last chapters Leiby points to the superficial similarities between the late Bourbon state and the contemporary Mexican state, concluding that they are both centralizing, patrimonial structures, and that the latter is in some way a direct outgrowth of the former (we are not told how this occurred—the relationship is mostly a phenomenological one). This is tantamount to comparing Notre Dame with the Pompidou Center: after all, they are only across town from each other, and they are both buildings.

ERIC VAN YOUNG
University of California, San Diego

DAVID J. LANGUM. *Law and Community on the Mexican California Frontier: Anglo-American Expatriates and the Clash of Legal Traditions, 1821–1846*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 308. $30.00.

In the present book David J. Langum provides a look at the legal system in operation in Mexican California from a uniquely local perspective. The vehicle for that analysis is Anglo-American expatriates and their experiences with the system. The contacts of expatriates with the evolving legal system are viewed with an eye to their cultural biases and the fairness with which the system dealt with their cases.

Langum provides an ample introduction to the legal traditions of California. The importance of the alcalde system in Spanish California and its role in Mexican California are detailed, as are the changes in the legal system as it evolved under Mexican rule. His analyses of both the alcalde's role in legislative, executive, and judicial decision making and the changes in the role of regular courts are significant.

His analysis of the expatriate experience, the major portion of the book, indicates that expatriates were treated fairly by the legal system. In criminal courts punishments were not more harsh for expatriates than natives. In civil affairs the same was generally true. Expatriates used the "hombres buenos" system just as natives did. Langum's analysis of cases argued indicates that judgments were generally fair and consistent and did not demonstrate bias against or in favor of expatriates.

With such evidence available, it becomes necessary to analyze the reasons for expatriate criticism of the legal system, of which there was much. The weaknesses of remedies to problems in the system were a result of geographic and cultural limitations rather than the legal system. Problems that arose between local and expatriate legal traditions were a result more of differences in the norms of the society the expatriates had left than of inequities in the legal system of Mexican California. Analysis of cases in both criminal and civil courts amply demonstrates this contention.

Langum concludes that, despite problems between individuals from disparate legal traditions, expatriates were able to adapt to the system. Where they could, they used both alcalde and regular courts. In a number of disputes, mostly commercial, they used their own methods (including arbitration),

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thus avoiding the legal system. Their discomfort with the legal system was a result much more of their cultural background and tradition than of the system. Langum provides the evidence necessary to substantiate that the system was valid and working and that it sought conciliation and harmony in California. It was possible for aliens to live within the legal system without fear of discrimination in either criminal or civil legal arenas. Appendixes, bibliography, and index are provided.

JAMES E. KERR
Triad High School
St. Jacob, Illinois

JEFFERY BRANNON and ERIC N. BAKLANOFF. *Agrarian Reform and Public Enterprise in Mexico: The Political Economy of Yucatán's Henequen Industry*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 1987. Pp. xv, 236. $31.95.

Jeffrey Brannon and Eric N. Baklanoff trace the development and subsequent decline of the henequen industry in the Yucatán peninsula from the early colonial period to the 1980s. They focus on the industry's rapid growth that began in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the increasing economic and social problems of the period from the 1930s to the present. With the waxing of henequen, Yucatán emerged from backwardness and isolation to become a region of elite opulence and international economic ties; with its waning, the state reassumed its position as of one of the poorest in the country. Strong international demand for henequen and favorable incentives introduced by the state and national governments help explain the rise of the industry. A declining international market, the organization of collective ejidos, and government control of production and processing help account for the subsequent fifty years of immiseration in the state.

The study presents a historical record of a monocrop economy and its impact on the development of Yucatán. The authors argue that, despite considerable labor shortages in the region, the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century henequen industry prospered because of a favorable mix of entrepreneurial behavior and economic incentives—including public policy—for producers and processors. Prosperity was shared by few, however, as plantation owners devised numerous ways to avail themselves of a nearly slavelike labor force. The agrarian reform carried out under the direction of President Lázaro Cárdenas in the 1930s sought to institutionalize collective production and, through the Banco Nacional de Crédito Ejidal, promoted a dependency relationship between the government and the ejidatarios. Government domination of the henequen industry was further strengthened with the creation of Cordemex, the public cordage enterprise, in the 1950s. The authors demonstrate the extent to which social and political goals rather than objectives of efficiency and productivity came to dominate the government's activities in the henequen zone. They conclude that "Yucatán's henequen industry is a classic example of how paternalistic government intervention in an economic activity can retard rather than advance development" (p. 185).

Brannon and Baklanoff clearly favor the undoing of the ejido structure to permit the ejidatario "to sell, transfer, or mortgage his ejido right as well as to decide what he produces on his land and the destination of the product" (p. 187). Diversification of the state's economy is viewed as the only viable solution to a regional economy still heavily dependent on a moribund industry. The authors assess the potential for production of fruits and vegetables for the U.S. market, tourism, and export-oriented industry to respond to the economic needs of Yucatán. They conclude that the future will be brighter for Yucatecans if and when the Mexican government permits a more open, market-oriented economy to develop in the region.

The study is inconclusive on several points. It remains unclear how much of the fate of henequen is due to international market conditions and how much to public policy. At times, ejidatarios are portrayed as completely subordinate to government institutions; elsewhere, they are held responsible for resisting state domination to the point of frustrating government reform efforts. Public agencies and officials are described as corrupt and inefficient, yet Mexican presidents are portrayed as well-meaning and reformist. A more explicit theoretical framework would help clarify the complex history the authors seek to understand. Despite shortcomings, this book makes a useful contribution to the literature on regional economic history and presents an interesting discussion of policy alternatives for the future of Yucatán.

MERILEE GRINDLE
Harvard Institute for International Development
Cambridge, Massachusetts

CHARLES A. WEEKS. *The Juárez Myth in Mexico*. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 204. $24.95.

In this stimulating study, Charles A. Weeks explains the creation and transformation of one of the most powerful secular myths in the Western world, that of Benito Juárez of Mexico. Thanks to this fascinating monograph those interested in Mexico and its

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

history will understand the reverence his figure continues to command.

Juárez (1806–72), an Indian from Oaxaca, was an outstanding member, if not leader, of the Reform generation (1858–67) and president during the restored republic (1867–72). During his last years, Juárez faced considerable opposition from José María Iglesias, president of the Supreme Court, and from General Porfirio Díaz, a commander during the war against the French. By his death in 1872, he had held power continuously for fourteen years.

In 1887, as liberals, and particularly his former rival and successor, Díaz, tried to extoll Juárez as the Mexican manifestation of all civic virtue, he soon became the focus of considerable debate. Naturally, his traditional opponents—the proclerical conservatives—rejected the elevation of a civilian Saint Benito. But, more surprisingly, Díaz's liberal critics used Juárez's image as a banner to lend credibility to their complaints against the personalistic rule of the Porfiriato. The author notes, with more than a tinge of exaggeration, that fifteen years after his death "Juárez, thus, was far more valuable to all Mexicans dead than alive" (p. 42).

The remainder of the book traces the evolution of the Juárez myth from the centennial of his birth in 1906 to the present, including an entire chapter devoted to iconography. In addition, the author discusses the critique of Porfirian Francisco Bulnes, who attacked the liberals (known as "Jacobins") who believed that Díaz had perverted Juárez's liberal legacy. After the Mexican revolution, the Juárez myth declined somewhat, perhaps in response to the rise of presidents from Sonora. With the shift away from reform toward industrialization in the 1940s, however, Juárez was dusted off again, and his image has been continuously burnished ever since.

Weeks approaches his subject straightforwardly, without reference to the techniques of psychohistory or those derived from the large and still growing literature on myth. Further, he has avoided the obvious comparisons to other regional heroic myths. Nevertheless, this book is an important contribution to the subject, along with the numerous essays on Simon Bolívar and William Sater's *The Heroic Image in Chile* (1973).

BARBARA A. TENENBAUM
Washington, D.C.

THOMAS GOMEZ. *L'envers de l'Eldorado: Economie coloniale et travail indigene dans la Colombie du XVI^eme siècle.* (Publications de l'Universite de Toulouse-Le Mirail, series A, number 51.) Toulouse: L'Universite Toulouse-Le Mirail. 1984. Pp. 353.

The issue of Indian labor during the first two centuries of Spanish American colonization has attracted considerable attention over the last twenty years. Most of the resultant studies have focused on Mexico or Peru. By contrast Thomas Gómez examines the case of sixteenth-century Colombia or, more specifically, the environs of Santa Fé de Bogotá. His book is divided into three parts: a survey of the region's geography, demography, and institutional history; an extensive look at the *boga* (river navigation system), its economic role in the formation of the colony, and its effects on the native population; and the *boga*'s impact on the global economy and on the social and demographic landscape of colonial Colombia.

Working primarily from manuscript sources (Archivo General de Indias; Archivo de la Real Academia Español de la Historia; Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid; British Museum; and the Archivo Histórico Nacional, Bogotá), Gómez describes a society that drew on both Iberian and American cultures while adapting itself to the mountainous terrain of south-central Colombia. The Spanish colonists who established Santa Fé de Bogotá did so because they encountered there a wealth of resources and a large industrious Indian population. Their rapid rise to dominance over the region's resources, both material and human, was largely untempered by crown interference, primarily because of the region's geographic isolation. The colonists turned that isolation to their political advantage without suffering economically. They relied on pre-Columbian means of transport—portage and river rafts—to move gold and emeralds out of their enclave, generally as contraband rather than through official channels.

The colonists similarly rejected all crown efforts to make production and transport more "efficient" and to protect the Indians from "abuse," because those efforts were incompatible with their interests. The Indians were forced into servile status, suffering demographic decline as a result of their labors and other factors (changes in environment, European diseases, and so on). Eventually, they were destined to be replaced with black slaves.

Sixteenth-century Colombia was clearly different than other parts of Spanish America. Nevertheless, Gómez's insistence that its society was the product of human interchange, aspirations, desires, and failings—within a context shaped by economic, geographical, and cultural factors—is shared by many of us who work on other colonial societies. It may not please social science purists, but it restores the human element to the historical process.

JEFFREY A. COLE
University of Massachusetts

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FREDRICK B. PIKE. *The Politics of the Miraculous in Peru: Haya de la Torre and the Spiritualist Tradition*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 1986. Pp. xvi, 391. $32.50.

In his first major work on Peru, *The Modern History of Peru* (1967), Fredrick B. Pike described what were in his opinion the basic flaws of the Peruvian Aprista party: "rank opportunism, absence of candour, and lack of a solid moral foundation" (p. 245). In this, his second major work on Peru, Pike radically revises his original portrayal of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre and the Aprista party. The author reacts strongly against the tendency of most North American scholars, perhaps himself at one time, to view Latin American politics through the lens of their own pragmatic and highly rationalistic culture. In so doing, he joins a growing number of scholars who have come to appreciate the "spiritualist tradition" of Latin America, a current of thought that deeply influenced many cultural elites in both Europe and America in the first decades of this century. Pike includes within this tradition such diverse phenomena as popular Catholicism, séances, Masonic rites, and messianic political movements.

The spiritualist tradition, as depicted by the author, disdains North American materialism and esteems the fully integrated human being who has achieved an inner harmony between body and spirit, poetry and logic, suffering and hope. Very much in communion with the world views of Heraclitus or Hegel, it perceives all of reality as a dynamic tension between inner psychic forces and external manifestations. This spiritualist vein is a key to understanding such diverse but fully typical figures of Latin America as José Rodríguez de Francia of Paraguay, Gabriel García Moreno of Ecuador, Emiliano Zapata of Mexico, and Ernesto "Che" Guevara. It also throws light on the basic motivations of thousands of Latin Americans of all social classes who are frequently swayed in their political choices by myth makers and "miracle men," not unlike the masses who supported Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini in another cultural context.

The prime example of Pike's thesis is Haya de la Torre (1895–1979), founder and leader of Peru's Aprista party (the APRA). A highly controversial figure, Haya commanded passionate loyalty among his followers and aroused bitter hostility among his enemies. Up until now almost all biographies of Haya have been political hagiographies that have never seriously plumbed the depths of the man. Pike has therefore assumed a twofold task: to write a nonpartisan biography of this Peruvian leader and, at the same time, to show that the spiritualist tradition became fully incarnated in Haya de la Torre. The result is a compelling, fascinating, and well-researched psychohistory of this central figure in modern Peruvian history.

The author's major thesis, the importance of the spiritualist tradition, is well stated and after this work must be taken seriously, especially in the case of Peru. But the application of the thesis to Haya suffers from two major weaknesses, which the author himself candidly admits. In the first place, the spiritualist side of Haya constituted but one facet of his personality and life. Yet, by the sheer weight of emphasis and repetition, Pike has virtually made that facet the single theme of Haya's career. In the second place, even though the author warns the reader of the pitfalls of psychohistory, his biography of Haya is essentially just that. As a result, his portrayal of the Aprista leader, which includes insights from Jung and other observers of human psychic states, is a highly subjective interpretation. At times the external evidence for certain claims is very weak or nonexistent. In other cases Pike bases his observations on unflattering gossip spread by biased sources, such as Haya's purported role in serving, in 1939, as a liaison between a medium and a conspiring general. In some instances the author fills in the picture with pure speculation: books that Haya "could have" read, mystical meanings he might have projected into the Aprista banner, Haya's Masonic connections, and so on.

Pike is closer to the mark when he diagnoses Haya as a man in search of personal integration. This interpretation is more in accord with sympathetic but critical witnesses who found Haya to be a well-read but unsystematic thinker and probably an agnostic, who dabbled in spiritualism as a substitute for an integrating faith that he had either lost or never had. Finally, the presence of spiritualist or esoteric elements in Haya does not fully explain Haya the political phenomenon. Spiritualism of the séance or Masonic variety was an elitist cultural trend that had little or no meaning for the great mass of lower-class Peruvians who admired Haya. More like the calculating rationalist, the Aprista leader related to them in terms of the popular religiosity that they did understand.

In short this is a thought-provoking and artfully written psychobiography. The question that lurks between every line and Jungian insight, however, is, how much of this is really true? Like Haya himself, Pike's work is captivating and definitely controversial.

JEFFREY KLAIBER
Catholic University
Lima, Peru

FRANK MACDONALD SPINDLER. *Nineteenth-Century Ecuador: A Historical Introduction*. Lanham, Md.:

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

George Mason University Press. 1987. Pp. xiv, 285. $28.75.

Frank MacDonald Spindler has produced a frustrating book, albeit not one without value in a field that desperately calls out for attention. He can be congratulated for having made available a veritable encyclopedia of Ecuadorian political (and to some extent ecclesiastical) history covering the years 1809 to 1912. Strong in this regard, and with a plethora of useful minibiographies and fully forty-eight pages of relevant notes, the book is nevertheless disappointing.

Absent from this work are treatments of economic and social issues, without which many of the political upheavals and changes cannot be adequately limned. Thus, we have a unidimensional approach to the history of nineteenth-century Ecuador that implies a simplicity of structure quite misleading. Hence, on page 199 we learn that the nation in 1909 had a foreign debt of 27,950,000 sucres and an internal debt of another 11,000,000 sucres. But, we are not told how these debts have been accumulated, and, inexplicably, the author does nothing to inform the reader just what a sucre was worth. One might wish also that the various concordats with the Vatican were presented in less detailed manner or perhaps placed in an appendix for those specifically interested. Other features jar the reader. For instance chapter 7, entitled "The Age of Borrero and Veintemilla, 1875–1883," (can eight years constitute an "Age"?), should be renamed "The Age of Juan Montalvo," the learned polemicist whose influence ran deep and was potent in Ecaudorian life and politics for far more years than eight.

Finally, the reader might be puzzled by the book's last narrative pages, in which former President Eloy Alfaro and his *pandilla* are dragged from a jail cell, murdered, castrated by a mob, and burned. This is where the book ends, save for a one-paragraph "Aftermath." There should have been a conclusion instead, a drawing together of the main threads of nineteenth-century political (if not social and economic) life. The reader, in short, is left wondering just why the tale ends in a bonfire in January 1912. This should not be.

JOHN HOYT WILLIAMS
Indiana State University

ADEMIR GEBARA. *O mercado de trabalho livre no Brasil (1871–1888)* [The Free Labor Market in Brazil, 1871–88]. São Paulo: Brasiliense. 1986. Pp. 221.

This work's depth of research is impressive, with sources ranging from the personal archives of the Barão de Cotegipe, to the Visconde do Rio Branco, to British Foreign Office files, and to public and private collections on slavery in São Paulo. Ademir Gebara's grasp of slave bibliographies by Brazilian and American scholars is impeccable as well. The book is well written and competently documented so that those in slave studies will count it among the most important contributions to the subject.

The core thesis of the book is that the abolitionist process was intricately tied to the rise of the demand for a free labor market in Brazil, especially after 1871. Therefore, the transition from slavery to free labor was as much a function of the transformation of capitalism as of the organization of the labor market, free and servile.

The point of departure for Gebara's study is the Rio Branco Law of 1871, or Free Womb Law. The fundamental purpose of the law was to safeguard property rights (for slaveowners) and to avoid any undue disruption of the then explosive agricultural expansion. These twin goals remained the guiding principles throughout the 1880s. Of the three labor management laws—the Rio Branco Law for the freed and slaves, the service rental law for both Brazilian and foreign agricultural laborers of 1879, and the Commercial Code of 1850, which regulated the nonagrarian labor force—Gebara considers that the prime force that determined Brazil's (more precisely São Paulo's) labor market was the corpus of laws governing servile labor. Through a careful analysis of the politics of the evolution of laws, he shows skillfully that planters did not support abolition until they were convinced of the availability of a free labor supply and of the comparative economic advantages that it offered (p. 170).

The strongest and most interesting part of the book is the treatment of slave-freeman relations in local settings, however. Using the cases of several sugar- and coffee-growing counties in São Paulo province, Gebara convinces the reader that the local preoccupations, or those of planters, were quite different from those of the nation's politicians. The social control of slavery meant regulating slaves' relations to freemen, as well as imposing limits on the commercialization of labor and other endeavors of the servile population. Many São Paulo counties, almost all prosperous coffee-growing regions, had ordinances addressing specifically slave participation in the local economy.

Another aspect of the book that also deserves mention deals with the patterns of slave resistance, more specifically runaways. An interesting hypothesis is introduced: the urbanization of São Paulo played an important role in precipitating slave escape in the late 1870s and 1880s. Hence, Gebara dismisses the notion that all slaves who ran away from plantations ended up in the backlands. Rather, he points out that the Africans (first generation) were more prone to do this, for they were equipped

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with survival skills. Brazilian-born slaves often ran away to cities. In a close examination of one São Paulo fazenda (a medium-size plantation, according to the author, who, by the way, never provides enough data for the reader to determine the size and productivity of the property) over a ten-year period, Gebara reveals two interesting points: first, the fazenda relied on a mixed labor regime, and, second, slave runaways were engaged more often in truancy than in an organized escape. The role of mixed labor and the transient nature of slaves (those counties that Gebara studied were heavy importers of slaves) are never fully analyzed to determine if his thesis on resistance is valid.

The book falls well within the mainstream thinking of Brazilian-American slave historiography. However, like much of Brazilian historians' research, the book is a "local" case study, in this case, of São Paulo's north and northwest. With the data presented in the book, it is difficult for the reader to extrapolate broader, "national" conclusions. On the question of commercial activities by slaves, for instance, Mary Karasch's work contradicts Gebara's findings. Perhaps the rural-urban dichotomy in slavery should be tackled empirically before intelligent generalizations on aspects or the whole of Brazilian slavery can be made.

EUL-SOO PANG
Colorado School of Mines

ALFREDO M. SEIFERHELD. *Nazismo y fascismo en el Paraguay*. Volume 1, *Vísperas de la II Guerra Mundial, 1936–1939*; volume 2, *Los años de la guerra, 1939–1945*. Asunción: Histórica. 1986. Pp. 224; 331.

In the decade 1936–45 Paraguay concluded a victorious peace following the Chaco War, experienced a short-lived, authoritarian, populist government, witnessed a Liberal counterrevolution, suffered the military's entrance into domestic politics, and encountered both the dangers and opportunities presented by World War II. Alfredo M. Seiferheld's goal is to assess the extent that Fascist or Nazi doctrines influenced Paraguayan leaders in this eventful decade and then to determine what impact, if any, those doctrines had on internal and external policies.

The traditional liberalism that guided Paraguay since the turn of the century and led it through the Chaco War no longer sufficed to meet urgent societal and economic needs. Many Latin Americans, Paraguayans included, looked in the 1930s to Italy and Germany as examples of successful, nationalistic, modernizing nations. Greater state intervention in the economy was deemed necessary by reformist Paraguayans, and the authoritarian models of Germany and Italy appeared to them to be more successful during the Great Depression than the liberal democracies of the West. Then too, that type of authoritarianism could more easily be grafted onto traditional modes of leadership in Latin America.

To single out specific Nazi influences in Paraguay is difficult, but Seiferheld does cite the temporary measures of the late 1930s to restrict Jewish immigration. Those laws, however, were poorly enforced. Far from being persecuted in this era, the local Jewish community grew in numbers and for the first time acted as an effective pressure group. Anti-Semitism probably did exist among some high officials, but many simply believed that European Jews with their urban and commercial backgrounds were not the agricultural immigrants desired by the nation.

The virus of Nazism did flourish among one group: the German Paraguayans. This community was deemed useful to German diplomacy, and the Asunción legation promoted Nazi ideology within that ethnic community. Their strong business presence in Asunción and prominent position in parts of the countryside made them a force that no other immigrant group could match. Later, during the war itself, certain German Paraguayans spread propaganda for the fatherland and even engaged in minor espionage. Although respected and even protected by officials in the government, these local adherents of Nazism never had any real influence on the Paraguayan leadership.

The author's analysis of government external policies in relation to the ebb and flow of Axis fortunes in this decade is his most intriguing theme. Diplomats of the Third Reich wooed Paraguay—as they did other Latin American nations—for economic reasons first. Later, the Paraguayan military were extremely impressed with German victories from 1939 to 1942. However, Paraguay's leadership, civilian and military, was little concerned with Nazi or Fascist ideology. They simply desired that their small, weak nation be aligned with the winning side in the great power conflict. The United States, in particular, did not fully understand this traditional policy of Asunción and often overestimated the extent of German influence in Paraguay—particularly in the late 1930s when the economic goals of the Good Neighbor Policy clashed with German economic diplomacy. By 1938, for strategic hemispheric reasons as well as for economic goals, Washington began wooing Asunción with economic aid.

North American aid, Paraguay's dependence on the Allies for markets and imports, and the change in the fortunes of war by late 1942 persuaded the government of Higinio Morínigo first to break relations with the Axis and later to declare war. Some Paraguayan military and civil officials resented the

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

growing North American influence, but Realpolitik dictated those actions. The war's end found Paraguay on the winning side and German and Italian ideologies seemingly discredited by the overwhelming Allied victory and the revelation of Nazi atrocities.

Seiferheld has presented us with a useful contribution to the knowledge of Paraguay's internal and external policies in this decade, as well as illuminating the Paraguayan German and Jewish communities. There are, however, some problems in these two volumes. Often, the author appears unwilling or unable to differentiate between ideology and sheer national interest when discussing the motives and actions of Paraguay and the Third Reich. He was unable to gain access to his own nation's diplomatic records and was forced to rely heavily on those of the United States and the German Foreign Office. In compensation, however, Seiferheld possesses the requisite analytical skills to use secondary writings as he explores the political, diplomatic, and even economic options Paraguay faced. He slights the activities of Italy and Japan in Paraguay, but more surprising is his failure to use available records of the Nazi party's overseas branch. With all these faults, these two volumes yet stand as significant contributions to the history of an era that has cried out for its historian.

JERRY W. COONEY
University of Louisville

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Collected Essays

These volumes, recently received in the *AHR* office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed. Other similar volumes that are amenable to reviewing will be found in the review section.

DAVID STRICKLIN and REBECCA SHARPLESS, editors. *The Past Meets the Present: Essays on Oral History*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. 1988. Pp. 151. Cloth $23.25, paper $11.50.

WILLIAM W. MOSS, Oral History: What Is It and Where Did It Come From? BARBARA ALLEN, Oral History: The Folk Connection. ELIOT WIGGINTON, Reaching across the Generations: The Foxfire Experience. VIVIAN PERLIS, Oral History as Biography. CULLOM DAVIS, Success and Excess: Oral History at High Tide. BARBARA ALLEN, Talking about the American Past: Oral History and American Studies. ELIOT WIGGINTON and CHRISTOPHER CRAWFORD, Foxfire and the Educational Mainstream. VIVIAN PERLIS, Perspectives on American Music. WILLIAM W. MOSS, Oral History: Where Is It Going?

WIEBE E. BIJKER *et al.*, editors. *The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 1987. Pp. x, 405. $35.00.

TREVOR J. PINCH and WIEBE E. BIJKER, The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each Other. THOMAS P. HUGHES, The Evolution of Large Technological Systems. MICHEL CALLON, Society in the Making: The Study of Technology as a Tool for Sociological Analysis. JOHN LAW, Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of Portuguese Expansion. HENK VAN DEN BELT and ARIE RIP, The Nelson-Winter-Dosi Model and Synthetic Dye Chemistry. WIEBE E. BIJKER, The Social Construction of Bakelite: Toward a Theory of Invention. DONALD MACKENZIE, Missile Accuracy: A Case Study in the Social Processes of Technological Change. EDWARD W. CONSTANT II, The Social Locus of Technological Practice: Community, System, or Organization? HENK J. H. W. BODEWITZ *et al.*, Regulatory Science and the Social Management of Trust in Medicine. RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN, The Consumption Junction: A Proposal for Research Strategies in the Sociology of Technology. EDWARD YOXEN, Seeing with Sound: A Study of the Development of Medical Images. STEVE WOOLGAR, Reconstructing Man and Machine: A Note on Sociological Critiques of Cognitivism. H. M. COLLINS, Expert Systems and the Science of Knowledge.

JOHN A. HALL, editor. *States in History*. New York: Basil Blackwell. 1987. Pp. vi, 317. $49.95.

JOHN A. HALL, Introduction. CLIVE GAMBLE, Hunter-Gatherers and the Origin of States. PATRICIA CRONE, The Tribe and the State. ERNEST GELLNER, Soviets against Wittfogel: Or, the Anthropological Preconditions of Mature Marxism. MICHAEL MANN, The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results. PETER BURKE, City-States. JOHN A. HALL, States and Economic Development: Reflections on Adam Smith. COLIN CROUCH, Sharing Public Space: States and Organized Interests in Western Europe. KAREN DAWISHA, State and Politics in Developed Socialism: Recent Developments in Soviet Theory. ANTHONY D. SMITH, State-Making and Nation-Building. J. G. MERQUIOR, Patterns of State-Building in Brazil and Argentina. SUSAN STRANGE, Supranationals and the State.

EUGENE KAMENKA, editor. *Utopias*. (Papers from the Annual Symposium of the Australian Academy of the Humanities.) New York: Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. 193. $39.95.

ANTHONY STEPHENS, The Sun State and Its Shadow: On the Condition of Utopian Writing. O. H. K. SPATE, The Pacific: Home of Utopias. R. B. ROSE, Utopias and the Enlightenment. J. R. POYNTER, Benthamite Utopias. EUGENE KAMENKA, Socialism and Utopia. J. C. DAVIS, Utopia, Science, and Social Science. VIRGINIA SPATE, Arcady or Utopia? Figures in the Landscape in Late Nineteenth-Century French Painting. MILES LEWIS, Architechtural Utopias. LEONIE KRAMER, Utopia as Metaphor. DON LAYCOCK, The Languages of Utopia.

CARY NELSON and LAWRENCE GROSSBERG, editors. *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1988. Pp. x, 738. Cloth $39.95, paper $18.95.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LAWRENCE GROSSBERG and CARY NELSON, Introduction: The Territory of Marxism. CORNEL WEST, Marxist Theory and the Specificity of Afro-American Oppression. STUART HALL, The Toad in the Garden: Thatcherism among the Theorists. HENRI LEFEBVRE, Toward a Leftist Cultural Politics: Remarks Occasioned by the Centenary of Marx's Death. CHANTAL MOUFFE, Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept of Democracy. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Desire and Power: A Feminist Perspective. PAUL PATTON, Marxism and Beyond: Strategies of Reterritorialization. A. BELDON FIELDS, In Defense of Political Economy and Systemic Analysis: A Critique of Prevailing Theoretical Approaches to the New Social Movements. ETIENNE BALIBAR, The Vacillation of Ideology. OSKAR NEGT, What Is a Revival of Marxism and Why Do We Need One Today? Centennial Lecture Commemorating the Death of Karl Marx. GAJO PETROVIĆ, Philosophy and Revolution: Twenty Sheaves of Questions. ERNESTO LACLAU, Metaphor and Social Anatagonisms. CHRISTINE DELPHY, Patriarchy, Domestic Mode of Production, Gender, and Class. GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, Can the Subaltern Speak? PERRY ANDERSON, Modernity and Revolution. FRANCO MORETTI, The Spell of Indecision. FREDRIC JAMESON, Cognitive Mapping. ANDREW ROSS, The New Sentence and the Commodity Form: Recent American Writing. FRED PFEIL, Postmodernism as a "Structure of Feeling." EUGENE HOLLAND, Schizoanalysis: The Postmodern Contextualization of Psychoanalysis. JULIA LESAGE, Women's Rage. MICHELE MATTELART, Can Industrial Culture Be a Culture of Difference? A Reflection on France's Confrontation with the U.S. Model of Serialized Cultural Production. FERNANDO REYES MATTA, The "New Song" and Its Confrontation in Latin America. SIMON FRITH, Art Ideology and Pop Practice. MICHAEL RYAN, The Politics of Film: Discourse, Psychoanalysis, Ideology. JACK L. AMARIGLIO *et al.*, Class, Power, and Culture. JEAN FRANCO, Beyond Ethnocentrism: Gender, Power, and the Third-World Intelligentsia. STANLEY ARONOWITZ, The Production of Scientific Knowledge: Science, Ideology, and Marxism. SUE GOLDING, The Concept of the Philosophy of Praxis in the *Quaderni* of Antonio Gramsci. RICHARD SCHACHT, Marxism, Normative Theory, and Alienation. ARMAND MATTELART, Communications in Socialist France: The Difficulty of Matching Technology with Democracy. IAIN CHAMBERS, Contamination, Coincidence, and Collusion: Pop Music, Urban Culture, and the Avant-Garde. TERRY EAGLETON, The Critic as Clown. MICHEL PECHEUX, Discourse: Structure or Event? HUGO ACHUGAR, The Book of Poems as a Social Act: Notes toward an Interpretation of Contemporary Hispanic American Poetry. DARKO SUVIN, Can People Be (Re)Presented in Fiction? Toward a Theory of Narrative Agents and a Materialist Critique beyond Technology or Reductionism. MICHELE BARRETT, The Place of Aesthetics in Marxist Criticism. FENGZHEN WANG, Marxist Literary Criticism in China.

ARVIND SHARMA, editor. *Women in World Religions.* (McGill Studies in the History of Religions.) Introduction by KATHERINE K. YOUNG. Albany: State University of New York Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 302. Cloth $34.50, paper $10.95.

KATHERINE K. YOUNG, Introduction. RITA M. GROSS, Tribal Religions: Aboriginal Australia. KATHERINE K. YOUNG, Hinduism. NANCY SCHUSTER BARNES, Buddhism. THERESA KELLEHER, Confucianism. BARBARA REED, Taoism. DENISE L. CARMODY, Judaism. ROSEMARY R. RUETHER, Christianity. JANE I. SMITH, Islam.

PAUL E. STEPANSKY, editor. *Freud: Appraisals and Reappraisals.* (Contributions to Freud Studies, number 2.) Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic. 1988. Pp. xx, 200. $29.95.

PETER HOMANS, Disappointment and the Ability to Mourn: De-Idealization as a Psychological Theme in Freud's Life, Thought, and Social Circumstance, 1906–1914. RICHARD E. GEHA, Freud as Fictionalist: The Imaginary Worlds of Psychoanalysis. PATRICIA HERZOG, The Myth of Freud as Anti-Philosopher.

PAUL E. STEPANSKY, editor. *Freud: Appraisals and Reappraisals.* (Contributions to Freud Studies, number 3.) Hillsdale, N.J.: Analytic. 1988. Pp. xxi, 201. $29.95.

JOHN KERR, Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Back Again: Freud, Jung, and Sabina Spielrein. PETER J. SWALES, Freud, Katharina, and the First "Wild Analysis." ROBERT R. HOLT, Freud's Adolescent Reading: Some Possible Effects on His Work.

JULIA ANNAS, editor. *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy.* Volume 5. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. 257. Cloth $54.00, paper $26.00.

THOMAS C. BRICKHOUSE and NICHOLAS D. SMITH, Socrates on Goods, Virtue, and Happiness. YAHEI KANAYAMA, Perceiving, Considering, and Attaining Being (*Theaetetus* 184–186). THEODOR EBERT, The Origin of the Stoic Theory of Signs in Sextus Empiricus. P. MITSIS, Epicurus on Friendship and Altruism. A. C. LLOYD, Plotinus on the Genesis of Thought and Existence. GREGORY VLASTOS, "Separation" in Plato. R. W. SHARPLES, Could Alexander (Follower of Aristotle) Have Done Better? A Response to Professor Frede and Others. CHARLOTTE STOUGH, Knowledge and Belief: A Discussion of Julia Anaas and Jonathan Barnes, *The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations*; and Harold Tarrant, *Scepticism or Platonism? The Philosophy of the Fourth Academy.* C. C. W. TAYLOR, Hellenistic Ethics: A Discussion of Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker, *The Norms of Nature, Studies in Hellenistic Ethics.*

Le mouvement confraternel au Moyen Age: France, Italie, Suisse. (Proceedings of the Conference "L'institution ecclésiale à la fin du Moyen Age," 1985; Collection de l'Ecole française de Rome, number 97; Université de Lausanne Publications de la Faculté des Lettres, number 30.) Lausanne: Université de Lausanne or Ecole Française de Rome, Rome. 1987. Pp. 405.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AGOSTINO PARAVICINI BAGLIANI, Présentation. JACQUES CHIFFOLEAU, Entre le religieux et le politique: Les confréries du Saint-Esprit en Provence et en Comtat Venaissin à la fin du Moyen Age. ANNA BENVENUTI PAPI, Donne religiose nella Firenze del Due-Trecento: Appunti per una ricerca in corso. NOEL COULET, Le mouvement confraternel en Provence et dans le Comtat Venaissin au Moyen Age. CATHERINE VINCENT, La confrérie comme structure d'intégration: L'exemple de la Normandie. ROBERTO RUSCONI, Pratica cultuale ed istruzione religiosa nelle confraternite italiane del tardo medio evo: "Libri da compagnia" e libri de pietà. GIOVANNA CASAGRANDE, Devozione e municipalità: La Compagnia del S. Anello/S. Giuseppe di Perugia (1487–1542). JEAN-LOUP LEMAITRE, La consorce du clergé de Lodi et son missel, XII^{e}–XIV^{e} siècle. KATHRIN TREMP-UTZ, Une confrérie de saint Jacques à Berne à la fin du Moyen Age. LOUIS BINZ, Les confréries dans le diocèse de Genève à la fin du Moyen Age. ANDRÁ SCHNYDER, Unions de prière patronnées par sainte Ursule en Allemagne du Sud à la fin du XV^{e} siècle. NICOLAS MORARD, Une charité bien ordonnée: La confrérie du Saint-Esprit à Fribourg à la fin du Moyen Age (XIV^{e}–XV^{e} siècles). CHARLES M. DE LA RONCIERE, Les confréries à Florence et dans son contado aux XIV^{e}–XV^{e} siècles. ANTONIO RIGON, Le congregazioni del clero urbano in area veneta (XII–XV secolo). GIUSEPPINA DE SANDRE GASPARINI, Il movimento delle confraternite nell'area veneta. ANDRE VAUCHEZ, Conclusion.

JOEL ROSENTHAL and COLIN RICHMOND, editors. *People, Politics, and Community in the Later Middle Ages*. New York: St. Martin's or Alan Sutton, Gloucester, U.K. 1987. Pp. xv, 198. $29.95.

I. ARTHURSON, The Rising of 1497: A Revolt of the Peasantry? MICHAEL BENNETT, Careerism in Late Medieval England. VIRGINIA DAVIS, William Waynflete and the Educational Revolution of the Fifteenth Century. MARJORIE DREXLER, Fluid Prejudice: Scottish Origin Myths in the Later Middle Ages. JAMES L. GILLESPIE, Cheshiremen at Blore Heath: A Swan Dive. ROSEMARY C. E. HAYES, The Pre-episcopal Career of William Alnwick, Bishop of Norwich and Lincoln. BEN. R. MCREE, Religious Gilds and Regulation of Behavior in Late Medieval Towns. R. G. K. A. MERTES, The Household as a Religious Community. SIMON J. PAYLING, Law and Arbitration in Nottinghamshire 1399–1461. JOEL T. ROSENTHAL, Kings, Continuity, and Ecclesiastical Benefaction in Fifteenth Century England. CHARLES W. SMITH, A Conflict of Interest? Chancery Clerks in Private Service.

E. I. KOURI and TOM SCOTT, editors. *Politics and Society in Reformation Europe: Essays for Sir Geoffrey Elton on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday*. New York: St. Martin's. 1987. Pp. xix, 568. $45.00.

HIEKO A. OBERMAN, The Impact of the Reformation: Problems and Perspectives. GERHARD MÜLLER, Martin Luther and the Political World of His Time. VOLKER PRESS, The Holy Roman Empire in German History. HORST RABE and PETER MARZAHL, "*Comme représentant nostre propre personne*": The Regency Ordinances of Charles V as a Historical Source. R. W. SCRIBNER, Police and Territorial State in Sixteenth-Century Württemberg. HANS-CHRISTOPH RUBLACK, Is There a "New History" of the Urban Reformation? THOMAS A. BRADY, JR, The Common Man and the Lost Austria in the West: A Contribution to the German Problem. HENRY J. COHN, Church Property in the German Protestant Principalities. HANS R. GUGGISBERG, The Problem of "Failure" in the Swiss Reformation: Some Preliminary Reflections. TOM SCOTT, Economic Conflict and Cooperation on the Upper Rhine, 1450–1600. BERND MOELLER, Luther in Europe: His Works in Translation, 1517–46. BERNARD VOGLER, Europe as Seen through the Correspondence of Theodore Beza. P. L. ROSE, Bodin's Universe and its Paradoxes: Some Problems in the Intellectual Biography of Jean Bodin. HEINZ SCHILLING, "History of Crime" or "History of Sin"? Some Reflections on the Social History of Early Modern Church Discipline. KONRAD REPGEN, What is a "Religious War"? HEINRICH LUTZ, Cardinal Reginald Pole and the Path to Anglo-Papal Mediation at the Peace Conference of Marcq, 1553–55. H. G. KOENIGSBERGER, Orange, Granvelle and Philip II. A. G. DICKENS, The Shape of Anti-clericalism and the English Reformation. E. I. KOURI, For True Faith or National Interest? Queen Elizabeth I and the Protestant Powers. R. B. WERNHAM, Queen Elizabeth I, the Emperor Rudolph II, and Archduke Ernest, 1593–94. G. D. RAMSAY, The Settlement of the Merchants Adventurers at Stade, 1587–1611. E. LADEWIG PETERSON and KNUD J. V. JESPERSEN, Two Revolutions in Early Modern Denmark. SVEN LUNDKVIST, The European Powers and Sweden in the Reign of Gustav Vasa. ANTONI MĄCZAK, The Conclusive Years: The End of the Sixteenth Century as the Turning-Point of Polish History. THOMAS NIPPERDEY, The Reformation and the Modern World.

ALAN CHARLES KORS and PAUL J. KORSHIN, editors. *Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England, France, and Germany*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 1987. Pp. viii, 290. $29.95.

ALAN CHARLES KORS, Introduction. ELISABETH LABROUSSE, Reading Pierre Bayle in Paris. ALAN CHARLES KORS, "A First Being of Whom We Have No Proof": The Preamble of Atheism in Early-Modern France. DALE VAN KLEY, Pierre Nicole, Jansenism, and the Morality of Enlightened Self-Interest. JOHN ANDREW BERNSTEIN, Shaftesbury's Optimism and Eighteenth-Century Social Thought. THOMAS P. SAINE, Who's Afraid of Christian Wolff? MARGARET C. JACOB, Scientific Culture in the Early English Enlightenment: Mechanisms, Industry, and Gentlemanly Facts. UWE-K. KETELSON, Science and Literature in the Early German Enlightenment. JOHN A. MCCARTHY, The Gallant Novel and the German Enlightenment, 1670–1750. P. M. MITCHELL, The Pattern Is Perceived and the Seed Is Sown. JOCELYN HARRIS, Sappho, Souls, and the Salic Law of Wit. J. PAUL HUNTER, "The Young, the Ignorant, and the Idle": Some Notes on Readers and the Beginnings of the English Novel.

JANET WOLFF and JOHN SEED, editors. *The Culture of Capital: Art, Power, and the Nineteenth-Century Middle Class*. Manchester: Manchester University Press; dis-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tributed by St. Martin's, New York. 1988. Pp. vii, 236. $60.00.

JOHN SEED and JANET WOLFF, Introduction. SIMON GUNN, The "Failure" of the Victorian Middle Class: A Critique. JOHN SEED, "Commerce and the Liberal Arts": The Political Economy of Art in Manchester, 1775–1860. ALAN WHITE, Class, Culture, and Control: The Sheffield Athenaeum Movement and the Middle Class. JANET WOLFF, The Culture of Separate Spheres: The Role of Culture in Nineteenth-Century Public and Private Life. CAROLINE ARSCOTT, "Without Distinction of Party": The Polytechnic Exhibitions in Leeds, 1839–45. CAROLINE ARSCOTT, Employer, Husband, Spectator: Thomas Fairbairn's Commission of *The Awakening Conscience*. CAROLINE ARSCOTT *et al.*, The Partial View: The Visual Representation of the Early Nineteenth-Century Industrial City.

EDWARD TIMMS and PETER COLLIER, editors. *Visions and Blueprints: Avant-garde Culture and Radical Politics in Early Twentieth-Century Europe*. Manchester: Manchester University Press; distributed by St. Martin's, New York. 1988. Pp. xii, 328. $39.95.

RAYMOND WILLIAMS, Introduction: The Politics of the Avant-garde. EDWARD TIMMS, Treason of the Intellectuals? Benda, Benn, and Brecht. PETER COLLIER, Dreams of a Revolutionary Culture: Gramsci, Trotsky, and Breton. DAVID MIDGLEY, Communism and the Avant-garde: The Case of Georg Lukács. HELGA GEYER-RYAN, Counterfactual Artefacts: Walter Benjamin's Philosophy of History. JUDY DAVIES, The Futures Market: Marinetti and the Fascists of Milan. MICHAEL LONG, The Politics of English Modernism: Eliot, Pound, and Joyce. MARGOT HEINEMANN, Left Review, New Writing, and the Broad Alliance Against Fascism. PETER COLLIER, The Poetry of Protest: Auden, Aragon, and Eluard. GINO RAYMOND, André Malraux and the Radical Dilemma. SAIME GÖKSU and EDWARD TIMMS, Nâzim Hikmet: Poetry and Politics in Kemalist Turkey. PAUL CONNERTON, Freud and the Crowd. RITCHIE ROBERTSON, Nationalism and Modernity: German-Jewish Writers and the Zionist Movement. ALISON SINCLAIR, Elitism and the Cult of the Popular in Spain. NAOMI SEGAL, Sexual Politics and the Avant-garde: From Apollinaire to Woolf. FRANK WHITFORD, The Triumph of the Banal: Art in Nazi Germany. ELSA STRIETMAN, *De Stijl*: Style and Idea. MICHAEL MINDEN, Politics and the Silent Cinema: *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* and *Battleship Potemkin*. RAYMOND WILLIAMS, Theatre as a Political Forum.

IVO BANAC and FRANK E. SYSYN, editors. *Concepts of Nationhood in Early Modern Eastern Europe*. (Harvard Ukrainian Studies, volume 10, number 3/4.) Cambridge: Ukrainian Research Center, Harvard University. 1986. Pp. viii, 271–597.

IVO BANAC and FRANK E. SYSYN, Introduction. OMELJAN PRITSAK, Kiev and All of Rus': The Fate of a Sacral Idea. JERZY OCHMAŃSKI, The National Idea in Lithuania from the Sixteenth to the First Half of the Nineteenth Century: The Problem of Cultural-Linguistic Differentiation. JANUSZ TAZBIR, Polish National Consciousness in the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century. HARVEY GOLDBLATT, Orthodox Slavic Heritage and National Consciousness: Aspects of the East Slavic and South Slavic National Revivals. PAUL BUSHKOVITCH, The Formation of a National Consciousness in Early Modern Russia. TERESA CHYNCZEWSKA-HENNEL, The National Consciousness of Ukrainian Nobles and Cossacks from the End of the Sixteenth to the Mid-Seventeenth Century. FRANK E. SYSYN, Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690. LÁSZLÓ BENCZÉDI, Hungarian National Consciousness as Reflected in the Anti-Habsburg and Anti-Ottoman Struggles of the Late Seventeenth Century. IVAN GOLUB, The Slavic Idea of Juraj Križanić. IVO BANAC, The Redivided Croatia of Pavao Ritter Vitezović. RADOVAN SAMARDŽIĆ, Count Djordje Branković's Political and Historical Impact on the Serbs. JAMES CRACRAFT, Empire versus Nation: Russian Political Theory under Peter I. KEITH HITCHINS, Religious Tradition and National Consciousness among the Romanians of Transylvania, 1730–1780. ZENON E. KOHUT, The Development of a Little Russian Identity and Ukrainian Nationbuilding. HUGH L. AGNEW, Josephinism and the Patriotic Intelligentsia in Bohemia.

KAIL C. ELLIS, editor. *The Vatican, Islam, and the Middle East*. (Contemporary Issues in the Middle East.) Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 1987. Pp. xviii, 344. $39.95.

HERMANN FREDERICK EILTS, Foreword. MICHAEL J. SCANLON, Fidelity to Monotheism: Christianity and Islam. GEORGES C. ANAWATI, An Assessment of the Christian-Islamic Dialogue. JAMES A. BILL and JOHN ALDEN WILLIAMS, Shi'i Islam and Roman Catholicism: An Ecclesial and Political Analysis. J. BRYAN HEHIR, The Catholic Church and the Middle East: Policy and Diplomacy. GEORGE EMILE IRANI, The Holy See and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. FRED J. KHOURI, The Jerusalem Question and the Vatican. JOSEPH L. RYAN, The Holy See and Jordan. TAHSEEN M. BASHEER, Egypt's Diplomatic Relations with the Holy See. ROBERT M. HADDAD, Eastern Christians in Contemporary Arab Society. YOAKIM MOUBARAC, The Lebanese Experience and Muslim-Christian Relations. WILLIAM SOLIMAN KILADA, Christian-Muslim Relations in Egypt. ABDULLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, Christian-Muslim Relations in the Sudan: Peaceful Coexistence at Risk. JOSEPH CARDINAL CORDEIRO, The Christian Minority in an Islamic State: The Case of Pakistan. CHRISTIAN W. TROLL, Christian-Muslim Relations in India. CESAR ADIB MAJUL, Muslims and Christians in the Philippines: A Study in Conflict and Efforts at Reconciliation.

PATRICIA W. ROMERO, editor. *Life Histories of African Women*. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Ashfield. 1988. Pp. 200. $12.50.

HAROLD SCHEUB, And So I Grew Up: The Autobiography of Nongenile Masithathu Zenani. BEVERLY MACK, Hajiya Ma'daki: A Royal Hausa Woman. ENID SCHILDKROUT, Hajiya Husaina: Notes on the Life History of a Hausa Woman. CHRISTINE OBBO, Bitu: Facilitator of Women's Educational Opportunities. AVOR WILKS, She Who Blazed a Trail: Akyaawa Yikwan of Asante. PATRICIA W. ROMERO, Mama Khadija: A Life History as Example of Family

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

History. ANN CASSIERS, Mercha: An Ethiopian Woman Speaks of Her Life.

MARGARET CASE and N. GERALD BARRIER, editors. *Aspects of India: Essays in Honor of Edward Cameron Dimock, Jr.*. New Delhi: American Institute of Indian Studies. 1986. Pp. 173.

A. K. RAMANUJAN, The Prince Who Married His Own Left Half. WENDY O'FLAHERTY, Horses and Snakes in the *Ādi Parvan* of the *Māhābhārata*. JOHN STRATTON HAWLEY, Echoes of Love and Creation in the Poetry of Sūr Dās. FREDERICK ASHER, On Stone and Artistic Production. DAVID KOPF, Keshub and Chaitanya: Brahmo Evangelism and the Indigenous Modernization of Vaishnavism in Bengal. FRANK F. CONLON, Indian Renaissance beyond Bengal: The Awakening in Maharashtra. GERALDINE FORBES, From Patronage to Partisanship: The Beginnings of the Women's Movement in India. N. GERALD BARRIER, Punjab Politics and the Press, 1880–1910. AINSLIE T. EMBREE, The Diplomacy of Dependency: Content and Style in Nineteenth-Century Foreign Relations in India. MILTON SINGER, A Conversation of Cultures: The United States and Southern Asia. WENDY O'FLAHERTY, Envoi.

JOHN C. BURNHAM. *Paths into American Culture: Psychology, Medicine, and Morals*. (American Civilization.) Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1988. Pp. x, 317. $34.95.

The Fragmenting of the Soul: Intellectual Prerequisites for Ideas of Dissociation in the United States. The Mind-Body Problem in the Early Twentieth Century. On the Origins of Behaviorism. The Medical Origins and Cultural Use of Freud's Instinctual Drive Theory. The New Psychology: From Narcissism to Social Control. The Influence of Psychoanalysis upon American Culture. American Historians and the Subject of Sex. How Recent Historiography Vindicates Ditzion's Approach to the History of Sex. Medical Inspection of Prostitutes in America in the Nineteenth Century: The St. Louis Experiment and Its Sequel. The Progressive Era Revolution in American Attitudes toward Sex. New Perspectives on the Prohibition "Experiment" of the 1920's. Psychiatry, Psychology, and the Progressive Movement. Medical Specialists and Movements toward Social Control in the Progressive Era: Three Examples. The Cultural Interpretation of the Progressive Movement.

NATHAN O. HATCH and HARRY S. STOUT, editors. *Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1988. Pp. viii, 298. $29.95.

NATHAN O. HATCH and HARRY S. STOUT, Introduction. HENRY F. MAY, Jonathan Edwards and America. DAVID LEVIN, Edwards, Franklin, and Cotton Mather: A Meditation on Character and Reputation. DONALD WEBER, The Recovery of Jonathan Edwards. NORMAN FIERING, The Rationalist Foundations of Jonathan Edwards's Metaphysics. WILSON H. KIMNACH, Jonathan Edwards's Pursuit of Reality. STEPHEN J. STEIN, The Spirit and the Word: Jonathan Edwards and Scriptural Exegesis. JOHN F. WILSON, History, Redemption, and the Millennium. HARRY STOUT, The Puritans and Edwards. AMY SCHRAGER LANG, "A Flood of Errors": Chauncy and Edwards in the Great Awakening. WILLIAM BREITENBACH, Piety and Moralism: Edwards and the New Divinity. JAMES HOOPES, Calvinism and Consciousness from Edwards to Beecher. DAVID LAURENCE, Jonathan Edwards as a figure in Literary History. MARK A. NOLL, Jonathan Edwards and Nineteenth Century Theology. BRUCE KUKLICK, Jonathan Edwards and American Philosophy.

NORMAN DORSEN, editor. *The Evolving Constitution: Essays on the Bill of Rights and the U.S. Supreme Court*. Foreword by ARCHIBALD COX. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press. 1987. Pp. xviii, 360. $35.00.

NORMAN DORSEN, Foreword. ARCHIBALD COX, Introduction. ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, Equality and Governmental Action. J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Public School Desegregation: Legal Remedies for De Facto Segregation. ELBERT P. TUTTLE, Equality and the Vote. ABE FORTAS, Equal Rights—for Whom? THURGOOD MARSHALL, Group Action in the Pursuit of Justice. IRVING R. KAUFMAN, The Medium, the Message, and the First Amendment. DAVID L. BAZELON, New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in a Democratic Society. SHIRLEY M. HUFSTEDLER, Comity and the Constitution: The Changing Role of the Federal Judiciary. JAMES L. OAKES, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule. WILFRED FEINBERG, Constraining "The Least Dangerous Branch": The Tradition of Attacks on Judicial Power. HARRY A. BLACKMUN, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away? WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights.

LEON LITWACK and AUGUST MEIER, editors. *Black Leaders of the Nineteenth Century*. (Blacks in the New World.) Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1988. Pp. xii, 344. $24.95.

ALBERT J. RABOTEAU, Richard Allen and the African Church Movement. PETER H. WOOD, Nat Turner: The Unknown Slave as Visionary Leader. BENJAMIN QUARLES, Harriet Tubman's Unlikely Leadership. WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., Frederick Douglass: Humanist as Race Leader. JASON H. SILVERMAN, Mary Ann Shadd and the Search for Equality. WILLIAM CHEEK and AIMEE LEE CHEEK, John Mercer Langston: Principle and Politics. STERLING STUCKEY, A Last Stern Struggle: Henry Highland Garnet and Liberation Theory. NELL IRVIN PAINTER, Martin R. Delany: Elitism and Black Nationalism. DAVID A. GERBER, Peter Humphries Clark: The Dialogue of Hope and Despair. HOWARD N. RABINOWITZ, Three Recontruction Leaders: Blanche K. Bruce, Robert Brown Elliott, and Holland Thompson. ERIC FONER, Black Reconstruction Leaders at the Grass Roots. ALFRED MOSS, Alexander Crummell: Black Nationalist and Apostle of Western Civilization. JOHN DITTMER, The Education of Henry McNeal Turner. GEORGE C. WRIGHT, Wil-

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liam Henry Steward: Moderate Approach to Black Leadership. JANET SHARP HERMANN, Isaiah T. Montgomery's Balancing Act. SHARON HARLEY, Mary Church Terrell: Genteel Militant.

DANIEL ROSELLE, editor. *Voices of Social Education, 1937–1987*. New York: Macmillan, for the National Council for the Social Studies. 1987. Pp. xxiv, 505. $34.95.

DANIEL ROSELLE, Introduction. EDGAR B. WESLEY and HOWARD E. WILSON, Wilson to Wesley to Wilson: An Exchange of Letters. JAMES A. MICHENER, The Mature Social Studies Teacher. ELIE WIESEL, Then and Now: The Experiences of a Teacher. THEODORE H. WHITE, Confessions of a Second-Look Liberal: An Interview. CHARLES A. BEARD, A Memorandum from an Old Worker in the Vineyard. ERLING M. HUNT, The New York Times "Test" on American History. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY *et al.*, Social Education Asks: How Can Books on American Government Be Improved? SHIRLEY H. ENGLE, Decision Making: The Heart of Social Studies Instruction. LAWRENCE E. METCALF, Some Guidelines for Changing Social Studies Education. EDWIN FENTON, History in the New Social Studies. MARK M. KRUG, Bruner's New Social Studies: A Critique. JAMES P. SHAVER, Social Studies: The Need for Redefinition. C. BENJAMIN COX, Behavior as Objective in Education. R. FREEMAN BUTTS, The Revival of Civic Learning. JOSEPHINE MAYER, Egypt and the Case for "Baggage". CARLOS P. ROMULO, Our Consciousness of Asia: An End to Innocence. D. G. JONES, Adam's Inventory. BARBARA WARD, Urbanization: A Worldwide Process. JACQUES COUSTEAU, Jacques Cousteau Comments on Current Archeological Exploration of Greek Waters. DESMOND TUTU, Dismantling Apartheid. RICHARD E. GROSS, The Moonshine Curriculum. BEATRIC LASKOWITZ GOLDBERG, She Is Risen. WILLIAM SAYRES, From the (Until Now) Unpublished Files of Mr. Harry Wesley, OEEO. CLARA MANNHEIMER GLASSER, Morning. MIKE CAUSEY, Jefferson's Document Needs Work. DANIEL ROSELLE, Reflections on Time. HAROLD RUGG, A Study in Censorship: Good Concepts and Bad Words. MERLE CURTI, The Responsibility of the Teacher in Times of Crises. HENRY WILKINSON BRAGDON, Dilemmas of a Textbook Writer. HARRIS L. DANTE, The Kent State Tragedy: Lessons for Teachers. JACK ANDERSON *et al.* Social Education Asks: Is It Proper to Prohibit High School Students from Reading Certain Books? CLAUDE M. FUESS, Yankee Individualism. EARL S. JOHNSON, Reflections on Teaching the Social Studies. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, Moral Development and the New Social Studies. JOHN B. CONLAN, MACOS: The Push for a Uniform National Curriculum. PETER B. DOW, MACOS Revisited: A Commentary on the Most Frequently Asked Questions about Man; A Course of Study. HYMAN KAVETT, How Do We Stand with the Pledge of Allegiance Today? NAOMI WEISSTEIN, Psychology Constructs the Female; or the Fantasy Life of the Male Psychologist (with Some Attention to the Fantasies of His Friends, the Male Biologist and the Male Anthropologist). JANICE LAW TRECKER, Women in U.S. History High School Texbooks. ELIZABETH BURR *et al.* Women and the Language of Inequality. JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, The Dignity of Man: Perspectives for Tomorrow. LOUIS R. HARLAN, Tell It Like It Was: Suggestions on Black History. DELL FELDER, A Talk with a Young Mexican American. HAZEL W. HERTZBERG, Issues in Teaching about American Indians. JAMES A. BANKS, Teaching for Ethnic Literacy: A Comparative Approach. JOHN JAROLIMEK, Born again Ethnics: Pluralism in Modern America. JOHN J. PATRICK, Immigration in the Curriculum. LEWIS PAUL TODD, View from the Country. ALVIN TOFFLER, Education and the Future: An Interview. IRVING MORRISSETT, Four Futures for Social Studies. CHRISTA MCAULIFFE, Comments on Launching Social Studies into Space.

JOHN FRANKLIN WHITE, editor. *Art in Action: American Art Centers and the New Deal*. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow. 1987. Pp. vii, 187. $22.50.

JOHN FRANKLIN WHITE, Introduction. JOHN FRANKLIN WHITE, The Walker Art Center: A Crowning Achievement. NICHOLAS A. CALCAGNO and BARBARA K. SCOTT, The Federal Gallery System in Oklahoma: A Successful Experiment. MARTIN G. TOWEY, Design for Democracy: The People's Art Center in St. Louis. SUE ANN KENDALL, The Spokane Art Center. DANIEL A. HALL, A WPA Art Center in Phoenix: 1937–40. MARGARET GOSS BURROUGHS, Chicago's South Side Community Art Center: A Personal Recollection. DAN E. BURKE, The Utah State Art Center. OLA MAIE FOUSHEE, North Carolina's Community Art Centers. MILDRED HOLZHAUER BAKER, Community Art Centers and Exhibitions.

ROBERT A. DIVINE, editor. *The Johnson Years*. Volume Two, *Vietnam, the Environment, and Science*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 1987. Pp. ix, 267. $25.00.

ROBERT A. DIVINE, The Johnson Revival: A Bibliographical Appraisal. CHARLES DEBENEDETTI, Lyndon Johnson and the Antiwar Opposition. DONALD F. KETTL, The Economic Education of Lyndon Johnson: Guns, Butter, and Taxes. BURTON I. KAUFMAN, Foreign Aid and the Balance-of-Payments Problem: Vietnam and Johnson's Foreign Economic Policy. MARTIN V. MELOSI, Lyndon Johnson and Environmental Policy. LEWIS L. GOULD, Lady Bird Johnson and Beautification. CLARENCE G. LASBY, The War on Disease. ROBERT A. DIVINE, Lyndon B. Johnson and the Politics of Space.

JAIME SUCHLICKI and DAMIAN J. FERNANDEZ, editors. *Cuban Foreign Policy: The New Internationalism*. Miami: Research Institute for Cuban Studies, Institute of Interamerican Studies, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Miami. 1985. Pp. 174.

EDWARD GONZALEZ, After the Third Party Congress: Whither Castro? BRIAN LATELL, Castro and the World: The Dilemmas and Anxieties of Cuba's Aging Leader. JUAN BENEMELIS, Domestic and External Factors in Cuba's Foreign Policymaking. OLGA NAZARIO, Cuba's Relations with Africa in the Eighties: Scope and Limitations. JIRI VALENTA, Soviet-Cuban Internationalist Activities: Muddling through until Succession or the 1988 U.S. Presidential Elections. DAMIAN J. FERNANDEZ, Cuba in the Middle East: Increasing the Risks of Internationalism. JAIME SUCHLICKI, Cuba and Security Implications for the United States.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Documents and Bibliographies

The following collections of documents, bibliographies, and other similar works were received by the *AHR* between February 16 and April 25, 1988. Books that will be reviewed are not usually listed, but listing does not necessarily preclude subsequent review.

GENERAL

DOENECKE, JUSTUS D. *Anti-Intervention: A Bibliographical Introduction to Isolationism and Pacifism from World War I to the Early Cold War.* New York: Garland. 1987. Pp. xviii, 421. $60.00.

HOLT, ELIZABETH GILMORE, editor. *The Expanding World of Art.* Volume 1, *Universal Expositions and State-Sponsored Fine Arts Exhibitions.* New Haven: Yale University Press. 1988. Pp. xi, 406. $42.50.

JOPPIEN, RUDIGER, and BERNARD SMITH. *The Art of Captain Cook's Voyages.* Volume 3, *The Voyage of the* Resolution *and* Discovery, *1776–1780; with a Descriptive Catalogue of All Known Original Drawings and Paintings of Peoples, Places, Artefacts, and Events and Original Engravings Associated with the Voyage.* New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art. 1988. Pp. xxi, 669. $225.00.

ANCIENT

PLEKET, H. W., and R. S. STROUD, editors. *Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.* Volume 34. Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben. 1987. Pp. xxi, 553.

MEDIEVAL

MAITLAND, FREDERIC WILLIAM. *Domesday Book and Beyond: Three Essays in the Early History of England.* Foreword by J. C. HOLT. Reprint. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. xxvii, 527. Cloth $59.50, paper $17.95.

STEVENSON, DAVID, and WENDY B. STEVENSON. *Scottish Texts and Calendars: An Analytical Guide to Serial Publications.* (Royal Historical Society Guides and Handbooks, number 14; Scottish History Society, series 4, number 23.) London: Royal Historical Society or Scottish History Society, Edinburgh. 1987. Pp. xii, 233. $25.00.

WILLIAM OF NEWBURGH. *The History of English Affairs: Book 1.* Edited by P. G. WALSH and M. J. KENNEDY. (Classical Texts; Medieval Latin Texts.) Warminster: Aris and Phillips. 1988. Pp. xi, 198. Cloth $39.95, paper $16.50.

BRITAIN AND IRELAND

BOYCE, GEORGE, editor. *The Crisis of British Unionism: Lord Selborne's Domestic Political Papers, 1885–1922.* (Sources for Modern British History.) London: Historians'; distributed by Humanities, Atlantic Highlands, N.J. 1987. Pp. xxiii, 260. $49.95.

BURKHARDT, FREDERICK, and SYDNEY SMITH, editors. *The Correspondence of Charles Darwin.* Volume 3, *1844–1846.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. xxix, 523. $37.50.

COCKTON, PETER. *Subject Catalogue of the House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1801–1900.* Volume 1, *Central Government and Administration; National Finance and Financial Institutions; Population and Demography; Statistics; Agriculture and Rural Society.* Alexandria, Va.: Chadwyck-Healey. 1988. Pp. xl, 805.

JEFFERYS, KEVIN, editor. *Labour and the Wartime Coalition: From the Diary of James Chuter Ede, 1941–1945.* (Sources for Modern British History.) London: Historians'; distributed by Humanities, Atlantic Highlands, N.J. 1987. Pp. ix, 238. $45.00.

KANNER, BARBARA. *Women in English Social History, 1800–1914: A Guide to Research.* Volume 3, *Autobiographical Writings.* (Garland Reference, number 155.) New York: Garland. 1987. Pp. 215. $120.00.

MCPHEE, CAROL, and ANN FITZGERALD, editors. *The Non-Violent Militant: Selected Writings of Teresa Billington-Greig.* (Women's Source Library.) New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1987. Pp. 312. $69.50.

MOBERLY, FREDERICK JAMES. *Operations in Persia, 1914–1919.* Foreword by G. M. BAYLISS. (Imperial War Museum; Facsimile Edition.) London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 1987. Pp. xxii, 490. £ 24.

MOGGRIDGE, DONALD, editor. *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes.* Volume 13, *The General Theory and After,* part 1, *Preparation.* Paperback edition. New York: Cambridge University Press or Macmillan, New York, for the Royal Economic Society, York. 1987. Pp. xiv, 653. $19.95.

MOGGRIDGE, DONALD, editor. *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes.* Volume 14, *The General Theory and After,* part 2, *Defence and Development.* Paperback edition. New York: Cambridge University Press or Macmillan, New York, for the Royal Economic Society, York. 1987. Pp. 583. $19.95.

MOGGRIDGE, DONALD, editor. *The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes.* Volume 29, *The General Theory and After: A Supplement.* Paperback edition. New York: Cambridge University Press or Macmillan, New York, for the Royal Economic Society, York. 1987. Pp. xiv, 340. $19.95.

PALMER, ALAN, and VERONICA PALMER. *Who's Who in Bloomsbury.* Brighton: Harvester. 1987. Pp. x, 215. $29.95.

REIN, GUSTAV ADOLF. *Sir John Robert Seeley: A Study of the Historian.* Edited and translated by JOHN L. HERKLESS. Wolfeboro, N.H.: Longwood Academic. 1987. Pp. xxix, 155. $25.00.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LOW COUNTRIES

DE BUJANDA, J. M., editor. *Index de l'Université de Louvain: 1546, 1550, 1558.* (Index des livres interdits, number 2.) Québec: Centres d'Etudes de la Renaissance or Droz, Geneva. 1986. Pp. 587.

GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND SWITZERLAND

CHAMBERLIN, BREWSTER, and MARCIA FELDMAN, editors. *The Liberation of the Nazi Concentration Camps, 1945: Eyewitness Accounts of the Liberators.* Introduction by ROBERT H. ABZUG. Washington, D.C.: United States Holocaust Memorial Council. 1987. Pp. ix, 214.

EDMONDS, JAMES E., editor. *The Occupation of the Rhineland, 1918–1929.* Foreword by G. M. BAYLISS. Reprint. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office in Cooperation with the Imperial War Museum, London. 1987. Pp. xxv, 444. £ 24.

MÜLLER, DETLEF K., and BERND ZYMEK. *Datenhandbuch zur deutschen Bildungsgeschichte.* Volume 2, *Höhere und mittlere Schulen; part 1, Sozialgeschichte und Statistik des Schulsystems in den Staaten des Deutschen Reiches, 1800–1945.* Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1987. Pp. 312. DM 84.

NOAKES, J. and G. PRIDHAM, editors. *Nazism, 1919–1945.* Volume 3, *Foreign Policy, War, and Racial Extermination: A Documentary Reader.* (Exeter Studies in History, number 13.) Exeter: University of Exeter Press; distributed by Humanities, Atlantic Highlands, N.J. 1988. Pp. viii, 609–1236. $15.00.

ITALY

BRUNI, LEONARDO. *The Humanism of Leonardo Bruni: Selected Texts.* Translated by GORDON GRIFFITHS *et al.* (Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, number 46 and Renaissance Texts Series, number 10.) Binghamton, N.Y.: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies or The Renaissance Society of America, New York. 1987. Pp. xi, 417. $25.00.

COMMISSIONE PER LA PUBBLICAZIONE DEI DOCUMENTI DIPLOMATICI. *I documenti diplomatici italiani.* First series, Volume 9, *16 giugno–23 dicembre 1867.* Rome: Libreria dello Stato or Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. 1987. Pp. liii, 641.

COMMISIONE PER LA PUBBLICAZIONE DEI DOCUMENTI DIPLOMATICI. *I documenti diplomatici italiani.* Second series: *1870–1896.* Volume 12, *14 luglio 1879–2 maggio 1880.* Rome: Libreria dello Stato. 1987. Pp. lxiii, 795.

COMMISSIONE PER LA PUBBLICAZIONE DEI DOCUMENTI DIPLOMATICI. *I documenti diplomatici italiani.* Seventh series, *1922–1935.* Volume 12, *1 aprile–31 dicembre 1932.* Rome: Libreria dello Stato or Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. 1987. Pp. xlv, 778.

DE BUJANDA, J. M. *Index de Venise, 1549, et de Venise et Milan, 1554.* (Index des livres interdits, number 3.) Québec: Centre d'Etudes de la Renaissance or Droz, Geneva. 1987. Pp. 527.

DEMARCO, DOMENICO, and EDUARDO RAPPI. *Nuovi documenti sulle origini e sui titoli del banco di Napoli.* (Revue internazionale d'histoire delle banque.) Geneva: Droz. 1987. Pp. 80.

FIRPO, MASSIMO, and DARIO MARCATTO, editors. *Il processo inquisitoriale del cardinal Giovanni Morone.* Volume IV, *Il processo difensivo Bolognese la sentenza.* (Italia e Europa; Collezione per il primo centenario dell'unità.). Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per l'Età Moderna e Contemporanea. 1987. Pp. 617. L. 54,000.

EASTERN EUROPE

KOZŁOWSKI, EUGENIUSZ, and PIOTR MATUSAK, editors. *Documenta Occupationis.* Volume 12, *Eksploatacja siły roboczej i grabież ziem polskich przez* Wehrmacht *w końcowym okresie II wojny światowej* [The Exploitation of Labor and Plunder of the Polish Lands by the *Wehrmacht* in the Final Period of World War II]. (Instytut Zachodni; Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hiterlowskich w Polsce; Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny; Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych.) Poznań: Instytut Zachodni. 1986. Pp. xxiii, 716.

QUIRINI-POPLAWSKA, DANUTA, editor. *Korespondencja Sebastiana i Valeria Montelupich (1576–1609)* [The Correspondence of Sebastian and Valerio Montelupi (1576–1609)]. (Materiały Komisji Historycznej, number 30.) Wrocław: Ossolineum. 1986. Pp. 179. 275 Zł.

V"ZV"ZOVZ-KARATEODOROVA, KIRILA, *et al.*, editors. *Lichniiat belezhnik (dzhobnoto tefterche) na Vasil Levski* [Personal Notebook (Pocket Notebook) of Vasil Levski]. Sofia: Nauka i Izkustvo. 1987. Pp. 162. 2.96 lv.

SOVIET UNION

FREEZE, GREGORY L. *From Supplication to Revolution: A Documentary Social History of Imperial Russia.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1988. Pp. xv, 331. Cloth $29.95, paper $9.95.

NEAR EAST

IBN-MUNQIDH, USĀMAH. *An Arab-Syrian Gentleman and Warrior in the Period of the Crusades.* Translated by PHILIP K. HITTI. Paperback edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1987. Pp. x, 265. $9.95.

AFRICA

JOHNSON, CHARLES S. *Bitter Canaan: The Story of the Negro Republic.* Foreword by JOHN STANFIELD. (Black Classics of Social Science.) New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction. 1987. Pp. lxxiii, 256. $29.95.

ASIA

GOPAL, S., editor. *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru.* (Second series, number 3.) New York: Oxford University Press, for the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Dehli. 1985. Pp. 521. $29.95.

KIRCHER, ATHANASIUS. *China Illustrata with Sacred and Secular Monuments, Various Spectacles of Nature and Art, and Other Memorabilia.* Translated by CHARLES VAN TUYL. (Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Oriental Series, number 6.) Bloomington: The Institute. 1987. Pp. iv, 228. $29.00.

PARTHASARATHI, G., editor. *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947–1964.* Volume 2, *1950–1952.* New York: Oxford University Press, for the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi. 1986. Pp. 661. $29.95.

PARTHASARATHI, G., editor. *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers, 1947–1964.* Volume 3, *1952–1954.* New York: Oxford University Press, for the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, New Delhi. 1987. Pp. 673.

SEMMLER, CLEMENT, editor. *The War Despatches of Kenneth Slessor: Official Australian Correspondent, 1940–1944.* New York: University of Queensland Press. 1987. Pp. xxxv, 493. $47.50.

UNITED STATES

ARMITAGE, CHRISTOPHER M., compiler. *Sir Walter Ralegh, an Annotated Bibliography.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, for America's Four Hundredth Anniversary Committee. 1987. Pp. xiii, 236. $14.95.

BRANCH, EDGAR MARQUESS, *et al.*, editors. *Mark Twain's Letters.* Volume 1, *1853–1866.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1988. Pp. xlvi, 616. $35.00.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CASPER, DALE E. *Richard M. Nixon: A Bibliographic Exploration.* (Garland Reference Library of Social Science, number 415.) New York: Garland. 1988. Pp. ix, 221. $30.00.

ELY, JAMES W., JR., and THEODORE BROWN, JR., editors. *Legal Papers of Andrew Jackson.* Assisted by WILLIAM J. HARBISON. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 1987. Pp. lxvi, 420. $45.00.

FITCH, RAYMOND E., editor. *Breaking with Burr: Harman Blennerhassett's Journal, 1807.* Athens: Ohio University Press. 1988. Pp. lxii, 275. $28.95.

GARCIA, CELINE FREMAUX. *Céline: Remembering Louisiana, 1850–1871.* Edited by PATRICK J. GEARY. Foreword by BERTRAM WYATT-BROWN. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1987. Pp. xxxix, 277. $25.00.

GINGER, ANN FAGAN, and EUGENE M. TOBIN, editors. *The National Lawyers Guild: From Roosevelt through Reagan.* Foreword by RAMSEY CLARK. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1988. Pp. xxviii, 440. $39.95.

JEFFREY, THOMAS E., *et al.*, editors. *A Guide to Thomas A. Edison Papers: A Selective Microfilm Edition, Part II (1879–1886).* Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America. 1987. Pp. ix, 483. $35.00.

JOHANNSEN, ROBERT W., editor. *Democracy on Trial: A Documentary History of American Life, 1845–1877.* 2d ed. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1988. Pp. x, 405. Cloth $34.95, paper $12.95.

LINK, ARTHUR S., *et al.*, editors. *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson.* Volume 58, *April 23–May 9, 1919.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1988. Pp. xxii, 663. $52.50.

LITTELL, NORMAN M. *My Roosevelt Years.* Edited by JONATHAN DEMBO. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 1987. Pp. xxi, 422. $35.00.

MACPHERSON, R. T., compiler. *John H. Russell, Jr., 1872–1947: Register of His Personal Papers.* Edited by J. MICHAEL MILLER. Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps. 1987. Pp. viii, 58.

PEASE, CLIFFORD A., JR. *Calvin Coolidge and His Family: An Annotated Bibliography.* Rutland, Vt.: Academy, for the Calvin Coolidge Memorial Foundation, Plymouth, Vt. 1987. Pp. 48.

PESKIN, ALLAN, editor. *North into Freedom: The Autobiography of John Malvin, Free Negro, 1795–1880.* Reprint. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 1988. Pp. vii, 93. $4.95.

RAWLYK, GEORGE A., editor. *Henry Alline: Selected Writings.* (Sources of American Spirituality.) New York: Paulist. 1987. Pp. vii, 343. $19.95.

SHEWMAKER, KENNETH E., *et al.*, editors. *The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers.* Volume 2, *1850–1852.* Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, for Dartmouth College. 1987. Pp. xxxiii, 820. $85.00.

SIMPSON, BROOKS D., *et al.*, editors. *Advice after Appomattox: Letters to Andrew Johnson, 1865–1866.* (Special Volume number 1 of the Papers of Andrew Johnson.) Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 1987. Pp. xxvi, 259.

VAN HORNE, JOHN C., *et al.*, editors. *The Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers of Benjamin Henry Latrobe.* Volume 3, *1811–1820.* New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Maryland Historical Society. 1988. Pp. xlv, 1116. $140.00.

WEBER, RALPH E., editor. *The Final Memoranda: Major General Ralph H. Van Deman, USA Ret., 1865–1952; Father of U.S. Military Intelligence.* Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources. 1988. Pp. xxv, 191.

CANADA

BASKERVILLE, PETER, editor. *The Bank of Upper Canada: A Collection of Documents.* (Carleton Library, number 141.) Ottawa: Carleton University Press, for the Champlain Society; distributed by Oxford University Press, Don Mills, Ontario. 1987. Pp. cliii, 397. $18.95.

CODIGNOLA, LUCA. *The Coldest Harbour of the Land: Simon Stock and Lord Baltimore's Colony in Newfoundland, 1621–1649.* Translated by ANITA WESTON. Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press. 1988. Pp. xv, 229. $27.50.

LATIN AMERICA

DEL CASTILLO, BERNAL DÍAZ. *Historia verdadera de la conquista de la Nueva España.* In two volumes. (Colección nuestros paises, serie rumbos.) Havana: Casa de las Américas. 1984. Pp. 349; 361.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Other Books Received

Books listed were received by the *AHR* between February 16 and April 25, 1988. Books that will be reviewed are not usually listed, but listing does not necessarily preclude subsequent review.

GENERAL

AGILION, RAOUL. *Roosevelt and de Gaulle: Allies in Conflict; A Personal Memoir*. New York: Free Press of Macmillan. 1988. Pp. x, 237. $22.50.

ATIYAH, P. S., and ROBERT S. SUMMERS. *Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning, Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions*. New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. xx, 437. $65.00.

BLACKFORD, MANSEL G. *The Rise of Modern Business in Great Britain, the United States, and Japan*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1988. Pp. xi, 176. Cloth $19.95, paper $8.95.

BOULDING, ELISE. *Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an Interdependent World*. (John Dewey Lecture.) New York: Teachers College. 1988. Pp. xxiv, 192. $18.95.

BOYD, ANDREW. *An Atlas of World Affairs*. 8th ed. New York: Methuen. 1987. Pp. 216. Cloth $39.95, paper $12.95.

BRIDGE, F. R. *1914: The Coming of the First World War*. (New Appreciations in History, number 10.) 2d ed. London: The Historical Association. 1988. Pp. 36. £2.06.

CAUTE, DAVID. *The Fellow-Travellers: Intellectual Friends of Communism*. 2d ed., rev. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1988. Pp. 458. Cloth $45.00, paper $17.95.

DODGE, BERTHA S. *Quests for Spices and New Worlds*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon. 1988. Pp. viii, 236. $25.00.

EHRENBERG, RALPH E. *Scholars' Guide to Washington, D.C. for Cartography and Remote Sensing Imagery (Maps, Charts, Aerial Photographs, Satellite Images, Cartographic Literature, and Geographic Information Systems)*. Preface by ALAN K. HENRIKSON. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, for the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. 1987. Pp. xx, 385.

FINER, S. E. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. 2d ed., rev. Boulder, Colo.: Westview or Pinter, London. 1988. Pp. 342. $42.50.

GOLDSMITH, RAYMOND W. *Premodern Financial Systems: A Historical Comparative Study*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 348.

GOLDSTEIN, JOSHUA S. *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1988. Pp. xiii, 433. Cloth $45.00, paper $19.95.

HART, MICHAEL H. *The 100: A Ranking of the Most Influential Persons in History*. Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel. 1987. Pp. 572. $19.95.

HIRSHLEIFER, JACK. *Economic Behaviour in Adversity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 310. $35.00.

HUTCHINGS, ROBERT L. *Soviet–East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict*. Paperback edition. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1987. Cloth $27.50, paper $12.50.

JOHNSON, STANLEY P. *World Population and the United Nations: Challenge and Response*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. xxxviii, 357. Cloth $59.50, paper $22.95.

KIERNAN, V. G. *State and Society in Europe, 1550–1650*. Reprint. New York: Basil Blackwell. 1986. Pp. x, 309. $14.95.

KIRKPATRICK, LYMAN B., JR. *Captains without Eyes: Intelligence Failures in World War II*. Rev. ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1987. Pp. xiv, 303. $37.50.

KITAGAWA, JOSEPH M. *The History of Religions: Understanding Human Experience*. (American Academy of Religion, Studies in Religion, number 47.) Atlanta: Scholar's. 1987. Pp. xix, 375. Cloth $35.95, paper $26.95.

LEVY, DAVID J. *Political Order: Philosophical Anthropology, Modernity, and the Challenge of Ideology*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1987. Pp. viii, 204. $22.50.

MACEY, SAMUEL L. *Patriarchs of Time: Dualism in Saturn-Cronus, Father Time, the Watchmaker God, and Father Christmas*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1987. Pp. xiii, 216.

MCCLOSKEY, DONALD N. *Econometric History*. (Studies in Economic and Social History.) London: Macmillan Education. 1987. Pp. 117. $8.50.

MAIER, CHARLES S. *In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy*. (Cambridge Studies in Modern Political Economies.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. x, 293. Cloth $29.95, paper $10.95.

MANCA, CIRO, editor. *Formazione e trasformazione dei sistemi economici in Europa dal feudalesimo al capitalismo: Saggi di storia economica*. Padua: Cedam. 1987. Pp. x, 353. L. 28,000.

MANCA, CIRO. *Introduzione alla storia dei sistemi economici in Europa dal feudalesimo al capitalismo*. Volume 1, *Gli strumenti dell'analisi*. Padua: Cedam. 1987. Pp. 77. L. 7,000.

MAYER, ARNO J. *Adelsmacht und Bürgertum: Die Krise der europäischen Gesellschaft, 1848–1914*. Translated by KARL HEINZ SIBER. Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag. 1988. Pp. 342. DM 14.80.

MONACO, PAUL. *Ribbons in Time: Movies and Society since 1945*. (Interdisciplinary Studies in History.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1988. Pp. xii, 154. Cloth $28.50, paper $10.95.

MURDOCH, DUGALD. *Niels Bohr's Philosophy of Physics*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. x, 294. $59.50.

PAASIVIRTA, JUHANI. *Pienet valtiot Euroopassa: Kansainvälisen järjestelmän muutoksia 1800– ja 1900–luvuilla* [The Small States of Europe: Changes in the International System in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries]. Summary in

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

German. (Historiallisia Tutkimuksia, number 139.) Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura. 1987. Pp. 361.

PARSONS, ANTHONY, *et al. Antarctica: The Next Decade.* (Studies in Polar Research.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. x, 164. $44.50.

RESSLER, EVERETT M., *et al. Unaccompanied Children: Care and Protection in Wars, Natural Disasters, and Refugee Movements.* New York: Oxford University Press. 1988. Pp. x, 421. Cloth $49.95, paper $18.95.

ROHRLICH, FRITZ. *From Paradox to Reality: Our New Concepts of the Physical World.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. x, 227. $34.50.

TUGENDHAT, CHRISTOPHER. *Making Sense of Europe.* New York: Columbia University Press. 1988. Pp. 239. $25.00.

WEINSHEIMER, JOEL C. *Gadamer's Hermeneutics: A Reading of* Truth and Method. Paperback edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1985. Pp. xiii, 278. $12.95.

ANCIENT

BREUER, STEFAN. *Imperien der alten Welt.* Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer. 1987. Pp. 271. DM 26.

FRASER, P. M., and E. MATTHEWS, editors. *A Lexicon of Greek Personal Names.* Volume 1, *The Aegean Islands, Cyprus, Cyrenaica.* New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, for the British Academy. 1987. Pp. xxxv, 489.

HANSEN, MOGENS HERMAN. *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes.* (Blackwell's Classical Studies.) New York: Basil Blackwell. 1987. Pp. viii, 249. $45.00.

LINTOTT, ANDREW. *Violence, Civil Strife, and Revolution in the Classical City, 750–330 B.C.* Paperback edition. New York: Croom Helm. 1987. Pp. 289. $14.95.

MACDONALD, WILLIAM L. *The Architecture of the Roman Empire.* Volume 2, *An Urban Appraisal.* Paperback edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1986. Pp. x, 316. $24.95.

MOMIGLIANO, ARNALDO. *Ottavo contributo alla storia degli studi classici e del mondo antico.* (Storia e letteratura: Raccolta di studi e testi, number 169.) Rome: Storia e Letteratura. 1987. Pp. 473. L. 90,000.

ONIANS, RICHARD BROXTON. *The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time, and Fate: New Interpretations of Greek, Roman, and Kindred Evidence; Also of Some Basic Jewish and Christian Beliefs.* Reprint. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1988. Pp. xviii, 583. Cloth $59.50, paper $19.95.

MEDIEVAL

DAY, JOHN. *The Medieval Market Economy.* New York: Basil Blackwell. 1987. Pp. vii, 232. $45.00.

DE L'ÉTOILE, ISAAC. *Sermons.* Volume 3. Edited by ANSELM HOSTE and GAETANO RACITI. Translated by GASTON SALET and GAETANO RACITI. (Sources Chretiennes, number 339.) Paris: Cerf with the cooperation of the Centre National des Lettres. 1987. Pp. 434. 298 fr.

GIERKE, OTTO. *Political Theories of the Middle Age.* Translated and Foreword by FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. lxxx, 197. Cloth $44.50, paper $13.95.

RUNCIMAN, STEVEN. *A History of the Crusades.* Volume 1, *The First Crusade and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Jerusalem*; volume 2, *The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Frankish East, 1100–1187*; volume 3, *The Kingdom of Acre and the Later Crusades.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. xiii, 376; xi, 521; xi, 529. $39.50 the set.

SCHMUGGE, LUDWIG. *Die Kreuzzüge aus der Sicht humanistischer Geschichtsschreiber.* (Vorträge der Aeneas-Silvius-Stiftung an der Universität Basel, number 21.) Basel: Helbing und Lichtenheim. 1987. Pp. 46. 18 Fr.

BRITAIN AND IRELAND

BENTLEY, MICHAEL. *The Climax of Liberal Politics: British Liberalism in Theory and Practice, 1868–1918.* London: Edward Arnold. 1987. Pp. xviii, 158.

BOURGUIGNON, HENRY J. *Sir William Scott, Lord Stowell: Judge of the High Court of Admiralty, 1798–1828.* (Cambridge Studies in English Legal History.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. xiv, 310. $49.50.

COWLEY, ROBERT L. S. *Marriage a-la-mode: A Re-View of Hogarth's Narrative Art.* Paperback edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press; distributed by St. Martin's, New York. 1988. Pp. x, 177. $20.00.

CROUZET, FRANÇOIS. *L'economie britannique et Blocus Continental.* 2d ed. Paris: Economica. 1987. Pp. cxiv, 949. 250 fr.

CROWTHER, M. A. *Social Policy in Britain, 1914–1939.* (Studies in Economic and Social History.) London: Macmillan Education. 1988. Pp. 87.

DAVIES, PAUL. *A. J. Cook.* (Lives of the Left.) Manchester: Manchester University Press; distributed by St. Martin's, New York. 1987. Pp. 223. Cloth $29.00, paper $8.75.

DEACON, AUDREY, and PETER WALNE, editors. *"A Professional Hertfordshire Tramp": John Edwin Cussans, Historian of Hertfordshire.* (Hertfordshire Record Publications, number 3.) Ware, U.K.: Hertfordshire Record Society. 1987. Pp. xiv, 127. £10.

HILL, CHRISTOPHER R. *Horse Power: The Politics of Turf.* Foreword by VISCOUNT WHITELAW. Manchester: Manchester University Press; distributed by St. Martin's, New York. 1988. Pp. x, 283. $30.00.

HORN, PAMELA. *Life and Labour in Rural England, 1760–1850.* (Context and Commentary.) London: Macmillan Education. 1987. Pp. x, 184. Cloth $29.95, paper $9.95.

HOWARD, MAURICE. *The Early Tudor Country House: Architecture and Politics, 1490–1550.* London: George Philip. 1987. Pp. 232. £17.95.

JONES, R. BEN. *A Political, Social, and Economic History of Britain, 1760–1914: The Challenge of Greatness.* London: Hodder and Stoughton; distributed by David and Charles, North Pomfret, Vt. 1987. Pp. viii, 228. $14.95.

LISTER, RAYMOND. *Samuel Palmer: His Life and Art.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. xx, 272. $49.50.

MOORE, JOHN. *The First Fleet Marines, 1786–1792.* New York: University of Queensland Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 345. $32.50.

OWEN, FELICITY, and DAVID BLAYNEY BROWN. *Collector of Genius: A Life of Sir George Beaumont.* New Haven: Yale University Press, for the Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art, New Haven. 1988. Pp. viii, 248. $37.50.

REISMAN, DAVID. *Alfred Marshall: Progress and Politics.* New York: St. Martin's. 1987. Pp. vii, 499. $45.00.

STAUFFER, R. C., editor. *Charles Darwin's Natural Selection: Being the Second Part of His Big Species Book Written from 1856 to 1858.* Paperback edition. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. 692. $29.95.

WALVIN, JAMES. *Victorian Values.* Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1987. Pp. 170. Cloth $20.00, paper $9.95.

WATERSON, DUGAN, and MAURICE FRENCH. *From the Frontier: A Pictorial History of Queensland to 1930.* New York: University of Queensland Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 360. $44.95.

WEIDHORN, MANFRED. *Churchill's Rhetoric and Political Discourse.* (Exxon Education Foundation Series on Rhetoric and Political Discourse, number 17.) New York: University Press of America or The White Burkett Miller Center of Public Affairs of the University of Virginia, Charlottesville. 1987. Pp. xvii, 135. Cloth $24.75, paper $12.75.

WRIGHT, ANTHONY. *R. H. Tawney.* (Lives of the Left.) Manchester: Manchester University Press; distributed by

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

St. Martin's, New York. 1987. Pp. ix, 176. Cloth $29.00, paper $8.75.

FRANCE

BLANNING, T. C. W. *The French Revolution: Aristocrats versus Bourgeois?* (Studies in European History.) Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International. 1987. Pp. vii, 70. $8.50.

DEROGY, JACQUES. *Histoire de l'Exodus: La loi du retour*. Paris: Fayard. 1969. Pp. 426. 98 fr.

GAY, PETER. *Voltaire's Politics: The Poet as Realist*. 2d ed. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1988. Pp. xv, 417. Cloth $40.00, paper $15.95.

GOUBERT, PIERRE. *The Course of French History*. Translated by MAARTEN ULTEE. New York: Franklin Watts. 1988. Pp. 495. $26.95.

Les Internationales et le problème de la guerre au XX^e siècle. (Collection de L'Ecole Française de Rome, number 95.) Rome: Ecole Française de Rome or Università di Milano. 1987. Pp. 390.

LITTLEWOOD, IAN. *Paris: A Literary Companion*. New York: Franklin Watts. 1988. Pp. viii, 246. $16.95.

SULEIMAN, EZRA N. *Private Power and Centralization in France: The Notaires and the State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1987. Pp. xxi, 338. $35.00.

TAYLOR, BRIAN BRACE. *Le Corbusier: The City of Refuge, Paris, 1929–33*. Foreword by KENNETH FRAMPTON. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1987. Pp. xiii, 185; 183 plates. $32.50.

WINOCK, MICHEL. *La fièvre hexagonale: Les grandes crises politiques de 1871 à 1968*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy or Seuil. 1987. Pp. 467.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

FRANCO, JOSÉ LUCIANO. *Las relaciones entre España y Norteamerica (1776–1789)*. Havana: Academia de Ciencias de Cuba. 1983. Pp. 39.

GRANZOTTO, GIANNI. *Christopher Columbus*. Reprint. Translated by STEPHEN SARTARELLI. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1987. Pp. 300. $9.95.

NORTHERN EUROPE

DRAXTON, NINA. *The Testing of M. Falk Gjertsen*. (Topical Studies, number 4.) Northfield, Minn.: Norwegian-American Historical Association. 1988. Pp. 134. $12.00.

EDGREN, LARS. *Lärling-Gesäll-Mästare: Hantverk och Hantverkare i Malmö 1750–1847* [Apprentice, Journeyman, Master: Crafts and Craftsmen in Malmö, 1750–1847]. Summary in English. Lund: Dialogos. 1987. Pp. 403.

FEHRMAN, CARL. *Lund and Learning: An Informal History of Lund University*. Translated by ALAN CROZIER. Lund: Lund University Press. 1987. Pp. 208.

HAAPALA, PERTTI. *Tehtaan valossa: Teollistuminen ja työväestön muodostuminen Tampereella 1820–1920* [In the Light of the Factory: Industrialization and the Formation of the Working Class in Tampere, Finland, 1820–1920]. Summary in English. (Historiallisia Tutkimuksia, number 133.) Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura. 1986. Pp. 408.

HYYTIÄ, OSMO. *Puolueettomuuden ja rauhan linja: SDP n suhtautuminen Suomen ulkopolitiikkaan ja turvallisuuskysymyksiin, Toukokuu 1918–toukokuu 1922* [The Neutrality and Peace Line: The Attitude of the Social Democratic Party to Finland's Foreign Policy and Security Issues, May 1918–May 1922]. (Historiallisia Tutkimuksia, number 137.) Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura. 1986. Pp. 305.

ISACSON, MATHS, and LARS MAGNUSSON. *Proto-Industrialisation in Scandanavia: Craft Skills in the Industrial Revolution*. Leamington Spa, U.K.: Berg; distributed by St. Martin's, New York. 1987. Pp. 151. $29.95.

KROGH, TYGE. *Staten og de besiddelsesløse på landet 1500–1800* [States and the Rural Propertyless, 1500–1800]. (Odense University Studies in History and Social Sciences, number 105.) Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag. 1987. Pp. 182.

LITZEN, AULIKKI. *Vapaa kasvu Helsingin esikaupunkialueella 1900–1970* [The Spontaneous Growth of the Helsinki Suburban Area, 1900–70]. Summary in English. (Historiallisia Tutkimuksia, number 140.) Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura. 1987. Pp. 157.

NORDSTROM, MARIE. *Pojkskola, flickskola, samskola: Samundervisningens utveckling i Sverige 1866–1962* [Boys' School, Girls' School, Mixed School: The Development of Coeducation in Sweden, 1866–1962]. Summary in English. (Bibliotheca Historica Lundensis, number 62.) Lund: Lund University Press. 1987. Pp. 231.

OLAI, BIRGITTA. *". . . till vinnande af ett redigt Storskifte . . .": En komparativ studie av storskiftet i fem härader* [". . . to Achieve an Orderly Reallocation of Holdings . . .": A Compartive Study of the First Phase of the Swedish Enclosure Movement in Five Districts]. Summary in English. (Studia Historica Upsaliensia, number 145.) Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell International. 1987. Pp. 131. 117 KR.

RAHIKAINEN, MARJATTA. *N. R. af Ursin: Aatelismies Suomen työväenliikkeessä* [N. R. af Ursin: An Aristocrat in Finland's Labor Movement]. Summary in English. (Historiallisia Tutkimuksia, number 135.) Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura. 1986. Pp. 332.

SULKUNEN, IRMA. *Raittius kansalaisuskontona: Raittiusliike ja järjestäytyminen 1870– luvulta suurlakon jälkeisiin vuosiin* [Temperance as a Civic Religion: The Temperance Movement and Popular Organization in Finland from the 1870s to the Years after the Great Strike of 1905]. Summary in English. (Historiallisia Tutkimuksia, number 134.) Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura. 1986. Pp. 312.

TURPEINEN, OIVA. *Nälkä vai tauti tappoi? Kauhunvuodet 1866–1868* [Was Hunger or Disease the Killer? Years of Terror, 1866–68]. Summary in English. (Historiallisia Tutkimuksia, number 136.) Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura. 1986. Pp. 307.

GERMANY, AUSTRIA, AND SWITZERLAND

BOCH, RUDOLF. *Handwerker-Sozialisten gegen Fabrikgesellschaft: Lokale Fachvereine, Massengewerkschaft und industrielle Rationalisierung in Solingen 1870 bis 1914*. (Kritische Studien zur Geschichtswissenschaft, number 67.) Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 1985. Pp. 382.

FREYER, HANS. *Herrschaft, Planung und Technik: Aufsätze zur politischen Soziologie*. Edited by ELFRIEDE UNER. (Acta Humaniora.) Weinheim, F.R.G.: VCH. Pp. 203. DM 64.

LOWENTHAL, LEO. *An Unmastered Past: The Autobiographical Reflections of Leo Lowenthal*. Edited by MARTIN JAY. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1987. Pp. x, 281. $25.00.

WESTERNHAGEN, DÖRTE VON. *Die Kinder der Täter: Das Dritte Reich und die Generation danach*. Munich: Kösel. 1987. Pp. 247.

ITALY

BURKE, PETER. *The Renaissance*. (Studies in European History.) Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities. 1987. Pp. 75. $7.95.

LYTTELTON, ADRIAN. *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919–1929*. 2d ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1987. Pp. viii, 556.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MINISTERO PER I BENI CULTURALI E AMBIENTALI. *Gli archivi per la storia contemporanea: Organizzazione e fruizione.* (Atti del Seminario di studi Mondovì, 23–25 febbraio 1984.) Rome: Libreria dello Stato. 1987. Pp. 321.

TROEBST, STEFAN. *Mussolini, Makedonien und die Mächte 1922–1930: Die "Innere Makedonische Revolutionäre Organisation" in der Südosteuropapolitik des faschistischen Italien.* (Dissertationen zur neueren Geschichte, number 19.) Cologne: Bohlau. 1987. Pp. xix, 573.

EASTERN EUROPE

BAK-KOCZARSKA, CELINA. *Juliusz Leo: Twórca wielkiego Krakowa* [Juliusz Leo: The Founder of Greater Cracow]. Summary in German. (Prace Komisji Historycznej, number 47.) Wrocław: Ossolineum. 1986. Pp. 162. 250 Zł.

DAWISHA, KAREN. *Eastern Europe, Gorbachev, and Reform: The Great Challenge.* New York: Cambridge University Press. 1988. Pp. xiii, 268. Cloth $29.95, paper $12.95.

DEYL, ZDENĚK. *Kolektivní smlouvy v Československu 1918–1938* [Collective Bargaining in Czechoslovakia, 1918–38]. Prague: Ustav Československých a Světových Dějin CSAV. 1987. Pp. 416.

MAKOWER, HENRYK. *Pamiętnik z getta warszawskiego: Październik 1940–styczeń 1943* [Memoir of the Warsaw Ghetto: October 1940–January 1943]. Edited by NOEMI MAKOWEROWA. Wrocław: Ossolineum. 1987. Pp. 213. 270 Zł.

MASSALSKI, ADAM, and STANISŁAW MEDUCKI. *Kielce w latach okupacji hitlerowskiej 1939–1945* [Kielce under Nazi Occupation, 1939–1945]. Wrocław: Ossolineum. 1986. Pp. 410. 650 Zł.

STASZEWSKI, JACEK. *Polacy w osiemnastowiecznym Dreźnie* [Poles in Eighteenth-Century Dresden]. Wrocław: Ossolineum. 1986. Pp. 183. 550 Zł.

SOVIET UNION

BAKHRUSHIN, S. V. *Trudy po istochnikovedeniiu, istoriografii i istorii Rossii epokhi feodalizma: Nauchnoe nasledie* [Works on Source Analysis, Historiography, and the History of Russia in the Age of Feudalism: Scholarly Legacy]. Moscow: Nauka for Akademiia Nauk SSSR, Otdelenie Istorii, Arkhiv AN SSSR. 1987. Pp. 217. 3 r.

BROOKS, JEFFREY. *When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Literature, 1861–1917.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1985. Pp. xxii, 450. $12.95.

DANIELS, ROBERT VINCENT. *The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia.* Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1988. Pp. xv, 524. $49.50.

GERSHENZON, MICHAEL. *A History of Young Russia.* Translated and edited by JAMES P. SCANLAN. Irvine, Calif.: Charles Schlacks, Jr. 1986. Pp. xlii, 283. $29.50.

GRAHAM, LOREN R. *Science, Philosophy, and Human Behavior in the Soviet Union.* New York: Columbia University Press. 1987. Pp. xiii, 565. $45.00.

KARLSSON, KLAS-GÖRAN. *Historieundervisning i klassisk ram: En didaktisk studie av historieämnets målfrågor i den ryska och sovjetiska skolan 1900–1940* [History Teaching in a Classical Frame: A Didactic Study of the Objectives of History in the Russian and Soviet School, 1900–1940]. Lund, Sweden: Universitetsförlaget Dialogos. 1987. Pp. 300.

ŁOS, MARIA. *Communist Ideology, Law, and Crime: A Comparative View of the USSR and Poland.* New York: St. Martin's. 1988. Pp. xv, 353. $35.00.

LOW, ALFRED D. *The Sino-Soviet Confrontation since Mao Zedong: Dispute, Detente, or Conflict?* Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Monographs; distributed by Columbia University Press, New York. 1987. Pp. xii, 322. $40.00.

PIPES, RICHARD. *Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885–97.* 2d ed. Irvine, Calif.: Charles Schlacks, Jr. 1985. Pp. xvi, 107. $20.00.

RUBINSOHN, WOLFGANG ZEEV. *Spartacus' Uprising and Soviet Historical Writing.* Translated by JOHN G. GRIFFITH. Oxford: Oxbow Books. 1987. Pp. iv, 55. $6.00.

SHATZ, MARSHALL S., and JUDITH E. ZIMMERMAN, editors. *Signposts: A Collection of Articles on the Russian Intelligentsia.* Irvine, Calif.: Charles Schlacks, Jr. 1986. Pp. xxviii, 179. $19.50.

TUCKER, ROBERT C. *Political Culture and Leadership in Soviet Russia: From Lenin to Gorbachev.* New York: W. W. Norton. 1987. Pp. x, 214. $22.50.

WOEHRLIN, WILLIAM F., editor. *Out of the Depths* (De Profundis)*: A Collection of Articles on the Russian Revolution.* Foreword by BERNICE GLATZER ROSENTHAL. Irvine, Calif.: Charles Schlacks, Jr. 1986. Pp. xxxviii, 254. $27.50.

NEAR EAST

DOBKIN, MARJORIE HOUSEPIAN. *Smyrna, 1922: The Destruction of a City.* Reprint. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 1988. Pp. 275. $14.00.

GOLDSCHMIDT, ARTHUR, JR. *A Concise History of the Middle East.* 3d ed., rev. Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1988. Pp. xvi, 448. Cloth $46.00, paper $20.00.

GUTH, STEPHAN. *Liebe und Mannesehre: Szenen einer muslimischen Kleinbürgerehe, beleuchtet anhand des Romans* Der Ölzweig *(Ġusn az-zaytūn) von M. 'Abdalhalīm 'Abdallāh.* (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, number 122.) Berlin: Klaus Schwarz. 1987. Pp. xi, 236.

LESSING, DORIS. *The Wind Blows away Our Words.* New York: Vintage of Random House. 1987. Pp. 171. $5.95.

VÄTH, GERHARD. *Die Geschichte der artuqidischen Fürstentümer in Syrien und der Gazīra'l-Furātīya (496–812/1002–1409).* (Islamkundliche Untersuchungen, number 121.) Berlin: Klaus Schwarz. 1987. Pp. vii, 265.

AFRICA

MARE, GERHARD, and GEORGINA HAMILTON. *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press or Ravan Press, Johannesburg. 1987. Pp. 261. $35.00.

MBEMBE, ACHILLE. *Afriques indociles: Christianism, pouvoir et Etat en société postcoloniale.* Paris: Karthala. 1988. Pp. 222. 85 fr.

ASIA

CHEN, KING C. *China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications.* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1987. Pp. xiv, 234. Cloth $31.95, paper $18.95.

DE WIT, AUGUSTA. *Java: Facts and Fancies.* Reprint. New York: Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. 321. $18.95.

EMBREE, AINSLIE T., editor. *Sources of Indian Tradition.* Volume 1, *From the Beginning to 1800.* (Introduction to Oriental Civilizations.) 2d ed. New York: Columbia University Press. 1988. Pp. xxxii, 547. Cloth $42.50, paper $17.50.

GOYAL, S. R. *A History of Indian Buddhism.* Meerut, India: Kusumanjali Prakashan. 1987. Pp. 1, 532. Rs. 350.

HAY, STEPHEN, editor. *Sources of Indian Tradition.* Volume 2, *Modern India and Pakistan.* (Introduction to Oriental Civilizations.) 2d ed. New York: Columbia University Press. 1988. Pp. xxvii, 433. Cloth $42.50, paper $16.00.

HOLLERMAN, LEON. *Japan, Disincorporated: The Economic Liberalization Process.* Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1988. Pp. xxi, 185. $19.95.

MEHRA, PARSHOTAM. *A Dictionary of Modern Indian History, 1707–1947.* Rev. ed. New York: Oxford University Press. 1987. Pp. xv, 823. $36.00.

MONTGOMERY, MICHAEL. *Imperialist Japan: The Yen to Dominate.* New York: St. Martin's. 1987. Pp. xxii, 567. $35.00.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

POWER, BRIAN. *The Puppet Emperor: The Life of Pu Yi, Last Emperor of China*. New York: Universe Books. 1988. Pp. ix, 230. $17.95.

REISCHAUER, EDWIN O. *The Japanese*. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 1982. Pp. 443. $25.00.

STEINBERG, DAVID JOEL, *et al.*, editors. *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History*. Rev. ed. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 590. $18.50.

UNITED STATES

ALLEN, CATHERINE B. *Laborers Together with God: 22 Great Women in Baptist Life; Biographical Sketches of the Officers Who Guided Woman's Missionary Union, Auxiliary to Southern Baptist Convention, for the First 100 Years*. Birmingham, Ala.: Woman's Missionary Union. 1987. Pp. 246. $6.50.

ARMSTRONG, RICHARD. *The Next Hurrah: The Communications Revolution in American Politics*. (Beech Tree Books.) New York: William Morrow. 1988. Pp. 300. $18.95.

BARKER, LUCIUS J. *Our Time Has Come: A Delegate's Diary of Jesse Jackson's 1984 Presidential Campaign*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1988. Pp. xviii, 233. $21.95.

BILLS, SCOTT L., editor. *Kent State/May 4: Echoes through a Decade*. Paperback edition. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 1988. Pp. xxviii, 320. $12.00.

BOBBITT, PHILIP. *Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy*. New York: St. Martin's. 1988. Pp. xii, 350. $35.00.

BODE, CARL, editor. *The Editor, the Bluenose, and the Prostitute: H. L. Mencken's History of the "Hatrack" Censorship Case*. Boulder, Colo.: Roberts Rinehart. 1988. Pp. 174. $19.50.

BOESSENECKER, JOHN. *Badge and Buckshot: Lawlessness in Old California*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1988. Pp. xiii, 333. $22.95.

BOLLER, PAUL F., JR. *Presidential Wives: An Anecdotal History*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1988. Pp. x, 533. $19.95.

BRINKLEY, DAVID. *Washington Goes to War*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1988. Pp. xvi, 286. $18.95.

BROWDER, CLIFFORD. *The Wickedest Woman in New York: Madame Restell, the Abortionist*. (Archon Books.) Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String. 1988. Pp. 217. $25.00.

BRUCHEY, STUART. *The Wealth of the Nation: An Economic History of the United States*. New York: Harper and Row. 1988. Pp. x, 259. $18.95.

BUCKLEY, THOMAS H., and EDWIN B. STRONG, JR. *American Foreign and National Security Policies, 1914–1945*. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 1987. Pp. viii, 210. Cloth $24.95, paper $12.95.

CANFIELD, GAE WHITNEY. *Sarah Winnemucca of the Northern Paiutes*. Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1988. Pp. xiv, 306. $9.95.

CARRERAS, CHARLES. *United States Economic Pentration of Venezuela and Its Effects on Diplomacy, 1895–1906*. (Foreign Economic Policy of the United States, number 8.) New York: Garland. 1987. Pp. 252.

CASILLAS, REX J. *Oil and Diplomacy: The Evolution of American Foreign Policy in Saudi Arabia, 1933–1945*. (Foreign Economic Policy of the United States.) New York: Garland. 1987. Pp. 229. $35.00.

CASSARA, ERNEST. *The Enlightenment in America*. Reprint. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. 1988. Pp. 208. $12.75.

CLARK, ELLA E. *Indian Legends from the Northern Rockies*. (Civilization of the American Indian Series, number 82.) Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1988. Pp. xviii, 350. $9.95.

COEL, MARGARET. *Chief Left Hand: Southern Arapaho*. (Civilization of the American Indian Series, number 159.) Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1987. Pp. xiv, 338. $11.95.

CURRAN, ROBERT EMMETT, editor. *American Jesuit Spirituality: The Maryland Tradition, 1634–1900*. (Sources of American Spirituality.) New York: Paulist. 1988. Pp. viii, 339. $19.95.

CURRIE, DAVID P. *The Constitution of the United States: A Primer for the People*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1988. Pp. ix, 150. Cloth $21.00, paper $6.95.

DALLAS, SANDRA. *Colorado Ghost Towns and Mining Camps*. Assisted by KENDAL ATCHISON. Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1985. Pp. ix, 254. $14.95.

DORGAN, HOWARD. *Giving Glory to God in Appalachia: Worship Practices of Six Baptist Subdenominations*. Knoxville: University of Tennesee Press. 1987. Pp. xxvii, 224. $24.95.

EATON, LEONARD K. *Houses and Money: The Domestic Clients of Benjamin Henry Latrobe*. (Frederic Lindley Morgan Chair of Architectural Design Monograph, number 2.) Dublin, N.H.: William L. Bauhan, for the Allen R. Hite Institute, University of Louisville. 1988. Pp. 72. $7.95.

FARAGHER, JOHN MACK. *Sugar Creek: Life on the Illinois Prairie*. Paperback edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1986. Pp. xvii, 280. $12.95.

FICHOU, JEAN-PIERRE. *La Civilisation Américaine*. (Que Sais-Je?) Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1987. Pp. 125.

GALBRAITH, JOHN KENNETH. *The Great Crash: 1929*. Reprint. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1988. Pp. xx, 206. Cloth $17.95, paper $8.95.

GERTZOG, IRWIN N. *Congressional Women: Their Recruitment, Treatment, and Behavior*. (Praeger Special Studies.) New York: Praeger. 1984. Pp. xiv, 290. $29.95.

GIBSON, ARRELL MORGAN. *The Santa Fe and Taos Colonies: Age of the Muses, 1900–1942*. Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1988. Pp. xiii, 305. $12.95.

GONICK, LARRY. *The Cartoon Guide to U.S. History*. Volume 2, *1865–Now*. (College Outline Series.) New York: Barnes and Noble of Harper and Row. 1988. Pp. 197. $6.95.

GOUGH, TERRENCE J. *U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach*. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army. 1987. Pp. viii, 126. $4.25.

GRAY, COLIN S. *The Geopolitics of Super Power*. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 1988. Pp. 274. $26.00.

GREENE, J. R. *Calvin Coolidge: A Biography in Picture Postcards*. Foreword by JOHN A. WATERHOUSE. Athol, Mass.: Transcript. 1987. Pp. 101. $9.95.

GRIM, JOHN A. *The Shaman: Patterns of Religious Healing among the Ojibway Indians*. (Civilization of the American Indian Series, number 165.) Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1987. Pp. xiv, 258. $8.95.

GRIMKÉ, SARAH. *Letters on the Equality of the Sexes and Other Essays*. Edited by ELIZABETH ANN BARTLETT. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1988. Pp. xii, 174. $21.50.

HALLENBECK, CLEVE. *The Journey of Fray Marcos de Niza*. Assisted by JOSE CISNEROS. Foreword by DAVID J. WEBER. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press; distributed by Texas A&M University Press, College Station. 1987. Pp. lxxi, 115. $29.95.

HAMILTON, ALEXANDER, *et al. The Federalist, or, the New Constitution*. Edited by MAX BELOFF. 2d ed. New York: Basil Blackwell. 1987. Pp. lxxvi, 484. $17.95.

HAMMERSCHLAG, CARL A. *The Dancing Healers: A Doctor's Journey of Healing with Native Americans*. San Francisco: Harper and Row. 1988. Pp. 170. $14.95.

HART, JAMES D. *A Companion to California*. 2d ed., rev. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 591. Cloth $38.00, paper $15.95.

HASTY, OLGA PETERS, and SUSANNE FUSSO, editors. *America through Russian Eyes, 1874–1926*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1988. Pp. 226. $25.00.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

HAWKE, DAVID FREEMAN. *Everyday Life in Early America.* (Everyday Life in America Series.) New York: Harper and Row. Pp. xii, 195. $16.95.

HENDERSON, PHILLIP G. *Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy—From Kennedy to Reagan.* (Transforming American Politics Series.) Boulder, Colo.: Westview. 1988. Pp. xii, 205. $29.95.

HOPE, HOLLY. *Garden City: Dreams in a Kansas Town.* Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1988. Pp. xv, 175. $15.95.

HOWE, FREDERIC C. *The Confessions of a Reformer.* Foreword by JAMES F. RICHARDSON. Paperback edition. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 1988. Pp. xxii, 352. $12.00.

HUBER, RICHARD M. *The American Idea of Success.* Reprint. Wainscott, N.Y.: Pushcart. 1987. Pp. 563. $19.95.

HYDE, GEORGE E. *The Pawnee Indians.* Foreword by SAVOIE LOTTINVILLE. (Civilization of the American Indian Series, number 128.) Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1988. Pp. xii, 372. $12.95.

HYNES, SAMUEL. *Flights of Passage: Reflections of a World War II Aviator.* New York: Frederic C. Beil or Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Md. 1988. Pp. viii, 270. $16.95.

JAMES, WILLIAM. *Writings, 1902–1910.* Edited by BRUCE KUKLICK. New York: Library of America. 1987. Pp. 1379. $27.50.

JENSEN, JOAN M. *Loosening the Bonds: Mid-Atlantic Farm Women, 1750–1850.* Paperback edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1986. Pp. xv, 271. $12.95.

JONES, WILLIAM K. *A Brief History of the 6th Marines.* Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps. 1987. Pp. xi, 181.

KARAMANSKI, THEODORE J. *Fur Trade and Exploration: Opening the Far Northwest, 1821–1852.* Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1988. Pp. xxii, 330. $10.95.

KAUFMAN, MARTIN, *et al.*, editors. *A Guide to the History of Massachusetts.* (Reference Guides to State History and Research.) New York: Greenwood. 1988. Pp. xii, 313. $59.95.

KNIGHT, ALAN. *U.S.-Mexican Relations, 1910–1940: An Interpretation.* (Monograph Series, number 28.) La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego. 1987. Pp. v, 149.

LADNER, MILDRED D. *O. C. Seltzer: Painter of the Old West.* Foreword by FRED A. MYERS. (Gilcrease-Oklahoma Series on Western Art and Artists, number 1.) Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press and the Thomas Gilcrease Institute of American History and Art, Tulsa, Okla. 1980. Pp. xiv, 224. $24.95.

MASTERSON, V. V. *The Katy Railroad and the Last Frontier.* Foreword by DONOVAN L. HOFSOMMER. Reprint. Columbia: University of Missouri Press. 1988. Pp. xiv, 312. $14.95.

MAYER, ROBERT STANLEY. *The Influence of Frank A. Vanderlip and the National City Bank on American Commerce and Foreign Policy, 1910–1920.* (Foreign Economic Policy of the United States, number 18.) New York: Garland. 1987. Pp. viii, 221.

MCCARTY, JOHN L. *Maverick Town: The Story of Old Tascosa.* Foreword by C. L. SONNICHSEN. Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1988. Pp. xv, 287. $10.95.

MONAGAN, JOHN S. *The Grand Panjandrum: Mellow Years of Justice Holmes.* Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. 1988. Pp. xiii, 153. $23.95.

NABOKOV, PETER. *Indian Running: Native American History and Tradition.* Reprint. Santa Fe, N. Mex.: Ancient City. 1987. Pp. 208. $10.95.

OLSON, JAMES S., editor. *Dictionary of the Vietnam War.* New York: Greenwood. 1988. Pp. viii, 585. $65.00.

PARRINGTON, VERNON LOUIS. *Main Currents in American Thought: An Interpretation of American Literature from the Beginnings to 1920.* Volume 1, *The Colonial Mind, 1620–1800*; volume 2, *The Romantic Revolution in America, 1800–1860*; volume 3, *The Beginnings of Critical Realism in America, 1860–1920.* Foreword by DAVID W. LEVY. Reprint. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1987. Pp. xxxi, 413; xxx, 493; xliii, 429. Cloth $28.95 each volume, paper $14.95 each volume.

PITZL, GERALD R. *A History of Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 323.* Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps. 1987. Pp. vii, 61.

ROOSEVELT, ARCHIE. *For Lust of Knowing: Memoirs of an Intelligence Officer.* Boston: Little, Brown. 1988. Pp. xiv, 500. $24.95.

RUBY, ROBERT H., and JOHN A. BROWN. *The Chinook Indians: Traders of the Lower Columbia River.* Foreword by STEPHEN A. MERIWETHER. (Civilization of the American Indian Series, number 138.) Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1988. Pp. xxii, 349. $13.95.

RUBY, ROBERT H., and JOHN A. BROWN. *Indians of the Pacific Northwest: A History.* Foreword by ALVIN M. JOSEPHY, JR. (Civilization of the American Indian Series, number 158.) Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1988. Pp. 294. $17.95.

SACKS, KAREN BRODKIN. *Caring by the Hour: Women, Work, and Organizing at Duke Medical Center.* Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 1988. Pp. xi, 239. Cloth $29.95, paper $11.95.

SAVAGE, WILLIAM W., JR. *Singing Cowboys and All That Jazz: A Short History of Popular Music in Oklahoma.* Paperback edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1983. Pp. xii, 185. $7.95.

SILVIA, PHILIP T., JR., editor. *Victorian Vistas: Fall River, 1865–1885: As Viewed through Its Newspaper Accounts.* Fall River, Mass.: R. E. Smith. 1987. Pp. xv, 471. $18.95.

SIMMONDS, A. J. *Pictures Past: A Centennial Celebration of Utah State University.* Logan: Utah State University Press. 1988. Pp. 126. $27.50.

SIRY, JOSEPH V. *Marshes of the Ocean Shore: Development of an Ecological Ethic.* (Environmental History Series, number 6.) Paperback edition. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 1984. Pp. 216. $12.95.

SMITH, HEDRICK. *The Power Game: How Washington Works.* New York: Random House. 1988. Pp. xxii, 793. $22.50.

SOBEL, MECHAL. *Trabelin' On: The Slave Journey to an Afro-Baptist Faith.* Paperback edition. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1988. Pp. xxv, 317. $12.95.

SPECTOR, RONALD H. *U.S. Marines in Grenada, 1983.* Washington, D.C.: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps. 1987. Pp. vii, 35. $2.25.

SUSIE, DEBRA ANNE. *In the Way of Our Grandmothers: A Cultural View of Twentieth-Century Midwifery in Florida.* Athens: University of Georgia Press. 1988. Pp. ix, 254. $25.00.

TROWER, W. PETER. *Discovering Alvarez: Selected Works of Luis W. Alvarez, with Commentary by His Students and Colleagues.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1987. Pp. ix, 272. $37.50.

UROFSKY, MELVIN I. *A March of Liberty: A Constitutional History of the United States.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1988. Pp. xxii, 969. $40.00.

WEAVER, GLENN. *The Italian Presence in Colonial Virginia.* New York: Center for Migration Studies. 1988. Pp. 88. $12.95.

WEEMS, JOHN EDWARD. *To Conquer a Peace: The War between the United States and Mexico.* (Texas A&M University Military History Series, number 7.) Reprint. College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 1974. Pp. xxv, 500. Cloth $29.50, paper $16.95.

WELCH, CLAUDE. *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century.* Volume 1, *1799–1870*; volume 2, *1870–1914.* Paperback edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1972; 1985. Pp. x, 325; xii, 315. $12.95 each volume.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WHITE, JOHN KENNETH. *The New Politics of Old Values.* Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England. 1988. Pp. x, 188. Cloth $18.00, paper $9.95.

WILKINSON, CHARLES F. *American Indians, Time, and the Law: Native Societies in a Modern Constitutional Democracy.* Paperback edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 225. $9.95.

CANADA

BALDWIN, GED. *Frontier Justice: The Reminiscences of Ged Baldwin.* Edmonton: University of Alberta Press. 1987. Pp. xi, 175.

DAVIDSON, JAMES WEST, and JOHN RUGGE. *Great Heart: The History of a Labrador Adventure.* New York: Viking. 1988. Pp. xii, 385. $19.95.

TENNYSON, BRIAN DOUGLAS, editor. *Canada and the Commonwealth Caribbean.* Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. 1988. Pp. 395. Cloth $29.75, paper $17.25.

LATIN AMERICA

DE JUAN, ADELAIDA. *En la Galería Latinoamericana.* (Colección nuestros paises, serie galeria.) Havana: Casa de las Américas. 1979. Pp. 203.

FOX, JOHN W. *Maya Postclassic State Formation: Segmentary Lineage Migration in Advancing Frontiers.* (New Studies in Archaeology.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 1987. Pp. xv, 310. $44.50.

GALICH, MANUEL. *Nuestros primeros padres.* (Colección nuestros paises, serie estudios.) Havana: Casa de las Américas. 1979. Pp. 432.

GAUTA, JOSE ROZO. *Los Muiscas: Cultura material y organización socio-política.* (Colección nuestros paises, serie estudios.) Havana: Casa de las Américas. 1984. Pp. 155.

GOMEZ-MARTINEZ, JOSE. *Bolivia: Un pueblo en busca de su identidad.* La Paz: Los Amigos del Libro. 1988. Pp. 384.

GOVEIA, ELSA. *Estudios de la historiografia de las Antillas Inglesas hasta finales del siglo XIX.* (Colección nuestros paises, serie estudios.) Havana: Casa de las Américas. 1984. Pp. 141.

GUZMAN, FRANCISCO PEREZ, and VIOLETA SERRANO RUBIO. *Máximo Gómez: Aproximación a su cronología 1836–1950.* Havana: Academia. 1986. Pp. vi, 104.

HART, RICHARD. *Esclavos que abolieron la esclavitud.* (Colección nuestros paises, sere estudios.) Havana: Casa de las Américas. 1984. Pp. 415.

JIMENEZ, LILIAM. *El Salvador: Sus problemas socio-economicos.* (Colección nuestros paises, serie estudios.) Havana: Casa de las Américas. 1980. Pp. 236.

LAJOUS, ALEJANDRA, editor. *Las razones y las obras: Gobierno de Miguel de la Madrid; Crónica del sexenio 1982–1988 cuarto año.* Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 1987. Pp. 832.

LIMA, JOSE LEZAMA. *Paradiso.* Translated by GREGORY RABASSA. (Texas Pan American Series.) Austin: University of Texas Press. 1988. Pp. 466. $10.95.

PARRY, J. H., *et al. A Short History of the West Indies.* 4th ed. New York: St. Martin's. 1987. Pp. xiv, 333. $29.95.

PEREZ-LOPEZ, JORGE F. *Measuring Cuban Economic Performance.* (Special Publication, Institute of Latin American Studies.) Austin: University of Texas Press. 1987. Pp. xii, 202. $25.00.

RODO, JOSE ENRIQUE. *Ariel.* Translated by MARGARET SAYERS PEDEN. Forewords by JAMES W. SYMINGTON and CARLOS FUENTES. Austin: University of Texas Press. 1988. Pp. 156. Cloth $16.95, paper $7.95.

RUIZ, ERNESTO. *Máximo Gómez: Selección bibliográfica y documental.* Havana: Editorial Academia. 1986. Pp. 98.

SANCHEZ, JOSE LOPEZ. *Bicentenario de Humboldt: Humboldt y su época.* (Serie Historica, number 13.) Havana: Academia de Ciencias de Cuba, for Museo Historico de las Ciencias "Carlos J. Finlay," Havana. 1970. Pp. 151.

STEPAN, ALFRED. *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone.* Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1988. Pp. xviii, 167. Cloth $25.00, paper $9.95.

TIMERMAN, JACOBO. *Chile: Death in the South.* Translated by ROBERT COX. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1987. Pp. 133. $15.95.

VAZQUEZ RODRIGUEZ, ROSA ELENA. *La prática musical de la población negra en Perú: La Danza de Negritos de El Carmen.* (Premio de musicologia.) Havana: Casa de las Américas. 1982. Pp. 177.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communications

A communication will be considered only if it relates to an article or review published in this journal; publication is solely at the editor's discretion. Letters may not exceed seven hundred words for reviews and one thousand words for articles. They should be submitted in duplicate, typed double-spaced with wide margins, and headed "To the Editor."

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

TO THE EDITOR:

John A. Armstrong gently rebukes my book, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine*, for demographic inadequacy (*AHR*, 92 [1987]: 1240–41).

Up to a point, he is quite right. No professional demographer, Western or Soviet, has yet submitted the period to a full examination. One of the reasons is the dearth of data. I make it clear that, though my estimates were indeed approved as highly probable by demographers, they remain estimates. Professor Armstrong rightly sees the main difficulty as being the proportion of the population deficit to be attributed not to deaths but to a temporary decline in the birthrate. It is unlikely that this can be settled, if only because registration of births and deaths did not take place in the famine area in 1932–1933 (and Soviet statistics did not in any case register as births infants dying after a few days). Nevertheless, I accept that my figure for the birth deficit was too low, and after further study of this and similar periods I have increased it in the new edition to *circa* 4.5 million.

However, I also find that my estimate of the total population deficit up to 1937, admittedly conservative, was also too low. In a source not originally available to me, I find the leading Soviet scholar of the collectivization gives it as 15–16 million (V. P. Danilov in *Arkheograficheskii Eshegodnik za 1968 god* [Moscow, 1970], 249), so my estimate of excess deaths in 1930–1937 remains about 11 million (with about 3 million peasants then in labor camps dying there later).

Several lines of evidence lead, if none quite conclusively, to that approximate result, but it is also based on the testimony of those with access to confidential material or with experience and information on the various phases adequate to making sound estimates. The true figure may be higher. But by placing a good deal of strain on the evidence it might possibly be reduced to about 9 million. Even that figure (larger than the World War I dead of all belligerent countries put together), would surely carry the social, moral, and historical weight I suggest.

ROBERT CONQUEST
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace
Stanford, California

PROFESSOR ARMSTRONG REPLIES:

In his helpful comments on my review of *The Harvest of Sorrow*, Dr. Conquest cogently points out that no professional demographer has made a full examination of the tragic period of the early 1930s. But specialists such as Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver are pursuing ingenious analyses of the incomplete data. My concern is that historians, who so often find demography an indispensable auxiliary discipline, be aware of such analyses. As Conquest suggests, all lines of evidence need consideration, and we are greatly indebted to him for discovering significant new materials (as exemplified by the citation in his letter) in obscure Soviet publications. I fully agree that any plausible figure for excess deaths fully substantiates the social, moral, and historical implications of his conclusions.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG
St. Augustine, Florida

TO THE EDITOR:

It is not obvious why Frank H. Ellis chose to write such a viciously negative review of *Daniel Defoe and Diplomacy* (*AHR*, 93 [1988]: 146–47). Perhaps he was upset by my observation on page 74 that his lack of knowledge of diplomatic practice led him to make an error of interpretation in his *Poems on Affairs of State*.

In any case, Dr. Ellis's review does not meet the minimum professional standards normally expected of reviews published in the *AHR*. The *AHR*'s guidelines state that a "review should give a clear statement of the book's content and a critical assessment of its contribution to knowledge in its field." No one reading Ellis's review would suspect that *Daniel Defoe and Diplomacy* is the first study anywhere arguing that both diplomacy and international relations were important in Defoe's thought. Almost no literary scholars have even noticed that Defoe was very interested in these topics and devoted many pages to discussing them. Ellis does not even hint that Defoe's writings are used for the historical, not literary, purpose of showing how Defoe both reflected and tried to influence early modern English "public opinion" (the "public" nature

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the ideas may account for some of their supposedly "numbing banality"). Ellis totally ignores the themes that Defoe was a realist in the Machiavelli/Morgenthau sense and that his underlying ideas were consistent despite his apparent tergiversations. Ellis's invocation of Samuel Johnson's comments about using "all the arts" to create a "big book," while cute, ignores the fact that scholarly historical works often include bibliographies, maps, notes, chronologies, and indexes. Historical studies are normally criticized for the absence of such "arts," not for their inclusion.

It is certainly acceptable to have reviews in the *AHR* written by nonhistorians. However, the author of a review published in a historical journal should at least understand the terminology used by historians. Ellis apparently does not know what historians mean when they use the word "diplomacy" in connection with international relations. If he did, he would never describe Defoe's role in the events leading to the union of Scotland and England in 1707 as an "unofficial diplomatic position." The union was important of course, but it was in no way the result of real diplomatic relations between independent princes or states. No historian would seriously suggest that relations between London and Edinburgh were of the same nature as relations between, for example, London and Vienna or London and Stockholm. Since Defoe's undercover mission was definitely not "diplomatic" in any of the senses that the word is normally used in discussing international relations, Ellis's claim that Defoe achieved "one of the most remarkable diplomatic feats in history" is balderdash. The mission might be discussed in a book about Defoe's ideas on diplomacy, but it has no special significance for the topic.

Readers of a review have the right to expect that quotations drawn from a book represent what the author actually says. Ellis, however, quotes snippets out of context and/or from widely separated pages to create apparent contradictions where none in fact exist. His complaint about the use of words like "may" and "perhaps" when referring to Defoe's thought is curious. Perhaps Ellis knows exactly what Defoe meant in all his writings, but I, like many historians, have a more modest opinion of my interpretive abilities. In any case, the method used in this book is similar to the approaches of other careful studies of Defoe's political, economic, and religious ideas.

Historians today are frequently criticized for failing to address audiences in disciplines beyond their own or for not using nontraditional sources. It is very discouraging that the attempt to do both of these things in *Daniel Defoe and Diplomacy* is met with a review like Ellis's in America's major historical journal.

WILLIAM ROOSEN
Northern Arizona University

Professor Ellis declines to respond. THE EDITOR

TO THE EDITOR:

In his review of Melvyn Dubofsky's and Warren Van Tine's *Labor Leaders in American History* (*AHR*, 93 [1988]: 784), to which I contributed an essay, Philip S. Foner describes my passing mention of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn ("later a Communist party workhorse") as "a contemptible comment." I readily concede that "activist" or "organizer" might have been more salutary choices, but "workhorse" still seems judgmentally neutral to me, as I intended it when I wrote it, even conveying a sense of "having great value" and "devoted," which happen to be parts of my opinion of the celebrated "Rebel Girl." Had I wished to insinuate an anti-Communist attitude, of which Professor Foner accuses the book as a whole, I had the well-worn "functionary" and "hack" at my disposal. To have written "First Lady of the Communist party" would have won me far more trouble from reviewers than Professor Foner's accusation has caused.

I cannot speak for the editors of the book, but I believe Professor Foner is mistaken to say they erred in not including biographical essays on the Communist activists Flynn, William Z. Foster, and Ben Gold. *Labor Leaders* is not an encyclopedia. It treats only fifteen pivotal figures in American labor history. Flynn was an agitator, never the leader of a working union. Foster led a mass movement for only a short time in 1919. Gold's Fur and Leather Workers Union was so negligible a force that genuine red-baiters cared little about it.

Foner may have a case with Harry Bridges, but which of the fifteen selected subjects would he justify dropping in his favor? George Meany? Walter Reuther? John L. Lewis? Now that I think about it, my essay on Big Bill Haywood was the only one he called "contemptible." The hell with Harry Bridges.

JOSEPH R. CONLIN
California State University, Chico

PROFESSOR FONER REPLIES:

Joseph R. Conlin's disagreement only underscores the correctness of my review.

PHILIP S. FONER
EMERITUS
Lincoln University, Pennsylvania

ERRATUM

Because of a printer's error, the Table of Contents of the June 1988 issue of the *AHR* did not list the review of Lance E. Davis and Robert A. Huttenback's *Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British Imperialism, 1860–1912*. The review, written by Peter Harnetty, did appear in that issue on pages 704–05.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American Historical Association

Founded in 1884. Chartered by Congress in 1889.
Office: 400 A Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

President: Akira Iriye, *University of Chicago*
President-elect: Louis R. Harlan, *University of Maryland*
Executive Director: Samuel R. Gammon
Controller: James H. Leatherwood

MEMBERSHIP: Persons interested in historical studies, whether professionally or otherwise, are invited to membership. The present membership and subscription total is approximately 17,000. Members elect the officers by ballot.

MEETINGS: The Association's annual meeting takes place December 27–30. The meeting in 1988 will be held in Cincinnati. Many professional historical groups meet within or jointly with the Association at this time. The Pacific Coast Branch holds separate meetings on the Pacific Coast and publishes the *Pacific Historical Review*.

PUBLICATIONS AND SERVICES: The *American Historical Review* is published five times a year and sent to all members. It is available by subscription to institutions. The Association also publishes its *Annual Report, Perspectives* (newsletter with classified listings), a variety of pamphlets on historical subjects, the bibliographic series *Writings on American History*, and *Recently Published Articles*. To promote history and assist historians, the Association offers other services, including an Institutional Services Program. It also maintains close relations with international, specialized, state, and local historical societies through conferences and correspondence.

PRIZES: The *Herbert B. Adams Prize* of $1,000 awarded annually for a first book in the field of European history. The *George Louis Beer Prize* of $1,000 awarded annually for a book on any phase of European international history since 1895. The *Albert J. Beveridge Award* of $1,000 given annually for the best book on the history of the United States, Canada, or Latin America. The *Albert B. Corey Prize*, sponsored jointly by the AHA and the Canadian Historical Association, of $2,000 awarded biennially for the best book on the history of Canadian-American relations or the history of both countries (next award, 1988). The *Paul Birdsall Prize* of $1,000 for a major work by a U.S. or Canadian historian in European military and strategic history offered biennially commencing in 1986. The *James H. Breasted Prize* of $1,000 offered annually commencing in 1985 for the best book in English in any field of history prior to 1000 A.D. The *John H. Dunning Prize* of $1,000 awarded annually for a book on any subject relating to American history. The *John K. Fairbank Prize in East Asian History since 1800* of $1,000 awarded annually. The *Herbert Feis Award for Nonacademically-affiliated Historians* of $1,000 awarded annually to recognize the recent work of independent scholars. The *Leo Gershoy Award* of $1,000 awarded annually for outstanding work in seventeenth or eighteenth-century Western European history. The *Clarence H. Haring Prize* of $500 awarded every five years to a Latin American for an outstanding book in Latin American history (next award, 1990). The *Joan Kelly Memorial Prize* of $1,000 awarded annually for the best book in women's history and/or feminist theory. The *Littleton-Griswold Prize* of $1,000 awarded annually for the best work on history of American law and society. The *Howard R. Marraro Prize* in Italian history awarded annually and carrying a cash award of $500. The *James Harvey Robinson Prize* for the teaching aid that has made the most outstanding contribution to the teaching of history (next triennial award, 1990). The *Robert Livingston Schuyler Prize* of $500 awarded every five years for the best work in modern British and Commonwealth history (next award, 1990). The *J. Franklin Jameson Prize* awarded every five years for outstanding editorial achievement (next award, 1990). The *Waldo G. Leland Prize* awarded every five years for the most outstanding reference tool (next award, 1991). The *Alexis de Tocqueville Prize* offered every five years for the best work in U.S. history published outside the U.S. by a foreign scholar (next award, 1989).

DUES: For incomes of $40,000 and above, $60.00 annually; $30,000–$39,999, $55.00; $20,000–$29,999, $47.00; $15,000–$19,999, $40.00; $10,000–$14,999, $30.00; below $10,000, students, and joint memberships, $20.00; associate (nonhistorian) $30.00; life $1,000. Overseas members add $5.00 for postage. Members receive the *American Historical Review*, *Perspectives*, the program of the annual meeting, and the *Annual Report* on request and may subscribe to the *RPA* for $20.00 (plus $2.00 postage for overseas members).

CORRESPONDENCE: Inquiries should be addressed to the Executive Director at 400 A Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American Historical Review

Founded in 1895

The *AHR* is sent to all members of the American Historical Association; information concerning membership will be found on the preceding page. The *AHR* is also available to institutions by subscription. There are five categories of subscription:

CLASS I: *American Historical Review* only, United States $43.00, foreign $47.00.
CLASS II: *American Historical Review, Perspectives,* the program of the annual meeting of the Association, and the *Annual Report,* United States $54.00, foreign $60.00.
CLASS III: Subscription to *Recently Published Articles* only, $28.00, foreign $30.00.
CLASS IV: *American Historical Review* with *Recently Published Articles,* United States $67.00, foreign $72.00.
CLASS V: *American Historical Review, Perspectives,* the program of the annual meeting of the Association, and the *Annual Report,* with *Recently Published Articles,* United States $78.00, foreign $85.00.

Single copies of the current issue and back issues in and subsequent to volume 84 (1979) can be ordered from the Membership Secretary of the Association at $10.00 per copy. Issues prior to volume 85 should be ordered from Kraus Reprint Company, Route 100, Millwood, N.Y., 10546.

Notice of nonreceipt of an issue must be sent to the Membership Secretary of the Association within three months of the date of publication of the issue. Changes of address should be sent to the Membership Secretary by the first of the month preceding the month of publication. The Association is not responsible for copies lost because of failure to report a change of address in time for mailing. The Association cannot accommodate changes of address that are effective only for the summer months.

Correspondence regarding contributions and books for review should be sent to the Editor, *American Historical Review,* 914 Atwater, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47405. For further information on the submission of manuscripts, see page ii at the front of this issue.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LSU Press

JOHN C. CALHOUN AND THE PRICE OF UNION
A Biography
John Niven
Winner of the Jules and Frances Landry Award
"In this book the so-called 'cast-iron man' comes alive as a recognizable human being. He is seen clearly in relation to his friends and foes, each of them deftly characterized, and to the political events of his time. A fresh and original biography by a master of the historical period and of the historian's craft." —Richard Nelson Current
Illustrated
A Selection of the History Book Club
$24.95

TELLING MEMORIES AMONG SOUTHERN WOMEN
Domestic Workers and Their Employers in the Segregated South
Susan Tucker
Susan Tucker presents a revealing collection of oral history narratives that explore the complex, sometimes enigmatic bond between black female domestic workers and their white employers from the turn of the century to the 1960s.
Illustrated
$24.95

TWICE CONDEMNED
Slaves and the Criminal Laws of Virginia, 1705–1865
Philip J. Schwarz
While many historians have depicted dramatic examples of the sometimes deadly conflict endemic to societies based on slave labor, Philip J. Schwarz draws on the behavior attributed to slave convicts over the span of 160 years to analyze the prevalence, longevity, and variety of such discord.
$37.50

THE NEW DEAL IN THE URBAN SOUTH
Douglas L. Smith
Douglas L. Smith considers the four largest southeastern cities at the time of the depression —Atlanta, Birmingham, Memphis, and New Orleans—and demonstrates how major federal programs and policies, such as public works, housing, labor, and federal arts projects, affected each of them.
$29.95

THE CONFEDERATE CARPETBAGGERS
Daniel E. Sutherland
"Sutherland draws portraits of various types of carpetbaggers and examines the reasons for their exodus and its sociological and historical significance. Perusing newspapers, books, diaries and letters, he traces the lives of businessmen, artists and socialites, weaving their stories into the phenomenon of which they were an integral part." —*Publishers Weekly* "An important and well-crafted work." —*Library Journal*
Illustrated
A Selection of the History Book Club
$40.00 cloth, $16.95 paper

Louisiana State University Press Baton Rouge 70893

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NEW from INDIANA

Now in paperback

Into the Wilderness with the Army of the Potomac

By Robert Garth Scott

"This book is so well written, and the story so well told that I couldn't put it aside—I pushed on and read it all in one day." —Herman Hattaway

paper **$9.95** cloth **$29.95**

The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare

Ideas, Organization, and Field Command

By Edward Hagerman

". . . a major contribution to our knowledge of the place of the Civil War in the history of warfare." —Russell F. Weigley

$37.50

Winfield Scott Hancock

A Soldier's Life

By David M. Jordan

A compelling biography of "Hancock the Superb," Indian fighter, Civil War general (a key figure at Gettysburg and the Wilderness), controversial Reconstructionist commander of New Orleans, and presidential candidate. **$29.95**

The Free University of Berlin

A Political History

By James F. Tent

The history of this university, founded after the Second World War, is also a history of East/West relations in Berlin and encompasses many of the important events in postwar Germany. **$37.50**

Energy and Entropy

Science and Culture in Victorian Britain

Edited by Patrick Brantlinger

These essays on physics, mathematics, chemistry, economics, anthropology, and biology show how they influenced Victorian Britain. **$29.95**

A History of Our Own Times

By Ford Madox Ford
Edited by Solon Beinfeld and Sondra J. Stang
Foreword by Gordon A. Craig

This never-before-published manuscript of historical change in Europe and America between 1870 and 1895 is the only volume Ford completed of a planned three-volume history of his own times. **$27.50**

Edgar Snow

A Biography

By John Maxwell Hamilton

"Hamilton's well-informed biography scrutinizes both Ed Snow's career and the America that lionized him in World War II and ostracized him during the Cold War."
—John K. Fairbank

$25.00

JFK

History of an Image

By Thomas Brown

This well-written, lucid analysis examines the ways in which JFK has been portrayed in the popular media and provides insight into the cultural, political, and social trends of the last two decades in the United States. **$19.95**



Cincinnati and the Big Red Machine


By Robert Harris "Hub" Walker

"Robert H. Walker has hit a triple. His splendid work of social history is three fine books in one. It is a valuable contribution to the history of a great city and its region. It is an illuminating chapter in the annals of American business. And, of course, it is a loving and informed new chapter in the book of baseball history." —George F. Will

cloth **$19.95**
paper **$ 8.95**







AT BOOKSTORES, OR ORDER FROM

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS

TENTH AND MORTON STREETS, BLOOMINGTON, IN 47404
812-335-6804

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oxford

The American Intellectual Tradition A Source Book
Volume I: 1620-1865. Volume II: 1865 to the present
Edited by DAVID A. HOLLINGER, *University of Michigan* and
CHARLES CAPPER, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill*
This two-volume anthology makes easily available some of the most historically significant documents in American intellectual history, ranging chronologically from the early seventeenth century to the present.
January 1989 608 pp. Volume I: paper $14.95
Volume II: paper $12.95 The Set: cloth $45.95

The Magic Mirror Law in American History
KERMIT L. HALL, *University of Florida*
Advance praise: "I will adopt it willingly and eagerly. It promises to very quickly become the standard text in the field."—Paul L. Murphy, *University of Minnesota*
January 1989 368 pp. paper $11.95 cloth $24.95

U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation
Achievements, Failures, Lessons
Edited by ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, PHILIP J. FARLEY, and
ALEXANDER DALLIN, *all of Stanford University*
"A penetrating and sophisticated analysis....A fascinating and important study."
—Robert Jervis, *Columbia University*
1988 768 pp. paper $18.95 cloth $42.00

A History of Our Time Readings on Postwar America
Second Edition
Edited by WILLIAM H. CHAFE, *Duke University* and HARVARD SITKOFF, *University of New Hampshire*
"I have been using the first edition for several years. This new edition only increases my satisfaction with the work."—T.R. Frazer, *Baruch College*
1987 480 pp. paper $12.95

Connecting Spheres
Women in the Western World, 1500 to the Present
Edited by MARILYN J. BOXER, *San Diego State University*
and JEAN H. QUATAERT, *State University of New York at Binghamton*
Foreword by Joan W. Scott, *Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton*
"Some of the best social history to be found...carefully and intelligently presented."—Daryl M. Hafter, *Eastern Michigan University*
1987 303 pp.; illus. paper $10.95 cloth $32.00

Women's America Refocusing the Past
Second Edition
Edited by LINDA K. KERBER, *University of Iowa* and
JANE DE HART-MATHEWS, *University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill*
"A great compilation of the best of women's history is made even better. ...The panorama...is breathtaking!"—Arthur S. Link, *Princeton University*
1987 528 pp.; 4 illus. paper $16.95 cloth $32.50

Prices and publication dates are subject to change.
To request an examination copy, write on school letterhead giving full course information, including course name, level, expected enrollments, and your decision deadline, to:
College Humanities & Social Sciences Marketing Dept.

Oxford University Press
200 Madison Avenue • New York, NY 10016

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oxford

New edition!

Modern Latin America *Second Edition*

THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, *University of Wisconsin* and PETER H. SMITH, *University of California, San Diego*

"The best."—Frederick P. Bowser, *Stanford University* (on the first edition).
January 1989 464 pp.; 45 illus., 3 maps paper $14.95 cloth $32.50

Cuba Between Reform and Revolution

LOUIS A. PÉREZ, JR., *University of South Florida*

Spanning the history of the island from pre-Columbian times to the present, this text examines Cuba's political and economic development in the context of its international relations and continuing struggle for self-determination.
(*Latin American Histories*)
1988 (paper January 1989) 480 pp.; 5 maps paper $12.95 cloth $24.95

New edition!

Chile The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism *Second Edition*

BRIAN LOVEMAN, *San Diego State University*

"The best comprehensive history of Chile in our language."—Paul Drake, *Alternativas* (on the first edition).
(*Latin American Histories*)
1988 464 pp.; 10 maps, 36 tables paper $14.95 cloth $34.50

The Emergence of Latin America in the Nineteenth Century

DAVID BUSHNELL and NEILL MACAULAY, *both of the University of Florida, Gainesville*

"Just what we need...Very useful and well done....A fine history."
—John V. Lombardi, *The Johns Hopkins University*
1988 352 pp.; illus. paper $11.95 cloth $32.50

The Course of Mexican History *Third Edition*

MICHAEL C. MEYER, *University of Arizona* and WILLIAM L. SHERMAN, *University of Nebraska*

"The best one-volume work on the market...Very appealing...to my students."
—Hubert J. Miller, *Pan American University*
1987 792 pp.; illus. paper $19.95 cloth $38.00

From Supplication to Revolution

A Documentary Social History of Imperial Russia

Edited by GREGORY L. FREEZE, *Brandeis University*

"I can't imagine ever teaching history of Imperial Russia without using this text. It is superb and long overdue."—Hugh D. Phillips, *University of Alabama*
1988 352 pp. paper $9.95 cloth $29.95

Before France and Germany

The Creation and Transformation of the Merovingian World

PATRICK J. GEARY, *University of Florida*

"An excellent survey....Explains [the] civilization clearly and...brings the Merovingians to life." —Karen Gould, *University of Texas, Austin*
1988 272 pp.; 3 maps paper $11.95 cloth $29.95

Prices and publication dates are subject to change.
To request an examination copy, write on school letterhead giving full course information, including course name, level, expected enrollments, and your decision deadline, to:
College Humanities & Social Sciences Marketing Dept.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A Concise Economic History of the World

From Paleolithic Times to the Present

RONDO CAMERON, *Emory University*

This comprehensive history is grounded in economic theory but written in nontechnical language and a predominantly narrative style. Cameron places the contemporary world economy in broad historical perspective, making both the East-West rivalry and the North-South split more understandable.
March 1989 464 pp.; illus. $39.95

The Origins of Chinese Communism

ARIF DIRLIK, *Duke University*

Advance praise: "By far the most detailed, sophisticated, and comprehensive treatment of the origins of the Communist Party of China yet written. It is likely to be the standard work...for years to come. It is a gold mine of information and insights." —Maurice Meisner, *University of Wisconsin, Madison*
January 1989 352 pp.; illus. paper $11.95 cloth $31.95

Family, Fields, and Ancestors

Constancy and Change in China's Social and Economic History, 1550-1949

LLOYD E. EASTMAN, *University of Illinois*

"Meets a pressing need....Will add depth to both undergraduate and graduate courses—and the teachers of such courses will benefit from it themselves."
—Lyman P. Van Slyke, *Stanford University*
1988 284 pp.; illus., 12 maps paper $10.95 cloth $29.95

New edition!

A New History of India *Third Edition*

STANLEY WOLPERT, *University of California, Los Angeles*

"Vivid...sound and imaginative."—*The American Historical Review* (on the first edition)
January 1989 528 pp.; illus. paper $14.95 cloth $29.95

The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History

CHESTER STARR, *University of Michigan*

This innovative study provides an important corrective to Alfred Thayer Mahan's thesis, which argued for the paramount role of naval power in antiquity.
1988 (paper January 1989) 128 pp.; 4 maps paper $8.95 cloth $16.95

As the Romans Did A Source Book in Roman Social History

JO-ANN R. SHELTON, *University of California, Santa Barbara*

"An ideal reader for Roman History or Civilization courses....A handsome book." —Ronald Mellor, *University of California, Los Angeles*
1988 512 pp.; illus. paper $19.95 cloth $34.95

The Tentacles of Progress

Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850-1940

DANIEL R. HEADRICK, *Roosevelt University*

"A superb addition to the literature on colonization, which puts to rest a number of myths." —Bruce Fetter, *University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee*
1988 416 pp.; 4 maps paper $11.95 cloth $32.50

Oxford University Press

200 Madison Avenue • New York, NY 10016

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

We're making history

New for '89



James Kirby Martin / Randy Roberts / Steven Mintz
Linda O. McMurry / James H. Jones

This major new American history text blends people-oriented history with political-diplomatic-social history in a coherent, chronologically based mainstream perspective. Strong descriptive narrative engages students in the drama of human conflict and historical change. Special feature essays on everyday life and picture essays on physical and architectural landscape add a new dimension. ***Available December 1988,*** *1016 pages, illustrated, hardbound, Instructor's Manual, two-volume Study Guide, Test Bank, Transparency Program including Text Map Packet and Reference and Source Maps, and DIPLOMA electronic classroom management system.* **Also available in a two-volume softbound split edition: Volume I to 1877; Volume II from 1865.**

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Perspectives on the American Past

Michael Perman

This fascinating two-volume reader stimulates discussion and analysis of major issues and themes in American history through a diverse selection of articles by prominent American historians. ***Available December 1988,*** *illustrated, softbound; Volume I to 1877, 365 pages; Volume II from 1865, 375 pages.*

John F. Kennedy and a New Generation

David Burner

A revealing, unrepenting history of the late President. *©1988, 240 pages, softbound.*

A Short Guide to Writing About History

Richard Marius

Covers the writing process, modes of historical writing, book reviews, essays, and manuscript form. ***Available November 1988,*** *250 pages, illustrated, softbound.*

Recently published

America: Past and Present, 2/e

Divine / Breen / Fredrickson / Williams

Widely adopted, the Second Edition of this successful American history survey text draws upon the latest scholarship to present new insights and interpretations. **Also available in a two-volume softbound split edition and a a softbound Brief Edition with splits.**

The Social Fabric, 5/e

Cary / Weinberg

This highly successful anthology brings American history to life by depicting the way people actually lived. *Vol. I: American Life from 1607 to 1877; Vol. II: American Life from the Civil War to the Present.*

American Realities, 2/e Historical Episodes

Youngs

This lively collection of essays—written entirely by one author—explores the major themes in American history, offering rich and revealing details of particular episodes. *Vol. I: From the First Settlements to the Civil War; Vol. II: From Reconstruction to the Present.*

American Economic History, 2/e

Hughes

This beautifully written, comprehensive history of the American economy shows how today's economy is the product of past events.

Civilization Past and Present, 6/e

Wallbank / Taylor / Bailkey / Jewsbury / Lewis / Hackett

This comprehensive world civilization classic provides up-to-date coverage of global history and includes a striking new map and illustration program. **Also available in a two-volume split edition: Volume I to 1650; Volume II from 1650 to the Present.**

For further information write
Meredith Hellestrae,
Department SA-AHR
1900 East Lake Avenue
Glenview, Illinois 60025

Scott, Foresman and Company


PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED


New York University Press

Column Right
Conservative Journalists in the Service of Nationalism

DAVID BURNER and THOMAS R. WEST

116 pages/ISBN: 0-8147-1106-5
$19.95





Women, Work, and Fertility
1900-1986

SUSAN HOUSEHOLDER VAN HORN

232 pages/ISBN: 0-8147-8759-2
$35.00

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY PRESS
Washington Square South, New York, NY 10003

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cambridge University Press

New paperbacks

Restoration and Reaction, 1815-1848
Andre Jardin and Andre-Jean Tudesq

An account of the political, economic, social, and ideological aspects of French culture from the reestablishment of the Bourbon monarchy through the reigns of Louis XVIII and Charles X.
The Cambridge History of Modern France 1
Copublished with the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme
$16.95

The Rise and Fall of The Second Empire, 1852-1871
Alain Plessis

A thematic study of the government of Napoleon III, focusing on the major political, economic, and social developments of the period.
The Cambridge History of Modern France 3
Copublished with the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme
$10.95

The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871-1914
Jean-Marie Mayeur and Madeleine Reberioux

A picture of the economy and society of late nineteenth-century France, examining the establishment of the Republic and its political influence.
The Cambridge History of Modern France 4
Copublished with the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme
$14.95

The Decline of the Third Republic, 1914-1938
Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief

A detailed account of the Third Republic in France between the outbreak and conduct of the First World War and the fall of Leon Blum's Front Populaire soon after Hitler's invasion and annexation of Austria.
The Cambridge History of Modern France 5
Copublished with the Maison des Sciences de l'Homme
$14.95

The Peasantry in the French Revolution
Peter Jones

Fills a gap in the literature on the French Revolution and offers a synthesis that brings together the fruits of two generations' research in the field of French rural and agrarian history.
$14.95

The Hundred Years War
England and France at War c.1300-c.1450
Christopher Allmand

A comparative study of how the societies of late medieval England and France reacted to the long period of conflict between them, analyzing the main social and economic effects of the war.
Cambridge Medieval Textbooks
$34.50 Cloth
$ 9.95 Paper

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cambridge University Press

Putting Asunder
A History of Divorce in Western Society
Roderick Phillips
"...a very important book. We have long needed a history of divorce, but Phillips has gone one step further and provided us with an excellent introduction to the larger subject of family ideology. There is no study that attains his breadth and comparative strength."
—*Professor David Sabean,* Cornell University
$39.50

Reformers and War
American Progressive Publicists and the First World War
John A. Thompson
Focuses on those writers and journalists most prominently associated with "the progressive movement" and examines their responses to the war and its effects on their thinking.
$32.50

Science and Corporate Strategy
Du Pont R & D, 1902-1980
David A. Hounshell and John Kenly Smith, Jr.
A comprehensive, critical study of Du Pont's most effective research managers and the problems of research management that describes the development of some of the company's most famous products.
Studies in Economic History and Policy: The United States in the Twentieth Century
$39.50

From Monopoly to Competition
The Transformations of Alcoa, 1888-1986
George David Smith
Presents Alcoa's history, from its beginnings as a speculative venture, through its rise to become the most successful monopoly in American history, to the undoing of Alcoa's monopoly by war and anti-trust and the company's adaptation to competition.
$29.95

First the Seed
The Political Economy of Plant Biotechnology, 1492-2000
Jack R. Kloppenberg, Jr.
A history of the scientific and commercial lines of plant development in the United States, tracing its transformation from a public good to a corporate commodity.
$37.50

The Collapse of Complex Societies
Joseph A. Tainter
Develops a new and far-reaching theory that accounts for collapse among diverse kinds of societies, evaluating the process through detailed studies of the Roman, Mayan and Chacoan collapses.
New Studies in Archaeology
$39.50

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cambridge University Press

The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949

Benny Morris

"...the most comprehensive and detailed study yet published on the Palestinian refugees. These are words that should be read on the West Bank and in Gaza..."—*The Economist*

Cambridge Middle East Library

$39.50

Colonising Egypt

Timothy Mitchell

Examines the peculiar methods of order and truth that characterize the modern West through a re-reading of Europe's colonial impact on nineteenth-century Egypt.

Cambridge Middle East Library

$42.50

King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan

Mary C. Wilson

Because of his role in the partition of Palestine, King Abdullah has always been one of the most controversial figures in modern Middle East history. This is the first in-depth study of the historical and personal circumstances that made him so.

Cambridge Middle East Library

$42.50

Award winning books from Cambridge University Press

Winner of the Royal Historical Society's 1987 Whitfield Prize...

Criticism and Compliment

The Politics of Literature in the England of Charles I

Kevin Sharpe

$49.50

Winner of the American Historical Association's Littleton-Griswold Prize in American Law and Society and the American Society for Environmental History's George Perkins Marsh Prize...

The Fisherman's Problem

Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries, 1850–1980

Arthur F. McEvoy

$39.50

At bookstores or order from

Cambridge University Press

32 East 57th Street, NY, NY 10022.
Cambridge toll-free numbers for orders only:
800-872-7423, outside NY State. 800-227-0247,
NY State only. MasterCard and Visa accepted.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Pacific Microphone

William J. Dunn
Foreword by Mike Wallace

In the famous sculpture of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's triumphant return to the Philippines in 1944, one man follows the general onto the beach wearing neither helmet nor hat. That man is a radio reporter, one of only a handful who covered the war in the Pacific for the Americans back home. This is his story of that war.

"Bill Dunn has some unexpected, and fascinating memories of MacArthur that add to our collective historical knowledge. This is . . . a first-rate description of how the news was carried from the warfront to the civilian rear, and an altogether inspiring memoir of what it was like out there in the bloody, traumatic Pacific war."—*Mike Wallace, CBS News/60 Minutes.* 448 pp. 57 b&w photos. 5 maps. Index. $19.95

NOW AVAILABLE IN CLOTH AND PAPER

To Conquer a Peace

THE WAR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO
John Edward Weems

The conflict between the United States and Mexico is seen through the eyes of ten key participants. Using letters, journals, and memoirs as well as other historical documents, John Edward Weems reveals the unadorned thoughts of men as disparate as the young Lieutenant Sam Grant, President James K. Polk, Captain Robert E. Lee, and Mexican political and military leader Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna.

". . . his account of American soldiers on the march, in battle, and at their occasionally riotous ease is extremely readable."—*Bruce Catton.*

"This is the work of a master historian." —*Robert Sherrill, Nation.* 528 pp. 16 photos. 5 maps. $29.50 cloth; $16.95 paper



War Birds

DIARY OF AN UNKNOWN AVIATOR
John MacGavock Grider
Edited by Elliott White Springs
Foreword by James J. Hudson
Illustrations by Clayton Knight

In the summer of 1917, more than 200 Americans volunteered for service in England's Royal Flying Corps, where they would be trained to fly with the Allies until American squadrons could be organized. Pilot John MacGavock Grider's account of the rigors of training, the terrors of combat, and the respite of social activities is also an intimate look at the day-to-day lives of these volunteers. This is Grider's story, but in telling it he encompasses the opinions and prejudices, the successes and failures, the lives and deaths of the men who fought for the United States in World War I as guests of an ally in a foreign land. 278 pp. 26 illus. $17.95

Texas A&M
UNIVERSITY PRESS
Drawer C
College Station, Texas 77843

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Medieval Civilization
JACQUES LE GOFF
Translated by Julia Barrow
$34.95 350pp. 0-631-15513-0

Lady Inspectors
The Campaign for a Better Workplace 1893-1921
MARY DRAKE McFEELY
$24.95 220pp. 1-55786-002-5

Mary Stewart
Queen in Three Kingdoms
MICHAEL LYNCH, Editor
$45.00 256pp. 0-631-15263-6

Wet Nursing
A History from Antiquity to the Present
VALERIE FILDES
$34.95 272pp. 0-631-15831-6

The Franks
EDWARD JAMES
$29.95 256pp. 0-631-14872-8

An Ordered Society
Family and Village Life in England 1560-1725
SUSAN DWYER AMUSSEN
$39.95 256pp. 0-631-15521-X

History from Below
French and English Popular Protest, 1600-1800
FREDERICK KRANTZ
$65.00 368pp. 0-631-16042-6
$17.95 paper 0-631-16115-5

Peasant Life in the Medieval West
ROBERT FOSSIER
$39.95 208pp. 0-631-14363-7

The Blackwell Dictionary of Historians
JOHN CANNON, Editor
Advisory Editors: R.H.C. Davis, William Doyle and Jack Green
$75.00 600pp. 0-631-14708-X

Prelude to Terror
The Constituent Assembly and the Failure of Consensus, 1789-1791
NORMAN HAMPSON
$29.95 216pp. 0-631-15237-7

Danton
NORMAN HAMPSON
$12.95 paper 192pp. 0-631-16116-3

Napoleon Bonaparte
J.M. THOMPSON
$29.95 432pp. 0-631-16414-6

Contemporary History
Nature and Practice
ANTHONY SELDON, Editor
$55.00 184pp. 0-631-16092-2
$16.95 paper 0-631-16093-0

The Blackwell Encyclopedia of the Russian Revolution
HAROLD SHUKMAN, Editor
$65.00 304pp. 0-631-15238-5

History, Classes and Nation-States
Selected Writings
V.G.KIERNAN
HARVEY J. KAYE, Editor
$39.95 300pp. 0-7456-0424-2

Basil Blackwell
432 Park Avenue South
New York, NY 10016

Toll-free ordering:
1-800-638-3030

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In-depth explorations of Eastern cultures and their histories

THE SAUDIS
Inside the Desert Kingdom

By Sandra Mackey. Journalist Mackey spent four years in Saudi Arabia pretending to be no more than a doctor's wife. She could go where reporters were not allowed—a royal wedding, visiting women in harems, and to PLO headquarters, among other places. The result is a unique inside view of a country that is struggling to reconcile twentieth-century technology with an almost medieval ruling mentality.
MERIDIAN 0-452-00948-0
$8.95/$11.95*

CHINA
A Concise Cultural History

By Arthur Cotterell. Chronologically tracing the rise and fall of states and dynasties, from prehistoric times to the present, Cotterell probes the lives of key individuals and the events that have shaped China, and shows how the modern post-Mao People's Republic is part of a larger pattern of China's historical, political, religious, artistic, and scientific development. Illustrated with 32 photos.
MERIDIAN 0-452-00950-2
$10.95/NCR

A SHORT HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA
Third Revised Edition

By Manning Clark. Detailing its 200-year rise from British penal colony to prosperous Commonwealth, Clark traces the many stages of Australia's social, political, and cultural growth and future directions.
MENTOR 0-451-62561-7
$4.95/$6.95*

THE ANCIENT MEDITERRANEAN

By Michael Grant. In this superb volume Grant interweaves the history of the diverse Mediterranean peoples, from prehistoric times (circa 15,000 B.C.) to the time of Constantine (306-37 A.D.) to create an all-encompassing study of the cultures that formed the foundation of Western society. A selection of the History Book Club. 32-page photo insert.
MERIDIAN 0-452-00949-9
$9.95/NCR

AFRICANS AND THEIR HISTORY
Revised Edition

By Joseph E. Harris, Ph.D. A major re-evaluation of the Western view of African history, this book documents the ways in which Western writers have distorted historical fact.
MENTOR 0-451-62556-0
$4.95/$6.95*

UNDERSTANDING ISLAM
An Introduction to the Moslem World

By Thomas W. Lippman. Lippman places such events as the Iranian revolution, the Lebanese civil war, and the insurgency in Afghanistan within the context of Islamic history, making Islam's formidable influence understandable to the Western reader.
MENTOR ORIGINAL
0-451-62501-3 $3.50/$4.50*

*Price in Canada.
Prices subject to change.

Write to the NAL Education Department at the address below for a free History & Political Science catalog.

NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY
1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019
NAL

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Workings of American Government

THE TWILIGHT OF THE PRESIDENCY
From Johnson to Reagan Revised Edition

By George E. Reedy. In this completely revised and updated edition of his 1970 landmark book, Reedy describes the growing isolation, the air of unreality and the virtually unchecked powers that have evolved in that office during the presidential administrations of Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan. "One of the most thoughtful, stimulating, and alarming essays on American government."—*N.Y. Times*

Ⓜ MENTOR 0-451-62510-2 $4.50/$5.95*

THE U.S. SENATE
Paralysis or a Search for Consensus?

By George E. Reedy. This provocative inside look at how the Senate does—and doesn't—work sheds new light on current legislative problems. Reedy delves into the human motives and behaviors of this little understood institution and compares the 1980s legislature to the more productive Eisenhower years. "The best book on the subject I have read for many years." —Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

Ⓜ MENTOR 0-451-62608-7 $4.95/$6.95*

WITNESSES AT THE CREATION

By Richard B. Morris. "A superb recreation of the key ideas...and fascinating personalities that helped produce the Charter that governs us today," wrote James MacGregor Burns of this highly accessible account of the collaboration of John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison on "The Federalist" letters.

Ⓜ MENTOR 0-451-62686-9 $4.50/$5.95*
January 1989

BOSS
Richard J. Daley of Chicago

By Mike Royko. With a new Introduction by the author. "You can't know how this country works until you read *Boss!*" —Jimmy Breslin. "A pungent and precise portrait of how big-city politics work...Muckraking at its best..."—*N.Y. Times.*

Ⓟ PLUME 0-452-26167-8 $7.95/$10.50*

ROBERT KENNEDY
A Memoir

By Jack Newfield. With a new Introduction by the author. "A deeply moving and affectionate tribute," said *The New York Times* of this piercing psychological portrait of Robert Kennedy, which now includes a moving new introduction that puts the biography in perspective 20 years after Kennedy's assassination. "Jack Newfield's book—like my brother's campaign—has much to teach those of us who are, once again, trying to restore faith in the political process."—Senator Edward Kennedy

Ⓟ PLUME 0-452-26064-7 $7.95/$10.95*

THE REAGAN FOREIGN POLICY
A Foreign Affairs Reader

Edited and with an Introduction by William G. Hyland. From the pages of *Foreign Affairs* comes this sharp look at the first six years of the Reagan administration. With articles by such leading policymakers, military experts, journalists and scholars as George Shultz, George Kennan, Robert McNamara, and John Tower, this book analyzes a variety of national and international issues and their consequences in 1988 and beyond. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations.

Ⓜ MERIDIAN 0-452-00889-1 $9.95/$13.95*

*Price in Canada. Prices subject to change.

Write to the NAL Education Department at the address below for a free History and Political Science catalog.

NEW AMERICAN LIBRARY
1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019
NAL

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Houghton Mifflin 1988

Forthcoming for 1989

Western Civilization: Ideas, Politics, and Society Third Edition
Marvin Perry, Baruch College, City University of New York
Myrna Chase, Baruch College, City University of New York
James R. Jacob
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New York
Margaret C. Jacob, Lang College, New School for Social Research
Theodore H. Von Laue
Clark University
Complete Paperback Edition
About 960 pages
Two-Volume Paperback Edition
About 512/640 pages
***From the 1400s* Paperback Edition**
About 704 pages
Study Guide in Two Volumes
MicroStudy Plus: Computerized Study Guide • Instructor's Manual
Test Bank • MicroTest: Computerized Test Bank • Call-in Test Service • GPA: Grade Performance Analyzer • Map Transparencies
November 1988

Discovering the Western Past: A Look at the Evidence
Merry E. Wiesner, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee
Julius R. Ruff
Marquette University
William Bruce Wheeler
University of Tennessee
Two-Volume Paperback Edition
About 285/304 pages
Instructor's Manual
December 1988

East Asia: Tradition and Transformation Revised Edition
John K. Fairbank
Edwin O. Reischauer
Albert M. Craig
All of Harvard University
Complete Hardcover Edition
About 1,040 pages
***China/Japan* Paperback Editions**
About 560/360 pages
December 1988

Currently Available

A History of World Societies Second Edition
John P. McKay
Bennett D. Hill
John Buckler
All of University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Complete Hardcover Edition
1,280 pages
Two-Volume Paperback Edition
640/734 pages
Three-Volume Paperback Edition
488/374/510 pages
Complete ancillary package available • 1988

Also by **McKay, Hill,** and **Buckler**
A History of Western Society Third Edition
Complete Hardcover Edition
1,088 pages
Two-Volume Paperback Edition
595/560 pages
Three-Volume Paperback Edition
444/358/395 pages
Complete ancillary package available • 1987

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A People and a Nation:
A History of the United States
Brief Edition
Second Edition
Mary Beth Norton
Cornell University
David M. Katzman
University of Kansas
Paul D. Escott, University of North Carolina, Charlotte
Howard P. Chudacoff
Brown University
Thomas G. Paterson
University of Connecticut
William M. Tuttle, Jr.
University of Kansas
and **William J. Brophy**
Stephen F. Austin State University
Complete Paperback Edition
611 pages
Two-Volume Paperback Edition
280/346 pages
Complete ancillary package available • 1988

Also by **Norton et al.**
A People and a Nation:
A History of the United States
Second Edition
Complete Hardcover Edition
1,019 pages
Two-Volume Paperback Edition
448/601 pages
Complete ancillary package available • 1986

A More Perfect Union:
Documents in U.S. History
Second Edition
Paul F. Boller, Jr., Emeritus, Texas Christian University
Ronald Story
University of Massachusetts
Two-Volume Paperback Edition
252/324 pages
Instructor's Manual • 1988

Sources of the Western Tradition
Marvin Perry
Joseph R. Peden
Theodore H. Von Laue
Two-Volume Paperback Edition
442/398 pages
Instructor's Manual • 1987

Portrait of America
Fourth Edition
Stephen B. Oates, University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Two-Volume Paperback Edition
411/485 pages • 1987

Becoming Visible:
Women in European History
Second Edition
Edited by **Renate Bridenthal**
Brooklyn College,
City University of New York
Claudia Koonz
College of the Holy Cross
Susan Stuard, Haverford College
579 pages • paperback • 1987

Discovering the American Past:
A Look at the Evidence
William Bruce Wheeler
Susan D. Becker
Both of University of Tennessee
Two-Volume Paperback Edition
212/326 pages
Instructor's Manual • 1986

For adoption consideration, request examination packages from your regional Houghton Mifflin office.



Houghton Mifflin

13400 Midway Rd., Dallas, TX 75244-5165
1900 S. Batavia Ave., Geneva, IL 60134
925 E. Meadow Dr., Palo Alto, CA 94303
101 Campus Dr., Princeton, NJ 08540

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



The Invention of George Washington

PAUL K. LONGMORE

Longmore illuminates the relationship between the man, the myth, and the American people by tracing the relationship between Washington's career and image. He shows the linkage between that image and the cultual and political values of his generation. $25.00

Death Ritual in Late Imperial and Modern China

JAMES L. WATSON and EVELYN S. RAWSKI, Editors

During the late imperial era (1500-1911), China enjoyed a remarkable solidarity. This volume furthers discussion on what held Chinese society together for so many centuries by examining the role of death rituals in the unification of Chinese culture. $40.00

My Century

The Odyssey of a Polish Intellectual

ALEKSANDER WAT

With an Introduction by Czeslaw Milosz, Translated by Richard Lourie

"I found the book fascinating—who would not? One must know—one must be forced to know the fearful facts. . . . Only a detailed recapitulation like that of Wat allows us to understand to any extent what life in Stalin's Russia behind the lines was about."—Saul Bellow $35.00

Edward I

MICHAEL PRESTWICH

Here is the first comprehensive account of one of the great reigns of the English middle ages. Prestwich's balanced appraisal of a controversial period in English history is sure to become the standard for years to come. $29.95

Reflections on the Way to the Gallows

Rebel Women in Pre-war Japan

Translated and Edited with an Introduction by MIKISO HANE

"Once again Mikiso Hane has made it possible for us to hear the unheard voices of early modern Japan."
—Brett de Bary,Cornell University

"A fascinating and revealing glimpse of the underside of prewar Japan." —Edwin O. Reischauer, Harvard University $22.50



Wittgenstein: A Life

Young Ludwig 1889-1921

BRIAN McGUINNESS

Now at last the intimate connections between the extraordinary life and work of this much misunderstood philosopher are elucidated in this book, the first volume of the only comprehensive biography of Wittgenstein ever published. $22.50

Empire and Islam

Punjab and the Making of Pakistan

DAVID GILMARTIN

Gilmartin argues that an understanding of Muslim politics in the decades leading up to India's partition depends on an understanding of the close interaction between the ideology and structure of the British colonial empire on the one hand, and the structure of Islamic organization and ideas on the other. $32.00

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Embarrassment of Riches

An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age

SIMON SCHAMA

New in paper—"This is history on the grand scale, and like all generously conceived historical works, it leaves us reflecting about the present as well as the past."
—*The New York Times*
$15.95 paper

Rainbow's End

Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840-1985

STEVEN P. ERIE

"A fresh and penetrating treatment of a vital issue—the changing character of the American big city political machine and the role of Irish-Americans in its evolution and demise. The prose is crisp, lucid, and lively. It is a fine book." —Stephan Thernstrom, Harvard University $27.50

Medieval Iceland

Society, Sagas, and Power

JESSE L. BYOCK

"New views, new scholarship, and a fresh view of a society that captured in narrative its own socio-history."
—Richard F. Tomasson, University of New Mexico
"There is absolutely nothing like this important book."
—Eleanor Searle, California Institute of Technology
$32.50

Disenchanted Night

The Industrialization of Light in the Nineteenth Century

WOLFGANG SCHIVELBUSCH

Translated by Angela Davies

"*Disenchanted Night* makes 'artificial illumination' a historical subject of inquiry, I think for the first time, giving an account that is interesting and imaginative, ranging through many countries and containing a number of striking aperçus."
—Jerrold Seigel, Princeton University $22.50

Between Craft and Class

Skilled Workers and Factory Politics in the United States and Britain, 1890-1922

JEFFREY HAYDU

"An extremely important book. It is the first attempt to bring a detailed comparative perspective to bear upon the growth of radical politics at the factory level. As such, it points in an important new direction for labour historians."
—Richard Price, University of Maryland $32.50

The Social Origins of Political Regionalism

France, 1849-1981

WILLIAM BRUSTEIN

"An intriguing blend of rational choice and structuralist reasoning accompanied by outstanding original data. . . . An exemplary contribution to comparative historical sociology." —Michael Hechter, University of Arizona $28.00



History of the Goths

HERWIG WOLFRAM

Translated by Thomas J. Dunlap

Rejecting the nationalistic view of the Goths as a "German people," Wolfram finds a series of discontinuous and heterogeneous groups, indiscriminately called "Goths." All those who have accepted the mythical connection between early barbarian society and the history of the German people will find this perspective enlightening. $39.95

At bookstores or call toll-free 800-822-6657. Visa & MasterCard only.

University of California Press

Berkeley 94720

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

FIRST-RATE STUDIES OF THE THIRD WORLD



Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries

Steve J. Stern, Editor

"This collection . . . challenges our understanding of the history of native Andean rebellion during the last three centuries. The contributors . . . move beyond the traditional structural analysis of society to a finer understanding of people as actors. Native Andean initiatives and consciousness are clearly placed at the center of this inquiry, which merges the best methods of history and anthropology. . . . The theoretical dimension of the book makes it an original contribution not only to the field of peasant studies, but also to the ongoing debate on the role of 'agency' and 'structure' in history. . . . "—*Latin American Research Review.* $45.00 cloth/$15.00 paper

Way of Death

Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730–1830

Joseph C. Miller

With extraordinary skill, Miller explores the complex relationships among the separate economies of Africa, Europe, and the south Atlantic that collectively supported the slave trade. Its grim history is placed securely within the context of the rise of merchant capitalism in the 18th century. "This is certainly the most important book yet to appear on the history of the Portuguese slave trade in any language, and one of the most important books to appear on the history of the slave trade by any national group. It will be a landmark in the scholarship of the Atlantic basin for several decades to come."—Philip D. Curtin, The Johns Hopkins University. $35.00 cloth

Also available in paper:

Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest Huamanga to 1640

Steve J. Stern

$10.50

Global Problems and World Order

Robert D. McKinlay & Richard Little

$13.50

The Theory of Peasant Economy

A. V. Chayanov

Edited by Daniel Thorner, Basile Kerblay, and R.E.F. Smith, with a Foreword by Teodor Shanin

"Based on work carried out in pre- and post-revolutionary Russia, A.V. Chayanov's work first appeared in English-language translation in 1966. . . . This new edition . . . includes the original introductions by Thorner, Kerblay, and Smith, and a new one by Teodor Shanin, a leading scholar of the pre-1917 Russian peasantry. The past two decades have seen the emergence of a whole new field called 'peasant studies' and, along with those of Karl Marx, Chayanov's ideas have been central to its development. . . . The work is a classic."—*The Times Higher Education Supplement.* $14.95 paper

Third World Politics

An Introduction

Christopher Clapham

$12.50

Wisconsin

University of Wisconsin Press

114 N. Murray St., Madison, WI 53715

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Allen & Unwin is now
UNWIN HYMAN

Warfare in the Twentieth Century
Theory and Practice
Edited by Colin McInnes and G.D. Sheffield

This important new textbook highlights key themes of warfare throughout the world and emphasizes the gulf between the theory of war and its practice. 1988, 256pp.
$49.95 cloth, $16.95 paper

Britain and the First World War
Edited by John Turner

The contributors to this volume have drawn on their own research and the most current scholarship in their fields to give a succinct account of politics, diplomacy, strategy, and social developments during a period of dramatic change. 1988, 256pp.
$44.95 cloth, $14.95 paper

The Weimar Republic
Eberhard Kolb
Translated by P.S. Falla

This major work charts the complex history of the fourteen years of the Weimar Republic, from its inauspicious beginnings through the rise of National Socialism and the international consequences of the collapse of democracy. 1988, 208pp.
$49.95 cloth, $15.95 paper

Refugees in the Age of Total War
Edited by Anna Bramwell

Written by historians, lawyers, political scientists, and sociologists, and based on primary research, this volume charts society's responses to the waves of refugees who fled their homes in the wake of World War II. 1988, 432pp. **$60.00 cloth**

Five Sisters
Women Against the Tsar
Edited and Translated from the Russian by Barbara Alpern Engel and Clifford N. Rosenthal

Previously out of print, *Five Sisters* provides a first-hand account of the Russian revolutionary movement of the 1870s from the perspective of five young women who participated in it. 1987, 304pp. **$11.95 paper**

The Rise of Colonial Nationalism
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa First Assert Their Nationalities, 1880-1914
Edited by John Eddy and Deryck Schreuder

In the formative period of 1880-1914, citizens of the "new societies" of migration and overseas settlement began to express a growing sense of independence within the British imperial system. This book explores the birth of nationalism within these societies. 1988, 268pp. **$19.95 paper**

Now in paper

The Far Eastern War
States and Societies
Christopher Thorne

1988, 355pp. **$12.95 paper**
Previously published in cloth as The Issues of War

Reissue

Human Documents of the Industrial Revolution in Britain
E. Royston Pike

1988, 368pp. **$14.95 paper**

UNWIN HYMAN
8 Winchester Place • Winchester, MA 01890
To order by VISA or MC, call toll-free 1-800-547-8889, in MA or Canada 1-617-729-0830

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American History from Yale

Indian Survival on the California Frontier

Albert L. Hurtado

During the middle decades of the nineteenth century, when vast numbers of whites poured into California, the native Indian population was decimated through disease, starvation, homicide, and a declining birth rate. In this book Albert L. Hurtado focuses on the Indians who survived this harrowing time.

"**[A] fresh factual history** of Indian persistence in California. . . . **A major reinterpretation** of the nature of the Indian-white frontier in gold-rush California." —Howard Lamar 22 illus. $25.00

Gerald L. K. Smith, Minister of Hate

Glen Jeansonne

The first full-length biography of Gerald L. K. Smith—one of the twentieth century's most powerful evangelical preachers, a confederate of Huey Long and Father Coughlin, and the founder of the rabidly anti-Semitic Christian Nationalist Crusade.

"A **riveting** portrayal, presented with both scholarly objectivity and deep concern, of the rise and successes of an American bigot. **A study of major importance.**" —James MacGregor Burns 10 illus. $25.00

The Papers of Benjamin Franklin

Volume 27: July 1 through October 31, 1778

Claude A. Lopez, editor; Douglas M. Arnold, Dorothy W. Bridgwater, Ellen R. Cohn, Jonathan R. Dull, and Catherine M. Prelinger, associate editors $60.00


Yale University Press
Dept. 845
92A Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520

Borderland

Origins of the American Suburb, 1820–1939

John R. Stilgoe

A fascinating prehistory of the American suburb. Using a rich array of contemporary written and pictorial sources, prize-winning historian John Silgoe guides us through the early suburbs of Manhattan, Boston, Chicago, and other cities, showing us not only what they looked like but what life was like for the men and women who lived there.



"**Original, provocative, important.**" —John Mack Faragher 198 illus. $35.00

The Founding of Yale

The Legend of the Forty Folios

George Wilson Pierson

Was Yale College founded as a public institution or as a private, self-governing college? In this book, the distinguished Historian of Yale University takes a fresh look at the documentary evidence and offers a new version of the story of Yale's founding.

"Professor Pierson traces Yale's roots deeper than the traditional account, and his conclusions are **bound to have a large impact** on Yale's sense of its history and on the history of higher education in Colonial America. . . . **Fascinating reading.**" —Benno C. Schmidt, Jr. 30 illus. $27.50

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Impressionism

Art, Leisure, and Parisian Society
Robert L. Herbert

This beautifully illustrated book shows for the first time how completely Impressionism was integrated into the social and cultural life of its times.



"Remarkable. . . . A major contribution to the art history, and the cultural history, of the nineteenth century." —Linda Nochlin 70 b/w + 240 color illus. $50.00; $60.00 after 1/1/89

The "Golden" Twenties

Art and Literature in the Weimar Republic
Bärbel Schrader and Jürgen Schebera
translated by Katherine Vanovitch

This **handsome and provocative** book explores the vivid contrasts of the art and literature of the Weimar Republic. Dealing with all forms of art—from architecture and opera to pop music and best-selling fiction—its authors demonstrate that Weimar cultural life was just as polarized and troubled as was its politics. 191 b/w + 31 color illus. $35.00

Slavery and Society in Medieval Scandinavia

Ruth Mazo Karras

Drawing on a wide variety of sources—law codes, wills, charters, sagas, chronicles, and archeological data—Ruth Mazo Karras provides here the first book in English to examine the institution of slavery in Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Iceland from the Viking Age to its end in the fourteenth century.

"Essential reading for medieval historians." —Edward Peters $32.50

Félix Fénéon

Aesthete and Anarchist in Fin-de-Siècle Paris
Joan Ungersma Halperin

The first major biography in any language of Félix Fénéon: the preeminent art critic of turn-of-the-century France; an editor and publisher of the new symbolist writing; and a secret anarchist propagandist for workers' rights.

"An **indispensable and brilliant** study recreating an entire historic epoch." —Patricia Mainardi 140 b/w + 20 color illus. $35.00

Now available in paperback

Pleasures of the Belle Epoque

Entertainment and Festivity in Turn-of-the-Century France
Charles Rearick

This engaging and beautiful social history of the France of Toulouse-Lautrec and Jules Chéret focuses especially on its "places of pleasure"—the Folies-Bergère, Bastille Day celebrations, cabarets, early cinema, and world fairs.

"An **entertaining and important** book." —Richard Holt, *History* 70 b/w + 8 color illus. $17.95

The City as a Work of Art

London, Paris, Vienna
Donald J. Olsen

"A marvelous book, which brilliantly relates the form and functions of these three great cities to the political cultures and social values which moulded and created them. **Written with wit, warmth and wisdom,** it is not only a stylish celebration of city life, but also **a superb piece of urban history** by one of its foremost practitioners at the very top of his form." —David Cannadine 142 b/w + 8 color illus. $19.95

Yale University Press
Dept. 847
92A Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Corruption and the Decline of Rome

Ramsay MacMullen

An intriguing new perspective on the decline and fall of Rome. Ramsay MacMullen argues that a key factor in Rome's fall was the steady loss of focus and control over government as its aims were thwarted for private gain by high-ranking bureaucrats and military leaders. His book provides a fascinating, fresh line of investigation and shows convincingly that the decline of Rome was a gradual, insidious process rather than a climactic event.
17 illus. $25.00

The Myth of Ritual Murder

Jews and Magic in Reformation Germany
R. Po-chia Hsia

From the mid-fifteenth to the early seventeenth century, German Jews were persecuted and tried for the alleged ritual murders of Christian children, whose blood purportedly played a crucial part in Jewish magical rites. In this engrossing book R. Po-chia Hsia traces the rise and decline of ritual murder trials during that period.

"Fascinating. . . . A model of thorough scholarship and judicious argument."
—David Sabean 15 illus. $27.50

The Food of China

E. N. Anderson

A comprehensive, entertaining historical and ethnographic account of Chinese food from the Bronze Age to the present.

"A rare and wonderful essay. . . . Anyone interested in almost any aspect of the daunting question of how the Chinese have managed to sustain themselves generation upon generation, from earliest times down to the present, will find much to ponder in Anderson's thoughtful, refreshingly unpretentious, and fascinating book." —Jerome B. Grieder $23.50

Yale University Press
Dept. 811
92A Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520
(203) 432-0940

Heaven: A History

Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang

In this "informative and readable presentation of ideas about heaven through the centuries" (Hans Küng), Colleen McDannell and Bernhard Lang describe ways in which believers—from biblical authors to medieval mystics, from Jesus to present-day religious thinkers—have pictured Heaven, not just in doctrine but also in poetry, art, literature, and popular culture.
65 illus. $29.95



From Jesus to Christ

The Origins of the New Testament Images of Jesus
Paula Fredriksen

Placing the various canonical images of Jesus within their historical context—the Hellenistic and Judaic cultures from which the Christian communities grew—Paula Fredriksen provides fascinating insights into such issues as the social and religious problems facing early Christian communities, the content of Jesus' ministry, and the circumstances of his crucifixion.

"[An] extraordinarily well-written and exciting book."—Wayne Meeks $22.50

Now available in paperback

The Garden of Eden

The Botanic Garden and the Re-Creation of Paradise
John Prest

"A splendid book. . . . This thorough examination of the Botanic Garden ideal traces its rise and development and shows it in action in such places as Padua, Leyden, Paris, and Oxford. Dr. Prest draws on a very wide range of literary references and his study is discreetly annotated and beautifully illustrated."—J. S. Cummins, *History*. 72 b/w + 8 color illus. $14.95

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MAKING HISTORY

A DEATH IN THE DELTA
The Story of Emmett Till
Stephen J. Whitfield

August, 1955. The mutilated body of Emmett Till, a 14-year-old black Chicago youth is pulled from Mississippi's Tallahatchie River. His death shocked America – and when the all-white jury acquitted the two white defendants, the outcry helped mobilize the civil rights movement nationwide. In this probing inquiry into Till's death and its aftermath, Whitfield examines the potent ideological roots of this tragedy in rural Mississippi – and explores the rise and decline of lynching in the Deep South and the critical role played by the Till case in galvanizing Americans to combat racism's dreadful legacy.
1988 ISBN: 0-02-935121-9 $19.95

AMERICA 1941
A Nation at the Crossroads
Ross Gregory

Beginning in peace and ending in war, 1941 was the year in which the United States stepped into the future. It was the time of swing music and Joe Louis, Edward R. Murrow and "The Shadow". Ross Gregory vividly portrays the social, political, economic and cultural events of this pivotal year, in a book filled with the excitement and uncertainty of a nation poised on the eve of World War II.
1988 ISBN: 0-02-912801-3 $22.95

THE COURAGE OF THEIR CONVICTIONS
Sixteen Americans Who Fought Their Way to the Supreme Court
Peter Irons

Almost without exception, the celebrity of Supreme Court cases is matched by the obscurity of those who initiate them. Peter Irons introduces us to human beings hidden behind the "mask of the law" in civil liberties cases spanning five decades and four major issues – religion, race, protest, and privacy. Told in their own words, here are the personal stories behind the cases, why each was begun, the public and personal reaction, and what happened after the justices ruled.
1988 ISBN: 0-02-915670-X $22.95

TECHNOLOGY AND WAR
From 2000 B.C. to the Present
Martin van Creveld

Destined to become *the* standard work, this volume – based on a five-year research project originally commissioned by the Pentagon – reveals the historical changes technology has – and has not – wrought in the waging and winning of war. Van Creveld considers man's use of technology over the past 4000 years – and its impact on military organization, weaponry, logistics, intelligence, transportation, and command.
1988 ISBN: 0-02-933151-X $22.95

SWORDS AROUND A THRONE
Napoleon's Grande Armée
John R. Elting

As engaging as a war novel, this monumental work examines the Grande Armée's origins, development, tactics, and the causes of its final collapse – and provides flesh-and-blood portraits of the daily life of the Grande Armée soldier, the Emperor Napoleon, and his officers.

"A masterpiece: quite simply, John Elting's book is the best I have ever read on this challenging subject."
– David Chandler, author of *The Campaigns of Napoleon* and *Napoleon's Marshals*

A History Book Club Alternate Selection
A Book-of-the-Month Club Dividend Selection
1988 ISBN: 0-02-909501-8 $35.00

Now available in paperback—

THE CAUSES OF WAR
Third Edition
Geoffrey Blainey

"I know of no better book on war than Blainey's *Causes*, which has already become a classic in the field of international relations. This Third Edition will demonstrate once again the power of his exciting, provocative ideas and penetrating understanding."
– Amos Perlmutter, *The Journal of Strategic Studies*
1988 ISBN: 0-02-903591-0 $12.95

For VISA or MasterCard orders, call toll-free 1-800-323-7445
between 9am-5:30pm Eastern Time.



THE FREE PRESS
A Division of Macmillan, Inc.
866 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cambridge University Press

British Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery

The Legacy of Eric Williams

Editors: Barbara L. Solow and Stanley L. Engerman

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, slaves and slave products dominated Atlantic trade. To this day, the connection between slavery and capitalism is vigorously debated among scholars in the United States, Canada, England, Africa and the Caribbean. This book brings together authorities from these countries to explore the relationship between Great Britain and her plantation slave colonies in the Caribbean.

Studies in Interdisciplinary History *$29.95*

Contents:

British Capitalism and Caribbean Slavery: The Legacy of Eric Williams: An Introduction / *Barbara L. Solow and Stanley L. Engerman*

Part I. Slavery as an Economic Phenomenon

Race and Slavery: Considerations on the Williams Thesis / *William A. Green*

Part II. Caribbean Slavery and the Industrial Revolution

Capitalism and Slavery in the Exceedingly Long Run / *Barbara L. Solow*

Slavery and the Development of Industrial Capitalism in England / *Joseph E. Inikori*

The Slave Trade, Sugar, and British Economic Growth, 1748-1776 / *David Richardson*

Part III. The Decline of the British West Indies

The American Revolution and the British West Indies' Economy / *Selwyn H.H. Carrington*

"Dreadful Idlers" in the Cane Fields: The Slave Labor Pattern on a Jamaican Sugar Estate, 1762-1831 / *Richard S. Dunn*

Part IV. The Basis of Abolition and Emancipation

Paradigms Tossed: Capitalism and the Political Sources of Abolition / *Seymour Drescher*

Capitalism, Abolitionism, and Hegemony / *David Brion Davis*

Eric Williams and Abolition: The Birth of a New Orthodoxy / *Howard Temperley*

What and Who to Whom and What: The Significance of Slave Resistance / *Michael Craton*

Part V. *Capitalism and Slavery* in Historical Perspective

Capitalism and Slavery on the Islands: A Lesson from the Mainland / *Gavin Wright*

"The Williams Effect": Eric Williams's *Capitalism and Slavery* and the Growth of West Indian Political Economy / *Hilary McD. Beckles*

Eric Williams and *Capitalism and Slavery:* A Biographical and Historiographical Essay / *Richard B. Sheridan*

At bookstores or order from

Cambridge University Press

32 East 57th Street, New York, NY 10022.
Cambridge toll-free numbers for orders only:
800-872-7423, outside NY State. 800-227-0247, NY State only.
MasterCard and Visa accepted.


PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LibertyPress/LibertyClassics

GEORGE WASHINGTON: A COLLECTION

Compiled and Edited by William B. Allen

April 1989 marks the bicentennial of George Washington's presidency, yet that is the only one-volume compilation of his writings in print. Washington must now be acknowledged as a man of considerable political insight.



"George Washington: A Collection is an important addition to the literature on the American Revolution. It makes accessible to interested readers, a set of documents intelligently selected from the enormous mass of Washington's collected papers and presented with respect for the high standards of contemporary scholarly editing. The book provides a splendid introduction to Washington and his political beliefs, to the events of the Revolution through which he lived, and to the eighteenth-century world." — *Pauline Maier, Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

"This volume of correspondence and other writings of George Washington should be very useful to intelligent general readers and to students. Professor Allen, the editor of the collection, has chosen the materials judiciously, and he has not overburdened the text with annotations. His choices are excellent and should enable the reader to gain insight into Washington's political thought and his ideas about selections also reveal much about the springs of Washington's actions in the formative period of the American Union. All in all, it is a fine volume." — *Robert Middlekauff, The Huntington Library*

743 pages. Printed throughout in two colors with 15 illustrations.

Hardcover $26.00 **0-86597-059-9**
Paperback $ 9.50 **0-86597-060-2**
Liberty Fund edition, 1988

Prepayment is required on all orders not for resale. We pay book rate postage on prepaid orders. Please allow approximately 4 weeks for delivery. *All* orders from outside the United States *must* be prepaid *in* U.S. *dollars*. To order, or for a copy of our catalogue, write:

LibertyPress/LibertyClassics
7440 North Shadeland Avenue, Dept. X102
Indianapolis, IN 46250

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Read and Reap.

EYEWITNESS TO HISTORY
Edited by John Carey

From the plague that swept through Athens in 430 B.C. to the 1986 Manila crowd snatching souvenirs from the Marcos palace, John Carey has assembled hundreds of vivid eyewitness accounts of important historical events. "It deserves a place by the bedside of every literate insomniac." —Jonathan Raban, *The Observer*
$24.95 cloth

THE MELODY OF THEOLOGY
A Philosophical Dictionary
Jaroslav Pelikan

The great theologian Jaroslav Pelikan weaves the polyphonic threads of philosophy, morality, history, and personality to create a singular portrait of his life and work. Two books in one, *The Melody of Theology* is both a dictionary of Christian theology and an intellectual autobiography.
$20.00 cloth

GEORGE WASHINGTON SLEPT HERE
Colonial Revivals and American Culture, 1876–1986
Karal Ann Marling

"This is a brilliant book...For a complete, colorful and humorous description of one strand—albeit an important one—of popular culture from 1876 through the 1930s, Marling's book has no peers." —Lillian B. Miller, Historian of American Culture, National Portrait Gallery
$39.95 cloth/224 halftones







SOPHISTICATED REBELS
The Political Culture of European Dissent, 1968–1987
H. Stuart Hughes

"Hughes [is] the premier chronicler of European political and intellectual history in the twentieth century...[and] is perhaps the most gracious stylist among living historians." —Paul Robinson, Stanford University
Studies in Cultural History
$20.00 cloth

MIRROR IN THE SHRINE
American Encounters with Meiji Japan
Robert A. Rosenstone

"I found this book absolutely delightful, at first for its unspoiled picture of late-nineteenth-century Japan as seen through the eyes of three remarkable but very different Americans and then for the marvelous reconstruction of how Japan worked on their minds." —Edwin O. Reischauer
$25.00 cloth

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND ENLIGHTENMENT IN ENGLAND, 1789–1832

Seamus Deane

In the English response to the French Revolution, Seamus Deane finds a new perspective on English political thought, on the sharpening of national consciousness, and on the power of the written word to influence events.
$25.00 cloth

THE LETTERS OF HENRY ADAMS

Volumes IV–VI, 1892–1918

Edited by J.C. Levenson, Ernest Samuels, Charles Vandersee, and Viola Hopkins Winner

With the assistance of Jayne N. Samuels and Eleanor Pearre Abbot

The range of Henry Adams' interests, his sharp perceptions, his eye for telling detail and passion for generalization, together with his irony and wit, make his letters the engrossing record of an extraordinary life-in-progress and an incomparable commentary upon his age.
Belknap $150.00 three-volume set
Also available: Volumes I–III, 1858–1892
$125.00, three-volume set

THE AESTHETICS OF THOMAS AQUINAS

Umberto Eco

Translated by Hugh Bredin

The Italian semiotician and novelist Umberto Eco discloses for the first time to English-speaking readers the unsuspected richness, breadth, complexity, and originality of the aesthetic theories advanced by Thomas Aquinas.
$30.00 cloth/$14.95 paper

FRANKLIN OF PHILADELPHIA

Esmond Wright

"In many ways, *Franklin of Philadelphia* is the best biography of Benjamin Franklin ever. It is beautifully written and full of fascinating comments about personalities and political events, with splendid appreciations of the major settings and times of Franklin's life."
—J.A. Leo Lemay, *William and Mary Quarterly*
$12.95 paper

AUTHORITY AND CONFLICT

England, 1603–1658

Derek Hirst

"Without question, *Authority and Conflict* is the most up-to-date, well-balanced, and interesting survey of the politics of this tumultuous period that we are likely to have for a long time." —Lawrence Stone, *New York Review of Books*
$12.95 paper



75th · 350th
ANNIVERSARY

Harvard University Press
79 Garden Street Cambridge, MA 02138

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

TRANSFERS OF PROPERTY IN ELEVENTH-CENTURY NORMAN LAW

by Emily Zack Tabuteau

"The first major study of a 'truly feudal' world to appear since Milsom's study of the effect of the assizes of Henry II. This work is of the highest quality."—Charles Donahue, Jr.
455 pp., $49.95
Studies in Legal History

CUSTOM, KINSHIP, AND GIFTS TO SAINTS
The *Laudatio Parentum* in Western France, 1050–1150

by Stephen D. White

"This study forces us to view in a new way not only the social relations and even the religious attitudes of northern France . . . but also the Anglo-American tradition of legal history."
—Caroline Walker Bynum
333 pp., $29.95
Studies in Legal History

PURSUITS OF HAPPINESS
The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture

by Jack P. Greene

"One of the most original and provocative interpretations of this period ever written."
—Don Higginbotham
approx. 340 pp., $32.50 cloth, $12.95 paper

TESTING DEMOCRACY
Electoral Behavior and Progressive Reform in New Jersey, 1880–1920

by John F. Reynolds

"A subtle, sophisticated, and profound examination of legal, institutional, and behavioral changes in turn-of-the-century northern politics."—J. Morgan Kousser
262 pp., $39.95

GERMAN LIBERALISM AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE WEIMAR PARTY SYSTEM, 1918–1933

by Larry Eugene Jones

"This is the standard work on liberalism in Weimar Germany, in part because of its truly comprehensive character, but mainly because of the quality of its presentation and analysis."
—Gerald D. Feldman
approx. 630 pp., $42.50

THE COLLAPSE OF THE GERMAN WAR ECONOMY, 1944–1945
Allied Air Power and the German National Railway

by Alfred C. Mierzejewski

"The author describes how the Nazi war economy was brought to a standstill by the bombing of the rail network. . . . An important book in assessing the impact of strategic bombing during World War II."—Edward L. Homze
approx. 310 pp., $35.95

AMERICAN-SOVIET TRADE IN THE COLD WAR

by Philip J. Funigiello

"An important work that contains new information and fresh insights for students of East-West relations."—Ralph B. Levering
302 pp., $32.50

LIBERALISM
Politics, Ideology and the Market

by John A. Hall

"This elegant tract, which wears its erudition lightly, surveys the history of liberalism in relation to science, capitalism, and politics."
—Guenther Roth
265 pp., $24.95 cloth, $9.95 paper

available from
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS
Post Office Box 2288
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27515-2288

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Non-Darwinian Revolution

Reinterpretation of a Historical Myth

Peter J. Bowler

The "Darwinian Revolution," argues Peter Bowler, never happened. Examining the work of Owen, Spencer, Kelvin, Huxley, Haeckel, and Freud, Bowler finds a near-universal tendency to accept evolutionism while rejecting Darwin's central premise: natural selection. Instead, leading scientists and thinkers stubbornly clung to Lamarckian theory of guided, purposeful development until forced by the twentieth century's "rediscovery" of Mendelian law to concede otherwise.

$27.50

Jefferson and Nature

An Interpretation

Charles A. Miller

Nature — the term and the many ideas associated with it — pervades Jefferson's life and writings. It sets him apart from his colleagues in the American Enlightenment and provides the distinctive gateway to his thought and action. Charles Miller's book tells why this is so.

"By following a central idea in Jefferson's thought with a thoroughness that will probably never be repeated, Miller has illuminated the internal connections brilliantly."—Joyce Appleby, University of California, Los Angeles

$29.50

Rethinking the South

Essays in Intellectual History

Michael O'Brien

What is distinctive about the intellectual history of the South? Does it even exist, or are its students misspending their time in pursuit of phantom documents? In *Rethinking the South*, Michael O'Brien not only posits the existence of a Southern intellectual history, but describes its persistence and vitality from the early nineteenth century to the present day. Polemical and provocative, *Rethinking the South* suggests doing just that: letting go of old habits of perspective to recast the argument in fresh terms.

$29.50



THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PRESS
701 West 40th Street, Suite 275, Baltimore, Maryland 21211

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Tennessee

Peace Movements and Political Cultures
Edited by Charles Chatfield and Peter van den Dungen

"An important contribution to comparative history and peace studies. These carefully-researched essays place peace movements within their cultural and political contexts, and help to explain why these movements have lacked the consistent public support that can be translated into victories at the polls."
—Ralph Levering, Davidson College.
320 pages, $39.95

The First of Men
A Life of George Washington
John E. Ferling

". . . . a sensitive but hard-hitting portrait, worthy of the attention of anyone interested in Revolutionary America and the founding of the United States. Quite simply, the best one-volume biography of Washington to appear in years."
—James Kirby Martin, University of Houston. 616 pages, illustrations, $39.95

Urban Vigilantes in the New South
Tampa, 1882–1936
Robert P. Ingalls

"Equally important for historians of violence and vigilantism, of the New South, and of the Southern labor movement."—Roger Lane, Haverford College. 310 pages, illustrations, $29.95

The Southern Agrarians
Paul K. Conkin

"An admirably brisk and independent assessment of the Agrarians, which improves our understanding of the movement's coherence, motion, and disintegration."—Michael O'Brien, Miami University. 210 pages, illustrations, $24.95 cloth, $12.95 paper

Disease and Distinctiveness in the American South
Edited by Todd L. Savitt and James Harvey Young

". . . brings together the work of seven prominent medical historians, to offer the most comprehensive discussion to date of the role of disease in creating a unique southern culture."
—Ronald L. Numbers, University of Wisconsin. 216 pages, illustrations, $24.95

Now in paperback!
First published in 1984
Winner of the Virginia C. Ledbetter Prize

The Wild Ass of the Ozarks
Jeff Davis and the Social Bases of Southern Politics
Raymond Arsenault

"[This] clear and pleasantly written monograph advances the study of southern demagoguery to a new plane of self-consciousness and sophistication."
—J. Morgan Kousser, *American Historical Review*. 360 pages, $12.95 paper

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



Charleston Antebellum Architecture and Civic Destiny
Kenneth Severens

"Kenneth Severens' most fascinating account of Charleston's architectural development is a work that historians as well as general readers of the American architectural past will find useful and provocative. This work deepens our understanding of the city's physical as well as intellectual vitality."
—Bertram Wyatt-Brown, University of Florida. 384 pages, illustrations, $49.95

Cades Cove
The Life and Death of a Southern Appalachian Community, 1818–1937
Durwood Dunn

"Professor Dunn provides us with a model historical investigation of a southern mountain community. His findings on commercial farming, family, religion, and politics will challenge many standard interpretations of the Appalachian past."
—Gordon B. McKinney, Western Carolina University. 336 pages, illustrations, $24.95 cloth, $12.95 paper

Black Radicals and the Civil Rights Mainstream, 1954–1970
Herbert H. Haines

". . . . Herbert Haines provides an imaginative and thoughtful analysis of a tumultuous period in American history, showing how the 'radical flank' of black collective action affected the power and effectiveness of more 'moderate' civil rights organizations."—Paul Burstein, author of *Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics.*
224 pages, $24.95

Coming in 1989!

Reading Becomes a Necessity of Life
Material and Cultural Life in Rural New England, 1780–1835
William J. Gilmore
512 pages, illustrations, $49.95

Afro-American Women of the South and the Advancement of the Race, 1895–1925
Cynthia Neverdon-Morton
352 pages, illustrations, $34.95

Andrew Johnson and the Negro
David Warren Bowen
256 pages, $29.95

The University of Tennessee Press
Knoxville 37996-0325

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hierarchy, History, & Human Nature

The Social Origins of Historical Consciousness

Donald E. Brown

Why have reliable histories been written in some literate civilizations but not in others? Anthropologist Donald Brown here argues that the answer lies in stratification: that hereditarily stratified societies tend to develop mythological views of the past, while civilizations with open social stratification typically develop both sound historical views of the past and sound concomitants to history. Drawing on the historical writings of South Asia and China, Southeast Asia, the Ancient Mediterranean world, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance, Brown demonstrates how their differing conceptions of historiography relate to differences in the nature of the societies. The social construction of cultural forms can thus be understood as creating a set of constraints, either positive or negative, not only on history but also on its recording.
400 pages, $35.00

"This is a major, and original, contribution to the history of ideas, or perhaps I should say to the philosophy of history. It artfully blends anthropological, sociological and historical thinking—areas which too often find each other conceptually incompatible." —Paul A. Carter


"It deals with issues which are so critical to how social science disciplines are designed that I find it hard for any field not to come to grips with what the author has presented." —Aram A. Yengoyan


"This comparative study of historical consciousness deserves many readers. I read it eagerly and recommend it cordially." —C. Vann Woodward

The University of Arizona Press
1230 N. Park Ave., #102, Tucson, AZ 85719


PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED


New Titles In . . .
U.S. NAVAL HISTORY











VOYAGE TO THE SOUTHERN OCEAN: The Letters of Lieutenant William Reynolds from the U.S. Exploring Expedition, 1838 – 1842

Edited by Anne Hoffman Cleaver and E. Jeffrey Stann

William Reynolds' exciting account of America's first major exploring expedition – a successful attempt to prove the existence of the Antarctic continent – and the joys and agonies of that 19th-century voyage is both revealing and entertaining. This book includes some twenty letters Reynolds wrote to his sister and mother – from the time the expedition's six ships set sail from Norfolk on August 18, 1838, until their return nearly four years later after circumnavigating the world. 384 pages. Illus. Maps. ISBN: 300-8. **List price: $24.95**

BROWN WATER, BLACK BERETS: Coastal and Riverine Warfare in Vietnam

By Thomas J. Cutler, LCDR, USN

"Tom Cutler's hard, factual reporting glistens with such texture and detail that it reads like a novel. If only it were! Then we could have learned the lessons we find here without the remembered pain that this was all real – all too real."
– *Wilbur E. Garrett, editor,* ***National Geographic Magazine***

320 pages. Illus. ISBN: 011-4. **List price: $21.95**

TEDDY ROOSEVELT'S GREAT WHITE FLEET

By James R. Reckner

Drawing on previously untapped resources, naval historian James Reckner provides a fascinating picture of the fleet that thrust the United States into the ranks of great world naval powers. His fresh new interpretations of the fleet's historic 1907-9 world cruise establish for the first time the relationship between the fleet cruise and the reorganization of the Navy and allow today's readers to fully appreciate the significance of the famous fleet that set sail during Teddy Roosevelt's second term as president. 384 pages. 34 photos. Cartoons. Map. ISBN: 697-X. **List price: $26.95**

GOLD BRAID AND FOREIGN RELATIONS: Diplomatic Activities of U.S. Naval Officers, 1798 – 1883

By David Long

Leading naval historian Professor David F. Long covers all activities by U.S. naval officers that had repercussions abroad in 500 cases over an 85-year period. 448 pages. Illus. ISBN: 228-1. **List price: $32.95**

The latest from the Classics of Sea Power series:

THE NAVY AS A FIGHTING MACHINE

By Bradley A. Fiske

This book sets forth Bradley Fiske's innovative ideas that had a tremendous influence on the fighting quality, operational efficiency, and habitability of the New Steel Navy. First published in 1916 while Fiske was president of the U.S. Naval Institute, it shows him to be a brilliant tactician, dedicated to the combat readiness of the American navy, and an effective naval reformer. 352 pages. ISBN: 437-3. **List price: $23.95**

Available from the

NAVAL INSTITUTE PRESS

Toll-Free: 1-800-233-USNI
In MD: (301) 224-3378/9
Monday – Friday: 8 a.m. – 4 p.m.

4782

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Greenwood Press...
The Source for Historical Reference Works

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890–1920
edited by **John D. Buenker**
and **Edward R. Kantowicz**
This volume provides biographical sketches of the most prominent individuals of the period along with entries on major reform and professional organizations, key legislative enactments, commissions and committees, schools of interpretation, and important concepts.
December 1988. ISBN 0-313-24309-3.
$75.00 tent.

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE FRENCH SECOND EMPIRE
A Bibliography
compiled and edited by **William E. Echard**
This bibliography, the most comprehensive yet published on this subject, contains over 4,100 citations and offers a wealth of useful information to aid the researcher in locating sources for the study of the foreign policy of the French Second Empire.
ISBN 0-313-23799-9. $75.00

NEW DAY/NEW DEAL
A Bibliography of the Great American Depression, 1929–1941
compiled by **David E. Kyvig**
and **Mary-Ann Blasio**
The most extensive bibliography of the depression era ever published, this volume lists retrospective books, articles, and doctoral dissertations that deal with American government, law, politics, economics, regional and local affairs, society, thought and culture, and foreign relations during this tumultuous period.
ISBN 0-313-26027-3. $45.00

THE ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP
An Annotated Bibliography of Scholarship, 1945–1985
compiled and annotated by **David A. Lincove**
and **Gary R. Treadway**
This interdisciplinary bibliography covers scholarly writings from 1945 to 1985 that treats the interactions between the United States and Great Britain during the period 1783 to the mid-1980s.
ISBN 0-313-25854-6. $49.95

DICTIONARY OF AFRO-AMERICAN SLAVERY
edited by **Randall M. Miller**
and **John David Smith**
This dictionary, the first reference on Afro-American slavery to appear since the 1960s, fills the significant gap in the historiography of slavery that has been created by the proliferation of modern slavery studies. It provides the opportunity for synthesizing the best literature on the many and diverse topics relating to the slavery experience in North America.
ISBN 0-313-23814-6. $95.00

A HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL LANGUAGE
edited by **William H. Mulligan, Jr.**
Designed to make the industrial vocabulary of earlier eras understandable and accessible to contemporary investigation, this dictionary brings together in one place a great deal of widely scattered information.
ISBN 0-313-24171-6. $55.00

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE 1920s
From World War I to the New Deal, 1919–1933
by **James S. Olson**
This historical dictionary presents more than 700 short essays on people, legislation, popular culture, foreign policy, politics, social history, and culture of the 1920s.
ISBN 0-313-25683-7. $55.00


INDEX TO AFRO-AMERICAN REFERENCE RESOURCES
compiled by **Rosemary M. Stevenson**
This volume makes a much-needed contribution to the field of Afro-American studies by providing subject access to a wealth of materials on the black experience in the Americas.
ISBN 0-313-24580-0. $45.00

HISTORIANS OF THE AMERICAN FRONTIER
A Bio-bibliographical Sourcebook
edited by **John R. Wunder**
This new reference is the first volume to provide comprehensive information on more than fifty historical scholars who have helped to shape research, writing, and critical thought on the American frontier and American history in general.
November 1988. ISBN 0-313-24899-0.
$55.00 tent.

For more information about these and other historical reference books and monographs, contact
Greenwood Press
88 Post Road West, P.O. Box 5007
Westport, CT 06881
(203) 226-3571


PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Comprehensive, contemporary, and more current than ever



RISE TO GLOBALISM: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 ***Fifth Revised Edition***
Stephen E. Ambrose (University of New Orleans). In or out of war, America has been at the heart of world events for the past half-century. But is her dominance threatened by internal factors? In his classic foreign policy study, now thoroughly updated through the Reagan era, a leading historian offers a penetrating exploration into American diplomatic successes and failures to show how the world's most powerful nation continues to shape—and be challenged in—the volatile arena of world affairs. "Lively and provocative"—*American Historical Review.*

0-14-022826-8
416 pp. $8.95




A new look at might versus right

THE FREE AND THE UNFREE: A New History of the United States ***Second Edition***
Peter N. Carroll and David W. Noble (University of Wisconsin). "The land of the free" is a nation shaped by conflicts arising from ethnic, religious, and sexual oppression. This thought-provoking revisionist history examines what is a characteristically American dynamic over four centuries of social, cultural, political, and economic development to show how the nation's democratic principles are tested—and found wanting. "Provocative and timely"—Robert A. Divine, University of Texas, Austin.

0-14-022827-6
496 pp. $7.95

Mapping present and past



THE PENGUIN ATLAS OF NORTH AMERICAN HISTORY to 1870
Colin McEvedy. Edited by John Krugler (Marquette University). More fascinating and wide-ranging than a geography lesson, this unique annotated atlas maps out the remarkable history of North America's exploration and expansion—from Nicaragua to Newfoundland, from *homo sapiens* to Sam Houston—tracing, analyzing, and putting into perspective the events that shaped a continent.

0-14-051128-8
122 pp. $6.95

Penguin Books **Academic Marketing Department**
40 West 23rd Street, New York, N.Y. 10010

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Mothers of Misery
Child Abandonment in Russia
David L. Ransel



At the height of its operation in the second half of the nineteenth century, the central foundling home in Moscow was receiving 17,000 children each year. The home dispatched most to wet nurses and foster care in the countryside, where at any one time it supervised over 40,000 children in Moscow province and six adjoining provinces.

David Ransel explores the creation and management of foundling homes in Russia and compares them to the European foundling care programs on which they were modeled. Examining the foundling system as a point of contact between educated society and the village, he profiles the women who gave up their children, the changing sex ratios of the children, and the condition of the peasant foster families who drew on the subsidies provided by the homes.
Cloth: $34.95 ISBN 0-691-05522-X

Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia
Cochabamba, 1550–1900
Brooke Larson

Cochabamba is the principal agricultural region of Bolivia, with a peasantry that has been especially active in small-scale commercial agriculture and marketing. Focusing on this region, Brooke Larson supplies the first long-term historical view of rural society in colonial and nineteenth-century Bolivia. Combining economic history and ethno history, Larson shows how the contradictions of class and colonialism gave rise to new social forces from below that both accommodated and challenged the evolving structures of domination.
Paper: $25.00 ISBN 0-691-10241-4
Cloth: $65.00 ISBN 0-691-07738-X

Archives and Manuscript Repositories in the USSR
Ukraine and Moldavia Book 1: General Bibliography and Institutional Directory
Patricia Kennedy Grimsted

Patricia Grimsted's internationally acclaimed reference series provides the only comprehensive information available in any language about the development, holdings, and published reference aids for the rich archives and manuscript collections of the Soviet Union. In this, the first of a two-part third volume of the work, Grimsted focuses on Soviet Ukraine and Moldavia.

The first section of this book provides an annotated bibliography of basic reference works for those using archival materials. Subsequent sections offer directories of institutions now located in Kiev, Lviv, Kharkiv and other oblasts, and in Soviet Moldavia. Appendixes contain procedural information about Soviet archival organization and access restrictions and a table of geographic names in relevant languages.
Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies
Canadian Library of Ukrainian Studies
Cloth: $125.00 ISBN 0-691-05391-X

Florentine Histories
Niccolò Machiavelli
A new translation by
Laura F. Banfield and
Harvey Mansfield, Jr.
With an introduction by
Harvey Mansfield, Jr.


Machiavelli's *Florentine Histories* (also called *The History of Florence)* is a literary masterpiece describing the period from the origins of Florence to the death of Lorenzo dé Medici in 1492. This new translation, more accurate and more readable than the earlier English translation, brings forth Machiavelli's graceful and powerful style.
Cloth: $35.00 ISBN 0-691-05521-1

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR
Princeton University Press
41 WILLIAM ST. • PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • 609-452-4900
ORDERS: 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

The Blue-Eyed Enemy
Japan against the and Luzon, 1942–1945
Theodore Friend



The Blue-Eyed Enemy is a comprehensive account of the interwoven histories of the three major archipelago-nations of the West Pacific during the years of the Second World War. Theodore Friend examines Japanese colonialism in Indonesia and the Philippines as an example of recurring patterns of domination and repression in that region. He depicts Japanese rule in Greater East Asia as expressive of the folly of the general who exhorted his troops "to annihilate the blue-eyed enemy and their black slaves." At the same time he clearly shows where the return of Western power aimed at new links between conqueror and conquered, or lords and bondsmen.
Cloth: $45.00 ISBN 0-691-05524-6

"The story is told, in great and fascinating detail, of the private, worldly life of the Princes of the Church as they put aside official cares in favour of epicurean aspirations, often at enormous expense. . . . a mammoth, erudite and well-illustrated account of the history of the villa." —*Times Literary Supplement*
243 illustrations.
Paper: $19.95 ISBN 0-691-00279-7

NOW IN PAPERBACK

The Villa in the Life of Renaissance Rome
David R. Coffin

The Ghost Festival in Medieval China
Stephen F. Teiser

Stephen Teiser examines one of the most important religious festivals that attracted Chinese people from all walks of life. These festivals provide the most instructive examples of the interaction between Chinese forms of social life and the Indian tradition of Buddhism. Professor Teiser uncovers a wide range of sources, many translated or analyzed for the first time in any language, to demonstrate how the symbolism, rituals, and mythology of the ghost festival pervaded the social landscape of medieval China.
Cloth: $37.50 ISBN 0-691-05525-4

AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR
Princeton University Press
41 WILLIAM ST. • PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • 609-452-4900
ORDERS: 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Short-Title Catalogue of Books

Printed in England, Scotland, Ireland, Wales, and British America and of English Books Printed in Other Countries, 1641–1700

Volume III: P to Z

Second edition, revised and enlarged
Compiled by Donald Wing
Edited by John J. Morrison, Carolyn W. Nelson, et al.

Few reference tools have proved so useful to scholars, librarians, and students of the later seventeenth century as Donald Wing's *Short-Title Catalogue*. These three volumes enable researchers from all disciplines to discover and locate the original printed works of seventeenth-century people whose ideas and achievements shaped the foundations of the modern English-speaking world.

The three volumes together list all the known printed materials in English from 1641 to 1700, except serials, by author, title, or corporate heading.

Each entry provides the imprint, bibliographical format, and references for the item and gives a list of symbols for selected libraries and other institutions that hold a copy.

1988. xxvii & 766 pages. Clothbound, $350.00

British Newspapers and Periodicals, 1641–1700

A Short-Title Catalogue of Serials Printed in England, Scotland, Ireland, and British America

Edited by Carolyn W. Nelson and Matthew Seccombe

This book provides the first comprehensive issue-by-issue union list of all known British serials of the period, including many never before cataloged. Of particular interest to historians is a month-by-month chronological index.

The first entry gives a uniform title with inclusive dates, followed by a headnote listing format, average length, periodicity, editor/author if known, and bibliographical references. Subsequent entries are issue-by-issue, giving title, number, inclusive dates, place, imprint, year, and a list of libraries holding that issue. Six indexes, covering period, editor/author, publisher/printer, place, language, and subject, and two major appendixes complete the volume.

1988. xx & 724 pages. Clothbound, $250.00

MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION

10 Astor Place New York, NY 10003-6981

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THE BEINECKE RARE BOOK & MANUSCRIPT LIBRARY

Visiting Fellowships

YALE UNIVERSITY

The Beinecke Rare Book & Manuscript Library offers short-term fellowships to support visiting scholars pursuing post-doctoral or equivalent research in its collections. The Beinecke Library is Yale University's principal repository for literary papers and for early manuscripts and rare books in the fields of literature, theology, history, and the natural sciences. In addition to its distinguished general collections, the Library houses the Osborn Collection, noted for its British literary and historical manuscripts, as well as outstanding special collections devoted to American literature, German literature, and Western Americana.

The fellowships, which support travel to and from New Haven and pay a living allowance of $1,000 per month, are designed primarily to provide access to the Library for scholars who reside outside the greater New Haven area. The length of a grant, normally one month, will depend on the applicant's research proposal; fellowships must be taken up between September 1989 and May 1990. Recipients are expected to be in residence during the period of their award and are encouraged to participate in the activities of Yale University.

There is no special application form. Applicants are asked to submit a résumé and a brief research proposal (not to exceed three pages) to The Director, Beinecke Rare Book & Manuscript Library, Box 1603A Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520-1603. The proposal should emphasize the relationship of the Beinecke collections to the project and state the preferred dates of residence. The applicant should also arrange to have two confidential letters of recommendation sent to the Director.

One of those selected to receive an award will be named the Donald C. Gallup Fellow in American Literature. There is no special application procedure for this named fellowship.

This announcement contains all of the information necessary to complete the application process.

All application materials must be received by January 15, 1989.
Awards will be announced in March 1989
for the period September 1989 through May 1990.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Oxford

The Duel in European History

Honour and the Reign of Aristocracy

V.G. Kiernan, *University of Edinburgh (Emeritus)*

Describes the evolution of the duel from its medieval origins to the early 20th century, throwing new light on the long ascendancy of aristocratic classes and their values throughout European history. 1988 360 pp.; illus. $49.95

Introducing a new series: SPORTS, HISTORY, AND SOCIETY
General Editors: *Peter Levine* and *Steven Tischler*

The new series will emphasize the interplay among sports and a number of issues—especially race, ethnicity, class, and gender—and will include biographies, books on individual sports, popular reference works, and more.

Sports and Freedom

The Rise of Big-Time College Athletics

Ronald A. Smith, *Pennsylvania State University*

Focusing on the influence of Yale and Harvard, this fascinating study traces the origins and development of intercollegiate athletics in America from the mid-19th century to the early 20th century. 1988 320 pp. $26.95

After Columbus

Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America

James Axtell, *College of William and Mary*

This new collection of essays—four previously unpublished—deals with a wide range of important and fascinating topics, and will serve as an invaluable reader to students of ethnohistory and Native American history. 1988 320 pp.; illus. $29.95

From Divine Cosmos to Sovereign State

An Intellectual History of Consciousness and the Idea of Order in Renaissance England

Stephen L. Collins, *Babson College*

Collins here draws on a wide range of sources to treat the idea of order as a dynamic concept which incorporates changing views of self, society, and the relationship between private and public during the late English Renaissance.
January 1989 336 pp. $39.95

Joan of Arc and Richard III

Sex, Saints, and Government in the Middle Ages

Charles T. Wood, *Dartmouth College*

Medieval historian Charles Wood here considers the larger than life figures, Joan of Arc and Richard III, who influenced the political development of their respective countries and served as catalysts for emerging national trends through both their actions and the legends that surrounded them. 1988 304 pp. $34.50

For Whom Do I Toil?

Judah Leib Gordon and the Crisis of Russian Jewry

Michael Stanislawski, *Columbia University*

"[A] gracefully written biography of the leading spokesman of Jewish Enlightenment in nineteenth century Russia....Essential reading for all those interested in the cultural history of the West in the twentieth century and in the role played by the Jews in it."—Marc Raeff, *Columbia University.* 1988 288 pp.; illus. $35.00

Growth Recurring

Economic Change in World History

E.L. Jones, *La Trobe University, Australia*

This study concerns the conflict in world history between economic growth and political greed. Jones proposes two new frameworks in which to view this conflict and examines "obstacles to growth" and their subsequent erosion, and provides an explanation of the modern world economy in which growth has recurred and East Asia has taken a prominent place. 1988 264 pp. $49.95

Prices and publication dates are subject to change.
To order, send check or money order to: Humanities and Social Sciences Marketing Department

Oxford University Press
200 Madison Avenue • New York, NY 10016

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED



LOUIS S. GLANZMAN *SIGNING OF THE CONSTITUTION* 1987 COLLECTION INDEPENDENCE NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK PHOTO © 1988 LOUIS S. GLANZMAN

THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM

The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke

THOMAS L. PANGLE

"An original and important contribution to political theory and to our understanding of the American Founding. Not even an extended summary could do justice to the richness of Pangle's reflections on Locke, the founding documents, and the interpretations to which they have given rise."—Mary Ann Glendon, Harvard Law School

"This extraordinary book will be essential reading for a very long time to come."—Allan Bloom, University of Chicago

Cloth $22.50 352 pages

THE *FEDERALIST* CONCORDANCE

Edited by **THOMAS S. ENGEMAN, EDWARD J. ERLER,** *and* **THOMAS B. HOFELLER**

An alphabetical index of all but the most common words contained in the *Federalist Papers*, locating each occurrence of a word by paper number, author, page, and line in the definitive Cooke edition. This edition carries a new table correlating the pages in Cooke with those in other, often used editions of the *Federalist*.

Paper $19.95 640 pages
Library cloth edition $60.00

PERSECUTION AND THE ART OF WRITING

LEO STRAUSS

"The locus classicus of Strauss's theory of 'esoteric writing'."—Nathan Tarcov, University of Chicago

Paper $9.95 214 pages

WHAT IS POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY?

And Other Studies

LEO STRAUSS

What Is Political Philosophy contains ten essays and lectures and sixteen book reviews written between 1943 and 1957.

Paper $12.95 318 pages

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS

5801 South Ellis Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

History re-created from CHICAGO

CREATING CHICAGO'S NORTH SHORE
A Suburban History

MICHAEL H. EBNER

"This book is an outstanding contribution, not only to the history of an important area of metropolitan Chicago, but also to the literature of metropolitanism and suburbanization in general."—Harold M. Mayer, coauthor of *Chicago: Growth of a Metropolis*

Cloth $29.95 360 pages Illus.

URBAN DESIGN IN WESTERN EUROPE
Regime and Architecture, 900–1900

WOLFGANG BRAUNFELS
Translated by Kenneth J. Northcott

Braunfels locates the great achievements of urban design wherever a bishop, a free burgher community, or a nation as a whole managed to design a city as a reflection of forms of government and ideals of order.

Cloth $49.95 416 pages 190 halftones

CITIES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
From the Dawn of History to the Present

PAUL BAIROCH
Translated by Christopher Braider

Cities and Economic Development shows how the rise of cities crucially depends at first on a community's state of agriculture and later on its state of industrialization.

Cloth $49.95 600 pages

THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST, 9000–2000 B.C.

HANS J. NISSEN
Translated by Elizabeth Lutzeier, with Kenneth J. Northcott

Nissen provides a much-needed overview of 7000 years of development in the ancient Near East from the beginning of settled life to the formation of the first regional states.

Cloth $34.95 224 pages Illus.

FREAK SHOW
Presenting Human Oddities for Amusement and Profit

ROBERT BOGDAN

Bogdan's social history of the amusement world provides a compelling examination of American popular culture that sheds new light on attitudes toward disability and human differences.

Cloth $29.95 336 pages 79 halftones

THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS
An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor

ANDREW ABBOTT

Abbott's comparative and historical study of the professions in nineteenth-and twentieth-century England, France, and America builds a general theory of how and why professions evolve.

Paper $19.95 456 page
Library cloth edition $49.95

INHERITING POWER
The Story of an Exorcist

GIOVANNI LEVI
Translated by Lydia G. Cochrane

Through sensitive historical detective work Levi has reconstructed the career and world of an Italian exorcist during the 1600s. A new and controversial view of the historic process in seventeenth-century society emerges from this "microhistory."

Paper $12.95 224 pages
Library cloth edition $29.95

Now in paper

PROFESSIONAL POWERS
A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge

ELIOT FREIDSON

"This is a stimulating and well-written book which opens up a new perspective on the professions as well as contributing to existing debates."—David Podmore, *Times Higher Education Supplement*

Paper $12.95 241 pages



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS *5801 South Ellis Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637*

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BASIC reading in history

New! **Homeward Bound**
American Families in the Cold War Era
ELAINE TYLER MAY
$20.95

New in Paperback

Alchemists of Revolution
Terrorism in the Modern World
RICHARD E. RUBENSTEIN
$8.95

The Great School Wars
A History of the New York City Public Schools
DIANE RAVITCH
$14.95

The Italians and the Holocaust
Persecution, Rescue, Survival
SUSAN ZUCCOTTI
$9.95

Women and War
JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN
$9.95

Coming in Early '89

The Anxious Years
America in the Vietnam-Watergate Era
KIM McQUAID
$19.95 January

In Sickness and in Wealth
American Hospitals in the Twentieth Century
ROSEMARY STEVENS
$24.95 January

The Other Jews
The Sephardim Today
DANIEL J. ELAZAR
$21.95 January

Our Parents' Lives
The Americanization of Eastern European Jews
NEIL M. COWAN & RUTH SCHWARTZ COWAN
$19.95 March

Retreat from Doomsday
The Obsolescence of Major War
JOHN MUELLER
$20.95 March

Shooting War
Photography and the American Experience of Combat
SUSAN D. MOELLER
$25.95 January

War
Ends and Means
PAUL SEABURY & ANGELO CODEVILLA
$19.95 March

Coming in Paperback

And We Are Not Saved
The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice
DERRICK BELL
$9.95 February

Bourgeois Utopias
The Rise and Fall of Suburbia
ROBERT FISHMAN
$9.95 February

The Care of Strangers
The Rise of America's Hospital System
CHARLES E. ROSENBERG
$12.95 February

If I Had a Hammer...
The Death of the Old Left and the Birth of the New Left
MAURICE ISSERMAN
$8.95 February

The Rise of the Corporate Commonwealth
United States Business and Public Policy in the 20th Century
LOUIS GALAMBOS & JOSEPH PRATT
$9.95 January

Visit us at the AHA Annual Meeting
BOOTH #5

BASIC BOOKS

BASIC BOOKS, INC.
10 E. 53rd Street • New York NY 10022

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SMP

St. Martin's Press

Social History of Western Civilization
Volume I: READINGS FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
Volume II: READINGS FROM THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT

RICHARD M. GOLDEN,
Clemson University

This two-volume anthology contains 50 secondary source articles (25 in each volume) that examine the daily concerns and conditions in the lives of diverse groups of people. Different articles discuss the status of women, family organization, rural life, and urbanization. Other selections cover disease and death, sexuality, religion, crime, leisure, and popular culture. All the articles were chosen for their readability, as well as for their insightful coverage of important topics. Useful text features include a general introduction to the study of social history; part introductions to each reading that place selections in their larger historical context; introductions to each reading that pose questions encouraging students to think critically; and editorial footnotes that explain unfamiliar terms or identify otherwise obscure historical names.

Volume I: 326 pages. Paperbound. 1988
Volume II: 312 pages. Paperbound. 1988

Readings in World Civilizations
Volume I: THE GREAT TRADITIONS
Volume II: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN WORLD

KEVIN REILLY,
Raritan Valley Community College

This two-volume anthology contains 134 readings (65 in Volume I and 69 in Volume II) drawn from a wide range of primary and secondary sources. The selections represent many fields of history as well as other disciplines. Introductions direct students' attention with a series of questions that require them to read critically. Illustrations and time lines add to the appeal of the texts.

Volume I: 353 pages. Paperbound. 1988
Volume II: 359 pages. Paperbound. 1988

Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

CHARLES D. SMITH,
San Diego State University

This narrative text provides an introduction to the conflict between the Arab states and Israel. Beginning with the rise of Zionism and Arab nationalism in the nineteenth century, Professor Smith provides equal coverage of both the pre-1948 and the post-1948 periods, up to and including events of early 1987. He examines social and political rivalries among the Arabs and among the Israelis themselves and assesses the role of the "Great Powers" in the Middle East.

Paperbound. 308 pages. 1988

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SMP

Brings You the World!

NEW

The Making of the Modern World
CONNECTED HISTORIES, DIVERGENT PATHS (1500 TO THE PRESENT)

ROBERT W. STRAYER,
State University of New York,
College at Brockport
WITH:
EDWIN HIRSCHMANN,
Towson State University
ROBERT B. MARKS, Whittier College
ROBERT J. SMITH,
State University of New York,
College at Brockport
JAMES J. HORN AND
LYNN H. PARSONS, both of
State University of New York,
College at Brockport

This introduction to world history from 1500 to the present has been developed expressly as a text in world history; it is not an expanded version of a Western Civilization textbook. Organized by geographic regions, it is a comparative, thematic, issues-oriented text that emphasizes the modern transformation effected by science and technology as it occurred first in Europe and then in other parts of the world. Maintaining an overall structure that presents "the story of world history," the book features a strong analytical dimension that treats history as a series of problems, issues, and questions.

Paperbound. 550 pages
Just Published
Instructor's Manual available

NEW

The West and the World Since 1945
Second Edition

GLENN BLACKBURN, Clinch Valley College of the University of Virginia

This brief survey text provides concise thematic coverage of the most significant developments of our time: the superpower conflict and the nuclear arms race, Western affluence, inequality among nations and regions, and intellectual and spiritual issues in a technological age. The emphasis throughout is on relationships between Western nations as acted out within a global context. Coverage of the Third World is illustrated with four case studies on China, Zaire, Brazil, and the Arab-Israeli conflict—all brought up to date for the Second Edition Included are 7 photos (3 new) and 4 maps.

Paperbound. 166 pages
Publication: November 1988

To request an examination copy of any of these titles, please call us at our toll-free number, 800-221-7945, Ext. 554; or write us on your college letterhead specifying your course title, present text, and approximate enrollment. Send your request to:

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS

College Division • Department JR • 175 Fifth Avenue • New York, NY 10010

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT FROM THE INSIDE

You can help your students understand *how* and *why* Washington works with two new important supplemental paperbacks from Houghton Mifflin.

THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION
Archibald Cox

Professor Cox, the first Watergate special prosecutor and a leading authority on constitutional law, illuminates the workings of the judicial branch of American government by describing how the Supreme Court of the United States has met its historical dual challenge—to preserve authority by building a body of law linked to the Constitution, and to accommodate the new realities and emergent needs of an ever-changing society. In this review of the issues, debates, and dramatic stories of the history of American law, Cox provides a valuable companion piece to standard political science and law texts. This book is a "comprehensive account of the [Supreme] Court's shaping of the nation by its shaping of constitutional law."
(Los Angeles Times)
$8.95 Paper

A POLITICAL EDUCATION
A Washington Memoir
Harry McPherson
With a Foreword by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

"If you will imagine a compound of Rousseau, Henry Adams, and East Texas, you will have some sense of the dimensions and the pleasures of this extraordinary book," said Senator Moynihan about McPherson's portrayal of life in Washington's inner circles. From Congress in the 1950s to the White House of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, the former aide to both JFK and LBJ details the way it was in the capital between 1956 and 1969 in what *The New Yorker* called "One of the best books on life in Washington to have been published in this century." Reissued now with a new Foreword by Senator Moynihan and an Afterword by the author, McPherson's memoir offers glimpses of the times and insights that are timeless.
$11.95 Paper

For more information or to order, contact your local Houghton Mifflin sales representative or write:



Houghton Mifflin Paperbacks
Two Park Street
Boston, MA 02108

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1989-1990 AEROSPACE HISTORY Fellowship

Applications are invited for the Fourth Competition of the Aerospace History Fellowship Program–1989-1990

DESCRIPTION: The Programwhich is funded and supported by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) allows a fellow to engage in significant and sustained advanced research in all aspects of aerospace history from the earliest human interest in flight to the present, including cultural and intellectual history, economic history, history of law and public policy, and the history of science, engineering, and management. Research may be conducted at NASA headquarters in Washington, D.C. or at one of the NASA centers.

QUALIFICATIONS: Applicants must be U.S. citizens, possess a doctoral degree in history or in a closely related field, **OR** be enrolled as a student (having completed all coursework) in a doctoral program at an accredited university or college.

STIPEND AND TENURE: The Fellowship term is from six months to one year. The maximum stipend is $25,000, adjustable to the length of the fellowship term. Graduate students are eligible for a maximum stipend of up to $16,000 (funds may not be used to support tuition or fees). Finalists in the selection process will be invited to Washington, D.C. for interviews with the committee prior to final selection.

APPLICATION FORMS: A curriculum vitae and proposal must accompany your application. To obtain an application form or inquire for further information please write: Aerospace History Fellowship Program, American Historical Association, 400 A St., S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.

APPLICATION DEADLINE: FEBRUARY 1, 1989

The Aerospace History Fellowship Program is administered by the American Historical Association in cooperation with the Society for the History of Technology, the History of Science Society, and the Economic History Association, each of which supplies a member of the selection committee.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hot off The Press!

The Guide to Departments of History 1988-89

630 departments in colleges, universities, and research institutions in the U.S. and Canada

The Guide includes:

—Research facilities and programs in institutions
—Staff listings with degree information, rank, and specializations
—Enrollment statistics
—Contact addresses
—Tuition figures
—Recent doctoral recipients and their dissertation titles
—All Ph.D. programs in the U.S. and Canada
—Department specializations
—History of science departments

An index of over 11,000 historians and their affiliations
$22 Members, $27 Non-Members

Please add $1 handling charge per order

Grants, Fellowships, and Prizes of Interest to Historians

This handy guide lists over 300 sources of grant and fellowship funding for scholars from the undergraduate to the senior-scholar level. The guide also contains a section of book and essay prizes.

$5 Members, $6 Non-Members
Please add $1 handling charge per order

Order your copy now from the Publications Sales Department, AHA, 400 A Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003.

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Have you joined the American Historical Association?

Membership includes:

- **The American Historical Review**
- **Perspectives *(includes employment information)***
- **Program *of the annual meeting***
- ***Annual Reports (on request)***
- ***Group insurance programs***
- ***The right to vote and hold office***
- ***Discounts on AHA publications***
- ***Discounts on convention registration***

MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION
American Historical Association
400 A Street SE, Washington, DC 20003
202/544-2422

Name _____ Last _____ First _____ Initial _____

Address _____

_____ () _____
Zip Telephone

Income	Annual Dues (U.S. Funds Only)
_____ Over $40,000	$60.00
_____ $30,000–$39,999	$55.00
_____ $20,000–$29,999	$47.00
_____ $15,000–$19,999	$40.00
_____ $10,000–$14,999	$30.00
_____ Below $10,000	$20.00
_____ Joint (spouse of member)	$20.00
_____ Life	$1,000.00
_____ Associate Membership*	$30.00
_____ *Recently Published Articles*†	$20.00
_____ Overseas Members Add Postage	$5.00
Dues _____	
Postage _____	
Total _____	

*Associate Membership is for those persons whose primary professional identification is in a field other than history.
†Overseas members please add $2.00 postage for RPA.
ALL ANNUAL DUES ARE PAYABLE IN ADVANCE, U.S. FUNDS ONLY.
☐ Send gift cards to me for mailing.
☐ Send gift cards to recipients with my greeting.
Gift card to read "From _____ "

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Index of Advertisers

American Historical Association Cover 3, 51–53

Basic Books 47

Basil Blackwell 15

The Beinecke Library 43

Cambridge University Press 11–13, 28

Free Press 27

Greenwood Press 38

Harvard University Press 30–31

Houghton Mifflin 18–19, 50

Indiana University Press 4

Johns Hopkins University Press 33

The Liberty Press 29

Louisiana State University Press 3

Modern Language Association 42

Naval Institute Press 37

New American Library 16, 17

New York University Press 10

Oxford University Press Cover 2, 5–7, 46

Princeton University Press 40–41, Cover 4

Scott Foresman/Little Brown 8–9

St. Martin's Press 48–49

Texas A & M University Press 14

University of Arizona Press 36

University of California Press 20–21

University of Chicago Press 44–45

University of North Carolina Press 32

University of Tennessee Press 34–35

University of Wisconsin Press 22

Unwin Hyman 23

Viking Penguin 39

Yale University Press 24–26

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Speaking of History...

The American Historical Association's **SPEAKERS BUREAU** *makes available for guest lectures some of the most eminent historians in non-U.S. fields. Speakers may be engaged for a nominal fee of $750 plus expenses and engaging an AHA Speaker goes to help the Association as well. All fees will be used to support the Association in future activities and publications. To engage a speaker, call James Gardner, AHA Deputy Executive Director, or write AHA SPEAKERS BUREAU, 400 A St., SE, Washington, DC 20003.*

Elizabeth A.R. Brown, Brooklyn College,City University of New York, MEDIEVAL EUROPE

Robert F. Byrnes, Indiana University, MODERN RUSSIA (specific topics: The Ferment about Stalin in the Soviet Union; Gorbachev's Domestic and Foreign Policies; Kliuchevskii as a Maker of the Modern Russian State)

Gordon A. Craig, Stanford University, MODERN EUROPE, GERMANY

Philip D. Curtin, The Johns Hopkins University, AFRICA, WORLD HISTORY (specific topics: Migration and World History; Disease and Imperialism; Mythology and the Slave Trade)

Charles F. Delzell, Vanderbilt University, MODERN EUROPE, ITALY (specific topics: Mussolini's Italy in Retrospect; Renzo De Felice's Interpretations of Fascism: The Historiographical Controversy; The Italian Armed Resistance, 1943-1945; Allied Policies toward Liberated Italy, 1943-1944: Repetition of Darlanism or Renewal of Democracy?)

Katherine Fischer Drew, Rice University, MEDIEVAL EUROPE (specific topic: Law and Society in the Early Germanic Kingdoms)

Robert Forster, The Johns Hopkins University, MODERN EUROPE, FRANCE (specific topics: From Toulouse to Port-au-Prince; A Plantation on Saint-Domingue [Haiti] in the 18th Century; A Dialogue with Napoleon Bonaparte; The Roots of Revolution on Saint-Domingue [Haiti])

C. Warren Hollister, University of California, Santa Barbara, MEDIEVAL EUROPE (specific topics: King John and the Magna Carta; The Normans: Normandy, Italy, Sicily, and the First Crusade; William the Bastard and the Norman Conquest of England; Henry I of England: Renaissance Prince and Feudal Monarch)

Barbara Jelavich, Indiana University, EASTERN EUROPE, BALKANS

Friedrich Katz, University of Chicago, LATIN AMERICA, MEXICO

Franklin W. Knight, The Johns Hopkins University, LATIN AMERICA

Barbara Miller Lane, Bryn Mawr College, MODERN EUROPE, URBAN

Stanford E. Lehmberg, University of Minnesota, GREAT BRITAIN (specific topics: The English Reformation Reconsidered; The History of Parliament in Tudor-Stuart England: A New Model for Reassessment; The Role of Cathedrals in English Society, 1485-1603)

Bernard Lewis, Princeton University, NEAR EAST (specific topic: Europe and Islam)

William H. McNeill, University of Chicago, WORLD HISTORY, EUROPE (specific topics: Disease in History; Teaching World History; The Christopher Columbus Quincentenary)

Emiliana P. Noether, University of Connecticut, Storrs, MODERN EUROPE, ITALY (specific topics: Italy and the United States: Cultural Affinities during the 19th Century; Mazzini, Marx, and Bakouin: A Study in Conflict; The Two Souls of Italian Intellectuals: The Apollonian Croce and the Dionysian d'Annunzio)

David H. Pinkney, University of Washington, MODERN EUROPE, FRANCE (specific topics: The Pursuit of Liberty and Order: Two Centuries of Constitutional Experiment in France, 1787-1987; The Fifth Republic and the Second Rebuilding of Paris, 1958-1985; The 1840s—France's Decisive Years?)

Sarah B. Pomeroy, Hunter College and the Graduate School, City University of New York, ANCIENT (specific topics: Women, Humanism, and the *Oeconomicus* of Xenophon; The Greek Domestic Economy; Growing Up Female in Classical Athens)

David L. Ransel, Indiana University, IMPERIAL RUSSIA (specific topics: Child Abandonment in Russian History; Infant Mortality in the Russian Empire; Catherine the Great; War and the Shaping of the Russian View of the World)

Eugene F. Rice, Columbia University, RENAISSANCE, REFORMATION

David F. Rock, University of California, Santa Barbara, LATIN AMERICA, ARGENTINA (specific topics: The Crisis of Modern Latin America from a Historical Perspective; The Origins of Military Dictatorship and the Ultra-Right in Latin America)

Nancy L. Roelker, University of Chicago, MODERN EUROPE, FRANCE

Robert I. Rotberg, Tufts University, AFRICA, SOUTH AFRICA, COLONIAL AND MODERN AFRICA

Stuart B. Schwartz, University of Minnesota, LATIN AMERICA, BRAZIL

James J. Sheehan, Stanford University, GERMANY (specific topics: Knowledge and Power: Some Reflections on John Dewey and Max Weber; Biedermeier Culture and 19th-Century Society; Foreign and Domestic Policy in German History: Some Reflections on the German Question; Bourgeois Culture and Liberal Policies in 19th-Century Germany)

Lacey Baldwin Smith, Northwestern University, GREAT BRITAIN

Louise A. Tilly, New School for Social Research, MODERN EUROPE, ITALY, 19TH-CENTURY WOMEN (specific topics: Sex and Occupation in Comparative Perspective; Women Workers and the State in Turn-of-the-Century France; Italian Women Workers at the Turn of the Century: Subjects, Objects, and Actors of Social Movements)

Donald W. Treadgold, University of Washington, MODERN RUSSIAN (specific topic: Gorbachev: The First Three Years)

Judith Walkowitz, Rutgers University, GREAT BRITAIN, WOMEN (specific topics: Sexual Danger and the Victorians; Contested Terrain: Urban Exploration and Class and Gender Identity in Late-Victorian London)

Gerhard L. Weinberg, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, MODERN EUROPE, GERMANY

John Wirth, Stanford University, LATIN AMERICA, BRAZIL

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Constitutional Faith

Sanford Levinson

Sanford Levinson's book examines the "constitutional faith" that has, since 1788, been a central component of American "civil religion." By taking seriously the parallel between wholehearted acceptance of the Constitution and religious faith, he opens up a host of intriguing questions about what it means to be an American in the late twentieth century.

"Professor Levinson has written a lively, intelligent, timely, and highly original study of American constitutionalism as a form of secular religion. His book is a welcome addition to the literature on constitutional theory, and deserves a wide audience."
—*Richard A. Posner*

Cloth: $19.95 ISBN 0-691-07769-X

American Rubber Workers & Organized Labor, 1900–1941

Daniel Nelson

Daniel Nelson tells the story of the changes that occurred in the rubber products industry between the turn of the century and the U.S. entry into World War II.

This book is a case study of union growth against a background of critical developments in twentieth-century economic life. Nelson discusses not only labor's triumph over adversity but also the problems that occurred with union victories: the flight of the industry to low-wage communities in the South and Midwest, internal tensions in the union, and rivalry with the American Federation of Labor.

Cloth: $32.50 ISBN 0-691-04752-9

NOW IN PAPERBACK

The Rise of Statistical Thinking, 1820–1900

Theodore M. Porter

Emphasizing the debt of science to nonspecialist intellectuals, Theodore Porter describes in detail the nineteenth-century background that produced the burst of modern statistical innovation of the early 1900s. Statistics arose as a study of society—the science of the statist—and the pioneering statistical physicists and biologists, Maxwell, Boltzmann, and Galton, each introduced statistical models by pointing to analogies between his discipline and social science.

"An outstanding feature of Mr. Porter's book is its depiction of the interrelationships between statistics and certain intellectual and social movements. . . . [The book] is unfailingly interesting."
—*Morris Kline,*
New York Times Book Review

Paper: $12.50 ISBN 0-691-02409-X



AT YOUR BOOKSTORE OR
Princeton University Press
41 WILLIAM ST. • PRINCETON, NJ 08540 • 609-452-4900
ORDERS: 800-PRS-ISBN (777-4726)

PRODUCED BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED